Caron v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.
Filing
108
ORDER Dismissing Claim granting 18 Motion to Dismiss 15 Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. on 4/13/2017. (ls)
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 16-23065-Civ-Scola
)
NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. dba Norwegian )
)
Cruise Line, Defendant.
Order Dismissing Claim
Olivier Caron, Plaintiff,
Plaintiff Olivier Caron seeks to recover damages from Defendant NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., doing business as Norwegian Cruise Line, for injuries he
claims to have suffered when he tripped and fell through an open, manholetype structure while a passenger aboard one of Norwegian’s, cruise ships. In its
motion to dismiss, Norwegian seeks to prevent Caron from relying on a new
allegation set forth in his amended complaint. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
18.) According to Norwegian, the new allegation is barred by a limitations
provision included in Caron’s “Guest Ticket Contract.” Caron counters that the
limitations provision does not actually bar the new allegation; and, even if it
did, the new allegation relates back to the original complaint. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF
No. 27.) The Court finds the new allegation indeed runs afoul of the party’s
contractual limitations provision and does not relate back and therefore grants
Norwegian’s motion (ECF No. 18).
1. Background
Regarding Caron’s fall, his initial complaint contained a long list of
allegations that he claimed amounted to breaches of Norwegian’s duty to use
reasonable care. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 12.) According to Caron, these breaches
led to his fall though the opening and his resulting injuries. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The
vast majority of the acts or omissions Caron alleged specifically implicated
solely the physical condition of various aspects of the ship:
its “manholes, floors, walkways, or thresholds” (id. at ¶ 12a–d, f, i–k, o,
p);
“the area of the ship where [the] incident occurred” (id. at ¶ 12g);
the “lighting” (id. at ¶ 12h);
condensation from the air conditioning (id. at ¶ 12m);
“drainage of liquids from the area” (id. at ¶ 12n); and
“the area and the premises” (id. at ¶ 12q).
The remaining three of the eighteen alleged breaches were phrased more
vaguely, generally referencing:
“a dangerous condition” (id. at ¶ 12e);
Norwegian’s failure “to comply with applicable standards, statutes, or
regulations” (id. at ¶ 12l); and
“other acts or omissions . . . [to] be revealed through discovery” (id. at ¶
12r).
In contrast, Caron’s amended complaint added allegations, among
others, that Norwegian “served an excessive amount of alcohol.” (Am. Compl. ¶
19; see also ¶ 55l (charging that Norwegian was negligent for “over-serving
alcohol and/or alcoholic beverages to its passengers”).)
2. Unless the over-service claim relates back, the ticket contract
between Caron and Norwegian prevents Caron from raising his overservice-of-alcohol claim.
The ticket contract between Caron and Norwegian contains a limitations
provision that provides “no suit shall be maintainable unless commenced
within one (1) year from the day of the incident giving rise to such injury.”
(Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1, “Guest Ticket Contract,” ¶ 10(a), ECF No. 18-1.) Caron
alleges that his injury occurred on July 16, 2015. He filed his initial complaint
on July 14, 2016. His amended complaint was not filed until September 30,
2016, over two months beyond the one-year limitations-period.
Caron insists that the contract’s limitations provision “clearly does not
address the issue of timeliness of amendments” because: (1) it refers only to
“suit[s]” rather than to additional claims that may be added by amendment to a
suit that has been timely filed; (2) it does not mention the relation-back
doctrine; and (3) it does not reference the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
caselaw relating to those Rules. (Pl.’s Resp. at 12.) Based on these
shortcomings, according to Caron, as long as he filed a law suit within one
year, he could thereafter amend his complaint, at will, without running afoul of
the limitations provision. The Court finds this interpretation untenable.
“When new or distinct conduct, transactions, or occurrences are alleged
as grounds for recovery,” “recovery under [an] amended complaint is barred by
limitations if it was untimely filed.” Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th
Cir. 1993). Once new facts are alleged, the suit being maintained is not the
same as the suit that was timely commenced within the one year limitations
period. Only through the legal fiction of relating back will the amended
complaint be deemed to have been timely filed. McCurdy v. United States, 264
U.S. 484, 487 (1924) (“The doctrine of relation [back] gives effect to an act done
at one time as if it had been done at another. It is a legal fiction adopted by
courts solely for purposes of justice—to avoid denial or loss of right, but not to
impose burdens.”) Thus Caron’s contention that he can avoid the limitations
provision by simply adding new allegations to his timely filed initial complaint
necessarily fails. Similarly, Caron’s protestation that the contractual limitation
provision does not mention the relation-back doctrine, and the rules and
caselaw related thereto, is nonsensical. The relation-back doctrine, if
applicable, is the only thing that can save his new allegations from being
stricken as untimely under the limitations provision.
3. The relation-back doctrine does not apply
complaint’s allegation of alcohol over service.
to
the
amended
As relayed above in section 1, Caron’s initial complaint did not raise any
allegations of over service. Instead, the initial complaint focused on the
physical condition of the ship, particularly the areas around the opening in the
floor through which Caron alleges he fell.
Under Rule 15(b), “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date
of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading . . . .” The Court finds that Caron’s allegations of
over service do not relate back to the original pleading. The alleged acts or
omissions regarding the condition of the physical aspects of the ship “involve[]
separate and distinct conduct,” Moore, 989 F.2d at 1132, from any conduct
that would be related to the allegation that Norwegian “served an excessive
amount of alcohol” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19). The amended complaint’s reference to
Norwegian’s over service is not, as claimed by Caron, “merely” the addition of
“an incidental fact reasonably inferable from the facts alleged in the original
complaint.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 7 (emphasis and quotations in original omitted).)
That is, “[i]n order to recover on the negligence claim contained in h[is]
amended complaint, [the plaintiff] would have to prove completely different
facts than would otherwise have been required to recover on the . . . claim in
the original complaint.” Moore, 989 F.2d at 1132. This leaves Norwegian at a
distinct disadvantage: “Limits to relation back are designed to protect
defendants from prejudice not just from lost and destroyed evidence, but from
an unexpected increase in liability and an inherently more complex defensive
strategy long after the statute of limitations had run.” Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 F.
App’x 867, 883 (11th Cir. 2012). Simply put, Norwegian was not given notice
regarding the over-service claim anywhere within the originally filed complaint.
Caron’s argument that his over-service allegation relates back because it
is not a new cause of action but rather simply “another allegation of breach”
also falls flat. Caron’s over-service allegation “is premised upon ‘new distinct
conduct’ . . . which prevents this claim from relating back to the date the
original claim was filed.” Hajtman v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 07-22429-CIV,
2008 WL 1803630, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2008) (Moore, J.). Caron’s
submission that Norwegian had notice that intoxication was a factual issue in
this case, even if true, simply does not mean that Norwegian therefore was
aware that Caron would be asserting allegations of over service. Nor do the
original complaint’s allegations that: (1) Norwegian “fail[ed] to take proper
precautions for the safety of passengers using its manholes, floors, walkway, or
thresholds” (Compl. ¶ 12b); or (2) “other acts or omissions constituting a
breach of the duty to use reasonable care which will be revealed through
discovery” (id. at ¶ 12r), provide notice of the over-service claim. In sum,
Caron’s claim regarding excessive service of alcohol is barred by the parties’
contractual limitations provisions.
4. Conclusion
To the extent that Caron attempts to assert a claim based on over service
of alcohol, that claim is dismissed. The Court therefore strikes any reference to
such over service from the amended complaint. (E.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 55l.)
The Court thus grants Norwegian’s motion (ECF No. 18). At the same time, the
Court notes that its barring of Caron’s claim for over service does not prevent
him from raising facts related to Norwegian’s service of alcohol in response to
potential allegations that Caron’s intoxication rendered him comparatively
negligent for his own injuries.
Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on April 13, 2017.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
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