Goode v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.

Filing 83

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 60 Poet's motion to stay discovery, for issuance of a protective order, to modify the Scheduling Order, and to schedule a status conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres on 9/29/2017. (js02)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-24131-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
KENNETH GOODE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. et al,
Defendants,
v.
AKIRA ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON POET’S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY, FOR ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER,
AND TO SCHEDULE A STATUS CONFERENCE
This matter is before the Court on Poet Holdings, Inc., Poet Theatricals
Marine, LLC, and Poet Technical Services, LLC’s (collectively, “Poet”) motion for (1)
a stay of discovery, (2) a protective order for non-party witnesses, (3) an extension of
all pre-trial deadlines, and (4) a status conference. [D.E. 60]. Celebrity Cruises
(“Celebrity”) filed its response on July 28, 2017 [D.E. 61] and Plaintiff filed his
response on August 3, 2017. [D.E. 64]. Poet timely replied on August 4, 2017.
[D.E. 67].

Therefore, Poet’s motion is now ripe for disposition.

1

After careful

consideration of the motion, response, reply, relevant authority, and for the reasons
discussed below, Poet’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.

BACKGROUND

Kenneth Goode (“Plaintiff”), a Canadian citizen, filed this action on
September 27, 2016. Plaintiff worked as a carpenter onboard a ship owned and
operated by Celebrity and claims that he was directly paid by Akira Entertainment,
Inc. (“Akira”) in connection with the removal of theater and lighting equipment
from the M/S Equinox.1 The removal of the equipment was supposedly necessitated
by the conclusion of a contractual relationship between Poet and Celebrity, whereby
Poet produced various entertainment shows on five separate Celebrity-owned
vessels, including the M/S Equinox.
Following the conclusion of the business relationship between Poet and
Celebrity, Celebrity was contractually obligated to return all equipment, including
set pieces, costumes, props, and flying motors to Poet. In order to return Poet’s
equipment and allow for the installation of new equipment, Celebrity contracted
directly with Akira to provide the necessary labor for removal and/or installation of
the equipment. Celebrity allegedly contracted with Akira for two separate reasons:
(1) Celebrity lacked sufficient personnel with the requisite knowledge and
experience to remove and/or install the equipment, and (2) Celebrity was unwilling
to hire Poet to remove Poet’s own equipment because Poet’s rates were too
expensive.
Plaintiff alleges that Akira functioned merely as a pay-roll employer and that
either Celebrity and/or Poet were his actual and/or borrowed employer(s).
2
1

Thereafter, Akira hired Plaintiff, in addition to other individuals, as a
carpenter and to serve as a member of its workforce upon the M/S Equinox.
Plaintiff had previously and continuously worked for several weeks removing
equipment onboard two of Celebrity’s other ships, the M/S Solstice and the M/S
Eclipse. Plaintiff was also scheduled to work on two additional Celebrity ships, the
M/S Silhouette and the M/S Reflection. In other words, Plaintiff’s initial contract
was to work on five vessels in Celebrity’s fleet.
On November 10, 2015, Plaintiff was working on the tension grid located in
the theater of the M/S Equinox.2 While performing the required work, Plaintiff fell
through an opening in the tension grid when another Akira employee removed one
of the grid posts. Plaintiff purportedly suffered serious physical injuries as a result
of the fall. Plaintiff fell approximately 25 to 30 feet to the theatre floor sustaining
broken wrists, broken ankles, multiple fractures in his back and neck vertebrae,
and other significant trauma. Following the incident and the transport of Plaintiff
off the M/S Equinox, Plaintiff performed no further work for Akira in connection
with the removal and/or installation of equipment on Celebrity owned vessels.
Soon after Plaintiff included Poet in its amended complaint [D.E. 21], Poet
initiated the process of serving Akira with a third-party complaint. Pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Hague Convention on the service of
extrajudicial documents, Poet engaged the Ministry of Justice for British Columbia
on May 5, 2017 to facilitate service of a third-party complaint on Akira via the
Plaintiff alleges that Celebrity and/or Poet employed Plaintiff to serve as a
Jones Act Seaman or a seaman under general maritime law.
3
2

Vancouver Sherriff’s Office.

On June 1, 2017, the Vancouver Sheriff’s Office

explained to Poet that it had not yet attempted service on Akira. In an attempt to
expedite service, Poet provided another address where Akira may be served and the
Ministry of Justice confirmed receipt of the second address on June 8, 2017.
In June 2017, Celebrity sought to pursue discovery including numerous nonparty depositions of former and/or current Akira employees located throughout the
domestic United States, including the deposition of Plaintiff and the corporate
depositions of both Celebrity and Poet.

Poet responded with objections to

Celebrity’s requests and explained that it would not continue discovery until a final
determination was made as to the service of the third-party complaint on Akira.
Specifically, Poet stated to all parties that “[u]ntil such time that Akira is served
and/or it can be confirmed that Akira cannot be located for service, Poet objects to
the scheduling of any further depositions, inspections and/or further discovery.”
[D.E. 60]. On July 14, 2017, Poet emailed the Ministry of Justice and learned that
the Vancouver Sherriff’s Office had still not attempted service on Akira at either
address.3
At the time of filing its motion to stay discovery, Poet states that, despite its
best intentions to effectuate service on Akira, Poet has been unable to do so. Poet
asserts that Akira’s participation in this litigation is imperative because Akira was

Poet notes that at the time the papers were forwarded for service, the
Ministry of Justice indicated that service might take additional time due to volume
of requests for service.
4
3

Plaintiff’s de facto employer at the time of the incident in that Akira hired, paid,
and supervised Plaintiff.
Poet also explains that neither Plaintiff nor Celebrity sought to name Akira
as a party to the action and that it was left upon Poet to do so. And although
Plaintiff has not named Akira as a defendant in his complaint, Poet believes that it
is equally plausible that Plaintiff’s actually employer was Akira. As such, in the
absence of Akira, Poet claims that it is hindered in its ability to obtain relevant
discovery and testimony to establish Plaintiff’s Jones Act employer at the time of
his injury.

Poet suggests that continuing with discovery in Akira’s absence is

grossly inefficient and highly prejudicial because it will only serve to force the
parties to engage in the recall of numerous witnesses and repetitive document
discovery.
On September 5, 2017, Poet notified the undersigned that it has now served
Akira and that Akira’s answer to the complaint is due shortly. Accordingly, Poet
seeks (1) a reasonable stay of discovery pending Akira’s joinder, (2) a protective
order with regard to the production of non-party witnesses for deposition whom are
under the control of Poet, and (3) a reasonable extension of all deadlines. [D.E. 60].
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Motion to Stay Discovery and to Modify the Scheduling Order

To prevail on a motion to stay discovery, Poet must demonstrate
reasonableness and good cause.

The Court “has broad discretion to stay

proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones,
5

520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”); Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d
1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (“At the outset, we stress the broad discretion district
courts have in managing their cases.”); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e accord district courts broad
discretion over the management of pre-trial activities, including discovery and
scheduling.”). Additionally, “[m]atters pertaining to discovery are committed to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Patterson v. United States Postal Serv., 901
F.2d 927, 929 (11th Cir. 1990). “In evaluating whether the moving party has met
its burden, a court ‘must balance the harm produced by a delay in discovery against
the possibility that the [dispositive] motion will be granted and entirely eliminate
the need for such discovery.’” Bocciolone v. Solowsky, 2008 WL 2906719, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. July 24, 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting McCabe v. Foley, 233 F.R.D. 683, 685
(M.D. Fla. 2006)).
As for Poet’s motion to amend the Court’s Scheduling Order, it “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4);
see also Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1312 (11th Cir. 2009) (where
motion to amend came long after scheduling order deadline, “Plaintiffs were
required to show good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b).”);
Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A
6

plaintiff seeking leave to amend its complaint after the deadline designated in a
scheduling order must demonstrate ‘good cause’ under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).”).
The “good cause” standard “precludes modification unless the schedule
cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Sosa v.
Airprint Systems, Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1319
(11th Cir. 2008) (“To establish good cause, the party seeking the extension must
have been diligent.”). This is a strictly enforced standard because otherwise courts
would be unable to control their docket and litigation could be severely disrupted.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2395194, *1 n. 3 (S.D.
Ala. June 22, 2012) (“[A] scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly
entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril . . . Disregard
of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the
agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.”)
(citation omitted).
In sum, Poet argues that a stay and a modification of the Scheduling Order is
necessary because (1) Akira may be the actual employer of Plaintiff, (2) the Court
has personal jurisdiction over Akira, (3) Akira is an indispensable party, and (4) a
determination as to Akira’s participation must be ascertained before substantive
discovery can proceed.

7

Celebrity agrees that we should modify the Scheduling Order and extend the
pre-trial deadlines.4 Yet, Celebrity opposes Poet’s motion to stay all discovery and
Poet’s request for a protective order. Celebrity contends that a motion to stay is
completely unnecessary because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Akira.
Celebrity explains that Poet is primarily responsible for the delay of this action
because it continues to oscillate between (1) a position that any deposition discovery
is inappropriate until Akira is brought into the case, and (2) a position that
indicates that discovery may proceed, but that Poet’s lead counsel is unavailable.
For example, since Poet joined this case, Celebrity suggests that only one deposition
has taken place. As such, Celebrity believes that the parties are woefully behind
any workable schedule to comply with the Court’s current Scheduling Order.
Celebrity’s primary argument as to why Poet’s motion for a stay should be
denied is because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Akira. In Poet’s thirdparty complaint, Poet alleges that “Akira personally or through an agent engaged in
substantial business activity in the State of Florida, specifically Miami-Dade
County, and performed services in connection with the operation of cruise ships in
the waters of the state of Florida.”

[D.E. 40-1].

Because Poet’s jurisdictional

allegations are purportedly insufficient, Celebrity suggests that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over Akira.
Plaintiff filed a two-page response [D.E. 64] to Poet’s motion, indicating that
Plaintiff does not oppose Poet’s motion for a stay of discovery on the condition that
the Court extends the discovery and pre-trial deadlines by sixty days. If the Court
declines to do so, then Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion to stay.
Plaintiff also suggests that Akira is not an indispensable party to this case and that
the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over a Canadian corporation.
8
4

A federal court must have personal jurisdiction over a third-party defendant
before it may adjudicate a third-party claim.

Jurisdiction comports with due

process when it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
“Considerations of due process require that a non-resident defendant have certain
minimum contacts5 with the forum, so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Consol. Dev. Corp. v.
Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Borg–Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett &
Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996)).

However, the nature and

quality of these contacts ordinarily “vary depending upon whether the type of
personal jurisdiction being asserted is specific or general.” Consol. Dev. Corp., 216
F.3d at 1291.
Generally speaking, “[s]pecific jurisdiction arises out of a party’s activities in
the forum that are related to the cause of action alleged in the complaint.” Consol.
Dev. Corp., 216 F.3d at 1291 (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1990), Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8-9 (1984)).

The amount of minimum contacts required to support specific

jurisdiction occurs when a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

The reason for minimum contacts is because it ensures fairness and the
expectation that “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [is]
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World–
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
5

9

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
On the other hand, general personal jurisdiction “arises from a defendant’s
contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the cause of action being litigated.”
Consol. Dev. Corp., 216 F.3d at 1292. “The due process requirements for general
personal jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction, and
require a showing of continuous and systematic general business contacts between
the defendant and the forum state.” Id. (citing Borg–Warner, 786 F.2d at 1057;
Hall, 466 U.S. at 412–13). General personal jurisdiction occurs in “instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. The Supreme
Court has established that general jurisdiction over corporations is mostly limited
to either the place of incorporation or its principal place of business.6 See Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“Those [two] affiliations have the virtue
of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily
ascertainable.”).

The Supreme Court has not held that only a corporation’s place of
incorporation or its principal place of business may suffice for general jurisdiction.
But, the Court has indicated that those two places are the two most common ways
of establishing general jurisdiction. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“Goodyear
did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a
forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed
those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”).
10
6

All parties agree that general maritime law governs this case. “As such, the
personal jurisdiction analysis includes a twist not present in diversity cases,
although ultimately there is no practical difference in the way in which the Court
proceeds towards its determination.” Zeus Projects Ltd. v. Perez y Cia. de Puerto
Rico, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 23, 28 (D.P.R. 1999). In determining the personal jurisdiction
of a party in an admiralty case, “due process only requires sufficient contacts within
the United States as a whole” and “the limits on a state’s power over non-resident
defendants do not apply to a federal court sitting in admiralty in that state.”
Trans–Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984). This
means that in admiralty cases, while “the law of the forum state ordinarily governs
the issue of personal jurisdiction,” it may also be established under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

United Trading Co. v. M.V. Sakura Reefer, 1996 WL

374154, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937
F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. M/V Ya
Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e conclude that federal law includes
admiralty cases for the purposes of Rule 4(k)(2).”).
To determine if there is personal jurisdiction over Akira, “a federal court
must [first] look to the long-arm statute of the state where it sits and the cases that
interpret that statute.” Johns v. Taramita, 132 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1027 (S.D. Fla.
2001) (citing Associated Transport Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El
Carmen, S.A., 197 F.3d 1070, 1072–74 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Florida long-arm
statute to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over defendant to suit in
11

admiralty); Shaffer v. Tiffany Yachts, Inc., 1996 WL 870734, *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct.31,
1996) (same)). In this case, the relevant long-arm statute is Florida. That means
that Akira “can be subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute
in two ways: first, section 48.193(1)(a) lists acts that subject a defendant to specific
personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over suits that arise out of or relate to a
defendant’s contacts with Florida, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a); and second, section
48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction—
that is, jurisdiction over any claims against a defendant, whether or not they
involve the defendant’s activities in Florida-if the defendant engages in ‘substantial
and not isolated activity’ in Florida, id. § 48.193(2).” Tarasewicz v. Royal Caribbean
Cruises Ltd., 2015 WL 3970546, at *19 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2015) (quoting
Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015)).
The allegations in Poet’s third party complaint do not rise to the level of
specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute.7 And general jurisdiction is
doubtful under Florida’s long-arm statute because it must be demonstrated that
Akira’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
[it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). The two most common ways of establishing

As stated earlier, Poet merely alleges that “Akira personally or through an
agent engaged in substantial business activity in the State of Florida, specifically
Miami-Dade County, and performed services in connection with the operation of
cruise ships in the waters of the state of Florida.” [D.E. 40-1]. These allegations
have no specific relationship to the cause of action being pursued – meaning that
the complaint does not allege specific jurisdiction.
7

12

general

jurisdiction

are

a

corporation’s

principal

place

of

business

and

headquarters. See id. Yet, both of those locations, as they relate to Akira, are
located in Canada and there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that
Akira is essentially at home in Florida.8

Accordingly, the most likely basis for

personal jurisdiction over Akira is under Rule 4(k)(2) (i.e. the national long-arm
statute). See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
“Rule 4(k)(2) was adopted to provide a forum of federal claims in situations
where a foreign defendant lacks substantial contacts with any single state but has
sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to satisfy due process
standards and justify the application of federal law.” Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681
F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558
F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n cases where a defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, authorizes a district court to
aggregate a foreign defendant’s nationwide contacts to allow for service of process”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted); Associated Transp. Line, Inc., 197 F.3d at
1074 (“This rule permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants for claims arising under federal law when the defendant has sufficient
contacts with the nation as a whole, but is without sufficient contacts to satisfy the
long-arm statute of any particular state.”) (citing United States S.E.C. v. Carrillo,
115 F.3d 1540, 1543–44 (11th Cir. 1997)).

8

Poet merely suggests that Akira operates in Ft. Lauderdale.
13

The rule is neither applicable nor relevant until a court finds that a
defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of any state. See
Merial Ltd., 681 F.3d at 1294 (“[O]ne precondition for applying Rule 4(k)(2) is that
the defendant must not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of any state
(sometimes called the ‘negation requirement’”) (citation omitted); see also Henriquez
v. El Pais Q’Hubocali.com, 500 F. App’x 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under Rule
4(k)(2), when a defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any one state, a court
may aggregate a foreign defendant’s nationwide contacts.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Once it becomes clear that there is no specific or
general jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute, the analysis on whether there
is personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) will turn on whether there are sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole.
Given the record presented, we cannot make a determination on whether we
have personal jurisdiction over Akira. While it is certainly possible that personal
jurisdiction exists, the parties must supplement the record before a finding on
jurisdiction can be made.9

For example, if the Court must determine whether

personal jurisdiction exists under Rule 4(k)(2), the record must be clear on Akira’s
contacts with the United States as a whole. Until that time, Celebrity’s arguments
– that there is no personal jurisdiction over Akira – are premature.

Celebrity’s second argument, that Akira is a permissive party, is now moot
because – as of September 5, 2017 – Akira has been served with Poet’s third party
complaint. As such, the distinction on whether Celebrity is either a permissive or
indispensable party is no longer significant.
14
9

Because we cannot determine at this time whether there is personal
jurisdiction over Akira, we turn back to Poet’s motion to stay discovery. It is now
clear that Akira was served in September 2017, which was the primary reason as to
why Poet did not want to proceed with any discovery in this case. Accordingly, we
find that there is no persuasive reason to halt these proceedings and that Poet’s
motion for a stay of discovery must be DENIED.
As for Poet’s motion to extend all of the pre-trial deadlines in the Court’s
Scheduling Order, all parties (except Akira) have indicated that completing fact
discovery by November 17, 2017 will be a burdensome task. The reason for the lack
of progress stems back to Poet believing that discovery could not proceed until Akira
became a party in this case. Now that Akira has been served, a sixty-day extension
of all the Court’s pretrial deadlines should provide the parties enough time to
conduct all necessary discovery.

As such, Poet’s motion is GRANTED and the

Court’s pre-trial deadlines are hereby extended for sixty additional days.
B.

Motion for Protective Order

The next issue is Poet’s motion for a protective order. “Rule 26(c) allows the
issuance of a protective order if ‘good cause’ is shown. In addition to requiring good
cause, this circuit has also required the district court to balance the interests of
those requesting the order. A ‘district court must articulate its reasons for granting
a protective order sufficient for appellate review.”’ McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of
Polk Cty., 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429–30 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Rule
15

26(c) provides that upon a showing of good cause, a court ‘may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.’ The party seeking a protective order has
the burden to demonstrate good cause, and must make ‘a particular and specific
demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements’
supporting the need for a protective order.”) (citations omitted).
At the time Poet filed its motion, Poet argued that a protective order was
needed because Celebrity indicated that it would issue a subpoena for three nonparty former Poet employees.

Yet, Poet asserted that all discovery, including

depositions, should not proceed until Akira was served in this case. Because Akira
was served in September 2017, there is no reason to delay these depositions any
further. As such, Poet’s motion for a protective order is DENIED as moot.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Poet’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. [D.E. 60].
A.

Poet’s motion for a stay of discovery is DENIED.

B.

Poet’s motion for a sixty-day extension of the Court’s pre-trial

deadlines is GRANTED.
C.

Poet’s motion for a status conference and a protective order are

DENIED as moot.

16

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 29th day of
September, 2017.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge

17