Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte International GMBH
Filing
304
Order Adopting Remaining Portions of Magistrate Judge Louis's July 16, 2020 Report and Recommendation and Order Finding Petitioner in Contempt. Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/9/2021. See attached document for full details. (jz01)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICTOF FLORIDA
Miami Division
Case Number: 16-24275-CIV-MORENO
INVERSIONES Y PROCESADORA
TROPICAL INPROTSA, S.A., a Costa Rican
.Corporation,
Petitioner,
VS.
DEL MONTE INTERNATIONAL GMBH, a
Swiss Corporation,
Respondent.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I
ORDER ADOPTING REMAINING PORTIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE LOUIS'S
JULY 16, 2020 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER FINDING
PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT
THE MATTER was refeiTed to the Honorable Lauren F. Louis, United States Magistrate
Judge, for a Report and Recomm_e11dation on Respgndent's Renewed Motion for Contempt (D.E.
229). The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation (D.E. 75) on July 16, 2020. On
_October 30, 2020, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in part, deferring ruling on
the Magistrate Judge's recommendations as to sanctions. The Court adopted her recommendation
to issue a ~eparate Order ~o Show Cause as to petitioner, Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical,
INPROTSA, S.A. as to why it should not be held in contempt for its noncompliance with the
Court's Final Judgment. INPROTSA, S.A. filed a response to the Order to Show Cause on
November 16, 2020. The Court nowreviews INPROTSA's response to the Order to Show Cause
and the remaining recommendatibns in the July 16, 2020 Report and Recommendation regarding
sanctions. The Court has reviewed the entire· file and record. The Court has made a de nova
review of the issues that the objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
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present, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is
ADJUDGED that the remaining portions of United States Magistrate Judge Lauren F.
Louis's Report and Recorrime-ndation are AFFIRMED and ADOPTED as set forth in this
Order.
I.
Background
On October 30, 2020, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause to Petitioner,
INPROTSA, S.A. to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to comply
with this Court's Order Confirming the Arbitral Award and Final Judgment. The Court's Order
confirmed an arbitral award, which contained a monetary award and two injunctions. The Court
also entere.d final judgment for the reasons stated in the confirmation order in favor of the
Respondent Del Monte.
INPROTSA's noncompliance with the injunctions is at issue in these contempt
proceedings. The first injunction ordered INPROTSA to "return or destroy 93% of the MD-2
[pineapple] vegetative materials in [INPROTSA's] farm" (the "destruction injunction") and the
second enjoined INPROTSA "'from selling MD-2 pineapples to third parties for as long as
[INPROTSA] shall not have fully complied with its obligation to destroy or return the MD-2
vegetative materials,' with the exception of sales in amounts not exceeding 7% of each MD-2
harvest" (the "sales injunction"). It is undisputed that INPROTSA did not comply from May
2017 t_o April 2018. INPROTSA did not destroy or return the seeds and once the pineapples were
grown, it elected to sell them to a third-·party until at least April 2018.
The Order to Show Cause finds that Respondent Del Monte International, GmbH met its
burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor, INPROTSA, S.A.,
violated the Court's prior confirmation order and final judgment. It required INPROTSA to show
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cause why it should not be held in contempt for its noncompliance and directed INPROTSA to
advise the Court if it requested an additional evidentiary hearing. In response to the order,
INPROTSA consented to Del Monte's Motion for Contempt being determined by the Court on
the existing evidentiary record, without a further evidentiary hearing.
INPROTSA's response to the show cause order incorporates by reference the transcript
of INPROTSA's closing argument at the evidentiary hearing conducted by Magistrate Judge
Louis, INPROTSA's final brief concerning Respondent's Renewed Request for Finding of
Contempt (D.E. 261), INPROTSA's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (D.E. 292), and INPROTSA's Notice of Filing Supplemental Authority, Liu v.
S.E. C., 140 S. Ct. 1936 (June 22, 2020). Del Monte seeks a final judgment of civil contempt
based on INPROTSA's failure to destroy the plants immediately and based on its decision to sell
the pineapples to a third-party, in violation of the sales injunction.
In addition to issuing the Order to Show Cause on October 30, 2020, the Court also
issued an Order Adopting in part the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF 297
& 287). The Court stopped short of adopting Judge Louis's recommendations regarding the
proper award of sanctions until after INPROTSA had an opportunity to show cause as to its
noncompliance. Specifically, the Court deferred ruling on whether disgorgement ofrevenues is a
proper measure of damages for contempt and on whether an award of attorney's fees to Del
Monte is appropriate. The Court must now decide whether INPROTSA shows cause to excuse its
noncompliance, and if it fails to show cause, what are the appropriate sanctions.
I.
Legal Standard and Analysis
Once a party meets its burden to show by "clear and convincing evidence that the alleged
contemnor violated a court's earlier order," the burden shifts "to the alleged contemnor to
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produce evidence explaining [its] noncompliance at a show cause hearing." Peery v. City of
Miami, 977 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chairs v. Burgess, 143 F.3d 1432, 1436 (11th
Cir. 1998)). "The clear and convincing evidence must establish that: (1) the allegedly violated
order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator
had the ability to comply with the order." Id. (quoting Riccardv. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d
1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002)). The Court must construe ambiguities in favor of the party charged
with contempt. Id (citing FTC. v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Del Monte seeks contempt sanctions for INPROTSA's violation of this Court's May 17,
2017 final judgment, which was issued after the Court confirmed an arbitral award in this matter.
There is no dispute in this case that INPROTSA did not comply with either the destruction or
sales injunctions. INPROTSA, however, raises arguments that the order was unlawful because
the Court lacks the power to enforce an extraterritorial mandatory injunction. Second,
INPROTSA argues the order was not clear and unambiguous such that its failure to comply
should result in contempt of Court. Finally, INPROTSA argues that it could not comply with the
Court's order because doing so .would violate Costa Rican law. If INPROTSA's arguments do
not excuse its noncompliance, the Court must determine whether the appropriate remedy is
disgorgement of revenues and an award of attorney's fees.
A. Civil Contempt
1. Was the Court's order lawful and valid?
INPROTSA argues the Court cannot find it in contempt because the Court lacked
authority to enter an order containing an extraterritorial mandatory injunction. Put another way,
INPROTSA argues it cannot be found in contempt for violating an unlawful injunction. In this
case, the Court confirmed an arbitral award, which included two injunctions - a sales injunction
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and a destruction injunction. This Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation on this issue prior to ordering INPROTSA to show cause. The Court,
nevertheless, revisits the argument to determine if it excuses INPROTSA's noncompliance.
Responding to the show cause order, INPROTSA first asserts that confirmation of the
award is a separate issue from a court's power to enforce all or part of the award. Relying on
Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B. V v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365-66
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009), INPROTSA argues that a court's duty to confirm an arbitral award
does not always match its power to enforce the same award. In a confirmation proceeding, the
Court has a narrow scope ofreview allowing it to either accept or reject confirmation of an
award, and INPROTSA suggests that this Court's power ends there. Four Seasons does not
support INPROTSA's position. Rather, it confirms an arbitral award even if the specific
performance mandate might be contrary to Venezuelan law or even if the court could not enforce
a judgment pertaining to activities in a foreign country. The posture of this case is different,
where the Court converted its order confirming an arbitral award into a judgment, which is
provided for in the statute. It states that upon connrmation of an arbitral award, the "judgment
shall be docketed as if it was rendered in an action. The judgment so entered shall have the same
force and effect, in all respects, as and be subject to all the provisions of the law relating to, a
judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court
in which it is entered." 9 U.S.C. § 13.
In her Report and Recommendation, which this Court adopted, Magistrate Judge Louis
examined this argument. Because the Court confirmed the award and converted it into a
judgment, the Court could "enforce the judgment by punishing the parties who violated the
judgment through contempt or enforcement proceedings." Report and Recommendation (ECF
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191). The adopted report adds that "[i]ssuing contempt sanctions for violation of this Court's
Judgment does not, as INPROTSA contends, implicate exercising jurisdiction over foreign
parties or assets, and it is without dispute that this Court has jurisdiction over INPROTSA."
Report and Recommendation (ECF 191).
INPROTSA' s acceptance of personal jurisdiction here also discredits its argument that
the Court has no power of enforcement. Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over
INPROTSA, an order of this Court requiring INPROTSA to act or refrain from acting anywhere
is valid. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8 (1909) (court can order party over which it has in
personam jurisdiction "to do or refrain from doing" an act even if the act is to occur in another
state or country). Certainly, the Court can enforce an injunction that prohibited INPROTSA from
selling pineapples to a third-party.
This Court has also previously examined INPROTSA's argument that the destruction and
sales injunctions are akin to Mareva injunctions, which are extraterritorial pre-judgment
prohibitive orders preventing litigants from dissipating assets worldwide. Grupo Mexicano de
Desarollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 328-29 (1999). This Court already
found that the injunctions at issue here are post-judgment injunctions, which differ from Mareva
injunctions. Especially with respect to the sales injunction, the Court does not find that it is
sufficiently similar to a Mareva injunction, so as to excuse INPROTSA's noncompliance with a
post-judgment order, which was affirmed on appeal.
Despite these findings INPROTSA again explains its noncompliance with the injunctions
by stating that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce them. INPROTSA categorizes them as
one in the same describing them as only one injunction containing two parts, one contingent on
the other. It argues that if the destruction injunction to destroy the vegetative material is invalid,
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then any derivative interim requirement to pick, pack, deliver and sell that material to Del Monte
while the plants are being destroyed is also invalid. INPROTSA's position is that the injunctions
are inextricably intertwined because the duration of sales to Del Monte is contingent on the
destruction of the plants. The Court does not agree that the injunctions are inextricably
intertwined. Indeed, the structure of the injunctions suggests if INPROTSA elected not to
comply with the destruction injunction, then alternatively it was prohibited from selling 93% of
the pineapple product to third-parties (which is what it did by selling the pineapples to Fruver).
Finally, this Court has previously held that INPROTSA' s jurisdictional argument is "too
little too late." This Court reiterates that INPROTSA cannot explain its noncompliance now by
asserting a lack of jurisdiction, when it did not raise the argument in the original proceedings or
in the Court of Appeals. INPROTSA argues that it was not until this enforcement proceeding that
it was proper to raise this argument. The Court disagrees. Although INPROTSA is correct that
the Court's jurisdiction to enforce an injunction is not grounds for consideration under the New
York Convention for vacating or confirming an award, INPROTSA could have raised the
argument in the confirmation proceeding. Rather than argue then that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to enter final judgment on the terms of the arbitral award, INPROTSA waited to raise
the issue until this contempt proceeding, after the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The
Federal Arbitration Act makes clear that to be enforced as a civil judgment, an award subject to
the Convention ... must first be confirmed and converted into a judgment by a court." Del
Monte Int'! GmbHv. Ticofrut, SA., No. 16-23894-CIV, 2017 WL 2901326, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
30, 2017) (~iting 9 U.S.C. § 13). The proper time to object to the Court's jurisdiction to enter the
injunctions was when the Court entered final judgment, not in a post-judgment, post-appeal
contempt proceeding.
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This Court reaffirms its prior finding that this jurisdictional argument cannot be raised as .
a defense in a collateral proceeding. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009)
(quoting Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) ("[T]he practical concern with
providing an end to litigation justifies a rule preventing collateral attack on subject matter
jurisdiction.")); Beck v. Boce Grp., 04-20683-CIV, 2005 WL 8155884, *2, n.3 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 15,
2005) (finding defendants' argument stating that contempt cannot be found if the underlying
order is invalid "moot" because underlying injunction was issued by court order and
subsequently reaffirmed.). Res judicata would be "short-circuited" if courts were to evaluate the
jurisdiction that they may or may not have had to issue final judgment. In re: Optical
Technologies, Inc., 425 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
Res judicata principles also defeat INPROTSA's reliance on US. Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236, 1249 (5th Cir. 1975) and Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 35, 374 (5th Cir. 2003). INPROTSA
argues it cannot be held in contempt for violating an invalid injunction as set forth in these cases.
In these cases, however, the appellate courts evaluated both the validity of the injunctions at
issue and the ensuing contempt orders. See US. Steel, 519 F .2d at 1249 (holding that district
court lacked jurisdiction to enter injunction and that union could not be found in contempt of that
order); Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 374 ("[T]he only district court order that should be subject to
review on appeal to us is the preliminary injunction. By reversing and vacating the preliminary
injunction, we addressed the substantive provisions of the contempt order. .. thereby making it
unnecessary for us to address now the contempt order itself."). Here, the judgment of this Court
has already been reviewed and affirmed on appeal. The principles of res judicata would preclude
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the Court from revisiting the validity of the injunctions as was the procedural posture in both
US. Steel Corp. and Karaha Bodas.
2. Was the Court's order clear and unambiguous?
In defense of its noncompliance, INPROTSA again argues that even if the Court did not
lack the equitable power to issue the extraterritorial injunctive relief, this is a complex
jurisdictional issue of first impression, and the Court's order was not clear and unambiguous.
INPROTSA's argument is not that it did not understand what the injunctions required, but rather
that there was a legal ambiguity with respect to the enforceability. See Drywall Tapers and
Pointers a/Greater New York Local 1974 ofIBPAT AFL-CIO v. Local 530 of Operative
Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Assoc., 889 F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that order is
clear and unambiguous if a party can "ascertain from the four comers of the order precisely what
acts are forbidden."). Thus, INPROTSA's legal ambiguity argument is insufficient to explain its
noncompliance. Indeed, INPROTSA did not contest the clarity or ambiguity of the injunctions in
the confirmation proceeding, or on appeal. Certainly, it understood what it was supposed to do
and what it was prohibited from doing. It chose to sell the pineapples in violation of the
injunction.
It is "established doctrine that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court
with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they
have proper grounds to object to the order." GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375,386 (1980). "INPROTSA has advanced no evidence that it
acted diligently in attempting to destroy the pineapples or sell them to Del Monte, in fact the
opposite has been shown: INPROTSA knew of the injunctions, knew that it had been ordered to
destroy the pineapples or sell them only to Del Monte, and chose instead to farm them as it
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normally would and sell them to third-party Fruver in hopes that it would win at the appellate
level." Report and Recommendation (ECF 287). The Court therefore reaffirms its prior finding
that the judgment was valid and lawful as well as clear and unambiguous. This defense to
contempt does not excuse INPROTSA's noncompliance.
3. Was INPROTSA able to comply with the Court's order?
To excuse its noncompliance, INPROTSA reasserts its position that it was factually
unable to comply because doing so would violate Costa Rican law. This Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF 287) on this point, and again finds that
INPROTSA's purported inability to comply with the injunctions does not excuse its
noncompliance. This finding is even more compelling now that the Supreme Court of Costa Rica
has confirmed the arbitral award. When first arguing this point, INPROTSA relied on the
testimony of its president, Jorge Luis Gurria Hernandez, who explained that INPROTSA needed
to make the sales notwithstanding the injunction and justified doing so because the confirmation
proceedings were then stayed in courts in Costa Rica and pending on appeal here. The appeal
here affirmed the confirmation order and final judgment, and now that there is a confirmation
order in Costa Rica, the justification provided by INPROTSA then is now proven unfounded.
This Court was correct to find the justification did not preclude the issuance of an order to show
cause and does not now excuse INPROTSA's noncompliance.
In any event, the Court again finds that even if INPROTSA could not comply with the
destruction injunction, it chose not to comply with the sales injunction. Neither the pending
appeal nor the stay in Costa Rica at the time obligated INPROTSA to sell the pineapples to
Fruver in violation of the injunction. Rather, as the Magistrate Judge aptly pointed out in her
Report and Recommendation, INPROTSA chose not to destroy the pineapples, and chose to sell
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them to a third party. The Court finds INPROTSA's decision to sell the pineapples to Fruver
does not equate with an inability to comply. Therefore, the Court does not excuse INPROTSA's
noncompliance based on this argument.
B.
Sanctions
This Court stopped short of adopting the July 16, 2020 Report's recommendations as to
the appropriate remedy to address INPROTSA's contempt. The civil contempt power may be
used to "coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained." United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04
(194 7). In her Report, the Magistrate Judge appropriately found that there is no argument that
lNPROTSA needs to be coerced into compliance since both parties admit the vegetative material
has since been destroyed. The remaining issue is the measure of compensation to Del Monte,
which the parties dispute. Del Monte seeks an award equal to INPROTSA's disgorgement of
gross revenues of its sales of the pineapples during the relevant period, which is $16,373,684.
INPROTSA argues the appropriate damages award equals the losses Del Monte suffered, and
since it has not shown proof of loss, it is not entitled to any disgorgement.
The July 16, 2020 Report and Recommendation recommends the Court not award
disgorgement of revenues or lost profits. The complainant, Del Monte, bears the burden of
producing evidence sufficient to show damages based on the contempt. See In re: Chase &
Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Magistrate Judge found that disgorgement ofrevenues was not a proper remedy, and
that "Del Monte has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that its measure of damages
is equal to INPROTSA's gross revenues." Report and Recommendation (ECF 287 at 13). In its
objections, Del Monte relies on Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) to argue that disgorgement of
gross sales proceeds is the proper remedy: Liu, however, recognizes that while "courts
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recognize[] that the wrongdoer should not profit by his own wrong, they also recognized the
countervailing equitable principle that a wrongdoer should not be punished by paying more than
a fair compensation to the person wronged." Id. at 1943. The Supreme Court emphasized that a
remedy "tethered to a wrongdoer's net unlawful profits, whatever the name, has been a mainstay
of equity court." Examining the contours of equity jurisprudence, the Supreme Court recognized
that federal courts have the power to order disgorgement of profits, as Del Monte suggests, but it
also compared disgorgement to restitution that simply "'restor[es] the status quo,' thus situating
the remedy squarely within the heartland of equity." Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412 (1987)).
Relying on FTC. v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) and Guyana Tel. &
Tel. Co., Ltd. v. Melbourne Int'l Comms., Ltd., 329 F.3d 1241, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003), Del Monte
argues disgorgement of revenues is the proper measure of damages for contempt. The Magistrate
Judge, however, correctly identified that in Leshin the contemnors had taken compensation from
consumers and were ordered to disgorge those monies back to the consumers as compensation
for their losses. Here, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that Del Monte did not pay INPROTSA any
sum of money, which INPROTSA would need to now disgorge. The issue raised in Del Monte's
objection is that the Magistrate Judge misread the sales injunction to require sales to Del Monte,
and instead the injunction prohibits sales to anyone. Based on this misreading, Del Monte asserts
that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that damages should be akin to those for breach
of contract as opposed to the appropriate remedy, which it claims is disgorgement. Regardless of
. how one reads the sales injunction, Del Monte did not pay monies to INPROTSA, which should
now be returned. That was the factual scenario presented in Leshin, which is not present here.
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Del Monte also asserts that INPROTSA as a "conscious wrongdoer" is liable for either
the "fair market value of the goods and services (restitutionary remedy) or the proceeds of the
sale (disgorgement remedy), and [Del Monte] is entitled to the higher." Guyana, 329 F.3d at
1249. Guyana, however, was not a contempt proceeding, but rather a Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act case, where the court was deciding on a legal remedy, not an
equitable one. In any event, both Leshin and Guyana precede the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Liu, which clarifies the limits of this Cami's equitable powers.
Del Monte's objections to the Report aµd Recommendation argue that the law of the case
establishes disgorgement as the proper measure of damages. It bases this argument on language
in a January 24, 2019 Report and Recommendation, which this Court adopted. (ECF 191 and
200). The January 24, 2019 Report stated that Del Monte was "damaged by loss of the benefit of
its bargain with INPROTSA." The adopted report also states that INPROTSA should "show
cause why the Court should not hold them in contempt for failing to comply with the Court's
Final Judgment by making sales ofMD-2 pineapples in violation of the permanent injunction of
the Award, and order sanctions, including monies !NPROTSA improperly received as a result of
its sales made after the entry of the Court's final judgment. " Id. (ECF 191 ). Del Monte argues
that the July 16, 2020 Report and Recommendation contravenes the law of the case established
in this Court's order adopting the January 24, 2019 report, which in its view ordered
disgorgement. This Court disagrees.
The Order adopting the January 24, 2019 report was not a final order sanctioning
INPROTSA. On the contrary, it was a preliminary order instructing INPROTSA to show cause
why disgorgement of revenues is improper. That is what INPROTSA has done- shown cause that
Del Monte's requested remedy is improper: Even if the Court's order can be viewed as
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predetermining the appropriate sanction, which it does not, the order predated the Supreme
Court's issuance of Liu, which provides the framework for this Court to now decide the
appropriate remedy.
Using Liu's principles, the Court next examines whether the record evidence establishes
the harm to Del Monte and how to quantify the appropriate remedy. The record evidence does
not establish by clear and convincing evidence how Del Monte was damaged. It only establishes
that during the relevant period INPROTSA had revenues of over $16 million, and Del Monte has
not met its burden to show that INPROTSA profited. Indeed, INPROTSA contends it operated at
a loss during the time between entry of the judgment on the award and the destruction of the
pineapples. Because Del Monte does not show by clear and convincing evidence that it suffered
losses or that INPROTSA profited and would be keeping its ill-gotten gains, the Court declines
an award of disgorgement to Del Monte. Even if Del Monte lost the benefit of its bargain, the
evidence does not quantify that loss. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and
Recommendation and declines to sanction INPROTSA by awarding damages exceeding $16
million. To rule otherwise would contravene the Supreme Court's instruction in Liu, which states
that "a wrongdoer should not be punished by paying more than a fair compensation to the person
wronged."
E. Attorney's Fees
Having adopted the Report and Recommendation's finding that disgorgement is not an
appropriate remedy, the Court examines whether the recommendation on attorney's fees is
appropriate. Generally, when a movant seeks a contempt order to force compliance with a
lawfully entered order, the movant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses
cause by the contemnor defendant's contempt. Belize Telecom. Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, No. 05-
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20470, 2005 WL 7858276, *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2005) ("Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses caused by Defendant's contempt."); US. v. Far East Suppliers,
Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1215, 1216-17 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding an award of fees and costs appropriate
where there is willful disregard of a court's order.
The evidentiary record shows that INPROTSA did not stop selling the MD-2 pineapples
until April 2018, after Del Monte had filed its Motion for Contempt, but before INPROTSA had
responded to that Motion. Therefore, the Motion was sufficient to, and successful in, ending the
contemptuous behavior. The Court, therefore, agrees with the Report and Recommendation that
an award of attorney's fees is appropriate in the amount incurred by Del Monte to secure
INPROTSA's compliance with the Court order. Far East Suppliers, 682 F. Supp. at 1216.
Del Monte seeks $550,225.50 for 1,276.4 hours billed from June 5, 2017 to July 16,
2020. The declaration of Mr. Pinter, the associate general counsel of the company that owns Del
Monte, shows that Del Monte paid those fees, establishing this as an expense incurred in having
to bring the contempt proceedings. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the award of
fees ends when the contemptuous behavior ended in April 2018. Therefore, her reduction of the
fees award to $204,958 is appropriate.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this
L
/\.
of August 2021.
FEDE.RIC~
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
United States Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis
Counsel of record
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