TIC Park Centre 9, LLC v. Wojnar et al

Filing 93

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 81 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres on 7/18/2017. (js02)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-24569-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
TIC PARK CENTRE 9, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL MANUEL CABOT, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
This matter is before the Court on TIC Park Centre 9, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”)
Motion to Compel (“Motion”) against Michael Manuel Cabot, Catherine Cabot,
Mariner

Property

Management

Services,

LLC,

and

WTK

Realty,

LLC

(“Defendants”). [D.E. 81-1]. Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s Motion on June 17,
2017 [D.E. 88] and Plaintiff timely replied on June 19, 2017. [D.E. 89]. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion is now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the
Motion, response, reply, relevant authority, and for the reasons discussed below,
Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.

BACKGROUND

TIC Park Centre 9, LLC (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action to seek remedies
for alleged illegal actions against Michael Manuel Cabot (“Cabot”), Catherine Cabot,
Jason Kraus, Mariner Property Management Services, LLC, and WTK Realty
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(collectively, “Defendants”) that resulted in a 2014 loss of a multi-million dollar
investment in commercial property (the “Property”) in Miami Gardens, Florida.
The gist of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that Defendants engaged in leasing schemes to
steal money from the Property and then concealed the leasing schemes and aided
the Property’s ultimate loss to foreclosure.
More specifically, Plaintiff is a qualified and accredited investor who
purchased a tenant in common interest in the Property in 2007. As part of that
purchase, Plaintiff entered into a property and asset management agreement
regarding the Property with Mariner Property Management Services, LLC, which
was controlled by Cabot and Mark Wojnar (“Wojnar”).

Mariner Property

Management Services, LLC managed the Property from 2007 until April 2011,
when Plaintiff and other tenants in common selected a new manager for the
Property. Midgard Management, Inc. began managing the Property in April 2011.
Plaintiff alleges that Mariner Property Management Services, LLC, Cabot
and Wojnar violated their duties under the Property Management Agreement and a
separate Tenant in Common Agreement by entering into two fraudulent leases with
Park Center Med-Suites, LLC and Garden Med-Suites, LLC in 2010 – who then
subleased the Property to other tenants. Cabot and Wojnar purportedly used the
Mariner Entities as a facade for their own personal economic benefit and harbored
monies wrongfully taken from Plaintiff’s Property, including through an entity
established in their wives’ names.

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As a result of those subleases, Plaintiff alleges that $130,000 in rental income
that otherwise would have been paid to the Property between 2011 and 2012 was
diverted from the Property to the owner of those two entities, Jeffrey Miller
(“Miller”), and $164,848.59 in broker commissions was paid to WTK Realty, LLC,
which Plaintiff alleges were disguised payments of Property income to Cabot and
Wojnar.

In other words, Miller allegedly acted through alter egos that made

payments of unlawfully obtained monies to Miller’s primary business entity,
Medical Practice Operations, Inc. (“MPO”). After Midgard Management, Inc. took
over the management of the Property in April 2011, it brought eviction actions
against Park Centre Med-Suites, LLC and Garden Med-Suites, LLC.
Among other defenses to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants have asserted
that their actions are (1) protected by the business-judgment rule, (2) commercially
reasonable, (3) that the Property suffered from the recent economic recession rather
than Defendants’ misconduct, and (4) that there was inadequate capital for the
Property to meet its financial obligations.1
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LAW

Under the Federal Rules, a party may pose interrogatories related to any
matter into which Rule 26(b) allows inquiry, FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(2), request the
production of any documents that fall within the scope of Rule 26(b), FED. R. CIV. P.
34(a), and serve requests to admit certain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1),

The Court has diversity jurisdiction over all claims asserted in the Complaint
because Plaintiff is a citizen of New York and Defendants are citizens of
Massachusetts, Florida, or Delaware.
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FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1). Rule 26(b) also allows discovery “through increased reliance
on the commonsense concept of proportionality.” In re: Takata Airbag Prod. Liab.
Litig., 2016 WL 1460143, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2016) (quoting Chief Justice John
Roberts, 2015 Year–End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6 (2015)). “Proportionality
requires counsel and the court to consider whether relevant information is
discoverable in view of the needs of the case.” Tiger v. Dynamic Sports Nutrition,
LLC, 2016 WL 1408098, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2016). If the opposing party
objects to interrogatories or requests, the requesting party may then file a motion to
compel production pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 37, but only after its counsel, in good
faith, confers with opposing counsel to resolve discovery disputes without court
intervention. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1).
The Federal Rules afford the Court broad authority to control the scope of
discovery, Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307
(11th Cir. 2011), but Astrongly favor full discovery whenever possible.

See

Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.3d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). Courts
must consequently employ a liberal and broad scope of discovery in keeping with
the spirit and purpose of these rules. See Rosenbaum v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A.,
708 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (collecting cases). The “overall purpose
of discovery under the Federal Rules is to require the disclosure of all relevant
information, so that the ultimate resolution of disputed issues in any civil action
may be based on a full and accurate understanding of the true facts, and therefore

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embody a fair and just result.” State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. City of Destin, 2015 WL
11109379, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2015).
However, while the scope of discovery is broad, it is not without limits. See
Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 959 F. 2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1992);
Rossbach v. Rundle, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Oppenheimer
Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978)). To show that the requested discovery is
otherwise objectionable, the onus is on the objecting party to demonstrate with
specificity how the objected-to request is unreasonable or otherwise unduly
burdensome. See Rossbach, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 1354 (citing in part Panola Land
Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Boilerplate objections and generalized responses are improper. See Alhassid
v. Bank of America, 2015 WL 1120273, at *2 (S.D. Fla. March 12, 2015).

This

District has frequently held that objections which fail to sufficiently specify the
grounds on which they are based are improper and without merit. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Bradshaw, 2014 WL 6459978 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2014); Abdin v. Am. Sec. Ins.
Co., 2010 WL 1257702 (S.D. Fla. March 29, 2010). More specifically, objections
simply stating that a request is Aoverly broad, or unduly burdensome@ are
meaningless and without merit. Abdin, 2010 WL 1257702 at *1 (quoting Guzman v.
Irmadan, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 399, 400 (S.D. Fla. 2008)).
In addition to the Federal Rules, Southern District Local Rule 26.1 controls
the necessary procedure a party must follow when objecting to a request for
production or asserting a claim of privilege. It requires that:
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All motions related to discovery, including . . . motions to compel
discovery . . . shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the occurrence of
grounds for the motion. Failure to file a discovery motion within thirty
(30) days, absent a showing of reasonable cause for a later filing, may
constitute a waiver of the relief.
S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(i)(1) (emphasis added). On its face, Rule 26.1(i) is therefore
plainly discretionary. While the “occurrence” of grounds for a motion tends to be
the moment at which responses are filed, this is not always necessarily the case.
See, e.g., Socas v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins., 2008 WL 619322 (S.D. Fla. March 4,
2008) (finding that the “occurrence” triggering the motion to compel was when the
requesting party examined certain documents months after their initial requests
had been answered); United States v. Polo Pointe Way, Delray Beach, Fl., 444 F.
Supp. 2d 1258, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that the “occurrence” at issue was a
deposition that took place after responses were filed).
In pertinent part, the Local Rules also provide that where a claim of privilege
is asserted, the objecting party must prepare “a privilege log with respect to all
documents, electronically stored information, things and oral communications
withheld on the basis of a claim of privilege or work product protection” except for
“written and oral communications between a party and its counsel after
commencement of the action and work product material created after commencement
of the action.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(g)(3)(C) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[w]here
a claim of privilege is asserted in objecting to any . . . production demand . . . and an
answer is not provided on the basis of such assertion . . . [t]he attorney asserting the

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privilege shall . . . identify the nature of the privilege . . . being claimed.” S.D. Fla.
L.R. 26.1(g)(3)(B)(I).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Motion is directed at the Defendants’ allegedly defective discovery
responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production. Plaintiff argues that Defendants
have objected to Plaintiff’s requests for production on the same unmeritorious
grounds Defendants recently asserted when moving to quash subpoenas Plaintiff
issued to various non-parties. Defendants have also purportedly declined to provide
privilege logs despite asserting privileges in their responses, and despite the Court’s
rulings requiring a privilege log for similar responses.

[D.E. 66, 80].

Because

Defendants have allegedly produced no responsive documents, Plaintiff moves the
Court to compel Defendants to supplement their responses, produce responsive
documents, and provide a proper privilege log for any responsive documents
withheld on the basis of any privilege.
On April 4, 2017, Plaintiff served requests for production on Defendants. On
May 6, 2017, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s requests with objections and
responses but purportedly produced no documents or privilege logs.

Plaintiff’s

counsel allegedly contacted defense counsel on May 8, 2017 identifying deficiencies
and requesting supplemental responses, a proper privilege log, and responsive
documents.

Defense counsel responded on May 15, 2017 by sending Plaintiff’s

counsel amended Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures but supposedly produced no
supplemental responses, privilege logs, or documents. Because Defendants have
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allegedly failed to comply with their discovery obligations, Plaintiff seeks to compel
the production of all relevant materials.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that there are deficiencies applicable to
all of Defendants’ responses.2

First, Defendants have allegedly produced no

responsive documents. Second, Plaintiff claims that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34(b)(2)(C) requires that any discovery objection should specify whether documents
are being withheld on the basis of any objection. And third, Plaintiff suggests that
Rule 34 requires Defendants to identify the form of documents Defendants intend to
produce.
In response, Defendants take issue with Plaintiff’s document requests
because they are purportedly overly broad and no effort has allegedly been made to
tailor the requests to the specific issues, claims, and defenses presented in this case.
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requests for production are not limited to
any time period and that Plaintiff’s claims should only concern the time period of
2010 through September 2014. Because Plaintiff’s requests are not limited to the
2010 through September 2014 time period at issue, Defendants argue that the
discovery requests encompass information that is simply not relevant to Plaintiff’s
claims. Third, Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s broad requests for the personal
financial information of Michael and Catherine Cabot should be denied because any
relevant information is already contained in the banking and financial records
regarding the entities at issue. And fourth, Defendants request that the Court give
Specifically, Plaintiff’s Motion is directed at the following discovery
responses: requests nos. 1-10, 19-21, 24-36, 40, 59-62, 65-70, and 73.
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Defendants an additional forty-five (45) days to produce any relevant documents
and prepare a proper privilege log.
A.

Whether the Discovery Requests are Facially Overbroad

The first dispute between the parties concerns the scope of Plaintiff’s
requests and whether they are facially overbroad.

Defendants contend that

Plaintiff made no effort to tailor the requests for production to the specific issues,
claims, and defenses presented in this action and that they are vague, overly broad
in scope, and not reasonably particularized. See, e.g., Audiotext Commc’ns v. U.S.
Telecom, Inc., 1995 WL 18759, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 17, 1995) (“Requests should be
reasonably specific, allowing the respondent to readily identify what is wanted.”).
As support, Defendants rely primarily on the decision in Great Lakes Transp.
Holding LLC v. Yellow Cab Serv. Corp. of Florida, 2010 WL 5093746 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
8, 2010), where the court was presented with similar types of requests for
documents that defendants objected to as overly broad and the court denied, in part,
the plaintiff’s motion to compel:
Defendants argue that these document-production requests are overly
broad, and the Court agrees. Some of the requests do not even seek
information relevant to the claims and defenses here. See, e.g., Pl.’s
Req. for Produc. No. 3 (requesting all documents that mention Great
Lakes). And those that purport to request relevant documents do so in
the broadest way possible. See, e.g., Pl.'s Reqs. for Produc. Nos. 1, 2
(requesting all documents relating to claims and defenses); id. Nos. 6, 7
(seeking all documents reflecting ownership of the marks by anyone).
These requests are in no way tailored to the issues presented here and
thus are not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Also, given the fairly
complex nature of this case, the burdens that these requests would
place on Defendants outweigh any likelihood that the responsive
documents would add new and useful information to the discovery
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record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(3). For these reasons, Plaintiff's
Motion Compel is denied with respect to Requests for Production Nos.
1 through 7, 9, and 43.
Great Lakes Transp. Holding LLC, 2010 WL 5093746, at *5.
Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s discovery requests are improper
because almost all of them use vague terms such as “concerning” or “relating to”.
Defendants point out that many courts have encountered similar discovery requests
and held that the terms are nearly always inappropriate because they are – by their
plain meaning – vague and ambiguous:
The Court notes initially that most of these document requests use the
terms ‘relate to’ or ‘concerning’ in a way that makes the requests
overbroad, vague, and ambiguous. Because these terms are broad,
they might well encompass irrelevant information.
Nor can
Defendants be certain exactly what information the discovery requests
cover and therefore what information is responsive.
Great Lakes Transp. Holding LLC, 2010 WL 5093746, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010)
(internal citations omitted); see also Carter v. Archdale Police Dep’t, 2014 WL
1774471, at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 2, 2014) (“‘A request for all documents ‘relating to’ a
subject is usually subject to criticism as overbroad since . . . all documents ‘relate’ to
all others in some remote fashion. Such a request thus unfairly places the onus of
non-production on the recipient of the request and not where it belongs—upon the
person who drafted such a sloppy request.”’) (quoting Massachusetts v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 727 F. Supp. 35, 36 n. 2 (D. Mass. 1989));
Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 2004 WL 764085, at *5 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 2004)
(holding that request for production seeking “all documents that relate to or
concern” a particular topic was “overly broad on its face”); Audiotext Commc’ns,
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1995 WL 18759, at *1 (explaining that discovery requests worded too broadly
“function like a giant broom, sweeping everything in their path, useful or not”).
In reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendants never complained that the
requests for “all documents”, or “all communications” were not sufficiently
particularized. In fact, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants never responded to
Plaintiff’s May 8, 2017 meet and confer letter nor raised the overbreadth objections
they now assert. Plaintiff’s requests purportedly contain defined terms and are
particularized to the allegations in the pleadings.

Because Plaintiff’s requests

contained defined terms, including the terms “document,” and “communication,”
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants cannot genuinely contend that they do not
understand what materials Plaintiff seeks in discovery.
After full consideration of the arguments presented, Defendants’ response is
largely well taken. “Requests which are worded too broadly or are too all inclusive
of a general topic function like a giant broom, sweeping everything in their path,
useful or not.”

Id. at *1.

In other words, overbroad requests “require the

respondent either to guess or move through mental gymnastics which are
unreasonably time-consuming and burdensome to determine which of many pieces
of paper may conceivably contain some detail, either obvious or hidden, within the
scope of the request.” Id. at *1.
Here, many of Plaintiff’s discovery requests are overly broad because there
are no meaningful limitations on the documents requested. For example, request
no. 67 seeks “[a]ll written statements obtained from or based on interviews with any
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person concerning this action.”

[D.E. 88].

There is little doubt that Plaintiff’s

request encompasses a vast array of individuals that likely have no relevancy to
this case. In other words, many of Plaintiff’s requests, as they stand now, are akin
to a fishing expedition because they seek documents concerning various topics with
no particular focus on the claims at issue in this action. While Plaintiff may have
included definitions for the terms “document,” “communication,” and “concerning,”
those explanations are often unhelpful because they merely refer to large categories
of information that fail to narrow any of the specific requests. Plaintiff has also
failed to present persuasive reasons in support of all the documents requested or
explain why this action requires such a broad array of discovery. Although many of
Plaintiff’s discovery requests are facially overbroad, we will address – further below
– those requests that are both clearly relevant and that can be more easily
narrowed in light of the issues presented.
B.

Whether the Discovery Requests are Overbroad in Time

Next, Defendants contend that the requests for production are not limited to
any time period and that the substance of Plaintiff claims only concerns the years
2010 through September 2014. Because Plaintiff’s requests are not limited to that
time frame, the requests allegedly encompass information that is irrelevant to the
claims in this case. Defendants further suggest that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
contain any substantive allegations of fact supporting a 2006 or 2007 to September
2014 time period because the allegations are too conclusory. As such, Defendants

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believe that the 2010-2014 time period is most relevant and that Plaintiff’s
discovery requests should be narrowed accordingly.
In response, Plaintiff argues that the Court already rejected a similar
argument that Defendants raised in their motions to quash the subpoenas to
various non-parties. The arguments presented here are allegedly no different and
Plaintiff suggests that Defendants’ contentions are actually an improper motion for
reconsideration.

Because the Defendants have essentially raised the same

arguments that were unsuccessfully presented in their motions to quash Plaintiff’s
subpoenas, Plaintiff contends that the temporal scope of 2006 or 2007 to September
2014 should be equally applicable here.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the issue of temporal scope has been
argued before and that the relevant time period set forth in the Court’s prior Order
on this question remains sound. [D.E. 85]. As stated previously, after the alleged
sham entities were created, Wojnar purportedly travelled to Brooklyn, New York in
March of 2007 to meet with the Plaintiff’s owner and to induce the $2 million dollar
investment.

In reliance on several misrepresentations, Plaintiff purportedly

exchanged real estate held in New York for a 17.896% ownership in the Property.
From 2007 until 2011, Wojnar or Cabot sent correspondence to Plaintiff requesting
approval for leases and construction projects. The alleged illegal conduct continued
until it harmed the Property and its owners’ cash flow that the Property entered
foreclosure proceedings in September 2014. Because the relevant events allegedly

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began in either 2006 or 2007 and ended with the Property’s foreclosure in
September 2014, Plaintiff’s discovery requests shall be limited to this time frame.
C.

Whether the Discovery Requests Seek Irrelevant Information

In requests nos. 19-21, Plaintiff seeks the personal financial information of
Michael and Catherine Cabot. Aside from the requests being vague and overbroad
in scope – as discussed above – Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requests for the
personal financial information of the Cabots is irrelevant because the information
sought is already contained in the banking statements and financial documents
regarding the Mariner and WTK entities. As such, Defendants believe that any
relevancy is outweighed by the sensitive and private nature of the financial records
requested.
However, Defendants’ arguments have already been rejected in the Court’s
prior Order on various motions to quash Plaintiff’s subpoenas. [D.E. 85]. In that
Order, the Court found that the financial information of Michael and Catherine
Cabot were central to the fraudulent conduct alleged because the Cabots
purportedly pursued the fraudulent scheme at issue in this action for their own
personal gain.

The financial scheme allegedly included transfers among both

personal and business accounts as a way to conceal the illegal activity. Defendants’
argument is also unpersuasive – for an entirely separate reason – because in order
to prevent the discovery of confidential information, the objecting party must first
show that the information is confidential and that its disclosure might be harmful.
See, e.g., Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackle, 108 F.R.D. 323, 326 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
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(“Under Rule 26(c)(7), there is no absolute privilege that immunizes trade secrets
and similar confidential information from discovery. In order to resist discovery of
such confidential information, a party must first establish that the information
sought is indeed confidential and then demonstrate that its disclosure might be
harmful. Once these requirements are met, the burden shifts to the other party to
establish that discovery of the trade secrets or confidential information is relevant
and necessary to the action.”). Defendants do neither in their response. As such,
Defendants’ arguments, with respect to the personal financial information of the
Cabots, lack merit because the information requested relates directly to the level of
fraudulent activity engaged in during the relevant time period.
Because we have now considered the Defendant’s three main arguments, we
will now turn our attention to a subset of Plaintiff’s requests that are both relevant
and more easily tailored to the issues presented in this action.
D.

Request 1

In request 1, Plaintiff seeks “[a]ll documents concerning the preservation,
loss, destruction, or deletion of any documents concerning the Property or the
claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint.” [D.E. 81-1]. Defendants object to this
discovery request because it is purportedly vague and unclear as to whether
Plaintiff seeks documents regarding document preservation policies or some other
type of document. In response, Plaintiff indicates that the request is clearly focused
on any document preservation or litigation hold policies, and that Defendants
should produce any records that may exist. When coupling the plain language of
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request 1 with Plaintiff’s clarification in response, we agree that request 1 is both
relevant and clear as to the type of documents requested.

As such, Plaintiff’s

Motion, as it relates to request 1, is GRANTED.
E.

Requests 2 and 4

In requests 2 and 4, Plaintiff seeks all documents concerning the formation of
each Mariner entity and WTK.

[D.E. 81-1].

Defendants’ response is that the

document requests are improper because the only entities that were involved with
the Property included (1) Mariner Asset Management, LLC, (2) Mariner Property
Management Services, LLC, (3) Mariner Park Centre H, LLC, (4) Mariner Park
Centre S, LLC, and (5) Mariner Park Centre M, LLC.3 Defendants also argue that
the requests are not proportional to the needs of the case considering the marginal
importance of the requested documents to the claims and defenses in this action.
Therefore, Defendants suggest that the burden and expense of identifying and
producing these documents outweigh any likely benefit.
Yet, Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive given the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint that Wojnar and Cabot are the owners and alter egos of the
Mariner entities and WTK – both of which were created to purportedly further a
fraudulent scheme. [D.E. 1 at ¶ 13] (“Wojnar and Cabot used the Mariner Entities’
bank accounts and corporate shield to embezzle, harbor, and wrongfully take and
shield monies rightfully belonging to Plaintiff and other Property owners, the

The only Mariner entity omitted in Plaintiff’s response was Mariner Asset
Management Services, LLC. When coupled with the five entities identified above,
they are collectively referred to as the “Mariner entities.”
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3

Property’s mortgage lender, and the Property’s tenants.”); [D.E. 1 at ¶ 19] (“Wojnar
and Cabot created WTK solely for the unlawful and fraudulent purpose of
concealing monies wrongfully taken from the Property’s incomes, namely, leasing
commissions, without the knowledge or consent of Plaintiff or any of the other
Property owners, and then using the monies for personal and family benefits.”)].
The documents requested are therefore pertinent to the discovery of whether the
Mariner entities or WTK were formed for the purpose of defrauding Plaintiff. To
this extent, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED because both the Mariner entities and
WTK are clearly relevant to this action and the request for documents is
proportionally tailored.
F.

Requests 3, 5, 6, and 7

In requests 3, 5, 6, and 7, Plaintiff seeks all documents concerning the
ownership interest of any Mariner entity and WTK. Defendants’ response is that
the requests are overbroad because they are not relevant to the parties’ claims or
defenses. However, as stated earlier, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Wojnar and
Cabot are the owners and alter egos of the Mariner entities and WTK – both of
which were created to purportedly further a fraudulent scheme.

The document

requests are therefore clearly relevant and carefully tailored to the issues presented
because Plaintiff seeks documents that demonstrate how Defendants orchestrated
their allegedly fraudulent scheme.

In other words, by seeking documents

concerning ownership interests in any Mariner entity and WTK, Defendants seek to

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develop a complete picture on how these companies operated in defrauding Plaintiff.
Therefore, in response to requests 3, 5, 6, and 7, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part [D.E. 811].
A. Defendants are compelled to produce responsive documents in connection
with requests 1-7.

To this extent, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

Defendants shall comply within fourteen (14) days absent agreement of
the parties otherwise.
B. As for the remaining discovery requests, we find that they are facially
overbroad and therefore Plaintiff’s Motion must be DENIED with leave to
re-serve Defendants with proper discovery requests that are targeted in
scope and relevant to the issues in this action.4

Plaintiff’s discovery

requests should be detailed, reasonably specific, pertinent to the claims
presented, and supported by allegations in the Complaint.

As for Defendants’ request for an additional forty-five (45) days to produce
discovery already agreed upon to Plaintiff, including a proper privilege log, it
appears that the parties have not properly conferred on this issue before seeking
Court intervention. As such, the parties shall work cooperatively on a production
schedule and agree upon a mutually desirable time period for Defendants to provide
a proper privilege log for document requests that are not in dispute.
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4

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 18th day of
July, 2017.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge

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