Gonzalez-Guzman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company et al

Filing 38

ORDER granting 31 Defendant MetLife's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Closing Case. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles (hs01) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 17-20107-CIV-GAYLES
VICTOR GONZALEZ-GUZMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant MetLife’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint [ECF No. 31]. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the record and is
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND 1
On October 1, 2005, Plaintiff Victor Gonzalez-Guzman (“Plaintiff”) obtained a disability
insurance policy (the “Policy”) from Defendant MetLife (“Defendant”). In the event Plaintiff
became totally disabled, and therefore unable to work, the Policy provided that Plaintiff would
receive $5,350 in monthly benefits until he reached the age of 65.
Sometime in late 2009 or early 2010, Plaintiff’s health began to deteriorate. According to
his treating physicians, Plaintiff suffered from, among other things, fibromyalgia. On June 4,
2010, Plaintiff resigned from his employment due to his “medical and personal condition.” [ECF
No. 30]. In July 2010, Plaintiff submitted a claim to Defendant for his disability benefits under

1
The Court takes the allegations from the Complaint [ECF 1] as true for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. See
Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). “Although analysis of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto, a court may consider
documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s
claim.” Starship Enter. of Atlanta, Inc. v Coweta County, Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1252, n. 13 (11th Cir. 2013).

the Policy. On December 8, 2010, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed, and on
December 21, 2010, Defendant denied the appeal.
Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff retained an attorney to challenge Defendant’s decision. On
May 23, 2012, the parties attended a mediation conference at Plaintiff’s attorney’s office.
Defendant had an agent at the conference (“Defendant’s Agent”). Plaintiff alleges that during
the mediation, outside of the presence of his attorney, Defendant’s Agent told him that she could
call the FBI and accuse him of insurance fraud and that his insurance contract was a nullity.
Despite these alleged threats, Defendant’s Agent offered Plaintiff a $100,000 advance payment
and purportedly stated that she would continue to investigate Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff alleges
that he then left the room to discuss the advance payment with his attorney, who encouraged him
to accept the settlement. That same day, Plaintiff signed a Settlement Agreement.
The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part:
1.

For and in consideration of the payment of One Hundred Thousand dollars
($100,000) . . . [Plaintiff] hereby releases, discharges and acquits
[Defendant] . . . from any and all “Claims and Causes of Action[]” . . .
which [Plaintiff] may have . . . which arose out of or are in any matter
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, connected with or related to (a) [the
Policy]; and (b) any act, omission, transaction, dealing, conduct or
negotiation of any kind whatsoever by [Defendant or Defendant’s agents] .
. . in connection with or related to the Policy.

2.

[Plaintiff] hereby acknowledges that the payment of the sum referred to
above represents payment for his claim for disability income benefits. The
payment constitutes full satisfaction and discharge of all of the Claims and
Causes of Action[]. In connection, [Plaintiff] warrants, represents and
agrees that the sole consideration for executing the Settlement Agreement
and Release (the “Agreement”) and for releasing said Claims and Causes
of Action is the payment of said sum.

8.

. . . [Plaintiff] understands and agrees that this Agreement shall not be
subject to any claim of mistake of fact, duress, lack of mental capacity to
execute the Agreement, or fraud and that it expresses the FULL,
COMPLETE AND FINAL SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE of any and
all claims relating to the Policy. Further, the release given herein by
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[Plaintiff] shall be and remain in effect as a full, complete and final release
notwithstanding the discovery of any such different or additional facts.
[PLAINTIFF] ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE HAS READ THIS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE AND THAT HE FULLY
KNOWS, UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES ITS CONTENTS, AND
THAT HE EXECUTES THE SAME AND MAKES THE SETTLEMENT
PROVIDED FOR HEREIN VOLUNTARILY AND OF HIS OWN FREE WILL.
[ECF No. 27-1]. Both Plaintiff and his counsel signed the Settlement Agreement as certified by
a notary public. Plaintiff alleges that he received a gross payment of $100,000, of which his
counsel received $42,000.
On January 9, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Defendant
asking the Court to rescind the Settlement Agreement and enforce the Policy. 2 The Court
granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, permitting Plaintiff, now represented
by counsel, to file an Amended Complaint. On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended
Complaint setting forth claims for (1) Breach of Contract (relating to the Policy); (2) Declaratory
Relief (relating to the Policy); (3) Declaratory Relief seeking Rescission of the Settlement
Agreement; (4) Fraudulent Misrepresentation (relating to the mediation conference and
Settlement Agreement); and (5) Fraud in the Inducement (relating to the mediation conference
and Settlement Agreement). 3

Defendant has moved to dismiss arguing that all of Plaintiff’s

claims are time barred. In response, Plaintiff argues that the applicable statutes of limitations
should be tolled and that Defendant should be prevented from raising such a statute of limitations
defense. In particular, Plaintiff claims that he relied on Defendant’s purported representations,
made in advance of the written Settlement Agreement, that it would continue to investigate
2
Plaintiff filed the same Complaint in 2016 in a lawsuit that was dismissed without prejudice. See 16-cv24592-KMM. For the Court’s statute of limitations analysis, Plaintiff’s prior action is irrelevant. See McBride v.
Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[T]here exists a well-established line of authority in
civil cases holding that, when an action is dismissed, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the period that the
dismissed action was pending; rather, the statute will run as if the dismissed action had never been filed.”).
3
In Count Six, Plaintiff pled a “Demand for Punitive Damages.” However, in his response to the Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that a demand for punitive damages is not a cause of action. See ECF No. 32.

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Plaintiff’s claims for an additional six months. As a result, Plaintiff contends that the statutes of
limitations did not begin to run until six months after he signed the Settlement Agreement, and
that, therefore, his claims are timely. The Court disagrees.
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although
this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than
unadorned, the defendant–unlawfully–harmed me accusations.” Id. (alteration added)(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To meet this “plausibility standard,” a
plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678 (alteration added) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as
true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
I. Statute of Limitations
Statutes of limitations exist “to prevent the litigation of stale claims – claims as to which
the defense may be hampered because of passage of time, lost evidence, faded memories, or
disappearing witnesses. . . .” Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Where the “allegations [of the Complaint], on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars
recovery on the claim,” dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). Cotton v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003); AVCO Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 494, 495 (11th
Cir. 1982) (“a statute of limitations defense may be raised on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted under [Rule]12(b)(6) . . . when the complaint shows
on its face that the limitations period has run . . . .”).
It is undisputed that, without tolling, all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. The statute
of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims relating to a breach of the Policy (Counts I and II) is five
years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2). Defendant denied the appeal of Plaintiff’s claim under the
Policy on December 21, 2010. Accordingly, the time for Plaintiff to file an action for Counts I
and II expired on December 21, 2015. The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims for
rescission of the settlement agreement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraud in the inducement
(Counts III, IV, and V) is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j),(l). Plaintiff’s rescission and
fraud claims stem from the mediation, and subsequent Settlement Agreement, on May 23, 2012.
Accordingly, the time for Plaintiff to file an action for Counts III, IV, and V expired on May 23,
2016.
Recognizing that his claims are time barred, Plaintiff argues that the statutes of
limitations should be tolled under Florida Statute § 95.051(1)(f), which provides that the running
of the statute of limitations is tolled by “payment of any part of the principal or interest of any
obligation or liability founded on a written instrument.” Fla. Stat. § 95.051(1)(f). In addition,
Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should operate to bar Defendant’s statute
of limitations defense. Plaintiff bases his arguments on Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation at
the mediation conference that the $100,000 payment was not a full settlement and that it would

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continue to investigate Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff’s self-serving allegations are belied by the
unambiguous and plain language of the Settlement Agreement.
The Settlement Agreement clearly states that the $100,000 payment was for full
satisfaction of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff released Defendant for any further claims.
Plaintiff signed the Settlement Agreement, is bound by its terms, and cannot now say that he did
not understand it. See Silver v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1341
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Parties who sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they
have read them or understood them.”) (quoting MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica
Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendant’s purported oral representation that it would
continue to investigate the claim negates the terms of the Settlement Agreement and, at a
minimum, estops Defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense. This argument is
without merit. Plaintiff cannot rely on alleged oral statements to avoid the statute of limitations,
when the oral statements are contradicted by the unambiguous Settlement Agreement. Indeed,
“Florida courts have found that claims for fraud were barred when the alleged misrepresentation
explicitly contradict[s] an unambiguous provision in a written contract.” Id. (citing Wilson v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)); see also Altenel, Inc. v.
Millennium Partners, L.L.C., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“[A]llowing
Plaintiffs to proceed with fraud claims contradicted by a subsequent agreement is to invite
contracting parties to make agreements . . . and then avoid them simply by taking the stand and
swearing that they relied on some other statement.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Further,

any evidence Plaintiff would seek to admit regarding Defendant’s oral

misrepresentations would be barred by the parol evidence rule. See Silver, 760 F. Supp. 2d at
1342 (“parol evidence cannot be admitted to create an ambiguity where none otherwise exists.”);
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Acquisition Corp. of America v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 760 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(“It is undisputed that parol evidence may not be introduced to vary or contradict the
unambiguous terms of a contract.”). In short, Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant’s alleged oral
misrepresentations to evade the statutes of limitations for his claims. 4
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant MetLife’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 31] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action shall be CLOSED for administrative
purposes, and all pending motions are DENIED as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 30th day of October,
2017.

________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4
The Court notes that Defendant moved to dismiss based only on its statute of limitations defense. But, as
detailed above, Plaintiff’s fraud claims – even if they had been timely filed – would fail to state a claim as they are
belied by the Settlement Agreement. See Altenel, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (holding that where a fraud claim is based
on oral misrepresentations that are contradicted by a later written agreement, it is appropriate to dismiss at the
pleading stage).

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