Waugh et al v. Sarasota County Sheriff Office

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Closing Case. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 3/28/2017. (zvr) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 17-cv-21145-GAYLES
NATHANIEL WAUGH, MARCUS WAUGH,
and VERLEY WAUGH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SARASOTA COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a sua sponte review of the record. Plaintiff
Nathaniel Waugh (“Nathaniel”), appearing pro se, 1 filed a Complaint in this action on March 28,
2017 [ECF No. 1]. Because Nathaniel has moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF
No. 4], the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 are applicable. Pursuant to that statute, courts
are permitted to dismiss a suit “any time [] the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
“The standards that govern a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
apply” to a dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1319-20
(11th Cir. 2008). Under those standards, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” meaning that it must contain “factual

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While the caption names Nathaniel Waugh, Marcus Waugh, and Verley Waugh as Plaintiffs in this action, Nathaniel
alone has signed both the Complaint and the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. As a pro se litigant,
Nathaniel cannot prosecute any claims in federal court on behalf of other persons. See Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d
1324, 1324 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[O]nly licensed lawyers may represent others in court.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(“[P]arties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .” (emphasis added)). Thus, to the
extent the Complaint alleges any claim or claims on behalf of Marcus Waugh or Verley Waugh, those claims are
dismissed.

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations
as true, “conclusory allegations . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth—legal conclusions
must be supported by factual allegations.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010).
“[T]he pleadings are construed broadly,” Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 437 F.3d 1118,
1120 (11th Cir. 2006), and the allegations in the complaint are viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 817 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998). However, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel
for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs.,
Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled
on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d 701. At bottom, the question is not whether
the claimant “will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal
court’s threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).
According to the Complaint, Nathaniel brings a claim against Defendant Sarasota County
Sheriff’s Office pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. From the Court’s review of the Complaint, the only
factual allegation that could possibly give rise to such a claim is the allegation that Nathaniel was
somehow subjected to what he terms an “unconstitutional arrest [and] confinement” on or around
January 18, 2016. Compl. at 2. As an initial matter, this allegation is merely a legal conclusion, unsupported by facts, which the Court is not required to accept. Apart from that, in no way would this
single allegation give the Defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). For this reason, the Court concludes
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that the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It is therefore
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
(1)

the Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(2)

the Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 4] is DENIED; Plaintiff Nathaniel
Waugh may refile the motion if he chooses to amend his Complaint; and

(3)

Plaintiff Nathaniel Waugh shall have leave to amend his Complaint. If he chooses
to do so, he must separate his claims into counts, with appropriate headings indicating
the cause of action. Below each heading, he shall assert, either expressly or inferentially, the elements applicable to the cause of action, the facts giving rise to the claim,
and any relevant statutes. He shall number the paragraphs of his complaint sequentially. Such amended complaint must be filed no later than April 28, 2017. If he fails
to do so, the Court shall dismiss his Complaint with prejudice.

This action is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 28th day of March, 2017.

________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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