Longhini v. 141st Street Center, LLC et al

Filing 61

ORDER granting 32 Motion to Dismiss; granting 32 Motion for More Definite Statement; granting 45 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice 1 Complaint, or Alternatively, MOTION for More Definite Statement by Hong Hong Inc., WBH Corp.. Responses due by 11/17/2017 Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 12/8/2017. (ail)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Doug Longhini, Plaintiff,
v.
141st Street Center, LLC, and
others, Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-23061-Civ-Scola
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Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
The Plaintiff bring this lawsuit pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12103, 12181-12205a (“ADA”). This matter
is before the Court on Defendants Samare, Inc. (“Samare”), WBH Corp.
(“WBH”), and Hong Hong Inc.’s (“Hong Hong’s”) motions to dismiss (ECF Nos.
32, 45). For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court grants the motions
to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 45).
1. Background
Plaintiff Douglas Longhini is a disabled individual who requires the use
of a wheelchair to ambulate. (Compl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges
that Defendants 141st Street Center, LLC (“141st Street Center”), Samaniky,
LLC, (“Samaniky”), International Agencies, Inc. (“International Agencies”),
Samare, and WBH own and operate commercial properties. (Id. ¶¶ 5-18.)
Defendant Mattress Firm, Inc. (“Mattress Firm”) owns and operates a mattress
business, and Defendant Hong Hong owns and operates an ice cream business.
(Id. ¶¶ 8, 18.) The Complaint alleges that 141st Street Center, Samaniky,
International Agencies, Samare, and WBH “operate and/or oversee individual
commercial properties which, combined, make up the commercial property
known to the public as ‘Mitchell Center’ . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) The relationship
between Mattress Firm and Hong Hong with these Defendants is not specified,
although it appears that Hong Hong and WBH have the same address, and
Mattress Firm and 141st Street Center have the same address. (See id. ¶¶ 6, 8,
16, 18.)
Longhini alleges that he visited the businesses in the Mitchell Center and
encountered architectural barriers in violation of the ADA. (Id. ¶ 28.) Longhini
seeks injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 13-14.) The Plaintiff
has settled the claims against 141st Street Center (ECF No. 59), the claims
against International Agencies have been dismissed pursuant to a joint
stipulation of dismissal (ECF No. 49), Samaniky and Mattress Firm have

answered the Complaint (ECF Nos. 16, 30), and Samare, WBH, and Hong Hong
have filed motions to dismiss.
2. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement
of the claims” that “will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme
Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citations omitted).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations and citations
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, “only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the
plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a
claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
73 (1984).
3. Analysis
In order to establish a claim for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must establish that: (1) he is disabled; (2) the subject facility is a public
accommodation; and (3) he was denied full and equal enjoyment of the public
accommodation as a result of his disability. See Ass’n for Disabled Americans,
Inc. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(Highsmith, J.). Samare, WBH, and Hong Hong argue that the Complaint does
not sufficiently identify the architectural barriers that Longhini encountered in
each of the Defendants’ businesses. Thus, they argue that the Plaintiff has
failed to establish the third element.
“Although a complaint against multiple defendants is usually read as
making the same allegation against each defendant individually,” a plaintiff
must still provide a factual basis to distinguish each defendant’s conduct.
Petrovic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2012 WL 3026368, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July
20, 2012) (Altonaga, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the

Complaint fails to provide a factual basis to distinguish each defendant’s
conduct. According to the Complaint, each of the Defendants owns and
operates a commercial property or business at a discrete address. (Compl. ¶¶
5-18.) Although the Complaint alleges that 141st Street Center, Samaniky,
International Agencies, Samare, and WBH’s properties “make up” the Mitchell
Center, it is unclear from the Complaint whether there is any relationship
between the Defendants. The Complaint identifies architectural barriers in the
following categories: “Parking,” “Entrance Access and Path of Travel,” “Access
to Goods and Services,” and “Public Restrooms.” (Compl. ¶ 36.) In light of the
allegations that each Defendant owns and operates a commercial property with
a discrete address, it is unclear whether the parking lot, entrance access, path
of travel, and public restrooms in which the architectural barriers are located
are common to all of the properties. Moreover, the Complaint does not actually
allege that any of the Defendants owns, operates, or leases these common
areas.
With respect to the architectural barriers that were presumably
encountered in specific properties, the Complaint does not specify the
properties in which the barriers are located. For example, the Plaintiff alleges
that he “could not utilize the tables for their intended use,” but fails to identify
the business(es) in which he encountered this barrier. (Id. ¶ 36C1.) A second
example is the Plaintiff’s allegation that “[t]he doors at several of the building
entrances are fitted with inaccessible hardware . . . .” (Id. ¶ 36B3.) While it is
clear that this allegation does not apply to all of the Defendants, it is unclear to
which Defendants it does apply.
Simply put, the Complaint fails to provide a factual basis to distinguish
each Defendant’s conduct. It is unclear which allegations pertain to which
Defendants; whether the parking lot, entrance path, and public restrooms are
common to all of the Defendants’ properties; and whether the Plaintiff even
encountered architectural barriers in areas owned, operated, or leased by each
Defendant. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face because the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to
support his assertion that each of the Defendants discriminated against the
Plaintiff on the basis of his disability. See, e.g., Longhini v. Hayday, Inc. et. al.,
No. 17-20330, 2017 WL 2703557, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2017) (Scola, J.)
(dismissing claims against tenant defendants because the complaint did not
establish that those defendants exercised control over the public restrooms in
which the plaintiff encountered architectural barriers); Ramnarine v. Epic
Realty of Ohio II, LLC, No. 10-81162, 2011 WL 52410, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6,
2011) (Cohn, J.) (dismissing complaint in part because it did not distinguish
“which alleged barriers pertain to the outparcel restaurant as compared with
barriers that pertain to the separate strip shopping center.”).

4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants Samare, WBH, and Hong
Hong’s motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 45). Because the deficiencies
identified in the motions to dismiss apply to all of the remaining Defendants,
the Court dismisses without prejudice the Complaint as to Defendants
Samaniky, Mattress Firm, Samare, WBH, and Hong Hong. If the Plaintiff is able
to correct the deficiencies in the Complaint, he may file an amended complaint
on or before December 22, 2017.
Done and ordered in chambers, at Miami, Florida, on December 8,
2017.
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Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge