Cain v. Burger King Corporation

Filing 29

ORDER on Motion to Dismiss. ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Amended Complaint due by 8/24/2018. Responses due by 9/7/2018. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 8/13/2018. See attached document for full details. (kpe)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Keaira Cain, Plaintiff
v.
Burger King Corporation, Defendant

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Civil Action No. 18-20482-Civ-Scola
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Order on Motion to Dismiss
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Burger King
Corporation’s (“Burger King”) motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) Count II of
Plaintiff Keaira Cain’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants Burger King’s motion (ECF No. 16).
1. Background
Burger King hired Cain as a shift coordinator on September 20, 2013.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 14.) On or about May 6, 2014, Cain’s daughter was
diagnosed with septo-optic dysplasia and considered legally blind. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
The next day, Cain informed Burger King of her daughter’s diagnosis. (Id. at
¶ 23.) Burger King’s district manager questioned Cain about how she planned
to take care of her daughter and maintain her work schedule. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
Cain was also prevented from working. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 30.) On May 19, 2014,
Burger King terminated Cain. (Id. at ¶ 31.)
On February 7, 2018, Cain filed the instant lawsuit against Burger King.
After Burger King filed its initial motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12), Cain filed her
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14). In it, Cain claims that Burger King
discriminated against her and terminated her in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., (Count I) and in
violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat § 760.01, et seq.,
(Count II) because of her association with her disabled daughter. Burger King
now moves for the Court to dismiss Cain’s FCRA claim with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. (Mot., ECF No. 16.)
2. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the complaint’s allegations as

true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.
McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading need only contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does
not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). A plaintiff must articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not survive dismissal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
3. Analysis
The FCRA makes it unlawful for employers to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an individual “with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital
status.” Fla. Stat § 760.10(1)(a).1 The ADA likewise prohibits this type of
discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), but also extends its protections to
individuals who have been excluded or otherwise denied equal jobs or benefits
“because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
Cain alleges in her complaint that Burger King violated the FCRA by
discriminating against her and terminating her based on her daughter’s
disability. Burger King argues that the FCRA, unlike the ADA, does not provide
protections against association discrimination. Burger King cites to two cases
from the Middle District of Florida in which the district court rejected attempts
by plaintiffs to assert claims similar to Cain’s claim. Cain responds that
During Cain’s employment, the FCRA did not include a protection against discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. See Fla. Stat. § 760.01, et seq. (1992). The FCRA was amended in 2015
to include an explicit prohibition against discrimination based on pregnancy. See Fla. Stat.
§ 760.01, et seq. (2015).
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although there is no explicit provision in the FCRA that prohibits association
discrimination, the Court should construe the FCRA liberally and in conformity
with the ADA. (Resp., ECF No. 21.)
The Court agrees with Burger King, and declines Cain’s invitation to
create Florida law. First, “a statute’s plain language controls unless it is
‘inescapably ambiguous.’” Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
704 F.3d 910, 915 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d
1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 1998)). The FCRA’s plain language does not include a
provision that mirrors the ADA’s provision that protects against association
discrimination. Although the FCRA is generally construed in conformity with
the ADA, see Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 835 (11th Cir. 2007), that
does not mean that the Court can stretch the text of the FCRA to mirror the
ADA’s protections without a basis to do so. See Stansell, 704 F.3d at 917
(“Similarities between laws, however, do not make them the same law.”).
Further, the FCRA’s directive that it “shall be liberally construed to
further the general purposes” of the statute, see Fla. Stat. § 760.01(3), does not
give the Court unlimited power to draft Florida law. Cain has not attempted to
explain how the FCRA can be read to include a protection against association
discrimination and has failed to provide the Court with any evidence that the
Florida legislature intended to protect against association discrimination.
Moreover, Cain did not cite, nor has the Court located, a case in which a
Florida court interpreted the FCRA to include such a protection.
To the extent Cain relies on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Delva
v. Control Group, Inc., 137 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 2014) to persuade the Court to
liberally construe the FCRA beyond its own limitations, the Court is
unconvinced. The Florida Supreme Court in Delva was deciding whether the
FCRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination encompassed discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. Delva, 137 So. 3d at 371–72. The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that discrimination based on pregnancy “is subsumed within
the prohibition in the FCRA against discrimination based on an individual’s
‘sex.’” Id. at 375. In reaching its holding, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted
a provision that was already part of the FCRA and considered legislative intent.
It was not liberally construing the statute to create a whole new protected class
without a basis in the text or legislative intent, which is what Cain is effectively
asking the Court to do.
Moreover, as noted by Burger King, other federal courts have similarly
declined to extend the FCRA to include a protection against association
discrimination. See Beatty v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-607-FtM38CM, 2015 WL 7777520, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2015); Lynn v. Lee Mem’l
Health Sys., No. 2:15-cv-161-FtM-38, 2015 WL 4645369 at *2–*3 (M.D. Fla.

Aug. 4, 2015). Cain argues that the Court should follow Gonzalez v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-80937-CIV, 2013 WL 5435789 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27,
2013) (Marra, J.) instead. Although the district court in Gonzalez did allow
certain forms of the plaintiff’s association discrimination claim to move
forward, it did not go so far as to hold that the FCRA allowed for a claim for
association discrimination, and instead assumed that was the case for its
purposes. Id. at *8–*13. The Court does not find Gonzalez persuasive because
the district court in that case did not address the issue before the Court today.
The Court concludes that the FCRA’s plain language does not protect
against association discrimination. The Court finds no basis to expand the
FCRA to create such a protection.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants Burger King’s motion to dismiss (ECF
No. 16). The Court dismisses Count II of the Amended Complaint with
prejudice. Cain shall file an amended complaint on or before August 24, 2018.
Burger King’s answer is due on or before September 7, 2018.
Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on August 13, 2018.

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Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge