Garcia v. Scottsdale Insurance Company

Filing 13

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Miscellaneous Deadline 7/27/2018. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 7/16/2018. See attached document for full details. (lbc)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Ricardo Garcia, Plaintiff,
v.
Scottsdale Insurance Co.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 18-20509-Civ-Scola
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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Ricardo Garcia claims Scottsdale Insurance Co. (“Scottsdale”)
breached an insurance contract by failing to cover damages suffered by his
residence on March 26, 2016. Garcia seeks relief under four counts: count one,
for breach of contract; count two, for declaratory relief; count three, for breach
of the duty of good faith under Fla. Stat. § 624.155, and count four, for a
petition for mediation. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1). Scottsdale argues that Garcia’s
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7). Garcia responds that his
complaint has alleged sufficient facts to adequately state a claim. (Pl.’s Resp.,
ECF No. 8). After careful review, the Court agrees with Scottsdale and grants
its motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7).
1. Factual Background*
Garcia owns a residence in Miami, Florida, and maintains an insurance
policy on the property through Scottsdale. (Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 8). On March 26,
2016, his property suffered water damage, for which he initiated an insurance
claim with Scottsdale. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–9). Scottsdale has not paid the full amount
of damages Garcia sought in his claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–13). Furthermore,
Scottsdale has never sent an insurance adjuster to evaluate Garcia’s claim,
and Garcia was therefore forced to hire a public adjuster. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 31).
Garcia has previously provided Scottsdale with notice of his belief that
Scottsdale has failed to fulfill its contractual duties under his insurance policy.
(Id. at ¶ 36).
Garcia filed his complaint in state court on January 9, 2018. (Compl.).
Scottsdale removed the case to federal court on February 8, 2018, on grounds
This Factual Background is comprised of Garcia’s allegations, which the Court accepts as
true and construes in the light most favorable to Garcia per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

*

of diversity jurisdiction, alleging diversity of citizenship and claims in excess of
$75,000. (Def.’s Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1).
2. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the complaint’s allegations as
true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.
McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading need only contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does
not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must articulate
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not survive dismissal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable
and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a
prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In light of these standards, the Court finds that Garcia has failed to
adequately state a claim for which relief can be granted.
3. Legal Analysis
A. Garcia fails to state a claim for breach of contract.
Garcia argues that his complaint sufficiently alleges the elements of a
breach of contract action and should therefore survive the motion to dismiss.
(Pl.’s Resp. at 4–5). The Court disagrees, however, and finds Garcia’s complaint
to contain mere legal conclusions with no factual support.
In his response, Garcia points to paragraphs forty-two through forty-five
of his complaint as evidence he has fulfilled his Rule 8 requirements. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 4–5). These paragraphs, however, simply conclude that Scottsdale

breached its contract with Garcia without providing any facts showing what
provision of the contract Scottsdale is alleged to have breached. (Compl. at
¶¶ 42–45). Garcia provides no statement alleging what part of his property was
damaged, what caused the damage, what repairs were necessary, what policy
provisions Scottsdale breached by not covering his loss, or even what portions
of his claim Scottsdale declined to cover under his policy. As such, his
complaint presents nothing more than the sort of “the defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation” that Iqbal prohibits. 556 U.S. at 678.
Garcia does make specific reference to the claim number Scottsdale has
assigned to him. (Compl. at ¶ 9). He argues that his citation of the claim
number should allow Scottsdale to properly respond to his allegations. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 3). The Court disagrees, however, as the mere citation of the claim
number in Garcia’s complaint does not put the Court on notice as to the nature
of his actual dispute with Scottsdale. Furthermore, his citing only the claim
number does not give Scottsdale adequate notice of Garcia’s legal theories to
which it must respond. Indeed, Scottsdale itself makes reference to a second
dispute and lawsuit with Garcia over the same insurance policy, arguing that
the current complaint makes no distinctions between the two existing policy
disputes. (Def.’s Resp. at 3); Garcia v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-24565
(S.D. Fla. remanded May 23, 2018). Because Garcia does not provide any facts
to support his legal conclusions, his complaint fails to rise above a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As
such, the Court finds Garcia has failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
B. Garcia’s request for declaratory judgment is duplicative of his
claim for breach of contract.
Declaratory judgment claims may properly coexist with breach of
contract claims when they provide the plaintiff a form of relief unavailable
under the breach of contract claim. See Kenneth F. Hackett & Assoc., Inc. v. GE
Capital Info. Tech. Solutions, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(Altonaga, J.) (finding plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim could affect future
payments or rate increases under the existing contract and so sought different
relief than the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim). Such claims for declaratory
judgment must be forward-looking, rather than retrospective, as any
retrospective declaration would be equally solved by resolution of the breach of
contract claim. Id. Therefore, the Court finds Garcia’s claim for declaratory
judgment duplicative and dismisses it without prejudice.
Garcia argues that he seeks “a declaratory judgment as to the party’s
obligations and duties to cooperatively adjust the loss.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 10). He

bases his claim on Scottsdale’s “failure and refusal to properly adjust the loss.”
(Id.). In his complaint, he requests a determination of “rights, duties, and
obligations with respect to . . . the subject loss.” (Compl. at ¶ 54). From the face
of Garcia’s complaint, then, the Court finds that Garcia’s claim for declaratory
judgment covers the same dispute as his breach-of-contract claim. This Court
has previously found that it should not hear claims for declaratory judgment
on issues which are properly raised in other counts. See Fernando Grinberg
Trust Success Int’l Properties LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 10-20448-Civ, 2010
WL 2510662, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 21, 2010) (Cooke, J.) (finding plaintiff’s claim
for declaratory judgment subsumed by its breach-of-contract claim). Therefore,
the Court dismisses Garcia’s claim for declaratory judgment, with leave to
amend should he believe he can adequately state a claim for declaratory
judgment which is not duplicative of his breach-of-contract claim.
C. Garcia’s claim for bad faith should be dismissed.
Actions against insurers for bad faith under Fla. Stat. § 624.155 do not
accrue until the insured’s underlying claim for insurance benefits is resolved.
Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991).
Noting this, Garcia argues that his bad-faith claim against Scottsdale should
be abated, rather than dismissed. (Pl.’s Resp. at 7). He relies primarily on a
Southern District of Florida case, Laxman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., where this
Court found that the plaintiff’s bad-faith claim should be abated for reasons of
judicial economy. No. 2:14-cv-14413-RNR, 2015 WL 845582, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 25, 2015) (Rosenberg, J.). However, the Court is not convinced that, in
this case, abatement is the best approach.
Premature bad faith claims based on Fla. Stat. § 624.155 may be either
abated or dismissed at the discretion of the trial court. Laxman, 2015 WL
845582 at *2 (citing Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Studio Imports, Ltd., 76 So. 3d
963, 964-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Garcia asserts that abatement is the proper
remedy to apply at this point, focusing on the interests of judicial economy:
primarily, his desire to keep his bad-faith claim in front of the same judge who
hears his breach-of-contract claim. (Pl.’s Resp. at 8). However, the Court is
persuaded that dismissal of the bad-faith claim is the more appropriate action
in this case. As this Court has found before, “abating the bad faith claim, even
if it may be in the interest of judicial economy, is not the proper route. Bringing
a premature bad faith claim is contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Fantecchi v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, No. 15-23969-CIVALTONAGA, 2015 WL 12516629, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2015) (Altonaga, J.)
(citing Bele v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296)
(M.D. Fla. 2015) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds it more

appropriate to dismiss Garcia’s bad-faith claim without prejudice rather than
abate it.
4. Conclusion
Because Garcia’s complaint does not allege specific facts in support of its
legal conclusions, the Court finds he fails to adequately state a claim for breach
of contract for which relief can be granted under count one. Because Garcia’s
complaint alleges the same grounds for his declaratory judgment claim as his
breach-of-contract claim, count two is duplicative of count one. Because his
claim for bad faith is untimely, count three also fails.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 7). If Garcia believes he can amend his complaint, consistent
with the above, to properly state a claim for breach of contract as well as a
separate claim for a declaratory judgment, he must do so by July 27, 2018.
Scottsdale must thereafter respond to any amended complaint within fourteen
days of its filing.
Done and ordered in chambers, at Miami, Florida, on July 16, 2018.
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Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge