Gomez v. Chevron Corporation
Filing
22
Order on Motion to Dismiss. Amended Complaint due by 8/3/2018. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 7/26/2018. See attached document for full details. (vmz)
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Andres Gomez, Plaintiff,
v.
Chevron Corp., Defendant.
)
)
) Civil Action No. 18-20598-Civ-Scola
)
)
Order on Motion to Dismiss
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendant Chevron
Corporation’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mot., ECF No. 17.) After careful
consideration of the motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, the
record in this case and the applicable case law, the Court grants the motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 17).
1. Background
Gomez filed the instant lawsuit under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (the “ADA”), alleging that
the Defendant’s website, www.chevron.com, is inaccessible to the visually
impaired. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-3.) The Defendant is an American multinational
energy corporation with multiple franchised gasoline stations in Florida. (Id.
¶ 16.) The Defendant’s website allows consumers to locate Chevron gasoline
stations, and supports sales and services at the physical locations. (Id. ¶¶, 16
18.)
The Plaintiff is legally blind, and therefore a member of a protected class
under the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 15.) As a legally blind individual, he must use screen
reader software to access and comprehend information on the internet. (Id.
¶ 20.) The Plaintiff alleges that when he attempted to access the Defendant’s
website, the website did not integrate with his screen reader software and the
website was inaccessible as a result. (Id. ¶ 22.) The Plaintiff claims that if the
Defendant’s website was accessible, he would have been able to independently
research products and services offered at the Defendant’s gasoline stations and
visited one of those gasoline stations for in-person purchases. (Id. ¶ 27.)
The Defendant, a Delaware corporation, is seeking dismissal under Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction.
2. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the Court conducts a two-part analysis. Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF
Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). First,
the Court must determine whether the applicable state long-arm statute is
satisfied. Id. at 1249 (citation omitted). Second, if the state long-arm statute is
satisfied, the Court must analyze whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2013).
A plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof of pleading sufficient material
facts to support long-arm jurisdiction. Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at
1249. The burden then “shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing
of the inapplicability of the statute.” Id. (quoting Prentice v. Prentice Colour, Inc.,
779 F. Supp. 578, 583 (M.D. Fla. 1991)). Once this prima facie showing is
made, “the plaintiff is required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in
the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate
the factual allegations in the complaint.” Id.
3. Analysis
The Defendant requests dismissal arguing that, because the Plaintiff’s
claim is based on website design and programming, and the Defendant’s
website was designed and is maintained outside of Florida, the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction in this case. (See Aff. of Kari H. Endries, ECF No. 17 at
10.) The Defendant argues further that the Plaintiff’s claim is not based on any
of Chevron’s activities in Florida. However, properly construed, the Plaintiff’s
claim asserts that the Defendant’s physical locations in Florida are inaccessible
to blind individuals in violation of the ADA because the website, which
constitutes in part a tool to locate physical stores, does not interface with the
Plaintiff’s screen reading software. Thus, the Defendant’s arguments do not
correctly characterize the Plaintiff’s claim. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff must
sufficiently allege facts to support long-arm jurisdiction in the first instance.
Accordingly, the Court examines the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint.
In pertinent part, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s physical store
locations and website work collectively, and together offer services to the public
in South Florida. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.) In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that
the website is offered as a tool to locate physical gasoline stations. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Upon review, these allegations alone are insufficient to satisfy the long-arm
statute.
Although the Plaintiff claims that Chevron does substantial business in
South Florida and that its stores in South Florida work in conjunction with its
website, it is not apparent upon which basis the Court may find the long-arm
statute to be satisfied.1 In his response (ECF No. 18), the Plaintiff argues that
because the website is intended to be used in conjunction with brick and
mortar locations in Florida, and the Defendant solicits customers in Florida
through its website, Chevron has established sufficient minimum contacts to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. However, the Plaintiff’s argument
conflates the two prongs of the Court’s analysis, and in any event, the Plaintiff
may not amend the factual allegations in the complaint in his response to the
motion to dismiss. See Burgess v. Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 665 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2009)) (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit has “repeatedly [ ] held that plaintiffs cannot amend their
complaint through a response to a motion to dismiss.”); see also Tsavaris v.
Pfizer, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-21826-KMM, 2016 WL 375008, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1,
2016) (Moore, J.) (“A plaintiff, though, cannot amend the complaint in a
response to a motion to dismiss, for a court’s review on dismissal is limited to
the four corners of the complaint.”) (citing St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d
1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)).2
As a result, as currently pled, the Plaintiff fails to satisfy the initial
burden of pleading sufficient facts to support long-arm jurisdiction in this case.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction (ECF No. 17) and the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice. The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before August 3,
2018.
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on July 26, 2018.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
Gomez cites to subsections (1)(b) and (1)(f) of the Florida long-arm statute, Fla. Stat.
§ 48.193; however, the statute has been amended—subsection (1)(f) no longer exists,
and it is unclear how subsection (1)(b) applies in this case. Even if the Court considers
the corresponding sections in the current statute, the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient.
1
The Court notes in addition that the Plaintiff also includes a standing argument in
the response, which was not raised by the Defendant in its motion to dismiss.
2
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