Patterson v. Miami-Dade County et al

Filing 44

ORDER DISMISSING CASE granting 20 Motion to Dismiss. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 20 MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice 10 Acknowledgment of Service, 1 Complaint, filed by Meyli Markward, Tammy Thompson, Savings Board of the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan, Lindsay D. DiTusa, NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan Master Trust, 41 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Jamie Morris, Young, Berman, Kar pf & Gonzalez P.A., Mitchell Karpf, 6 MOTION for Appointment of Special Process Server filed by Dimitri Patterson, 38 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Dimitri Patterson, 39 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Dimitri Patterson, [ 29] Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice 1 Complaint, filed by Bank of America Corp, 42 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Black, Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumph, P.A., M arcos Beaton, Jr, 16 MOTION to Quash Service filed by DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc., 37 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Dimitri Patterson, 40 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Dimitri Patterson. Signed by Judge Marci a G. Cooke on 4/20/2018. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 18-20878-Civ-COOKE
DIMITRI PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
THIS MATTER is before me on five Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (“Motion”) (ECF No. 20). On March 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint
(ECF No. 1). On March 30, 2018, the instant Motion was filed. Subsequently, at least six other
Defendants2 have filed three Motions to Dismiss. See ECF Nos. 29, 41, 42. While those three
Motions to Dismiss are not yet ripe, Plaintiff has not responded to the instant Motion—despite
filing five Motions for Clerks Entry of Default (ECF Nos. 30–34) and four Motions for Default
Judgment (ECF Nos. 37–40) on the same day his response to Defendants’ Motion was due. I
have reviewed Plaintiff’s filings and the relevant legal authority. I also note that Plaintiff has
filed two previous complaints which are exceedingly similar to the instant Complaint. See
Patterson v. Miami-Dade Cty., et al., Case No. 18-cv-20241-UU; Patterson v. Miami-Dade Cty., et
al., Case No. 18-20821-CMA.3 Both of Plaintiff’s previous complaints were dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See UU ECF No. 36; CMA ECF No.
9. For the reasons provided herein, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed once again for

1
The five Defendants who are party to this Motion are NFL Player Second Career Savings
Plan Master Trust, Savings Board of the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan, Meyli
Marward, Tammy Thompson, and Lindsay Ditusa.
2
These Defendants are Bank of America N.A., see ECF No. 29, Jamie Morris, Mitchell Karpf,
and Young Berman Karptf & Gonzalez, P.A., see ECF No. 41, and Marcos Beaton and Black
Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A., see ECF No. 42.
3
Docket entries in Case No. 18-cv-20241-UU are denoted as “UU ECF No.” Docket entries in
Case No. 18-20821-CMA are denoted “CMA ECF No.”
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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and Defendants’ Motion is due to be
granted.
I.

DISCUSSION

“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a case when the
plaintiff fails to comply with procedural rules or a court order.” Hanna v. Fla., 599 F. App’x
362, 363 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Local Rule 7.1(c) provides that failing to
respond to a motion within fourteen days may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the
motion by default. Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore due to be dismissed as to the five
Defendants who filed the instant Motion on that basis alone.
In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates that a pleading which states a
claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction,” as well as “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2). The facts pleaded in a complaint must state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further,
the “short and plain statement of the claim” in the complaint must be sufficient to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir.1998). However, the leniency shown to pro se litigants “does not give a court license
to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted), overruled on other grounds, as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir.
2010). “While the pleadings of pro se litigants are ‘liberally construed,’ they must still comply
with procedural rules governing the proper form of pleadings.” Hopkins v. Saint Lucie County
School Bd., 399 F. App’x. 563, 565 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the 54-page
Complaint contains numerous numbered paragraphs, they do not collectively establish, or put
any Defendant on notice, of any viable causes of action Plaintiff intends to pursue. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While longer than both of his previous complaints, the instant
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Complaint is nearly identical to the one filed in Case No. 18-20821-CMA. In that case, Judge
Altonaga based her dismissal on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, specifically that Plaintiff had not put forth plausible facts supporting a conspiracy,
Plaintiff had failed to adequately allege Defendants’ actions were discriminatory, and that
Plaintiff’s Complaint amounted to a classic shotgun pleading. Similar arguments were raised in
the various Motions to Dismiss filed in the instant case. See CMA ECF No. 9.
In the instant Complaint, Plaintiff again names the same 55 Defendants, including his
ex-girlfriend Ericka Medina, her attorneys, eight state court judges, Miami-Dade County State
Attorney and five Assistant State Attorneys, and a myriad of others, including financial
institutions, their employees, and NFL insurance plans. In his Complaint, Plaintiff again
claims violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1344,
4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 8th Amendment, 13th Amendment, and 14th Amendment.
See generally, Compl. He again appears to allege a conspiracy to deprive him of his
constitutional rights purportedly related to Medina’s state court action for child support against
Plaintiff, wherein Medina alleged Plaintiff is the biological father of her child. See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1. While Plaintiff has made an attempt to cure the defect of a shotgun
pleading by separating his causes of action by Defendant, the ultimate facts alleged are
essentially the same. Compare, e.g., CMA ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 with ECF No. 1, ¶¶
62, 71, 72, 73, 74 (paragraphs are identical). There are some slight differences, such as Plaintiff
adding in more phrases such as “meeting of the minds” “to conspire to deprive the Plaintiff of
his constitutional rights.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 75; see also id. at ¶¶ 66, 83, 94, 105, 126. However, such
phrases are conclusory legal statements unsupported by facts that would amount to a
constitutional violation or a conspiracy to commit constitutional violations. “[T]he Federal
Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to
its factual context.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.
Accordingly, even under the lenient pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, I find
that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be
dismissed.
II.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint
(ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice, meaning Plaintiff may file an amended
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complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, if, and only if, he is able to allege
facts that cure the pleading deficiencies outlined above. All pending motions, if any, are
DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this matter.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 20th day of April 2018.

Copies furnished to:
Dimitri Patterson, pro se
Counsel of record

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