Vargas v. State of Florida

Filing 4

ORDER Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Order Dismissing Complaint re 3 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 4/4/2018. (ail) Text Modified on 4/5/2018 (ail).

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Eduardo Arrechavaleta Vargas,
Plaintiff,
v.
State of Florida, Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 18-21101-Civ-Scola
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Order Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Order
Dismissing Complaint
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Eduardo Arrechavaleta
Vargas’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3). Mr. Vargas,
who is proceeding pro se, has not paid the required filing fee. Therefore, the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. See Rehnerger v. Henry Cty.,
Ga., 577 F. App’x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
applies to all IFP proceedings). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) permits a court to dismiss
a suit “any time [] the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Mr. Vargas’s complaint is entitled, “Petition for Special Equitable Relief
from Judgment and Sentence.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He claims that he exhausted
all remedies at law, citing to case numbers associated with his state criminal
proceedings in the Criminal Division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida
in and of Miami-Dade County, the Third District Court of Appeals, and the
Florida Supreme Court, and that these courts have refused to grant him relief
based on Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) and 3.850, which he
believes has resulted in “irreparable damages and injuries.” (Id.) His civil cover
sheet states that he is asserting a torts claim for “other personal injury,” would
like to bring his case as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, and that his action arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. (ECF No. 1-1.)
The Court’s independent review of the state court records Mr. Vargas
cites to in his complaint indicate that Mr. Vargas pled guilty to a motor vehicle
license/registration counterfeiting charge, for which he was sentenced to one
day of probation, upon the state trial court’s order to stay and withhold
adjudication. (Case No. F-16-022677, Seq. No. 53.) Mr. Vargas appealed to the
Third DCA, which dismissed his appeal because he did not file a motion to

withdraw his plea in the trial court. (Case No. 3D17-0884.) Mr. Vargas then
appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which denied him relief because he
failed to timely file his notice of appeal. (Case No. SC17-1666.)
Now, Mr. Vargas attempts to bring a case in federal court, but his
complaint does not state a proper basis for relief or explain why he is entitled
to relief, even considering his complaint under the “less stringent standards”
afforded to pro se litigants. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, Mr. Vargas’s complaint
fails to state a claim. This alone serves as a basis to dismiss Mr. Vargas’s
complaint under § 1915(e).
It appears from the Court’s review of the available state courts’ records,
however, that perhaps Mr. Vargas is attempting to collaterally attack his state
court conviction and in particular, his guilty plea. If that is the case, then the
applicable statute for Mr. Vargas to seek relief under is 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Mr. Vargas’s complaint, however, is due to be dismissed even if the Court
construes Mr. Vargas’s complaint as an effort to bring a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under § 2254 for multiple reasons. For one, the state trial court
docket states that Mr. Vargas was released from custody on March 24, 2017,
which would preclude Mr. Vargas from bringing a § 2254 petition since the
statute requires that a petitioner seeking habeas relief be “in custody.” See
Claudio v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 578 F. App’x 797, 798 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A habeas
petitioner must be in custody for the district court to have subject matter
jurisdiction over a habeas petition attack the state conviction, meaning that the
state must exercise some control over the petitioner to satisfy the in custody
requirement.”)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And, even
assuming Mr. Vargas were in custody, if Mr. Vargas is attempting to take issue
with his guilty plea, then this Court cannot yet review his claim because the
state courts’ records also indicate that Mr. Vargas failed to exhaust his state
remedies as required by § 2254(b)(1)(A). Id. at 799.
Accordingly, Mr. Vargas’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed without
prejudice, and his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is
denied as moot. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on April 4, 2018.
_______________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge