Negron et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.

Filing 19

ORDER the Court grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13 ) and dismisses with prejudice Count One of the Complaint. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 7/9/2018. See attached document for full details. (mc)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Maria Negron, and others, Plaintiffs,
v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., Defendant.

)
)
) Civil Action No. 18-21797-Civ-Scola
)
)

Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Celebrity Cruises, Inc.’s
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13). For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court
grants the Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 13).
1. Background
The Plaintiffs, Maria Negron, Victor Gonzalez-McFaline, Lizzette GonzalezNegron, and Miguel Gonzalez-Laugier sailed on the Defendant’s ship, Celebrity
Summit, on November 4, 2017. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) Four days into the
seven-day cruise, Negron began to feel dizzy and ill while the ship was docked in
Barbados. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Onboard medical personnel misdiagnosed Negron with
heart attack, and disembarked all of the Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Negron was
transported to a local hospital, where she allegedly endured unreasonable wait
times, discomfort, exposure to areas contaminated with Ebola, lack of food and
drink, and limited communication and information about her condition. (Id. at
¶¶ 16-18.) Fortunately, Negron’s CT scan results returned normal at
approximately 3 p.m.; nevertheless, the Plaintiffs were not transported back to
the ship until 4:45 p.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.) Upon their return to port, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendant’s personnel prevented them from re-boarding, and
instead, entered their cabins, removed their belongings, and transported them to
a hotel. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23, 26.) The Plaintiffs allege that they were confused,
anxious, and left stranded in a foreign country without proper travel documents
or necessary medications. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-35.) As a result, the Plaintiffs were
prevented from enjoying the cruise for which they paid, they incurred
unanticipated expenses, and sustained emotional and physical injuries. (Id. at
¶¶ 40-41.)
The Plaintiffs filed this suit against Celebrity Cruises, asserting claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 1), false imprisonment, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment. The Defendant has moved to dismiss the
Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Mot., ECF No.
13.)

2. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement
of the claims” that “will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the ground upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme Court
has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations
omitted).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950. When considering a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the complaint’s allegations as true,
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell,
516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
3. Analysis
The parties agree that this matter is governed by maritime law. Courts
sitting in admiralty typically look to the standards set out in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) as well as state law to evaluate claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). See, e.g., Wallis v. Princess
Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (noting that
since there is no maritime law concerning IIED claims, courts regularly employ
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to evaluate IIED claims in federal maritime
cases); Stires v. Carnival Corp., 243 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(citing to both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Florida state law in case
asserting claim for IIED for tort that occurred on a cruise ship).
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states, in relevant part,
that “one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm.” To state a claim for IIED under Florida law, a plaintiff must show:
(1) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct;

(3) that the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) that the distress was
severe. Nettles v. City of Leesburg Police Dep’t, 415 F. App’x. 116 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990)). Here,
Celebrity Cruises asserts that the Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to rise to the level of
outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim for IIED, and that the Plaintiffs’
allegations of emotional distress are not sufficiently severe.
The Complaint alleges that Celebrity Cruises misdiagnosed Negron, and
thereafter, failed repeatedly to consult with the Plaintiffs, or maintain them
apprised of the determined course of action. In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that
they were subjected to unacceptable risk and danger at the local hospital. When
they were finally returned to port, the Plaintiffs were “held hostage” in the taxi
while their belongings were gathered from their cabins without their permission,
and they were finally forcefully disembarked, despite repeated requests to be
permitted to re-board the cruise. The Complaint further alleges that the Plaintiffs
were grossly mistreated, and as a result, they experienced anxiety, fear for their
safety, and were “exposed to serious risk, discomfort, annoyance, uncertainty,
submission, estrangement, restraint, deceit, danger, and un-comfortableness.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 33, 40.)
However, the Defendant’s alleged conduct fails to rise to the level of
outrageousness required by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Florida state
law. “Outrageous” conduct is that which “goes beyond all possible bounds of
decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Rubio v. Lopez, 445 F. App’x 170, 175 (11th Cir. 2011). The
Restatement and Florida courts have stated that:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent
which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized
by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, cmt. d; Brown v. Zaveri, 164 F. Supp. 2d
1354, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Lenard, J.) (citations omitted).
Notably, the cause of action for IIED is “sparingly recognized by the Florida
courts.” Vamper v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (King, J.). A plaintiff alleging IIED faces an extremely high burden, as
Florida courts have repeatedly found a wide spectrum of behavior insufficiently
“outrageous.” A brief survey of Florida and maritime cases addressing claims of
IIED underscores this point. See, e.g., Rubio, 445 F. App’x at 175 (finding failure
to allege sufficient outrageous conduct where deputy sheriff hobble-tied arrestee

on black asphalt pavement in sun, resulting in second-degree burns to face and
chest); Wallis, 306 F.3d at 842 (finding no outrageous conduct where crew
member on cruise ship remarked in the plaintiff’s hearing after her husband fell
overboard that her husband was probably dead and that his body would be
sucked under the ship, chopped up by the propellers, and would probably not be
recovered); Garcia v. Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(Moore, J.) (finding no outrageous conduct where crew members assaulted cruise
passenger and prevented her from leaving her room for a period of time);
Vamper, 14 F. Supp. at 1306-07 (finding no outrageous conduct where
defendants fabricated reckless driving charge against plaintiff, called him the “n”
word, threatened him with termination, and physically struck him on ankle);
Blair v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1264, (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Seitz, J.)
(finding failure to allege sufficiently outrageous conduct where plaintiff’s child
drowned in a pool advertised as “kid friendly,” though lacking life guards,
lifesaving equipment, and personnel prepared to respond to a drowning event).
Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the
Defendant’s alleged conduct is not such that it “goes beyond all possible bounds
of decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” See Rubio, 445 F. App’x at 175. While the Plaintiffs’ allegations
describe distressing events, the allegations simply do not rise to the level of
outrageousness required by the applicable case law.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No.
13) and dismisses with prejudice Count One of the Complaint.
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on July 9, 2018.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge