Frida Kahlo Corporation et al v. Romeo Pinedo
Filing
38
ORDER granting 23 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 9/10/2021. See attached document for full details. (scn)
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Frida Kahlo Corporation and Frida
Kahlo Investments, S.A., Plaintiffs,
v.
Maria Cristina Romeo Pinedo and
Mara de Anda Romeo, Defendants.
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 18-21826-Civ-Scola
)
)
)
Order on Motion to Dismiss
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 23). The Defendants, two Mexican citizens, argue that this
case—a trademark infringement case brought by two Panamanian
corporations—cannot be heard in the Southern District of Florida. (Id.) The
Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that jurisdiction is appropriate. (ECF No. 30). After
a review of the briefs and relevant law, the Court grants the Defendants’
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.)
1. Background
Ars longa, vita brevis—life is short, but art is long. True to that aphorism,
Frida Kahlo died in 1954 at the age of forty-seven, but her art continues to
inspire. However, a different aphorism is more apt here—fame comes with a
price. While Frida Kahlo’s art moves audiences, the parties here have engaged
in a decade-long, international fight over ownership of the “Frida Kahlo” brand.
While the Southern District of Florida may be a stranger to this dispute, the
parties are no strangers.
The facts begin at Frida Kahlo’s death in 1954. Upon her death, certain
of Frida Kahlo’s property rights passed to her niece Isolda Pinedo Kahlo. (ECF
No. 7 at ¶¶ 12–14.) Isolda Pinedo Kahlo’s daughter, Defendant Maria Cristina
Romeo Pinedo (“Pinedo”), obtained power of attorney over these property rights
in 2003. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Defendant Mara de Anda Romeo (“Romeo”) is Pinedo’s
daughter. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
In 2004, Pinedo created Plaintiff Frida Kahlo Corporation (“FKC”) in order
to celebrate and commercialize the “Frida Kahlo” brand. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–17.) In
2007, Pinedo, acting through her mother’s power of attorney, and her mother
assigned various trademarks relating to Frida Kahlo to FKC (the “Assignment”);
this assignment was recorded in the United States. (ECF No. 7-1; ECF No. 7 at
¶¶ 20, 23.) Today, FKC is the owner of sixteen registered trademarks (including
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 2 of 10
those assigned). (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 24.) Pinedo remains a shareholder in FKC. (Id.
at ¶ 18.)
Around 2011, Pinedo and Romeo became disaffected with FKC. They
sought to attack the validity of FKC’s ownership of “Frida Kahlo”-related
trademarks and to misappropriate such trademarks. (Id. at ¶¶ 31–32.) The
Defendants have publicly asserted, through online and televised means, that
FKC does not own these trademarks. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–44.) Moreover, the
Defendants, through a third-party corporation, have sent cease-and-desist
letters, including to a media company in Miami, Florida, asserting ownership of
these trademarks. (ECF No. 30-1 at ¶¶ 5–6.) The Defendants also operate a
website and have contracted with agents in an effort to license rights in “Frida
Kahlo”-related trademarks. (ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 36, 46–49.) One of the Defendants’
agents represented that they stopped a deal between FKC and toy-maker
Mattel to produce a Frida Kahlo doll in Mexico. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Moreover, the
Defendants have initiated lawsuits in Panama and Mexico relating to FKC and
the Frida Kahlo trademarks. (ECF No. 30-1.) These efforts have damaged FKC’s
brand and caused financial harm. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 50.)
2. Legal Standard
The Defendants bring this motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(3). When evaluating a factual attack to
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider matters
outside the pleadings and “is free to independently weigh facts” in order to
“decide for itself the factual issues that determine jurisdiction.” Interim
Healthcare, Inc. v. Interim Healthcare of Se. La., Inc., No. 19-cv-62412, 2020 WL
3078531, at *6–7 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2020) (Bloom, J.).
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to counter the
plaintiff’s allegations. See id. at *7. If the defendant meets this burden, the
plaintiff must produce evidence to support jurisdiction—merely rearticulating
its allegations is not sufficient. See id. (quoting Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v.
Seasafe Transp. A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986)). Where evidence
conflicts, the court must “construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-movant plaintiff.” PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598
F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010).
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 3 of 10
3. Discussion
A. Forum-Selection Clause
A threshold issue is whether this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
or whether a forum-selection clause—contained within a contract purporting to
assign some, but not all, of the trademarks at issue—controls. The Court holds
that where an assignee of various trademarks brings an action against the
assignor for trademark infringement, a forum-selection clause of the type at
issue here controls.
The forum-selection clause in the Assignment states in relevant part:
“each and every dispute arising with regard to the interpretation or fulfillment
of this agreement shall be directed to the courts of Mexico City, Federal
District[.]” (ECF No. 7-1 at 12.) In the Eleventh Circuit, “forum selection
clauses are broadly construed[.]” Grape Stars Int’l, Inc. v. nVentive, Inc., No. 2020634-CIV, 2020 WL4586123, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2020) (Altonaga, J.).
Therefore, “[forum-selection] clauses referencing ‘any lawsuit regarding this
agreement’ . . . have been broadly construed to include . . . claims arising
directly or indirectly from the contractual relationship[.]” Jiangsu Hongyuan
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. DI Glob. Logistics Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1326 (S.D. Fla.
2016) (Gayles, J.) (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that a New York
forum-selection clause pertaining to “any case or controversy arising under or
in connection with [the contract]” should be read to “include[] all causes of
action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by
the contract”).
Construing the forum-selection clause in the Assignment broadly, claims
relating to the trademarks assigned must be brought in Mexico City. Indeed,
the forum-selection clause here pertains to “each and every dispute arising with
regard to the interpretation or fulfillment of this agreement[.]” (ECF No. 7-1 at
12) (emphasis added). This clause is arguably narrower than the clauses at
issue in Jiangsu and Stewart, as it is limited to cases arising out of “the
interpretation or fulfillment” of the Assignment. (Id.) But regardless of whether
this is a meaningful limitation on the scope of the clause vis-à-vis those cited
above, the Court holds that the claims brought here arise out of, directly or
indirectly, the “interpretation or fulfillment” of the Assignment.
The Plaintiffs argue that cannot be, as they bring no claims pursuant to
the Assignment. 1 (ECF No. 30 at 4–5.) However, the Defendants raise the
The Plaintiffs also argue that the Assignment has no use here as any arguments as to its
validity had to be brought within five years after execution in 2007. (ECF No. 30 at 4) (citing
Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)). However, a statute of limitations does not bar the enforcement of a
1
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validity of the Assignment as a defense (arguing that the assignment was
invalid), which is sufficient to bootstrap a statutory claim to a broad forumselection clause such as here. See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. Cigna Intern.
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The answer to the question
whether a ‘defense’ based on a contract that contains a forum selection clause
implicates that clause depends on the language of the clause.”); see also Omron
Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1994)
(enforcing a forum-selection clause and holding that claims for trademark
infringement “arose out” of a distributorship agreement, which was raised as a
defense, as every outcome in the case “depend[ed] on an understanding of the
parties’ written bargain and of its implied terms”). As the Plaintiffs’ claims
regarding the assigned marks depend on a resolution of the Defendants’
argument concerning ownership of the marks, as interpreted in the
Assignment, the forum-selection clause controls. 2
B. Personal Jurisdiction
As the forum-selection clause only pertains to the marks that were
assigned, the Court must move to the next inquiry: whether the Court has
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants for claims regarding marks that are
not governed by the Assignment. The Court answers no.
“A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint
sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs.
Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). A defendant challenging
personal jurisdiction must present evidence to counter the plaintiff’s
allegations. See Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2009). Once the defendant has presented sufficient evidence, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony or
documents.” Id.
In federal-question cases, such as trademark-infringement lawsuits, a
court must first ensure that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant
under the relevant state’s long-arm statute. See Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v.
Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855–56 (11th Cir. 1990); see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(A). Florida’s long-arm statute “must be strictly construed, and any
doubts about the applicability of the statute are resolved in favor of the
defendant and against a conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists.” See
forum-selection clause. Whether or not the Defendants can challenge the validity of the
Assignment in the contractually-agreed forum is a separate question for that forum.
2 The Plaintiffs did not contest the validity of the forum-selection clause, only its application
here.
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 5 of 10
Interim Healthcare, 2020 WL 3078531, at *8 (quoting Gadea v. Star Cruises,
Ltd., 949 So.2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). If personal jurisdiction is
appropriate under the state long-arm statute, the court must then “analyze
this long-arm jurisdiction under the due process requirements of the federal
constitution.” Cable/Home Commc’n, 902 F.2d at 857.
1. Florida Long-Arm Statute
Under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), a nonresident is subject to personal
jurisdiction in Florida “for any cause of action arising from . . . committing a
tortious act within Florida.” See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (cleaned up). This
long-arm jurisdiction even extends to defendants who committed their tortious
acts outside the state if their acts “cause injury in Florida.” Posner v. Essex Ins.
Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 1999). For purposes of this analysis,
trademark infringement is considered a tort. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that Louis
Vuitton’s trademark claims allege ‘tortious acts’ for purposes of Florida’s longarm statute.”). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit had held that a trademark
infringement on the Internet “causes injury and occurs in Florida ‘by virtue of
the website’s accessibility in Florida.’” Id. at 1353–54 (quoting Licciardello v.
Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008)).
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants own a website and use social
media in a manner that uses the trademarks at issue and promotes infringing
products and services. (See ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 36–40.) The Plaintiffs allege that
these websites are accessible in Florida. (See id. at ¶ 82.) Therefore, Florida’s
long-arm statute is satisfied. 3
2. Due Process
While personal jurisdiction is warranted by virtue of Rule 4(k)(1), the
Court must assure itself that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent
with due process. Due process “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has
established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). This
liberty interest is particularly acute where the alleged contacts at issue
The Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the “national long-arm statute” of Rule 4(k)(2) also
confers personal jurisdiction in this district. (ECF No. 30 at 15.) However, courts have
expressed doubt over whether “general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant could ever be
available under Rule 4(k)(2).” Esterina Giuliani v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:20-cv-22006, 2021
WL 4099502, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2021) (Gayles, J.). Nonetheless, because Rule 4(k)(1) is
met, the Court need not address this point.
3
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occurred through the Internet. Activity posted online could be shared across
hundreds of jurisdictions without the defendant’s intent or knowledge. Such
activity could easily bring a defendant into a jurisdiction based only on
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” with the forum. See id. at 475
(cleaned up). That, due process does not permit.
With that in mind, the Eleventh Circuit uses a three-part test 4 to
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due
process:
(1) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to at least
one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum;
(2) whether the nonresident defendant purposefully availed himself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefit of the forum state’s laws; and
(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to the first prong (arising out of or relatedness), a court should “focus
on the direct causal relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Id. at 1355–56. As to the second prong (purposeful availment), a
court may apply the traditional minimum-contacts test, or, in intentional-tort
cases, may utilize the effects test. “Under the ‘effects test,’ a nonresident
defendant’s single tortious act can establish purposeful availment, without
regard to whether the defendant had any other contacts with the forum state.”
Id. at 1356 (citation omitted). “This occurs when the tort: (1) was intentional;
(2) was aimed at the forum state; and (3) caused harm that the defendant
should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state.” Id. (cleaned
up). As to the third prong (fair play and substantial justice), a court should
“consider these factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; and (4) the judicial system’s interest in resolving
the dispute.” Id. at 1358 (quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, the Court turns to the three tests identified above: (1) arising
out of or relatedness; (2) purposeful availment; and (3) fair play and substantial
justice.
While the unique difficulties of determining personal jurisdiction where the contacts occurred
online may necessitate a different test, the Eleventh Circuit has continued to apply this threepart test where the website is “commercial and fully interactive.” Louis Vuitton, 736 at 1355
n.10.
4
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a. Arising out of or relatedness
“A fundamental element of the specific jurisdiction calculus is that
plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.” Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 850 (11th Cir. 2010)
(cleaned up). The Plaintiffs claim that their causes of action arise out of the
Defendants’ use of trademarks on their website and social media accounts,
which are accessible to residents of Florida, as well as out of the Defendants’
attendance at a trade show, presumably held in the United States. (ECF No. 30
at 12 (citing ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 34–41).) The Court assumes that the use of a
website that is accessible in Florida is a sufficient “contact” under this first
prong of the test. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have articulated that their claims
“arise out of or relate to” the alleged contacts. While this prong is satisfied, the
Plaintiffs have not met the purposeful availment test.
b. Purposeful availment – Effects Test
Applying the “effects test,” the Court finds that the Defendants have not
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state. As stated above, the “effects test,” which applies to intentional
torts, is met where a plaintiff shows that the tort “(1) was intentional; (2) was
aimed at the forum state; and (3) caused harm that the defendant should have
anticipated would be suffered in the forum state.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d
at 1356. As to the second element, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
the Defendants’ alleged infringing activity on the Internet was aimed at Florida.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ online statements were “aimed at
consumers . . . and others, located in the U.S., including Florida because . . .
the website offers content in English and Spanish and is accessible in this
judicial district.” (See ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 82, 119); (ECF No. 30 at 13–14.)
However, such bare-boned conclusory allegations do not show that this
conduct was “aimed” at Florida.
Courts across jurisdictions have held that activity on the Internet, by
itself, is not a sufficient minimum contact to establish “purposeful availment”
under the Due Process Clause. See Miller v. Gizmodo Media Grp., LLC, 383 F.
Supp. 3d 1365, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Altonaga, J.) (“[C]ourts have uniformly
rejected the argument that a tweet, not specifically directed to a forum state, is
a sufficient minimum contact to confer personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause.”). Rather, something more is required to show that online
activity is “aimed” at a particular jurisdiction. See CCTV Outlet, Corp. v. Desert
Sec. Sys. L.L.C., No. 17-60928-CIV, 2017 WL 5640717, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7,
2017) (Cohn, J.) (looking to: references to the forum state on the website;
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 8 of 10
mechanisms for ordering goods or services to the forum state on the website;
interactive features on the website; and passive advertising of contact
information). Here, the social media postings at issue did not reference Florida,
and while the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ website offers to sell
infringing goods, there is no allegation that such goods were ever sold in
Florida, let alone that the Defendants knew of any such sales. See id. (holding
that the “purposeful availment” prong was not met, as the website at issue was
not “manifestly intended” to target Florida and the defendants had no
knowledge of sales in Florida). The closest that the Plaintiffs come to alleging a
minimum contact is that Familia Kahlo, S.A. de C.V.—which is not a
defendant, but which Plaintiffs allege is the Defendants’ “company”—sent one
cease and desist letter to a Miami-based media company, asserting ownership
over Frida Kahlo’s name and likeness. (ECF No. 30-1 at ¶¶ 5–6, Ex. 3.)
However, a single contact by a third party—the relation of which to the named
Defendants is not clear—is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction. 5
Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not established the third prong of the
“effects test”—that the Defendants would anticipate harm in Florida. Plaintiffs
must “allege facts clearly indicating that the defendant knew that it was likely
committing trademark infringement specifically against the plaintiff in the
forum state and continued to do so anyway.” CCTV Outlet, 2017 WL 5640717,
at *3. The Plaintiffs assert that because the Defendants must have known that
FKC has an office in Bal Harbor, Florida, they knew that harm would occur in
Florida. (ECF No. 30 at 13.) The Defendants dispute that FKC has such an
office. (ECF No. 36 at 4.) Such conclusory allegations—amounting only to an
address on paper—are insufficient to establish that the Defendants knew that
it was causing harm in Florida. And the mere act of posting content on the
Internet, by itself, is also insufficient to show that the Defendants knew they
were causing harm in Florida. See Miller, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1373–34.
c. Purposeful availment – Minimum Contacts Test
Similarly, applying the “minimum contacts test,” the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Under the “minimum contacts” test, the
contacts must “(1) [be] related to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) involve some
5 The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts because
Defendant Pinedo, at some time in the past, travelled to Florida in connection with her role at
FKC. (ECF No. 30 at 13.) Whatever travels Pinedo conducted in connection with her former role
at FKC have no impact on whether Pinedo, as an individual, has purposefully availed herself of
Florida in connection with the alleged infringing activities at issue. Similarly, a single reference
to a conference that the Defendants may have attended somewhere in the United States does
not establish minimum contacts with Florida. (Id. at 10.)
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 9 of 10
act by which the defendant purposefully availed [itself] of the privileges of doing
business within the forum; and (3) [be] such that the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736
F.3d at 1357.
In particular, the Court holds that the Plaintiffs have not met the second
prong, as the Plaintiffs have provided no allegations concerning how many
consumers the Defendants reached in Florida. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772, 781 (1984) (holding that minimum contacts were
established where the defendant sold “some 10 to 15,000 copies” of its
magazine in the forum state); see also Miller, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1374 (holding
that the minimum contacts test was not met where less than one percent of the
defendant’s social-media audience was in Florida and there was no evidence of
profit from sales in Florida). Moreover, as above, social-media posts “not
specifically directed to a forum state” are not sufficient minimum contacts to
confer personal jurisdiction. See Miller, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1375.
Additionally, the Court holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish
the third prong, namely, that the Defendants “should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357. As
discussed above, the Defendants’ online activity alone—without a showing of
sales in Florida or a purposeful targeting of Florida—does not establish that
they “should reasonably anticipate” litigation in Florida. Moreover, the
conclusory allegations regarding Pinedo’s past work for FKC do not establish
that Pinedo, and certainly not Romeo, should have reasonably anticipated
litigation in Florida. (ECF No. 30 at 14.)
d. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
A defendant must show that personal jurisdiction offends “fair play and
substantial justice” only if the plaintiff meets its burden on the two first
prongs. See Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1355. While the Plaintiffs have not met
their burden, the Court will briefly address this last test, looking to “(1) the
burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; and (4) the
judicial system’s interest in resolving the dispute.” Id. at 1358 (cleaned up).
First, the Court finds that litigation in Florida would be burdensome for
the Defendants—two individuals who both reside in Mexico City and have no
connection to Florida. (ECF No. 23 at 15.) Second, Florida’s interest in this
dispute is minimal. While the Plaintiffs allegedly have an office in Florida, there
has been no showing of the impact of the Defendants’ alleged infringements in
Florida to raise Florida’s interest beyond a generalized interest in enforcing
federal law. Third, while the Plaintiffs have an interest in obtaining convenient
Case 1:18-cv-21826-RNS Document 38 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2021 Page 10 of 10
and effective relief, ongoing litigation in Mexico and Panama—countries where
the parties indisputably reside—may provide forums for such relief. Last, the
judicial system has an interest in resolving the dispute, as the Plaintiffs’ claims
arise from federal law. In total, these factors weigh against the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court holds that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants is incompatible with the Due Process Clause
and the protections that it affords.
4. Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the Court grants the Defendants’ motion
to dismiss. 6 (ECF No. 23.)
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on September 10, 2021.
____________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
As the Court holds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is not
appropriate, the Court need not reach the question of venue.
6
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