Ibis Apartments, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London

Filing 7

Order Remanding Case to State Court. Closing Case. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 6/12/2018. (pes)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Ibis Apartments, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London, Defendant.

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) Civil Action No. 18-21985-Civ-Scola
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Order Remanding Case
Previously the Court ordered the Defendant to file an amended notice of
removal because the Court could not discern from the Defendant’s initial notice
whether the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. (Order
Requiring Am. Not. of Removal, ECF No. 5.) The Court directed the Defendant to
address a number of issues: the Defendant’s failure to identify either the
members of Plaintiff Ibis Apartments, LLC, or their citizenships; the Defendant’s
failure to identify either the individual underwriters of the policy at issue or their
citizenships; and the Court’s concerns about whether the jurisdictional amount
had been met. The Defendant has fallen far short of addressing all, or even any,
of the Court’s concerns. As a result, the Court remands this case back to state
court.
To begin with, instead of providing the Court with all of the names of the
members of Ibis, the Defendant instead informs that “[a]ccording to Article IV of
Ibis Apts, LLC’s Articles of Organization, there are three members or persons
authorized to manage Ibis Apts, LLC (Yaakov Brafman, Eli Weberman, and
Avrohom Kagan), each with an address [in] Hollywood, Florida.” (Def.’s Am. Not.
of Removal, ECF No. 6 ¶ 3, 2–3.) The Defendant then refers the Court to an
“Exhibit C,” apparently Ibis’s articles of organization, which is not actually
attached to the Defendant’s notice. The Court has nonetheless itself accessed the
articles through the Florida Department of State’s Division of Corporations
website. Nowhere within these articles are these individuals identified as
members of Ibis. Instead, all three are identified as managers. And, in fact, the
Defendant seems to be aware of this shortcoming when it hedges its allegations,
vaguely contending only that these three people are “members or persons
authorized to manage Ibis.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Additionally, despite the
Court’s clear instruction to identify the citizenship of each member, the
Defendant offers only addresses that are listed on Department of State’s website
for these three managers. But, and as counsel should be well aware, under 28
U.S.C § 1332(a)(1), it is the citizenship, or domicile, of an individual party that is

the relevant inquiry, not her or his residence or, even less helpful, his or her
mailing address. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330,
1341–42 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Domicile is not synonymous with residence; one may
temporarily reside in one location, yet retain domicile in a previous residence.”);
Crist v. Carnival Corp., 410 F. App’x 197, 200 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
an allegation that a party is a “resident” of a State is “insufficient for diversity
jurisdiction purposes because residency is not the equivalent of citizenship”). So,
even if the Defendant’s allegations of Ibis’s membership had been sufficient, the
Defendant is still nonetheless unable to identify the citizenship of even those
individuals.
Similarly, although the Defendant lists three subscribers1 to the policy at
issue in this matter (QBE Underwriting Limited, Chubb European Group
Limited, and Cathedral Capital Holdings Limited), its citizenship allegations are
still unclear. Part of the problem is the Defendant’s failure to identify what type
of businesses QBE, Chubb, and Cathedral actually are. The Defendant informs
that QBE is a “limited company incorporated in England & Wales with its
principal place of business in London.” (Compl. at ¶ 2.) Perhaps this means that
QBE is equivalent to a corporation though the Court cannot be sure because the
Defendant also refers to it as a “limited company.” The Defendant’s allegations of
Chubb’s citizenship are even less clear: “Chubb . . . is a limited company
registered and domiciled in Switzerland.” (Id.) Is Chubb incorporated anywhere?
If so, where is its principal place of business? Or should its citizenship be
assessed based on its similarity to a limited liability company? The Defendant’s
allegations of Cathedral’s citizenship are similarly problematic; it identifies
Cathedral’s principal place of business as London but provides no information
about its incorporation or whether it too may be akin to a limited liability
company. (Id.) Without knowing what type of business associations these
companies are, the Court cannot determine their citizenships and, therefore,
whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. See, e.g.,
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189-190 (1990) (pointing out the
differences in how various entities are treated for the purposes of assessing
diversity jurisdiction).
Lastly, in its order requiring an amended notice of removal, the Court
clearly expressed its concern about the Defendant’s jurisdictional-amount
allegations: “the Defendant must establish that the jurisdictional amount in
controversy is met as to each member, underwriter, or name, or explain why the
jurisdictional amount should be aggregated among such entities.” (Order at 2.)
This allegation, too, was not entirely clear: are these all of the subscribers to this particular
policy? The Defendant doesn’t say.

1

In response, the Defendant provides only that “the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.00 [but that] Defendant is unable to establish that the
jurisdictional amount . . . is met as to each member, underwriter, or name.” (Am.
Not. at ¶ 5.) This falls far short of answering the Court’s questions about
whether the jurisdictional amount has been met in this case.
Because the Defendant fails, after being given a second chance, to meet its
burden of showing that the parties are completely diverse and that the
jurisdictional amount is met, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and
this action is required to be remanded. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). The Court notes that ambiguous
notices of removal like this one disrupt both the state and federal court system.
The Defendant’s careless removal deprived the state court of jurisdiction before
the Defendant was in command of the facts necessary to properly invoke federal
jurisdiction. Then, as if this was not bad enough, the Defendant prolonged the
disruption by failing to cure such defects when the Court offered it a second bite
at the apple.
Accordingly this case is remanded back to state court. The Clerk is thus
directed to close this case and take all necessary steps to ensure the prompt
remand of this matter and the transfer of this file back to Circuit Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. All pending motions are
denied as moot.
Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on June 12, 2018.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge