DORLEANT v. ADVANTAGE ACADEMY OF MIAMI, INC.

Filing 33

ORDER AND ADJUDGED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs AmendedComplaint and Motion to Strike Irrelevant Factual Allegations, DE# 21 , is DENIED. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 10/13/2020. See attached document for full details. (ebz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 20-cv-21223-BLOOM/Louis
WISLINE DORLEANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ADVANTAGE ACADEMY OF
MIAMI, INC. d/b/a PALM GLADES
PREPARATORY ACADEMY,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Advantage Academy of Miami, Inc.
d/b/a Palm Glades Preparatory Academy’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint and Motion to Strike Irrelevant Factual Allegations, ECF No. [21] (“Motion”). Plaintiff
Wisline Dorleant (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [22] (“Response”), to
which Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. [23] (“Reply”). The Court has carefully reviewed the
Motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and
is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally initiated this action against Defendant on February 5, 2020, in the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. ECF No. [1-2] at 3-12.
Defendant removed this action to federal court on March 20, 2020. ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff thereafter
filed an Amended Complaint on June 16, 2020, which asserts five counts for relief: Count I –
National Origin Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; Count II – Racial
Discrimination in Violation of Title VII; Count III – National Origin Discrimination in Violation

Case No. 20-cv-21223-BLOOM/Louis
of the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”); Count IV – Racial Discrimination in Violation of the
FCRA; and Count V – Retaliation in Violation of the FCRA. See generally ECF No. [20].
The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts: Plaintiff is Black female of Haitian
National Origin who commenced her employment with Defendant as a science teacher on or about
August 14, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Around November 2017, Plaintiff reported to the Dean of
Instruction, Ms. Darlene Escudero (“Ms. Escudero”), that a white male student from Plaintiff’s
class called her a “Black Monkey.” Id. ¶ 18. Ms. Escudero disregarded the complaint by shrugging
her shoulders and laughing at the incident, and instructed Plaintiff to go back to teaching her class.
Id. ¶ 19. Upon returning to her classroom, the white male student continued to be disruptive, and
a security guard “walked by and reported what he saw without Plaintiff requesting his assistance.”
Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Escudero then pulled Plaintiff from her classroom and scolded her for informing the
security guard of the incident. Id. ¶ 21.
Because of Ms. Escudero’s unwillingness to address the incident, Plaintiff requested to
meet with the principal, Ms. Archanlena Coats (“Principal Coats”). Id. ¶ 22. At the meeting,
Plaintiff discussed the student’s racial comment and Ms. Escudero’s unwillingness to address the
issue, to which Ms. Escudero stated she was unaware that the comment was a racial slur and
apologized to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. “Throughout the rest of the year, Plaintiff experienced more
mistreatment at the hands of Ms. Escudero.” Id. ¶ 25. “Specifically, Ms. Escudero spoke in a
condescending and demeaning manner to Plaintiff on a regular basis. Ms. Escudero did not speak
in this manner to non-black employees.” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff renewed her employment contract for
the following year. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
During the summer of 2018, Dr. Laura Ferreira Vesga (“Dr. Vesga”) replaced Ms. Coats
as Principal, and Ms. Escudero became Vice Principal. Id. ¶ 29. “Plaintiff was subjected to
derogatory comments, harassment, and negative treatment by both Ms. Escudero and Dr. Vesga.”
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Id. ¶ 30. “Specifically, Dr. Vesga often spoke in a condescending and demeaning manner to
Plaintiff in meetings and she would often publicly reprimand her in front of other co-workers.” Id.
¶ 31. “Furthermore, Escudero would alienate Plaintiff at open houses, make fun of Plaintiff’s
accent, and give her additional workload.” Id. ¶ 32.
For example, in the second month of the school year, Plaintiff noticed that more students
were added to her class roster, making the number of students exceed the maximum studentteacher ratio under Florida law. Id. ¶¶ 33-35. Likewise, Plaintiff noticed that a student with special
needs was added to her classroom when she was not qualified to teach special needs students. Id.
¶¶ 36, 39-40. Plaintiff complained to her direct supervisor and Science Coach, Ms. Estevez, and
to Ms. Escudero about these issues. Id. ¶¶ 37-39. “Ms. Escudero disregarded Plaintiff’s complaints
and told her she needed to ‘deal with it’. Plaintiff was not offered any assistance or guidance on
how to handle the added work.” Id. ¶ 41.
On or around October 25, 2018, Dr. Vesga emailed Plaintiff requesting to meet. Id. ¶ 42.
“During this meeting, Ms. Escudero was present. Dr. Vesga proceeded to tell Plaintiff, ‘You don’t
fit here, and you should go teach where people look more like you.’” Id. ¶ 43. “She then verbally
gave her a short list of schools that Plaintiff could apply to such as Miami Carol City Senior High
(80% of student body is Black) and Cutler Bay Middle School (40% of student body is Black).”
Id. Plaintiff was thereafter terminated. Id. ¶ 44. “When the Plaintiff asked for a legitimate and valid
reason for her termination, she was told that she just didn’t ‘fit in.’” Id. “Defendant’s
justification(s) for its treatment of Plaintiff, if any, are a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination
and retaliation.” Id. ¶ 45. “If, however, the reason(s) proffered by Defendant are found to be with
merit, Plaintiff’s race, national origin, and/or complaints of discrimination and violations of law
were motivating factor(s) in the decision for the adverse employment action(s).” Id. ¶ 46.

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Defendant now files the instant Motion seeking to dismiss Count V of the Amended
Complaint as procedurally barred and to strike certain allegations contained therein. ECF No. [21].
Plaintiff, on the other hand, takes the opposing position, arguing that her retaliation claim is not
procedurally barred and that the allegations Defendant seeks to strike are related to her claims.
ECF No. [22]. The Motion is ripe for this Court’s review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. These elements are required to survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) that
requests dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor
of the plaintiff. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d
1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts
“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d
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1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “courts may infer from the factual allegations in the
complaint ‘obvious alternative explanations,’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the
unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605
F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).
A court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “may consider only the complaint itself
and any documents referred to in the complaint which are central to the claims.” Wilchombe v.
TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint
may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of
authenticity.” (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002))).
B. Motion to Strike
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to “strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” granting
courts broad discretion in making this determination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see also Morrison v.
Exec. Aircraft Refinishing, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318-19 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Williams v.
Eckerd Family Youth Alt., 908 F. Supp. 908, 910 (M.D. Fla. 1995). Under Rule 12(f), “[a] motion
to strike will usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy
and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Harty v. SRA/Palm Trails Plaza, LLC, 755 F. Supp.
2d 1215, 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also BB In
Tech. Co. v. JAF, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 632, 641 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (same); Home Mgmt. Sols., Inc. v.
Prescient, Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV, 2007 WL 2412834, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007) (same);
Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (same).
Courts have broad discretion in considering a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(f). See, e.g., Sakolsky v. Rubin Mem’l Chapel, LLC, No. 07-80354-CIV, 2007 WL
3197530, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007). Irrespective of the Court’s broad discretion, this ability
to strike is considered to be drastic and is often disfavored. Thompson v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E.,
LLC, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction
of Escambia Cty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962));1 Fabing v. Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
Inc., No. 8:12-cv-2624-T-33MAP, 2013 WL 593842, at *2 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2013) (calling
Rule 12(f) a “draconian sanction”).
III. DISCUSSION
In the instant Motion, Defendant argues that Count V of the Amended Complaint should
be dismissed because Plaintiff’s retaliation count is procedurally barred and fails to state a claim.
Moreover, the Motion argues that the Amended Complaint’s allegations 33-41 should be stricken
as immaterial and prejudicial to Defendant.
A. Procedural Bar
First, regarding the argument that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is procedurally barred,
Defendant relies on the Charge of Discrimination, which it attaches to its Motion. ECF No. [21-1]
(“Charge”).2 In particular, Defendant argues that the Charge fails to check the box for retaliation,
and only checks the boxes for discrimination based on race and national origin. Further, Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s Charge fails to specify any actions that could support a claim for
retaliation. As such, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is procedurally barred

1

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit adopted all decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that were rendered prior to October
1, 1981.
2
“[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may [] be considered if it is central to the
plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.” Maxcess, Inc., 433 F.3d at 1340 n.3 (citing
Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1135). Plaintiff here does not dispute the authenticity of the Charge of Discrimination,
which is central to the claims raised in her Amended Complaint. Thus, the Court may properly consider
this document in resolving the instant Motion.

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Case No. 20-cv-21223-BLOOM/Louis
because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Plaintiff, however, argues that her retaliation claim is not procedurally
barred because it reasonably grew out of or was related to her claims of discrimination described
in the Charge.
In order to prove retaliation under Title VII,[3] a “plaintiff must show that
(1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action
occurred, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected
activities.” Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956,
959 (11th Cir. 1997). Prior to filing a Title VII action, however, a plaintiff first must
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970).
The purpose of this exhaustion requirement “is that the [EEOC] should have
the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it
to perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation
efforts.” Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1983);
see also Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The purpose of the
filing requirement is to insure that the settlement of grievances be first attempted
through the office of the EEOC.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This
Court further has noted that judicial claims are allowed if they “amplify, clarify, or
more clearly focus” the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but has cautioned that
allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate. Wu, 863 F.2d at 1547
(citation omitted).
In light of the purpose of the EEOC exhaustion requirement, we have held
that a “plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466 (noting
that the allegations in a judicial complaint filed pursuant to Title VII may
encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to the allegations contained in
the charge). Courts are nonetheless “extremely reluctant to allow procedural
technicalities to bar claims brought under [Title VII].” Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 46061. As such, this Court has noted that “‘the scope of an EEOC complaint should
not be strictly interpreted’” Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Gregory is directly applicable here. Although decided
at the summary judgment stage, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning regarding a potential procedural

“The Florida Civil Rights Act is patterned after Title VII, and therefore federal case law regarding Title
VII is applicable.” Natson v. Eckerd Corp., 885 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Castleberry
v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 810 So. 2d 1028, 1030 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)).
3

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bar to a retaliation claim made under similar facts to the instant action is instructive. As is the case
here, the plaintiff in Gregory failed to check the box for retaliation on her charge of discrimination.
Id. at 1279. Additionally, in the plaintiff’s description of the discrimination in Gregory, she stated
that she had been terminated without being given a legitimate reason for the termination, and that
she believed she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and sex. Id. “Moreover, she
asserted that white and male doctors (1) were not required to provide doctor’s excuses when they
used sick leave, (2) did not have negative performance memoranda placed in their records for
arbitrary reasons, and (3) were not subjected to unwarranted termination.” Id. Upon filing her
lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged, in part, that after she “complained to the administration of Defendant
Fuller’s racially discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff, Defendants treated Plaintiff worse and even
ended up terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff’s termination was motivated by her race
and/or in retaliation for complaining of Defendant Fuller’s race discrimination against her.” Id.
In affirming the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
the Eleventh Circuit explained that the relevant inquiry was whether the complaint was like or
related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s EEOC charge, which was
founded upon her ultimate termination. Id. at 1280. Although the plaintiff’s charge stated that she
believed she was terminated because of her race and sex, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there
could be various non-legitimate reasons driving an employee’s ultimate termination. Id. Indeed,
as the Circuit Court explained, “it could be that race and sex were the only reasons, as she initially
believed, why she was terminated. It could also be, however, that Dr. Gregory was terminated in
retaliation for having complained about Dr. Fuller’s disparate treatment of her, inter alia, during
physician scheduling and patient assignments.” Id. Ultimately, the Gregory court held that “[t]he
facts alleged in [the plaintiff’s] EEOC charge could have reasonably been extended to encompass

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a claim for retaliation because they were inextricably intertwined with her complaints of race and
sex discrimination.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Charge states:
I am a female African American of Haitian National Origin. I had been
employed by the [Defendant] as an educator and have not been the subject of any
major disciplinary incidents for performance or violations of [Defendant’s] rules
and regulations.
On October 25, 2018, I was summoned to the office of the Principal, Laura
Ferelia, (Hispanic) and I was informed that I was terminated. When I asked why I
was being terminated, the Principal informed me, that I was not a good fit for the
school and that I needed to apply for a position in a school with people who look
more like me (African American). Principal Escudero offered to provide me with a
work reference if I required one.
I believe, I was terminated because of my Race (African American[)] and
my National Origin (Haitian) in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
ECF No. [21-1]. Further, as Defendant notes, Plaintiff’s Charge did not check the box for
retaliation. Id.
Nevertheless, like the EEOC charge in Gregory, Plaintiff’s Charge here is premised upon
the ultimate act of her termination, which she believed was motivated by her race and national
origin. The Amended Complaint sets forth allegations supporting Plaintiff’s retaliation claim that
are inextricably intertwined with her claims for race and national origin discrimination. In
particular, the Amended Complaint notes that Plaintiff was subjected to derogatory comments,
disparate treatment, and increased workloads, which she believes were based upon her race and
national origin, and that she made several complaints about this disparate treatment to Ms.
Escudero and Dr. Vesga. ECF No. [20] ¶¶ 30-32, 93-94. Plaintiff’s ultimate termination could
have been motivated solely by her race and national origin, but “[i]t could also be [that
Plaintiff] . . . was terminated in retaliation for having complained about [her] disparate
treatment[.]” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280. Consistent with the reasoning articulated in Gregory, this

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Court will not strictly construe the Charge to bar Plaintiff’s retaliation claim here on a procedural
technicality. Id. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion is denied as to the procedural bar.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Count V of the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim. Specifically, Defendant contends
that Plaintiff fails to allege that she engaged in statutorily protected activity—a required element
of a retaliation claim. The Court, however, agrees with Plaintiff that the general allegations in the
Amended Complaint, combined with the allegations set forth in Count V, sufficiently present a
claim for retaliation at the pleading stage.4 To state a retaliation claim, “plaintiff must show that
(1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and
(3) the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected activities.” Gregory, 355
F.3d at 1279.
The Amended Complaint generally alleges that “Plaintiff was subjected to derogatory
comments, harassment, and negative treatment by both Ms. Escudero and Dr. Vesga.” ECF No.
[20] ¶ 30. “Specifically, Dr. Vesga often spoke in a condescending and demeaning manner to
Plaintiff in meetings and she would often publicly reprimand her in front of other co-workers.” Id.
¶ 31. “Furthermore, Escudero would alienate Plaintiff at open houses, make fun of Plaintiff’s
accent, and give her additional workload.” Id. ¶ 32. In addition to these general allegations
detailing the discriminatory conduct Plaintiff suffered, Count V also alleges that Plaintiff made
several complaints to Ms. Escudero and Dr. Vesga about the disparate treatment she was subjected
to, and these complaints were protected activity. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. Moreover, Plaintiff states that
Defendant retaliated against her for exercising her protected rights, that Defendant’s alleged

Generally, courts must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 304 F.3d at 1084.
4

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reasons terminating Plaintiff were pretextual, and that, if Defendant’s proffered reasons are
meritorious, Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination and disparate treatment were motivating
factors in Plaintiff’s ultimate termination. Id. ¶¶ 95, 99-100.
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that
the allegations in the Amended Complaint sufficiently state a claim for retaliation. Plaintiff’s
allegations support that Plaintiff suffered discriminatory treatment based on race and national
origin, she complained about this discrimination, and she was terminated, at least in part, due to
Plaintiff’s complaints. These allegations are sufficient to support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. See
Olson v. Dex Imaging, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1363 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (“Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint alleges that she engaged in multiple instances of protected activity including
complaining about discriminatory acts against her based on her gender and disability a few days
before she was constructively discharged.”). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is denied on this
basis.
C. Motion to Strike
Lastly, Defendant argues that allegations 33-41 of the Amended Complaint should be
stricken as immaterial and prejudicial to Defendant. The allegations at issue detail how Plaintiff
was assigned more students to her classroom than is allowed under Florida law and was assigned
a special needs student to her classroom when she was unqualified to teach special needs students.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, responds that these allegations are directly related to her claims of
discrimination and retaliation because they demonstrate how Plaintiff was subject to disparate
treatment and increased workloads by Ms. Escudero and Dr. Vesga.
As explained above, “[a] motion to strike will usually be denied unless the allegations have
no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Harty, 755
F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Amended
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Complaint clearly alleges that part of the discriminatory and disparate treatment Plaintiff was
subjected to was increased workloads. ECF No. [20] ¶ 32. Allegations about Defendant increasing
the number of students assigned to Plaintiff’s classroom beyond the maximum number of students
allowed by Florida law and assigning special needs students to her classroom despite Plaintiff’s
lack of qualifications to teach special needs students are not the types of allegations that “have no
possible relation to the controversy.” Thus, the Court will not employ this “drastic” remedy and
strike these allegations at this juncture. Thompson, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. As such, Defendant’s
Motion to strike allegations 33-41 is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion, ECF No.
[21], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 13, 2020.

_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Wisline Dorleant
1270 S.E. 28th Ct.
Homestead, Florida 33035
[e-mail]

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