Diaz v. Inch et al

Filing 18

ORDER DISMISSING TWO CLAIMS AND ALLOWING ONE CLAIM TO PROCEED. As previously determined, see ECF No. 9 , Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendant Inez Martin, in her individual capacity, for the alleged unlawful use of force on May 1 , 2020, shall PROCEED. Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Warden Jose Colon, in his individual capacity, for failing to ensure that his staff adhered to DCI policies and procedures following Plaintiff's May 1, 2020 injury shall PROCEED. All other claims, including Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Papillon and Martin, are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 2/17/2021. See attached document for full details. (daa)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 20-cv-23889-BLOOM
SCOTTY SANTOS DIAZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. INEZ MARTIN,
WARDEN JOSE COLON,
DR. FRANK PAPILLION,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DISMISSING TWO CLAIMS AND
ALLOWING ONE CLAIM TO PROCEED
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Scotty Santos Diaz’s (“Plaintiff” or
“Diaz”) Amended Complaint, ECF No. [16]. For the reasons set forth below, the Amended
Complaint shall proceed in part and is dismissed in part.
Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis and is there subject to
the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1228
(11th Cir. 2003).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate confined at the Dade Correctional Institution (“DCI”) and he filed

this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. [1]. The Complaint set forth
allegations that multiple prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment Rights. ECF No. [1]. The
Court entered an order that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Sgt. Inez Martin
shall proceed; however, Plaintiff’s claims against the rest of Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. ECF No. [9] at 17. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims of

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deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Mark Inch, Jose Colon, and
Franck Papillon in their individual and official capacities were dismissed without prejudice. ECF
No. [9]. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. ECF Nos. [12], [13].
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint renews allegations against Defendants Martin, Colon, and
Papillon. ECF No [16]. Plaintiff re-alleges the excessive force claim and a due process claim
against Defendant Martin in her individual capacity. Id. at 17. Plaintiff also re-alleges the
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against Defendants Colon and Papillon.
Id. at 18-20.
Plaintiff alleges excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
resulting in injuries that aggravated his pre-existing disability. Plaintiff’s allegations in the
Amended Complaint are largely the same as the allegations set forth in his original complaint. The
Court previously summarized Plaintiff’s allegations as follows:
Plaintiff is a visually impaired inmate suffering from severe stage Primary Open
Angle Glaucoma. ECF No. [1] at 4. On May 1, 2020, while housed at Dade CI,
Plaintiff was on his way to morning meal when Defendant Martin approached him
and asked why he was not wearing the blue homemade face mask issued to all
inmates. Id. Plaintiff politely advised Defendant Martin that someone took his blue
face mask. Id. Plaintiff told Defendant Martin that the medical department approved
the face mask he was using. Id. at 5. Defendant Martin then told Plaintiff that he
was not going to eat without his blue mask. Id. After Plaintiff again reminded
Defendant Martin that he no longer had a blue mask, she responded “I don’t care
what happen[ed] to it,” “you’re not going to eat without it,” “now get out of my line
or I’m going to spray you.” Id. Plaintiff respectfully requested to speak with a
captain and advised Defendant Martin that he was hungry and did not have any
food to eat. Id. Defendant Martin became angry and threatened to spray Plaintiff if
he did not move from the line. Id.
Fearing being sprayed, Plaintiff stepped out of line, lay down on the sidewalk on
his back in a horizontal position, placed his blind cane across his stomach, and
placed both of his arms on the ground. Id. Defendant Martin became even angrier,
shouting “I’m going to spray you” and “I don’t care who you want to speak to.” Id.
at 5. Plaintiff pleaded with Defendant Martin not to spray his eyes, telling her that
he had already lost total sight in one of his eyes from Glaucoma. Id. at 6. Defendant
Martin then took her can of chemical agent out, placed the nozzle directly under
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Plaintiff’s protective eyewear, and violently sprayed into Plaintiff’s surgically
repaired eyes for a long period of time. Id. As a result of the spraying, Plaintiff
experienced severe pain and was unable to breathe or see any light for several hours.
Id.
Plaintiff previously filed complaints and grievances against Defendant Martin for
her assaults on disabled inmates. Id. However, Defendant Martin’s actions were
simply “swept under the rug.” Id. at 7. Defendant Martin’s excessive use of force
by spraying Plaintiff’s eyes with chemical spray was intentional, willful, malicious,
and with retaliatory intent. Id.
As a result of the spraying incident, Plaintiff was placed into administrative
confinement and erroneously charged with disobeying a verbal order. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff was dragged to an empty shower stall for decontamination. Id. Plaintiff
advised the prison nurse that he had severe pain in his eyes and was unable to
breathe well. Id. Plaintiff requested to see a doctor for his glaucoma but was denied
any further medical treatment by a physician. Id.
Defendant Martin lied in her report when she wrote that Plaintiff became angry and
was waiving his blind cane towards her in an aggressive manner. Id. at 8-9. She did
so in an attempt to justify her unlawful use of excessive force against Plaintiff. Id.
at 9.
Plaintiff continued to seek medical treatment for the severe pain in his eyes, but he
never received responses to any of his medical requests. Id. at 10. Eventually, on
June 4, 2020, more than a month after the spraying incident, Nurse Mercedes
evaluated Plaintiff and determined that Dr. Altamirano needed to examine him. Id.
at 12. Dr. Altamirano determined that both of Plaintiff’s eyes were infected and
prescribed him antibiotic eye drops. Id. Despite Plaintiff’s request, “medical
providers” ignored his request to be seen by optometry. Id.
On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted another sick call request, advising medical
that he continued to experience severe pain in his eyes. Id. A week later, Nurse
Mercedes examined him and told Plaintiff that he would be seen by a doctor. Id.
On July 3, 2020, Plaintiff again submitted a sick call request, pleading for medical
attention. Id. Thirteen days later, on July 16, 2020, Dr. Altamirano examined
Plaintiff, prescribed more antibiotics and “excedrene migraine,” and advised
Plaintiff he would speak to the “C.H.O.” for consult with the eye specialist. Id. at
12-13. On August 5, 2020, Plaintiff was transported to Bascom and Palmer Eye
Institute to be seen by an eye specialist. Id. at 13. After several tests, it was
determined that Plaintiff would need surgery to alleviate the pain in his eyes. Id.
On August 20, 2020, surgery was performed on Plaintiff’s right eye. Id.
Despite Plaintiff’s multiple grievances filed soon after the use of excessive force
on May 1, 2020, Plaintiff was not seen by an eye doctor until August 5, 2020,

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approximately 90 days after the incident. Id. During this three-month period,
Plaintiff suffered from extreme pain and discomfort. Id.
ECF [9] at 4-6.
In this Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following additional facts. On May 5,
2020, plaintiff was found guilty at the D.R. hearing based on Defendant Martin’s “fabricated
report.” ECF No. [16] at 10 ¶ 32. In confinement, Plaintiff lost all his rights to “access to medical
when treatment is required, communication with family, maintaining your personal hygiene such
as daily showers.” Id. at 10 ¶ 33.
Plaintiff states that on July 18, 2020, he approached Defendant Colon inside of his
dormitory and showed him the infections in his eyes and personally asked him to investigate the
assault and to advise medical he was in need of treatment. Id. at 12-13 ¶ 46. Defendant Colon told
Plaintiff he would email medical. Id. at 13 ¶ 49. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Colon and Defendant
Papillon were already familiar with Plaintiff’s pre-existing medical conditions because of a
previously filed preliminary injunction in the Southern District of Florida with Case No. 19-cv23954-Bloom. Id. at 12 ¶ 45, 15 ¶ 63. Plaintiff states that Defendant Colon never emailed medical.
Id. at 13 ¶ 50. On July 20, 2020, in response to Plaintiff’s request, DCI’s legal mail representative
notified Plaintiff that a copy of Plaintiff’s formal complaint had been placed in Defendant Colon’s
mailbox. Id. at 13 ¶ 52.
Plaintiff seeks a (1) a declaration that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights; (2) the revocation of Defendant Martin’s certification after a full investigation of her
assaults on disabled inmates; (3) $15,000 in compensatory damages against each named defendant;
(4) $10,000 in punitive damages against each named Defendant; (5) nominal damages; (6)
recovery of attorney’s fees and costs; and, (7) any other relief the Court deems proper. Id. at 21.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is now before the Court for review.
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a complaint must be

dismissed if the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the complaint
under § 1915(e), the court takes the allegations as true and construes them in the most favorable
light. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003); Maps v. Miami Dade State Att’y,
693 F. App’x 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Complaints filed by pro se prisoners are held
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain factual
allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright, 740 F. App’x at 694 (citing Waldman v.
Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Although a pro se pleading is
liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some factual support for a claim.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show he was deprived of a federal
right by a person acting under color of state law. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295,
1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous claims that are
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or “whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, the same standards govern dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) and dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the
court may dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts “nevertheless
have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
There is no required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id.
at 8(d)(1). The statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (quotation omitted) (ellipses in original).
Additionally, each separate claim should be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with each
paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
“[A] pro se pleading must still suggest that there is at least some factual support for a
claim.” Waldman, 871 F.3d at 1289 (internal citations omitted). “Yet even in the case of pro se
litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica
Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla.,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)); see Rodriguez v. Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 603 (11th Cir.
2019). Pro se pleadings “must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at least some factual support
for a claim; it is not enough to just invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual basis.” Brown v.
Orange Cnty. Corr. Dep’t, 699 F. App’x 916, 916-17 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jones v. Fla.
Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).

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III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff advances claims against Defendant Martin, Colon, and Papillon in his Amended

Complaint. The Court already determined that Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against
Defendant Martin shall proceed. The Court will address the previously dismissed claims against
Defendant Martin for knowingly submitting false statements and the deliberate indifference claims
against Defendants Colon and Papillon.
A.

Violation of Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court in Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), recognized in the prison context that states may create liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clause, “[b]ut these interests will generally be limited to
freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 472. A due process violation, arising from
a deprivation of a prisoner’s liberty, may be established (1) when a change in a prisoner’s
confinement is so severe it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court, or (2) when the
liberty interest is created by the state. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
Defendant Martin
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Martin violated his due process rights by lying on the
disciplinary report when she stated that plaintiff swung his blind cane at her. Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant Martin issued a false disciplinary report is only cognizable under § 1983 if Plaintiff can
show that the report resulted in him suffering an atypical and significant hardship. See e.g.
Gonzalez v. Monty, 89 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

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The Court previously denied this claim, finding that Plaintiff did not “allege any facts to
suggest that the denial of medical treatment was related to his punishment resulting from the
disciplinary report” and that Plaintiff did not allege “any facts to suggest that his punishment
exposed him to conditions substantially different from those experienced by inmates in the general
population of the prison.” ECF No. [9] at 10 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that due to the administrative confinement, he lost access to medical
treatment, communication with family members, and the ability to maintain personal hygiene.
However, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. He alleges that he lost access to required medical
treatments but fails to allege facts that support that the delay in medical treatment was due to his
confinement. He fails to allege that a condition of his administrative confinement barred him from
access to medical treatment. Additionally, on May 14, 2020, while Plaintiff was still in
confinement, he “personally handed another sick-call request to nurse Ms. Moonsammy and
showed the nurse both his infected eyes . . . Nurse Moonsammy assured Plaintiff that she would
immediately take the request to the sick-call [nurse].” Id. at 11 ¶ 37-38. Although Plaintiff states
that he never received a response, there is no indication that this was a result of his confinement.
Moreover, given Plaintiff’s other allegations, Plaintiff’s access to medical care did not change after
he was released from confinement.
Plaintiff’s amended claim that Defendant Martin violated his due process fails to state a
claim for which relief can be granted and must be dismissed.
B.

Deliberate indifference
The Eighth Amendment prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards of

decency or involves “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102-03 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); see also Campbell v. Sikes,
169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
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Amendment to prohibit “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 103. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need and causation
between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
To establish the first element, that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that the prison official had (1) “subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm;” (2) disregarded that risk; by (3) conduct that is “more than mere
negligence.” Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 876 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing McElligott v. Foley,
182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)).
The subjective component requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official acted
wantonly, with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). Mere negligence
will not suffice. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36. “An official disregards a serious risk by more
than mere negligence ‘when he [or she] knows that an inmate is in serious need of medical care,
but he [or she] fails or refuses to obtain medical treatment for the inmate.’” Nam Dang v. Sheriff,
Seminole Cnty. of Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty.,
116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997)), overruled on other grounds by LeFrere v. Quezada, 588
F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).
The defendant’s conduct must be “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Nam Dang, 871 F.3d at 1280
(quoting Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)); see also Hines v. Parker, 725 F.
App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2018).

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Lastly, for a plaintiff to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate a causal connection between defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference and
plaintiff’s injury. See Harris v. Prison Health Servs., 706 F. App’x 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2017). The
Court previously determined that Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to plausibly state that
Defendant Martin’s unlawful use of force and Plaintiff’s resulting injuries constituted a serious
medical need. ECF No. [9] at 12; see Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir.
2009) overruled in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“A serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physical as mandating treatment . . . .”).
Therefore, it must be determined whether the Defendants were subjectively aware of
Plaintiff’s condition and wantonly disregarded the risk to him by delaying adequate treatment for
his injuries, and whether there is a causal connection between the alleged deliberate indifference
and Plaintiff’s injury.
Plaintiff advances his deliberate indifference claims based upon a theory of supervisory
liability. A claim based on supervisory liability may only proceed if (1) the supervisory official
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or (2) when there is a causal
connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff may establish a causal
connection by showing that: (1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to do so”; (2) “the supervisor’s
improper custom or policy le[d] to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “facts
support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that
the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Douglas v. Yates,
535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008). “The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her

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individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Doe v. Sch. Bd. of
Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant Colon
The Court previously denied this claim under a theory of supervisory liability finding that
Plaintiff cannot base his claim against Defendant Colon solely on the failure of his staff to follow
DCI policies and procedures. ECF No. [9] at 14. The Court stated that Plaintiff alleged only that
he was never seen by medical department and not that Defendant Colon failed to contact the
medical department. Id. at 15. Neither did Plaintiff allege that his injury was “so obvious to
Defendant Colon, as a layperson, that it was ‘apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate
the medical problem.’” Id. (quoting Fernandez v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t, 397 F. App’x 507,
512 (11th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Colon had knowledge of the serious injury
caused by Defendant Martin as well as Plaintiff’s pre-existing eye condition. Plaintiff filed a
formal complaint against Defendant Martin describing the injuries that resulted from her excessive
use of force against Plaintiff. Plaintiff sent the formal complaint via certified mail on June 5, 2020
and confirmed with DCI’s legal mail representative that the formal complaint was delivered to
Defendant Colon’s mailbox. Plaintiff states that when he approached Defendant Colon on July 18,
2020, Defendant Colon was able to see firsthand the condition of Plaintiff’s eyes. Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that although Defendant Colon stated he would email the medical department, he never
sent an email. Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief on his deliberate indifference of a
serious medical need claim against Defendant Colon.

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Defendant Papillon
The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Papillon because Plaintiff
failed to any facts to suggest that Defendant Papillon was subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s sick
calls and ignored them prior to Plaintiff’s examination by Dr. Altamirano. ECF No. [9] at 16.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not allege a single instance during this period where he was personally
seen by Defendant Papillon. Id. at 15. Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to support Defendant
Papillon’s personal participation in the delay in medical treatment or a causal connection between
any delay in treatment and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 16.
Here, Plaintiff alleges additional facts supporting that Defendant Papillon was aware of
Plaintiff’s pre-existing medical condition. However, Plaintiff’s additional facts do not support the
conclusion that Defendant Papillon was personally aware of the injuries Plaintiff suffered as a
result of Defendant Martin’s excessive force. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Papillon
disregarded “all efforts made by both the Plaintiff and Dr. Altamirano to evaluate his serious
medical condition” are conclusory and unsupported by facts that describe how Defendant Papillon
disregarded these efforts. Plaintiff’s amended claim that Defendant Papillon was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical need fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and
must be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

As previously determined, see ECF No. [9], Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
against Defendant Inez Martin, in her individual capacity, for the alleged unlawful
use of force on May 1, 2020, shall PROCEED.

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2.

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Warden Jose Colon, in
his individual capacity, for failing to ensure that his staff adhered to DCI policies
and procedures following Plaintiff’s May 1, 2020 injury shall PROCEED.

3.

All other claims, including Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Papillon and
Martin, are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on February 17, 2021.

_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Scotty Santos Diaz, Pro Se
# 670614
Dade Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
19000 SW 377th Street
Florida City, FL 33034

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