McDonald v. The Fresh Market, Inc

Filing 27

Order Requiring Amended Complaint. Denying as Moot 19 Motion to Dismiss; Denying as Moot 19 Motion to Strike ( Amended Complaint due by 5/4/2021.) Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 4/27/2021. See attached document for full details. (cds)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Kanisha McDonald, Plaintiff,
v.
The Fresh Market, Inc., Defendant.

)
)
) Civil Action No. 21-20259-Civ-Scola
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)

Order Requiring Amended Complaint
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (ECF No. 19.) This action arises from
injuries allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff Kenisha McDonald when she
slipped and fell at the Defendant’s business located at 18299 Biscayne Blvd.,
Aventura, Florida, 33160. For the reasons set forth below, the Court strikes
the Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 17) and denies as moot the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19.)
1. Shotgun Pleading
Upon review of the Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court finds it
is an impermissible shotgun pleading. “Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have
little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d
1291, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2018). They violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) and 10(b), “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the
scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the
public’s respect for the courts.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted). When
presented with a shotgun pleading, a district court “should strike the pleading
and instruct counsel to replead the case—if counsel could in good faith make
the representations required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).” Jackson v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2018) (“This is so even when the other
party does not move to strike the pleading.”). When shotgun pleadings “are
allowed to survive past the pleadings stage, ‘all is lost—extended and largely
aimless discovery will commence, and the trial court will soon be drowned in
an uncharted sea of depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits.’” Barmapov v.
Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2021) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)
(quoting Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1290,
1333 (11th Cir. 1998)). Faced with a shotgun pleading, district courts should
“immediately order a repleader and instruct the party to plead its case in
accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b).” Id. at 1329
(emphasis in original).

The Eleventh Circuit has identified four rough types of shotgun
pleadings: 1) “the most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before
and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; 2) a complaint
that commits the “venial sin” of being replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts; 3) a pleading that fails to separate into a different count each
cause of action; and 4) where a plaintiff asserts multiple claims against
multiple defendants but fails to specify which defendants the respective claims
are brought against. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d
1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s complaint is the third type of shotgun
pleading identified by the Eleventh Circuit. In violation of the Federal Rules,
the complaint fails to make any attempt to clearly state the cause of action or
causes of action the Plaintiff alleges against the Defendant. The Plaintiff is
warned that any attempts to lump multiple claims into a single cause of action
will not be well taken and will result in the Court striking the Plaintiff’s
complaint once again, or potentially in dismissal of this action as set forth
below. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-20859-Civ, 2020 WL
977935, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020) (Scola, J.) (“Within the third ‘general
negligence’ count, Wheeler attempts to cram multiple, distinct theories of
liability into one claim. Each distinct theory, however, is a separate cause of
action that must be asserted independently and with corresponding supporting
factual allegations.”).
2. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court strikes the Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 17), as
a shotgun pleading. The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by May 4,
2021, provided it complies with this order, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)
and 10(b), and the Iqbal/Twombly standard. Specifically, the Plaintiff must
assert each theory of liability as a separate cause of action, being careful not to
include redundant claims in her amended pleading. Consistent with this order,
the Court denies as moot the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19.)
The Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to comply with this order may
result in the dismissal of this case with prejudice or other appropriate
sanctions. See Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358-59 (instructing that “if the plaintiff
fails to comply with the court’s order—by filing a repleader with the same
deficiency—the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the
circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary
sanctions.” (quotations omitted)).

Done and ordered, in Chambers, in Miami, Florida on April 27, 2021.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge