Shevland v. Orlando et al

Filing 45

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 18 Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. Defendants' motion to compel is granted in part only as to Defendant Orlando. Signed by Ch. Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres on 9/19/2022. See attached document for full details. (jfz)

Case 1:21-cv-24324-DPG Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/19/2022 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 21-24324-Civ-GAYLES/TORRES
BRIAN SHEVLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK ORLANDO and
ARC GLOBAL INVESTMENTS II, LLC
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY THE CASE
This matter is before the Court on Patrick Orlando’s (“Orlando”), and ARC
Global Investments II, LLC’s (“ARC”) (collectively “Defendants”) joint motion to
compel all of Brian Shevland’s (“Shevland” or “Plaintiff”) claims to arbitration and
stay the case pending completion of the arbitral proceedings. [D.E. 18]. Plaintiff
filed a response on February 18, 2022, [D.E. 21], to which Defendants replied on
March 7, 2022.

[D.E. 24].

The motion is ripe for disposition. 1

After careful review

of the motion, response, reply, relevant authority, and for the reasons discussed
below, Defendants’ motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On June 15, 2022, the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles referred the case to the
Undersigned for a ruling on all pre-trial, non-dispositive matters, and a report and
recommendation on all dispositive matters. Disposition of an arbitration motion
may be deemed non-dispositive. But given the hybrid nature of such a motion, the
Court will enter an Order on the motion but the parties have leave to appeal, if
desired, by seeking de novo review as if the Order was a Report and Recommendation.
1

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I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a business relationship gone sour.

Shevland is a

founder and CEO with over twenty years of experience in the financial services
industry.

[D.E. 1, ¶13].

Orlando is a financial advisor and is the managing

member of co-Defendant ARC.

Shevland was introduced to Orlando in late 2020

through a friend who told Shevland that Orlando was looking for help in setting up a
business dedicated to the formation and execution of Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies (“SPACs”). 2 Id. ¶14.

The gist of the enterprise encompassed: creating

SPACs from scratch, bringing in investors, identifying potential targets, and
effectuating a successful merger. If all went well, Shevland and Orlando would reap
the benefits by having their founder shares grow in value exponentially. Id. ¶11.
Following multiple discussions, Shevland and Orlando entered into an oral
agreement setting forth the terms of their collaboration agreement on or about
December 21, 2020.

According to the Complaint, the parties agreed to being equal

partners in all future SPAC opportunities, meaning that, in exchange for their
contributions to the enterprise, both Shevland and Orlando would have the right to
invest in founder shares of each SPAC at the same price and to purchase the same
number of shares. Id. ¶15.

Soon thereafter, however, Orlando allegedly breached

the oral contract by limiting the number of shares to which Shevland was entitled in

“A SPAC is a publicly traded corporation with a two-year life span formed with the
sole purpose of effecting a merger, or “combination,” with a privately held business to
enable it to go public. SPACs raise money largely from public-equity investors and
have the potential to derisk and shorten the IPO process for their target companies,
often offering them better terms than a traditional IPO would.” Max H. Bazerman
& Paresh Patel, SPACs: What You Need to Know, Harvard Business Review, JulyAugust 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/07/spacs-what-you-need-to-know.
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connection with Benessere Capital Acquisition Corporation (“BENE”), their first
SPAC opportunity.

Despite Shevland’s displeasure with their first deal, he was still

interested in pursuing this venture with Orlando but insisted in memorializing the
agreement in writing.

Id. ¶¶17-19.

Between January 31 and February 10, 2021, the parties exchanged multiple
email communications discussing the terms of their agreement, and on February 10,
2021, the parties executed a final version of the agreement in writing.

Among other

things, the agreement provides that:
Patrick and Brian will have the opportunity but not the obligation to
invest up to equal amounts in all current and future SPAC
opportunities, whether internal or external, at the same terms (same
price/share). In the event that Brian and his network are able to raise
more sponsor capital in order to reduce the price per share, both Brian
and Patrick will share equally in the price/share reduction, the shares
will not be bifurcated. This right does not extend to BENE since those
terms are outlined in the subscription agreement but would apply to all
other SPAC opportunities.

Id. ¶21. (emphasis removed).
Following execution of the agreement, Shevland and Orlando worked together
to build their next project, Digital World Acquisition Company (DWAC), a SPAC
sponsored 3 by Orlando and co-Defendant ARC, and for which Orlando was Chairman
and CEO. Id. ¶26.

According to Plaintiff, Orlando relied on him for guidance,

support, and expertise to ensure that the launch of DWAC would be a success; and so
it was.

In 2021, an opportunity arose for DWAC to merge with the Trump Media

“The SPAC process is initiated by the sponsors. They invest risk capital in the form
of nonrefundable payments to bankers, lawyers, and accountants to cover operating
expenses. If sponsors fail to create a combination within two years, the SPAC must
be dissolved and all funds returned to the original investors.” Id.

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and Technology Group (“TMTG”), an emerging media company created by Donald
Trump.

Shevland was instrumental in securing TMTG as well as raising capital for

DWAC, thereby ensuring DWAC’s success and subsequent enormous growth.
Among other things, Orlando asked Shevland to raise $5 million in investment
capital for DWAC, and Shevland’s likeness, credentials, and experience were included
in investor materials designed to attract investment in DWAC. Id. ¶¶32-34.
Plaintiff alleges, however, that despite satisfactorily performing under the
agreement, in the weeks leading up to DWAC’s IPO, Orlando froze him out entirely
from DWAC, and refused to let him make any investment in DWAC in breach of their
agreement.

Id. ¶55.

According to Plaintiff, after DWAC completed its IPO on

September 3, 2021, Orlando held 5,490,000 founder shares in DWAC, the value of
which increased to approximately $400 million after the TMTG merger was
announced.

Id. ¶¶60-61; [D.E. 21, pp. 5-6].

Based upon these facts, Shevland commenced this action in federal court on
December 14, 2021, alleging breach of contract (Count I) and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and good dealing (Count II) against Orlando.

Plaintiff also

brought a claim of unjust enrichment (Count III) against both Orlando and ARC in
the alternative, and a claim for declaratory judgment (Count IV) against Defendants.
Defendants have responded by first moving to dismiss all counts in favor of
arbitration and to stay this action pending completion of arbitral proceedings.

II.

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed in favor of
arbitration.

Defendants do not dispute that the SPAC investment agreement with

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Shevland did not include an arbitration clause; rather, they contend that this dispute
is subject to arbitration under the auspices of the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”) because the parties are bound by FINRA’s mandatory
arbitration provisions. [D.E. 18, p. 4].

Specifically, Defendants allege that Shevland

and Orlando are subject to FINRA arbitration (i) by virtue of their current and prior
status as “associated persons” of a FINRA-member, and (ii) because this dispute arose
in connection with Shevland’s “business activity” as a FINRA associated person.

As

to co-Defendant ARC, Defendants assert that ARC is entitled to arbitration by virtue
of ARC’s status as a “customer” of a FINRA associated person.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, opposes the motion because the claims against
Orlando fall outside the realm of FINRA arbitration as (i) Orlando was neither a
FINRA-member nor an associated person at the time the parties executed the
investment agreement, and (ii) the claims at issue do not relate to Shevland’s
business activity because he executed the agreement with Orlando in his individual
capacity and not in his capacity as a FINRA associated person. As to co-Defendant
ARC, Plaintiff asserts that ARC was never his customer because he and ARC never
engaged in any sort of transaction.
We address each of these arguments in turn.

In short, we agree with

Defendants that the claims against Orlando are subject to FINRA arbitration but
disagree with respect to the claims against co-Defendant ARC, who is neither a
FINRA-member nor a customer of a FINRA associated person.
Defendants’ motion to compel is Granted in part only as to Orlando.

5

Accordingly,

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A.

The FINRA Rules

FINRA is a non-profit corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission that regulates securities firms and investment advisors.

FINRA

derives its authority and duties from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq., and has “the authority to exercise comprehensive oversight
over all securities firms that do business with the public.”

Pictet Overseas Inc. v.

Helvetia Tr., 905 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2018).
FINRA regulations provide that its “[r]ules shall apply to all members and
persons associated with a member. Persons associated with a member shall have the
same duties and obligations as a member under the Rules.” [D.E. 18, p. 4] (citing Rule
0140(a)).

Rule 13200 requires arbitration when “the dispute arises out of the

business activities of a member or an associated person and is between or among:
members, members and associated persons, or associated persons.” Id. (emphasis
added).

In turn, Rule 13100(a) defines an “associated person” as a “[a] natural

person who is registered or has applied for registration[,]” a “partner, officer, director,
or branch manager of a member, or other natural person occupying a similar status
or performing similar functions[,]” or “a natural person engaged in the investment
banking or securities business who is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled
by a member.” Id.
In addition, Rule 13000(u) provides that “a person formerly associated with a

member is a person associated with a member.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). FINRA
Rule 12200 also provides that arbitration between a “customer” and a Member or an
associated person is mandatory upon request by the customer. Id. at 4.

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B.

Legal Standard

Both the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit hold that courts must interpret
the FINRA Code “as it would a contract under the applicable state law.” MONY

Securities Corp. v. Bornstein, 390 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing MultiFinancial Sec. Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 2004); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).

“Because the FINRA Arbitration Code is

unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the
document.” Pictet, 905 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246,
1255 (Fla. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)). “[T]he language of the Code itself is
the best evidence of the parties’ intent, and its plain meaning controls.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).

And “unlike other contracts, any doubts concerning the

scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” King, 386 F.3d
at 1367 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)). Further, it is well settled that the
FINRA Code constitutes a written agreement to arbitrate and can be enforced as
such. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. v. Simon, No. 19-20053-CIV, 2019 WL 4864465, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-20053-CIV,
2019 WL 4685876 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2019) (internal citations omitted).

C.
(i)

Plaintiff’s Claims against Orlando Are Arbitrable
Shevland and Orlando Qualify as Asso c iated Perso ns

We first address Defendants’ claim that both Shevland and Orlando are
associated persons of a FINRA Member and, as such, are subject to the arbitration
mandate of Rule 13200.

In essence, Defendant’s argument is that a plain reading of

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Rules 13100(a) and 13200 dictate a finding of association because it is uncontested
that Shevland has been an associated person of FINRA-member MCG Securities LLC
(“MCG”) since 2014, 4 and that Orlando was an associated person of FINRA-member

Stillpoint Capital, LLC (“Stillpoint”) from January 1, 2013, to May 2019, and of
FINRA-member Entoro Securities, LLC (“Entoro”) since May 2021.

Hence,

Defendants allege that by virtue of their previous and current status as associated
persons, both Shevland and Orlando meet FINRA’s definition of associated persons.
Defendants’ position is well founded.

As even Plaintiff acknowledges, the

plain reading of Rule 131000(u) provides that “a person formally associated with a
member” is deemed “a person associated with a member” for FINRA purposes.
[D.E. 21, p. 7].

As such Shevland and Orlando are by Rule associated persons

subject to FINRA’s arbitration mandate.
Yet, Plaintiff asserts that Orlando’s status as an associated person to the
FINRA-members is futile here because he was not associated with either of these
firms in February 2021, the date on which the parties executed the investment
agreement.

This is so, Plaintiff posits, because “there must still be a nexus between

the former FINRA membership and the issues at hand in the Complaint,”
[D.E. 21, p. 7], a dubious proposition that finds no support in the cases cited by
Plaintiff. See MONY, 390 F.3d at 1343 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit applied
“a two-part test” framework to the enforcement of arbitration under NASD, FINRA’s
predecessor, whereby the court first addresses whether the dispute is between

“It is also true that since April 8, 2014, I have been registered with MCG Securities
LLC (“MCG”), a broker dealer and member of FINRA.” [D.E. 21-1, ¶ 4].

4

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members or associated persons (prong one), and then determines whether the dispute
has a connection (or nexus) with the activities of the associated person (prong two)).
Nothing in the text of FINRA Rule 131000(u) requires a showing of nexus between
membership and the claims alleged in the Complaint, and Plaintiff does not cite any
legal authority in support of this proposition.
Indeed, this court has previously rejected similar extrapolations of the nexus
prong into other parts of the FINRA code. See Viyella v. Nicor, No. 19-25094-CIV,
2020 WL 977481, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom Viyella v.

Fundacion Nicor, No. 20-11224-BB, 2020 WL 5755844 (11th Cir. July 14, 2020)
(rejecting the notion that Pictet’s nexus requirement applies to the definition of
“customer” under FINRA, and holding that “Movants’ insistence the Court should
follow the FINRA’s guidance on the definition of a customer under a different rule
fails to persuade.”).
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff argues to the contrary by relying on a single case
from Georgia for the proposition that a former FINRA member is subject to
arbitration only “if its membership was not terminated or cancelled prior to the
events giving rise to the dispute.”

[D.E. 21, p. 8 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Puzzo,

No. 1:13-CV-3858-TWT, 2014 WL 1817636, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 2014))].
Plaintiff’s reliance in Puzzo is misplaced.
significantly different from those at hand.

But

First the facts in that case were
In Puzzo, the Court refused to send a

breach of contract case (regarding non-solicitation obligations) to FINRA arbitration
on the basis that all of the material events giving rise to the dispute took place several
years after the relevant FINRA-member had terminated its FINRA membership.

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See Puzzo, 2014 WL 1817636 at *2.

Hence, that court’s focus was on the

membership status of the FINRA-member itself, and not on the membership status
of an associated person.

By contrast, nowhere does Plaintiff allege that the relevant

FINRA-members to this dispute have had their FINRA memberships cancelled,
As such, Puzzo is simply inapposite.

terminated, or suspended.

Second, a closer reading of Puzzo undermines Plaintiff’s position that the
relevant time frame in determining FINRA association status is the date on which
the contract was executed.

In Puzzo the court expressly noted that there were

numerous “material events giving rise to [the action,]” one of which was the date of
execution.

Id. Yet, the court notably also deemed relevant the date on which the

defendant was terminated form his job, as well as the date on which he poached some
of his former colleagues.

Like Puzzo, execution of the investment agreement in our

case is only one of the dates material to the dispute. Just as material, or even more
material, are the dates in which Orlando allegedly breached the agreement during
the months of June, July, August, and September, [D.E. 1, pp. 11-17], when Orlando
enjoyed status as a FINRA associated person by virtue of both his prior and current
association to FINRA-member entities.

See FINRA Rule 13000(u) (providing that

“a person formerly associated with a member is a person associated with a member.”).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s argument that he and Orlando were not FINRA
associated persons when the material events giving rise to this dispute is
unpersuasive.

This theory belies the plain meaning of FINRA Rules and misapplies

the relevant law. Hence Defendants’ motion is entirely sound in this respect.

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(ii)

The Dispute Aro se fro m the Business Ac tivities o f Shevland

Having found that Shevland and Orlando are associated persons under
FINRA, we turn to the second argument Plaintiff raises in opposition to Orlando’s
motion to compel arbitration: that his claims do not relate to his business activity
because he executed the agreement with Orlando in his individual capacity and not
in his capacity as a FINRA associated person.
We again agree with Defendants on this score because the claims against
Orlando are subject to arbitration under Rules 12200 and 13200. The crux of the
dispute arises from Shevland’s business activities as an associated person of a FINRA
member.

Specifically, in performing under the agreement, Shevland was, by

necessity, required to engage in investment-related activity connected to his status
as a FINRA associated person. As such FINRA arbitration is properly triggered.
Plaintiff takes issue with this proposition but cites no authority, and we are
unaware of any, supporting the claim that a FINRA associated person is absolved
from his FINRA obligations when engaging in investment-related activity in his
individual capacity.

Instead, Plaintiff primarily relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s

decision in Pictet, where the court enjoined two trust funds from proceeding in
arbitration against a Canadian entity and some of its indirect owners. There, the
enjoined trusts had hired an independent investment manager and through him
opened custodial accounts with Banque Pictet, a Swiss bank. See Pictet, 905 F.3d
at 1185.

After the investment manager stole the money from the accounts, the

trusts initiated FINRA arbitration against eight partners and several corporate
affiliates of Banque Pictet, one of which was Pictet Overseas, Inc., a Canadian broker-

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dealer and FINRA member.

See id. But because Pictet Overseas was not in the

business of keeping custodial accounts, was not licensed to engage in such activities,
and where the business of custodial accounts was not even FINRA regulated, the
court held that a dispute arising from the maintenance of such accounts could not
possibly relate to the business activities of a FINRA member. Id. at 1190.
It is worth noting that the Pictet decisions, both at the district and appeals
levels, relied heavily on Valentine, a California Court of Appeals’ case that warrants
closer review.

Valentine Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Agahi, 174 Cal. App. 4th 606,

608, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526, 527 (2009).

In Valentine the court refused to compel

arbitration in a dispute concerning the parties’ ownership interest in one of plaintiff’s
businesses (a non-FINRA business) and the parties’ respective right to certain clients
of that business.

Id. Concerned with the effects that an untethered construction of

the phrase “arising out of the business activity of an associated person” could have,
the court found that commonsense instructed that FINRA requires arbitration of
disputes:
[O]nly if they arise out of the business activities of an individual as an
associated person of a FINRA member. With this interpretation, FINRA
and the registered representatives under its jurisdiction are assured
that arbitration will pertain to matters with some nexus to the activity
actually regulated by FINRA. This is nothing else than common sense
meaning of the plain language contained in Rule 13200, and any other
interpretation would wrongly strip individuals of their civil jury trial
rights concerning subject matter in which FINRA maintain no
regulatory interest.

Valentine, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 616. (emphasis added).
According to Valentine, this common-sense construction of the scope of FINRA
arbitration would safeguard the expectations that associated person also engaged in

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side businesses “as freelance photographer[s], coin collector[s], novelist[s], [or] real
estate agent[s][,]” would have about not arbitrating before FINRA “these types of noninvestment disputes.”

Id. at 615-16; see also Pictet, 905 F.3d at 1189 (observing that

the business activities of an associated person in his capacity as a real estate agent
have nothing to do with his status as a FINRA member); id. 1189 n.8 (“Like the
district court, we are persuaded by the reasoning in Valentine”).
Against this backdrop, then, it is hard to see how the concerns underpinning
the reasoning of Valentine and Pictet could possibly apply to Shevland’s situation.
Here, the dispute does not arise from Shevland’s side business on freelance
photography or real estate; it arises from Shevland’s involvement in an investment
venture aimed at forming and launching special investment vehicles.

By Shevland’s

own account, this venture entailed his active involvement in the solicitation of
investors, the offering of SPAC securities, and the raising of investment capital for
the respective SPACs. [D.E. 1, ¶¶ 32-34]. Clearly, this is the sort of activity in which
FINRA maintains a regulatory interest. Furthermore, Shevland’s involvement in
this venture presupposed a level of involvement that had a connection to his status
as a FINRA associated person. That is miles apart from the types of claims at issue
in Valentine and Pictet.
Indeed, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim that his involvement in the SPAC
investment agreement was entirely divorced from his connection to FINRA member
MCG, exhibits attached to the Complaint bolster Defendants’ position as they reflect
that the parties expressly discussed and contemplated Plaintiff’s status as a FINRA
associated person. [D.E. 1-8, Ex. E (reading in relevant part: “[Orlando] and Eric to

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partner with [Shevland] to launch investment banking desk for/clear through
bluestone CM/MCG? [Orlando] and Eric to be registered reps of Bluestone CM or
MCG” and “[Orlando] to run investment banking efforts for/clear through Bluestone
CM/MCG.”)]; see, e.g., Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Simon, No. 19-20053-CIV, 2019
WL 4685876, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2019) (finding that claims arose from the
business activities of associated person where relevant correspondence reflected his
association with FINRA member).
In sum, the record here does not support Plaintiff’s theory that he executed
and performed under this agreement in his individual capacity such that it absolves
him from the requirements of FINRA.

The overall record reflects that Shevland’s

involvement in the investment venture concerned a “subject matter in which FINRA
maintain[s] [a] regulatory interest,” see Valentine, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 616, and that
his performance of the agreement entailed investment-related activities with a
connection to his status as a FINRA associated person, see Pictet, F.3d at 1189.
Hence, we hold that this dispute arises from Shevland’s business activities in
connection to his status as a FINRA associated person as defined by the FINRA Rules.
Accordingly, having concluded that both Shevland and Orlando fall within
FINRA’s definition of “associated persons” and that their dispute arises from
Shevland’s “business activities” in connection to his status as a FINRA associated
person, we find that all of the claims between Shevland and Orlando raised by the
Complaint are subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant the FINRA Rules.

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D.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against ARC are no t Arbitrable

We turn finally to the question of arbitrability as to co-Defendant ARC.

The

claim here is not that he was an associated person like Orlando, but instead a
“customer” under the FINRA rules.
persuasive in this respect.

Plaintiff’s opposition to arbitration is more

We thus reject Defendants’ claim that co-Defendant ARC

is entitled to FINRA arbitration by virtue of its status as a customer of Shevland.
As noted above, FINRA Rule 12200 provides that arbitration between a
customer and a member or an associated person is mandatory upon request by the
customer.

According to Defendants, FINRA Rules define customer as “not

include[ing] a broker or dealer[,]” and Eleventh Circuit precedent dictates that
nothing else is required.
different view.

[D.E. 24, p. 9].

Our court, however, has taken a very

As Judge Reinhardt explained, “[w]hatever the precise parameters

of a ‘customer’ for purposes of Rule 12200, at a minimum it requires a business
relationship between the parties.”

BNY Mellon Cap. Markets, LLC v. Paone, No.

19-81412-CIV, 2019 WL 8362167, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 26, 2019) (denying motion to
compel FINRA arbitration asserted by purported customer who had no tangible
business relationship with FINRA member).

That is consistent with the widely

accepted principle that, though no precise definition exists in the statute or caselaw,
a core definition of “customer includes at least a non-broker or non-dealer who
purchases, or undertakes to purchase, a good or service from a FINRA member.” UBS

Fin. Servs., Inc. v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing an online FINRA glossary stated that a “customer” is “[a] person or entity (not
acting in the capacity of an associated person or member) that transacts business

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with any member firm and/or associated person.”; Webster’s Third New Int’l

Dictionary 559 (3d ed. 2002)) (defining “customer” as “one that purchases some
commodity or service” (def. 2a)); American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language 450 (4th ed. 2000) (defining customer as “[o]ne that buys goods and
services”)).
This contextual interpretation has been adopted by other circuits.

The

Fourth Circuit, for instance, has held that a “customer” is “one, not a broker or dealer,
who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the course of the
member’s business activities insofar as those activities are covered by FINRA’s
regulation, namely the activities of investment banking and the securities business.”

UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2013) (because
“customer” is undefined, interpretation depends on context of other provisions such
as Rule 12200 that provides that arbitrable disputes must arise in connection with
the “business activities” of the FINRA Member, suggesting that a person must be a
customer of a FINRA member’s business activities to obtain arbitration). See also

Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding other
circuits’ analysis “persuasive” and “conclud[ing] that a ‘customer’ is a non-broker and
non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the
course of the member’s FINRA-regulated business activities, i.e., the member’s
investment banking and securities business activities.”).
With these principles in mind, Defendants’ simplistic application of Rule 12200
holds little weight because, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the text of that rule “does
not tell us what a ‘customer’ is, and because [ARC] is neither a broker nor a dealer,

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the FINRA Rules’ definition, standing alone, cannot tell us whether [ARC] fits the
bill.” Id. at 739 (emphasis in original).

Looking at the case against ARC given the

context of the Rule, ARC is not a customer as it does not engage in the purchase of
commodities or services from a FINRA member.

So compelled FINRA arbitration

against ARC, absent an express agreement to arbitrate that does not exist, is not
possible because ARC did not maintain “an account relationship, either individually
or jointly, with [Shevland].

Similarly, they have not received any investment or

brokerage services of any kind from [Shevland].” BNY Mellon, 2019 WL 8362167, at
*3 (enjoining filing of FINRA arbitration action against purported customer).
Defendants’ case for arbitration against ARC focuses on portions of Plaintiff’s
briefs wherein, in support of his unjust enrichment claim, he alleges that by
completing his part of the bargain, he conferred benefits on both Orlando and ARC.
According to Defendants, these allegations pull ARC within the scope of a “customer”
for FINRA purposes. Although Defendants cite multiple cases in support of their
claim, none of the cases provide actual support for their position.
Indeed, Defendants’ cherry-picked reading of this caselaw distorts the holdings
of these cases and misses the mark.

For instance, Defendants cite King and MONY

for their assertion of customer status for ARC.

But they are clearly inapposite.

In

the first place, “[both King and MONY] turned on whether the customer of an
associated person is also the customer of the broker-dealer who supervised the
associated person, even if the broker-dealer had no knowledge of the transaction.”

Pictet, 2017 WL 10403345, at *6. Here, in contrast, Defendants have not asserted
any supervision claims.

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Case 1:21-cv-24324-DPG Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/19/2022 Page 18 of 19

Second, and more fundamentally, Defendants ignore that embedded in these
cases is the requirement that the party asserting customer status must engage in

some sort of transaction with either the FINRA-member or the associated person.
In other words, contrary to Defendants’ theory that to meet the meaning of
“customer” under FINRA a party must merely show that it is neither a broker nor a
dealer, these cases recognize that to be a FINRA customer a party must actually
engage in a transaction in its capacity as a customer. See MONY, 390 F.3d at 1344
(“there is no dispute that the [parties claiming customer status] were customers of
[the associated person]”); see also Pictet Overseas Inc. v. Helvetia Tr., No. 13-81088CIV, 2017 WL 10403345, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2017) (observing that the Eleventh
Circuit has deemed the idea of “direct transactional relationship” as an essential
factor in determining a customer relationship).

Unlike King, MONY, or another

case they purport to rely on, Viyella, Shevland denies ever engaging in any sort of
transaction with ARC, and the evidence of record does not show otherwise.
Defendants do not point to any facts showing that ARC was considered a party to the
investment agreement, that ARC purchased any good or services form Shevland, that
ARC received investment advice from Shevland, or that ARC had any type of
contractual relationship with ARC. 5

We pause to note that Defendants also mischaracterize Viyella by claiming that
“[t]he Viyella court also rejected Shevland’s central argument ‘that Pictet limits the
definition of a customer.’” [D.E. 24, p. 10]. But Viyella did not reject Pictet’s
“customer” analysis; rather, as noted above, that case simply refused to extrapolate
Pictet’s analysis regarding the business activity question (second prong) into the
definition of customer under FINRA. See Viyella, 2020 WL 977481 at *6 (observing
that requiring a showing of nexus here would be redundant because “[t]he business
activities requirement already restricts the bounds of FINRA arbitration.”).
5

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Because ARC cannot establish that it engaged in some sort of “transactional
relationship” with Shevland we agree with Plaintiff that ARC does not qualify as a
customer under FINRA.

See also Pictet, 2017 WL 10403345, at *6 (holding that

parties failed to establish customer relationship where they admitted “they never had
accounts, never bought or sold any securities and never had any contractual
relationship with POI.”).

III.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration and stay the case pending completion of the arbitral proceedings,
[D.E. 18], is GRANTED only as to Defendant Orlando.

Defendants’ motion to

compel arbitration and stay as to Defendant ARC is DENIED.

The case against

ARC may proceed while any claims against Orlando will be Stayed pending
completion of arbitration proceedings.

If no appeal/objections are filed to this Order,

the parties shall confer and file a joint status report within 30 days that details
whether any agreement is reached to stay the action against ARC pending that
arbitration.

Otherwise, the current scheduling Order shall govern all proceedings

against ARC.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 19th day of
September, 2022.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge

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