Habib, Marwan v. Miami Dade District Attorney

Filing 9

ORDER denying 8 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 3/11/2025. See attached document for full details. (mp02)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 1:24-cv-20865-GAYLES
MARWAN HABIB,
Petitioner,
v.
MIAMI-DADE DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
Respondent.
______________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Petitioner Marwan Habib’s pro se “Motion of
Rehearing of Writ of Habeas Corpus Reconsideration New Issues Raise,” [ECF No. 8], liberally
construed as a Motion for Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Petitioner
seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition as barred by Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides for relief from final judgments or orders in
limited circumstances. Imperato v. Hartford Ins. Co., 803 F. App’x 229, 230 (11th Cir. 2020).
“The grounds for granting a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate are (1) mistake or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) void judgment; (5)
satisfied judgment; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Jones v. S. Pan Servs., 450 F.
App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2012). However, “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment cannot be
used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. Rather, it “must demonstrate why the court should reconsider
its prior decision and set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to
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reverse its prior decision.” Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 957 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (quotation omitted).
As the Court summarized in its Order Dismissing Habeas Petition, [ECF No. 3], Petitioner
is a pretrial detainee who challenged his pending state criminal prosecution under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. This Court sua sponte dismissed the Petition, finding that Petitioner’s claims were barred
by the Younger abstention doctrine because (1) they involved ongoing state court proceedings; (2)
those proceedings implicated the important state interest in prosecuting criminal offenses; and (3)
Petitioner could raise his claims in state court. Id. at 3. This Court also found that none of the three
exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine applied because (1) Petitioner had not alleged that
his prosecution was motivated by “bad faith”; (2) his allegations did not show “irreparable injury”
as delineated by Younger; and (3) he had an “adequate alternative state forum” in which to raise
his constitutional claims. Id. at 2, 4 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53–54).
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner contends that he has “established [that]
Younger’s three exceptions apply.” [ECF No. 8 at 2]. First, he alleges that his prosecutor and trial
judge “are motivated by bad faith and doing a political favor for the Governor Ron DeSantis.” Id.
But Petitioner offers no evidence to support this claim; and to satisfy Younger’s “bad faith”
exception, he must present a “substantial allegation” showing “actual bad faith.” Hudson v.
Hubbard, 358 F. App’x 116, 118 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 48). Conclusory
allegations of bad faith, absent any evidentiary support, do not suffice. See Barnes v. Florida, No.
22-11914-E, 2022 WL 17420304, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) (the petitioner’s “vague and
conclusory allegations did not show that his criminal prosecution was motivated by bad faith”);
Ballard v. Florida, No. 1:22-CV-106-AW-GRJ, 2022 WL 4348482, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2022)
(finding the petitioner had not made a substantial allegation showing actual bad faith where he
failed to provide evidentiary support for his claim that he was the victim of a bad faith prosecution);
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see also Chestnut v. Canady, 853 F. App’x 580, 583 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[a] proceeding is initiated
in bad faith if it is brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.”).
Second, Petitioner contends that he has shown “irreparable injury” because he has been
“injured by correction[s] officers more than 30 times” while in jail, which irreparably harms his
career as a professional volleyball player. [ECF No. 8 at 2]. But physical injury is not the type of
“irreparable injury” delineated by Younger. Rather, as this Court explained, Petitioner must show
that the criminal statute under which he is being prosecuted is “flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions,” or that “unusual circumstances exist that would call for
equitable relief.” Butler v. Ala. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54). Claims of physical abuse by corrections officers are not
cognizable in a § 2241 habeas petition and must be raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they
challenge the conditions of confinement, not the validity of confinement. See Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015). Moreover,
“release from imprisonment is not an available remedy for a conditions-of-confinement claim.”
Vaz, 634 F. App’x at 778. Thus, if Petitioner seeks to bring claims regarding physical abuse by
corrections officers, he must file a § 1983 complaint.
Petitioner also claims that “[m]y criminal statute . . . is ‘flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions.’” [ECF No. 8 at 2] (quoting Butler, 245 F.3d at 1264). But he
offers no support for this conclusory assertion, and it is implausible because he is charged with
burglary with assault and battery. See [ECF No. 3 at 3].
Finally, Petitioner still has not shown that he does not have an adequate alternative state
forum in which to raise his claims. He appears to assert that he has raised his claims in state court,
but the court has not considered his claims. [ECF No. 1 at 1]. To the extent Petitioner is alleging
that the trial court has failed to rule or has unreasonably delayed in ruling on his claims, his remedy
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is to seek a writ of mandamus from the district court of appeal, not to file a § 2241 petition. See
Deboles v. State, 960 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“[m]andamus is appropriate to compel
a trial court to rule on a motion or petition within a reasonable time”); Andrews v. Emanuel Cnty.,
No. 6:16-CV-56, 2016 WL 4445258, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2016) (finding that a § 2241
petitioner had available state court remedies because he could “seek a writ of mandamus from the
Georgia Supreme Court to compel the trial court judge to rule on his motions.”). In sum, Petitioner
has not cleared the Younger abstention hurdles, and he is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, [ECF No. 8], is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 11th day of March, 2025.

________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Marwan Habib, pro se
220120621
Metro West Detention Center
13850 NW 41 Street
Miami, FL 33178

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