Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Lifetime Brands, Inc. et al
Filing
57
ORDER adopting Report and Recommendation 49 , denying 35 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and denying 36 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 4/19/2016. (bkd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 2:15-CV-14333-ROSENBERG/LYNCH
UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INS. CO., as subrogee of TRACIE HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIFETIME BRANDS, INC. & WM
BARR CO.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ motions to dismiss at docket entries 35
and 36 which were both referred to the Honorable Frank J. Lynch for a Report and
Recommendation.
DE 46.
On March 8, 2016, Judge Lynch issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that both motions be denied.
DE 49.
Defendants filed
objections. DE 51, 52. Plaintiff filed responses to Defendants’ objections. DE 53, 54. The
Court has conducted a de novo review of Magistrate Judge Lynch’s Report and
Recommendation, the objections, the responses to the objections, and the record and is otherwise
fully advised in the premises. The Court finds Judge Lynch’s Report to be thoughtful and
correct. Defendants’ objections do not directly address the most pertinent portions of Judge
Lynch’s Report, as discussed below.
Defendants’ objections do not adequately address the equitable nature of equitable
subrogation. Equitable subrogation “is a creature of equity that does not depend on contract, but
which follows as a legal consequence of the acts and relationship of the parties.” Lincoln Nat’l
Health & Cas. Inc. Co. v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 666 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995). Although Defendants cite cases such as Lincoln National for the proposition that
equitable subrogation should only apply in a narrow circumstance (where Plaintiff would be
limited to subrogation of the homeowner’s claims in this case), this rigid and formulaic position
belies the very nature of equity and ignores the relationship at the heart of this case—that of a
houseguest and an (insured) homeowner. The underlying purpose of equitable subrogation is to
prevent unjust results that would otherwise occur in the absence of subrogation. See DeCespedes
v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). As properly stated in
Judge Lynch’s Report:
Mrs. Harris did not simply assign her tort away to some wholly unaffiliated third
party to litigate in her place. As the interceding insurer, the transfer of the cause
of action to Universal does not invoke the same public concerns about champerty
that the bar against the assignment of personal injury torts guards against.
Allowing Universal to substitute itself for the Harrises after paying the
homeowner’s insurance policy claim does not monetize Mrs. Harris’s injury or
generate unnecessary litigation. To the contrary, the doctrine of subrogation
provides the equitable remedy where the application of that bar would produce an
unjust result.
DE 49 at 5-6.1
Defendants’ objections do not address the standard with which this Court must apply the
doctrine of equitable subrogation. Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 156 So.
116, 120 (Fla. 1934) (“Our court is committed to a liberal application of the rule of equitable
1
To the extent Defendants object to Judge Lynch’s conclusion that contractual subrogation applies in this case, the
Court does not construe Judge Lynch’s Report as concluding contractual subrogation applies. See DE 49 at 16
(“Regardless of whether Universal has a contractual right to subrogation, it meets the requirements of equitable
subrogation.”). Instead, Judge Lynch merely mentioned the possibility of the injured party either being covered or a
beneficiary under the insurance contract in this case due to the relationship between the injured party, a guest, and
the insured, a homeowner. Judge Lynch’s discussion on this matter was in the absence of proper briefing by the
parties on the specific terms of the policy that may or may not encompass houseguests. In any event, the Court
construes Judge Lynch’s Report as standing for the conclusion that any question pertaining to whether contractual
subrogation applies in this case is moot. This Court concurs.
2
subrogation.”). In applying this doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court has noted:
[Equitable subrogation] has long been an established branch of equity
jurisprudence. It does not owe its origin to statute or custom, but it is a creature of
courts of equity, having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice
between the parties without regard to form. It is a doctrine, therefore, which will
be applied or not according to the dictates of equity and good conscience, and
considerations of public policy, and will be allowed in all cases where the equities
of the case demand it. It rests upon the maxim that no one shall be enriched by
another’s loss, and may be invoked wherever justice demands its application . . . .
The right to it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
and to which must be applied the principles of justice.
Id. at 119. Judge Lynch applied the elements of equitable subrogation as delineated in Nova
Info. Sys., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 996, 1005 (11th Cir. 2004), and, accepting all of
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court agrees with Judge Lynch that all necessary elements are
met in this case.
Finally, Defendants object to Judge Lynch’s application of Casino Cruises Inv. Co., L.C.
v. Ravens Mfg. Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. 1999) to the instant case. Although Casino
Cruises is perhaps the most factually similar case to the case at bar, the court in Casino Cruises
did not engage in an analysis or discussion on the issue of equitable subrogation. The Casino
Cruises court may very well have had no need to consider equitable subrogation, as Judge Lynch
speculates, for the reason that the plaintiff had other avenues for recovery. In any event, the
Court agrees with Judge Lynch that Casino Cruises does not outweigh Florida law that generally
allows subrogation in the insurance context.2
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Magistrate Judge Lynch’s Report and Recommendation [DE 49] is hereby
2
To the extent Defendants now press the argument that, by allowing subrogation in this case, Defendants are
prejudiced as Plaintiff does not have “control” over the alleged victim in this case, the Court disregards any
argument that such a basis precludes equitable subrogation. In the event Defendants are ultimately prejudiced
insofar as they are unable to procure evidence critical to their defense, this is an issue for another time.
3
ADOPTED;
2. Defendant Lifetime Brands, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 35] is DENIED;
3. Defendant WM Barr Company’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 36] is DENIED; and
4. Defendants shall answer Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint within five (5) days of
the date of rendition of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Pierce, Florida, this 19th day of April, 2016.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?