Perales et al v. Heard et al

Filing 35

ORDER granting 19 Motion to Vacate Default. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 2/5/2016. (dzs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 2:15-cv-14381-ROSENBERG/LYNCH
MIGUEL R. PERALES, PATRICIA HETZEL-PERALES,
MIGUEL PERALES, JR., and LORI WOOD MARKUT,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JENNIFER DALE HEARD, WILLIAM D. SNYDER,
and MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
/
ORDER GRANTING SHERIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion to Vacate Default [DE 19] filed by
Defendant William D. Snyder, the Sheriff of Martin County (hereinafter “the Sheriff”). Plaintiffs
failed to file any response to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [DE 19] is
GRANTED.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this action under the Driver Privacy Protection
Act, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Florida common law. See DE 1.
The Sheriff was served with process on November 9, 2015 via substitute service on an
authorized agent. See DE 10. The Sheriff’s response to the complaint was therefore due on
November 30, 2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). When the Sheriff failed to timely
respond, Plaintiffs obtained a Clerk’s default against him on December 4, 2015. See DE 18. The
Sheriff moved to vacate the default that same day. See DE 19.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) allows a court to set aside an entry of default on a
showing of “good cause.” The Eleventh Circuit has described good cause as “a mutable standard
varying from situation to situation” that “is not susceptible to a precise formula.” Perez v. Wells
Fargo, N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1337 n.7 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Compania Interamericana
Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996)).
The Eleventh Circuit has nevertheless noted that the following factors may be relevant: (1)
whether the default was culpable or willful; (2) whether setting the default aside would prejudice
the non-moving party; (3) whether the defaulting party may have a meritorious defense; (4)
whether the public interest was implicated; (5) whether there was significant financial loss to the
defaulting party; (6) whether the defaulting party acted promptly to correct the default. Perez,
774 F.3d at 1337 n.7.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Sheriff’s counsel states that he was retained on November 10, 2015, but that he was
either in trial or out of town almost continuously until December 3, 2015. See DE 19. On that
date, counsel reviewed the filings in this case and realized an answer was overdue. Id. By that
time, Plaintiffs had already moved for a default. See DE 15. The Sheriff’s counsel moved to
vacate the default the following day, December 4, 2015. See DE 19. The Sheriff has submitted a
proposed answer listing eight affirmative defenses. See DE 19-1. The Court finds that the Sheriff
has demonstrated good cause to vacate the default because he acted promptly to correct the
default and may have meritorious defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, it is hereby

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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Sheriff’s Motion to Vacate Default [DE
19] is GRANTED. The Sheriff shall separately file the answer attached to his motion, see DE
19-1, on or before Wednesday, February 10, 2016.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Pierce, Florida, this 5th day of February,
2016.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of record

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