Poindexter v. Zacharzewski et al
Filing
38
ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 8/1/2018. See attached document for full details. (bkd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 2:18-CV-14156-ROSENBERG/MAYNARD
STEWART FEKETA, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
SANTIA FEKETA, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH A. ZACHARZEWSKI, as
Personal Representative of the Estate
of WALTER RONEY, deceased;
JOSEPH A. ZACHARZEWSKI, as
Trustee of the WALTER A. RONEY
TRUST, and CAROLYN E. EVANS
BRUNS,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
CASE NO. 2:18-CV-14155-ROSENBERG/MAYNARD
YVONNE POINDEXTER, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of BRITNEY
POINDEXTER, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH A. ZACHARZEWSKI, as
Personal Representative of the Estate
Of WALTER RONEY, deceased;
JOSEPH A. ZACHARZEWSKI, as
Trustee of the WALTER A. RONEY
TRUST, and CAROLYN E. EVANS
BRUNS,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT TRUSTEE’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendant’s Joseph A. Zacharzewski, in his capacity as
trustee of the Walter A. Roney Trust (the “Trustee”), Motions to Dismiss at docket entry 38 in
case 18-CV-14156 and docket entry 30 in case 18-CV-14155. The Motions raise identical legal
issues, both cases were consolidated by this Court, and the Motions have been fully briefed. For
the reasons set forth below, the Motions are both granted.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of estates of two individuals who were
passengers in an automobile. DE 24 at 3. Plaintiffs allege that the decedents were killed when a
recreational vehicle collided with their vehicle head-on. Id. That vehicle is alleged to have been
driven by Mr. Walter Roney, who also died in the crash and who is also represented now by his
estate. Id.
Plaintiffs filed separate suits in this Court, bringing claims for negligence and for joint
enterprise. The cases were consolidated for the purposes of discovery. Plaintiffs’ claims also
include counts for negligence against the trustee of Mr. Roney’s trust, who in turn filed the
Motions presently before the Court.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff; however, a plaintiff is still obligated to provide grounds of his or her
entitlement to relief which requires more than labels, conclusions and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-563 (2007).
Unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint cannot be admitted as true for the purposes of
testing the sufficiency of the allegations. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416
2
F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). The facts as pled must state a claim for relief that is plausible
on the face of the pleading. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-69.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs have brought three counts against the Defendant Trustee. Plaintiffs’ Count IV
and Plaintiffs’ Count V are negligence claims against the Trustee. Plaintiffs’ Count VI is a joint
enterprise claim against the Trustee. To be clear, these claims are not brought against the estate
of Mr. Roney—these claims are against the trust itself.
The Trustee argues that these claims should be dismissed because there is no allegation in
the Complaint that the trust was negligent or somehow responsible for Mr. Roney’s driving.
Upon review of the Complaint, the Court agrees—the Complaint is virtually silent as to the
Trustee and the trust. In response, Plaintiffs do not cite to specific allegations that explain how
the Trustee should be held liable for Mr. Roney’s driving, noting only that Mr. Roney’s vehicle
was “funded into” the trust. But Plaintiffs have cited to no case law for the proposition that auto
negligence claims may be brought against the Trustee. Similarly, Plaintiffs have not alleged that
the Trustee or the trust owed any duty to them, nor can the Court discern any legal basis upon
which Plaintiffs could make such an allegation. This is a case about an auto accident in Florida,
and the Court can see no way (and Plaintiffs have provided none) for the Michigan Trustee or the
trust to be held liable for that auto accident.1 Plaintiffs have provided no case law wherein trusts
were sued for the negligence of a driver. Plaintiffs have provided no case law showing how a
trustee could owe a duty to the victims of an auto accident.
1
Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent entrustment requires the allegation that the Trustee supplied something (here, a
vehicle) to another. See Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1997). There is no allegation in the
Complaint that the Trustee “supplied” Mr. Roney with a vehicle. Instead, Plaintiffs have made a contradictory
allegation—that Mr. Roney was the owner of the vehicle and that Mr. Roney entrusted that vehicle to another
individual Defendant in this case. DE 24 at 8.
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Additionally, both Florida law and Michigan law bar claims against a trustee for the
individual liability of the settlor. Pursuant to Florida law:
After the death of a settlor, no creditor of the settlor may bring, maintain, or
continue any direct action against a trust described in s. 733.707(3), the trustee of
the trust, or any beneficiary of the trust that is dependent on the individual
liability of the settlor. Such claims and causes of action against the settlor shall
be presented and enforced against the settlor’s estate as provided in part VII of
chapter 733, and the personal representative of the settlor's estate may obtain
payment from the trustee of a trust described in s. 733.707(3) as provided in ss.
733.607(2), 733.707(3), and 736.05053.
Fla. Stat. § 736.1014(1) (emphasis added). In response, Plaintiffs take the position that they can
bring a claim against the trust under Michigan law, but the specific law that Plaintiffs cite—
Section 700.7605 of the Michigan Trust Code—does not apply in this case. Specifically, Section
700.7605(1) states:
The property of a trust over which the settlor has the right without regard to the
settlor’s mental capacity, at his or her death, either alone or in conjunction with
another person, to revoke the trust and revest principal in himself or herself is
subject to all of the following, but only to the extent that the settlor’s property
subject to probate administration is insufficient to satisfy the following
expenses, claims, and allowances:
(a) The administration expenses of the settlor’s estate.
(b) An enforceable and timely presented claim of a creditor of the settlor,
including a claim for the settlor's funeral and burial expenses.
(c) Homestead, family, and exempt property allowances.
(emphasis added).
Thus, on its face, the statute above only applies to: (1) administration
expenses of the settlor’s estate, (2) enforceable claims of a creditor, and (3) homestead, family,
and exempt property allowances. See id. It is clear from Plaintiffs’ Complaints that they are not
involved in the administration of Mr. Roney’s estate, such that they could receive compensation
for administering the estate. Plaintiffs cannot seek any homestead, family, or exempt property
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allowances. Finally, Plaintiffs are not creditors of Mr. Roney.2 Plaintiffs have provided no case
for the proposition that they may bring an auto accident claim, prior to becoming a creditor of the
estate, against a Michigan trust.
In summary, Plaintiffs have not alleged any tortious conduct on behalf of the trust or the
Trustee and, furthermore, both Florida and Michigan law insulate the trust and the Trustee from
the claims in this case. At best, Plaintiffs have alleged that they may, at some point in the future,
become a creditor of Mr. Roney’s estate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against the trust and
Trustee, Count IV, Count V, and Count VI are all dismissed. Because Plaintiffs have had three
opportunities to file complaints in this case and because further amendment on this issue would
be futile, the Court’s dismissal is with prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions to
Dismiss at docket entry 38 in case 18-CV-14156 and docket entry 30 in case 18-CV-14155 are
both GRANTED, and all claims against the Trustee (Count IV, Count V, and Count VI) are
dismissed with prejudice. The Defendant Trust is dismissed from both cases.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 1st day of August,
2018.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record
2
Addtionally, section 700.7606(1) only applies to trusts that are revocable at death, and Plaintiffs have not pled that
the trust in this case is revocable. In re John Markoul Living Trust, No. 316892, 2015 WL 404668, at *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 2015).
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