Marquardt v. Ocean Reef Community Association et al

Filing 195

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 187 Defendants' Motion in Limine. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 7/18/2022. See attached document for full details. (dw00)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 19-10110-CIV-GOODMAN
[CONSENT CASE]

ELIZABETH MARQUARDT,
Plaintiff,
v.
OCEAN REEF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
“RENEWED” MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE “METOO” EVIDENCE
In this gender discrimination and civil rights lawsuit, Defendants Ocean Reef
Community Association and David Ritz seek to preclude Plaintiff Elizabeth Marquardt
from introducing evidence at trial that David Ritz allegedly harassed another female
employee, LeeAnne Yule. [ECF No. 187]. Defendants argue that this “MeToo” evidence
is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Id. Plaintiff responds that Defendants’ Motion is
untimely and an unabashed attempt to relitigate matters already addressed by the Court.
[ECF No. 190].
For the reasons discussed below, the Undersigned grants in small part and denies
in part Defendants’ Motion.

When the case was assigned to now-Chief United States District Judge Cecelia M.
Altonaga, Defendants and Plaintiff each previously filed their own motions in limine.
[ECF Nos. 101; 102]. Defendants’ motion in limine sought, in part, to exclude any
“MeToo” evidence from trial. [ECF No. 101]. Judge Altonaga issued substantive rulings
on both motions in limine [ECF Nos. 120; 140] and on Defendants’ pending summary
judgment motion [ECF No. 121].
Following these rulings, the parties consented to the Undersigned’s jurisdiction
[ECF No. 138], and Judge Altonaga referred the case to the Undersigned for all future
proceedings, including trial. [ECF No. 139]. Following this referral, the Undersigned
entered a Trial Scheduling Order, setting a new trial date along with new deadlines. [ECF
No. 152]. Due to scheduling issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, additional Trial
Scheduling Orders, containing additional deadlines and instructions, were entered. [ECF
Nos 158; 184].
As permitted by the operative Trial Scheduling Order, Defendants filed this
“renewed” motion in limine to exclude “MeToo” evidence. [ECF No. 187]. Plaintiff filed
a response. [ECF No. 190]. Defendants did not file an optional reply and the time to do
so has passed.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion should be denied as untimely. In support,
she quotes the Undersigned’s warning from the operative Trial Scheduling Order that
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the parties would face an uphill battle to convince the Undersigned to consider any
motion in limine on the merits. However, as Defendants argue in their initial motion, the
Undersigned’s two earlier orders allowed motions in limine to be filed up to 45 days
before trial. See [ECF Nos. 152; 158]. Because these prior deadlines never lapsed -- owing
to the trial date twice being rescheduled due to COVID -- the principles of equity support
considering Defendants’ Motion on the merits.
Although Defendants characterize their motion as a “renewed” motion, it is more
appropriately considered as a motion for reconsideration. As justification for revisiting
their argument against the admission of “MeToo” evidence, Defendants direct the court
to two salient considerations: (1) Ms. Yule has given a deposition since the original ruling
was announced; and (2) the issues have been narrowed since the Court’s ruling by way
of the Court’s Order on Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
On the first point, Defendants title one of their sections “The Trial Court Has the
Discretion to Revisit an In Limine Ruling If the Actual Testimony Differs from What is
Contained in the Proffer.” [ECF No. 187]. However, despite the title’s allusion to changed
testimony, Defendants fail to point to any material differences between Ms. Yules’
declaration and complaint and the testimony she gave during her deposition. Thus, this
is not a sufficient reason to justify revisiting the Court’s earlier ruling.

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On the second point, Defendants argue that “it is now clear which claims will be
tried. At the time of the ruling on the original Motion in Limine, the Court had not yet
ruled on the summary judgment motion.” Id. They then cite Whidden v. Roberts, 334 F.R.D.
321 (N.D. Fla. 2020) for the proposition that “courts asked to address motions in limine
sometimes are handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside
of a factual context. This is particularly true in cases involving multiple claims, some of
which might not survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
(alterations made for clarity).
This argument is misleading because it implies that the Court was unaware of its
summary judgment ruling when it ruled on Defendants’ earlier motion in limine. The
following exchange between defense counsel and Judge Altonaga demonstrates why this
is not true:
[Defendants]: . . .To go to the first one, which is a Leeanne Yule, again, Your
Honor, the case -- the 11th Circuit has been very clear on this issue. When
you have a hostile work environment, which Ms. Marquardt has raised a
hostile work environment -THE COURT: Can I stop you there for one minute. And I apologize because
ideally I would have had my order on the summary judgment motion
before this hearing, but it's about to come out, and you are not going to be
looking at the hostile work environment claim. That one is going to go away
as is Count 4, constructive discharge.
[ECF No. 140, p. 27:1-10]. This exchange reveals that there is no post-ruling, newfound
clarity concerning Plaintiff’s claims and no basis to revisit the issue on this ground.
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At bottom, Defendants have failed to present any factual or legal developments
which justify revisiting the Court’s prior ruling on the admissibility of the “MeToo”
evidence. Despite this, however, Defendants are entitled to some, minimal relief. Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, Plaintiff may not admit the actual nude photos of Yule (or
any promiscuous photos/videos) as unfairly prejudicial. It will be sufficient for Yule to
testify that the events occurred and that the images/videos were posted on the internet.
Additionally, based on Plaintiff’s stipulation, she may not introduce evidence of the
settlement between Yule and Ritz.
For these reasons, Defendants’ renewed motion in limine is granted in small part
and denied in part. Plaintiff may not introduce actual sexually explicit photos/videos of
Yule, nor may she introduce evidence of the settlement between Yule and Ritz.
Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on July 18, 2022.

Copies furnished to:
All Counsel of Record

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