Soria v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc.
Filing
25
OPINION AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Amended Complaint due by 9/11/2012. Signed by Judge Kenneth A. Marra on 8/20/2012. (ir)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-CV-80228-MARRA
GEORGE L SORIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE CORPORATION
IN NY, METLIFE OFFICE IN
WEST PALM BEACH, ROBERT LEIMAN,
and METLIFE IN BOCA RATON,
ROBERT MARGOLIS, METLIFE OFFICE
IN STATEN ISLAND, STEVE FILORAMO,
DOMINICK IORIO,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE 11). The motion
is fully briefed and ripe for review. The Court has carefully considered the Motion and is
otherwise fully advised in the premises.
I. Background
On February 28, 2012, Defendants Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc. (“Met
Life”), with the consent of Defendants Steve Filoramo, Dominick Iorio, Robert Liebman and
Robert Margolis (collectively, “Defendants”), filed a Notice of Removal of pro se Plaintiff
George Soria’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. (Notice of Removal, DE 1; Compl., DE 1-2.) According
to the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff, a former employee of Met Life, was terminated in
December of 2006. (Compl. ¶ 19.) The Complaint notes several events that occurred prior to his
termination. For example, the Complaint alleges that, in September of 2002, Met Life did not
comply with an agreement “of covering expense for operations forcing downsizing” entered into
between Plaintiff and Met Life. (Id. at ¶ 7.) A “settlement was then to be reached,” but “they
reneged” on it, despite the fact that a vice-president approved it. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
In 2003, Plaintiff was “transferred to Florida” and his residence license was delayed for
nine months. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Met Life offered “no assistance” during this “difficult personal
situation,” which involved “no income” and “a shocking blow with [his] daughter.” (Id. at ¶ 10.)
In 2005, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack and Met Life was “not interested” in his medical
condition. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits, which was lower than it
should have been because of the delayed license transfer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) At no time, did Met Life
send him a get well card. Furthermore, Met Life mailed him his 10 year service award rather
than presenting it at a general meeting. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
In 2006, Plaintiff returned to work, “only to experience [a] second cauterization for chest
pains,” resulting in hospitalizations in April of 2006. He continued to suffer “personal depression
and personal child custody problems” with “no assistance offered from management.” (Id. at ¶
15.) When Plaintiff returned to work in the second half of 2006, he experienced “anguish and
fear,” and requested management change his position, but no “appointment” ever occurred. (Id. at
¶ ¶ 16-17.) In November of 2006, “management” informed him that he needed to meet the
“personal sales quota” or he would be terminated. This decision was made by the vice-president
of the region, and “nothing could be done by agency management.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) In December
of 2006, Plaintiff was terminated “due to lack of production by VP” with “no choice according to
agency management” and with no involvement by human resources. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
In January of 2007, Plaintiff was “stripped of all [his] business overrides, clients,
2
securities business and everything [he] transferred and earned in 30 years of business in the
insurance business.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) All of his “business, override and securities . . . were dispersed
to another agent. . . in direct breach of the agreement made up signing on to the company.” (Id. at
¶ 21.) Plaintiff states that “this is a major management abuse of Met Life in making promises to
recruit qualified agency and breaching their promise, and forcing their will on agent or making
them [ ] lose everything.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff notes that he could have been offered “retired
status” and that his “book of business” could have remained intact and human resources could
have been advised of his physical or mental status or requests. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
According to Plaintiff, management “failed to act in the best interest of their agent, [did
not] notify [human resources], disperse[d] accounts, benefit[ted] from all overrides from both
Life and securities business, was knowingly aware of the prior agreement which existed in the
employment agreement [and] was taking advantage of the mental status of agent.” (Id. at ¶ 24.)
Additionally, the “Legal Department knowing of such agreement failed to implement and only
used the standard agreement which must be completed at time of hire of any agent, and ignored
the special agreement negotiated at time of employment.” (Id. at ¶ 25.)
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to Defendant Iorio, Defendant states that no
general nor specific jurisdiction exists over him and his conduct does not give rise to personal
jurisdiction under the constitutional standard. Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint
because: (1) there are no allegations or claims against the individual defendants; (2) to the extent
Plaintiff brings a claim for breach of contract, it is barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the
3
facts in the Complaint do not allege breach of contract.1
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant Iorio for lack of
personal jurisdiction. (Mot. at 6-10.) The allegations of the Complaint state that Defendant Iorio
is “agency manager of the office involved in the subject contract, and is over the age of 18
years.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendant contends the Complaint lacks any allegations that Defendant
Iorio, personally or through an agent, engaged in any activities in Florida.
The plaintiff's burden in alleging personal jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff establish
a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A prima facie case is
established if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.
The district court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the extent they are
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If by defendant's affidavits or other competent
evidence, defendant sustains the burden of challenging plaintiff's allegations, the plaintiff must
substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits, testimony or documents.
However, where the evidence conflicts, the district court must construe all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. See Future Tech. Today, Inc., v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247,
1249 (11th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990)); Exhibit Icons, LLC v. XP Cos.,
1
Defendant also moves to dismiss on the basis that any claim relating to unpaid disability
benefits is preempted by ERISA. The Court has reviewed the Complaint and does not view it as
containing an ERISA claim. Nor does Plaintiff’s response memorandum suggest that he is
bringing an ERISA claim.
4
LLC, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1291-92 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Here, the Complaint does not provide any indication of Defendant Iorio’s citizenship. Nor
has this Defendant provided any evidence that would allow the Court to infer that he is not a
citizen of Florida. Upon amendment, Plaintiff shall identify the state of citizenship of Defendant
Iorio. Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is denied without prejudice.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
With respect to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the Court observes first that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
“a short and plain statement of the claims” that “will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). As explained by
another court, “[t]he claim of the plaintiff in his complaint [must be] sufficiently definite to
enable the defendant to know with what it is charged, and . . . reasonably able therefrom to
respond whether it did the thing charged.” Dennis v. Begley Drug Co. of Tennessee, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 608, 609 (E.D. Tenn.1971). Put another way, “a pleading is insufficient if a defendant
does not know the basic facts that constitute the claim for relief against it.” Clearwater
Consulting Concepts, LLP v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLC, No. 09–81042–CIV, 2010 WL
916392, at * 1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010).
The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
5
555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. When considering a motion
to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his pleadings therefore will be liberally
construed, the Court will not rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.
GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). After
careful review of the Complaint, the Court concludes it must be dismissed. It is not a “short and
plain statement of the claims” as mandated by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Instead, the Complaint is incomprehensible. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is attempting to
bring a breach of contract claim against Defendants. Such a claim requires Plaintiff to identify
the terms of the contract, how Defendants breached those terms and the damages resulting from
the breach. See Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(elements of a breach of contract claim). Although Plaintiff provides facts in the Complaint, it is
impossible for the Court to discern how the facts alleged relate to any specific contractual
obligation of any particular Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff must amend the Complaint and
6
provide facts in support of each of these elements. Furthermore, Plaintiff must clearly define the
relationship between himself and each Defendant, the specific contractual provisions that relate
to each Defendant and the alleged wrongful acts committed by each Defendant. Cf. Textiles
Morales, S.A. de C.V. v. Green Paradigm Partners, LLC, No. 8:10–cv–2298–T–30EAJ, 2011
WL 2881666, at * 2 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2011) ( merely alleging the existence of a contract and
stating that it was “breached” would be inadequate under Iqbal). Lastly, Plaintiff must provide
the specific date he was terminated by Defendants. It is insufficient to state that he was
terminated in “December of 2006.”2 (Compl. ¶ 19.)
Finally, the Court notes that, in responding to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff provided
additional facts not alleged in the Complaint, including facts that the individual Defendants
tampered with his employment agreement. (Resp. at 1-2.) The Court’s review on a motion to
dismiss is limited to the four corners of the complaint. See Valdes v. Fisher Safety, No.
12–60034–CIV, 2012 WL 1405685, at * 2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2012) (citing St. George v. Pinellas
County, 285 at 1337). Thus, the Court cannot consider these new allegations. Even assuming the
Court considered these new factual allegations, for the reasons previously stated, they do not
provide the necessary factual underpinnings to support a contract claim. In other words, these
facts do not speak to the terms of the contract or the alleged breach. Finally, to the extent
Plaintiff requests permission to undertake discovery to obtain his employee file and determine
whether a “violation of breech [sic], or fraud and deception”(Resp. at 2) exists, the Court will
2
The Court rejects Defendants’ submission of evidence regarding Plaintiff’s termination.
(Mot. at 14 n.11.) See St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (It is
axiomatic that on a motion to dismiss, the scope of the Court's review is limited to the four
corners of the complaint.).
7
deny this request. Indeed, the “purpose of discovery is to find out additional facts about a
well-pleaded claim, not to find out whether such a claim exists.” Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp.
790, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1991).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (DE 11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Complaint, consistent
with the directives in this Order, no later than September 11, 2012.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,
Florida, this 20th day of August, 2012.
______________________________________
KENNETH A. MARRA
United States District Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?