Howard v. Chanticleer Holdings, Inc. et al
ORDER denying 32 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 34 Motion for More Definite Statement. Defendants' Answers due by 10/8/2013. Jury Trial reset for 5/12/20 14 at 9:00 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge James I. Cohn. Calendar Call reset for 5/8/2014 at 9:00 AM in Fort Lauderdale Division before Judge James I. Cohn. Please see Order for details. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 9/17/2013. (sry)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-81123-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
FRANCIS HOWARD, individually
and on behalf of all others
CHANTICLEER HOLDINGS, INC.,
MICHAEL D. PRUITT, ERIC S.
LEDERER, MICHAEL CARROLL,
PAUL I. MOSKOWITZ, KEITH
JOHNSON, MARK HEZLETT,
MERRIMAN CAPITAL, INC.,
DAWSON JAMES SECURITIES, INC.,
and CREASON & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
AND FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon three motions filed by Defendants:
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint on Behalf of Defendants
Chanticleer Holdings, Inc., Michael D. Pruitt, Eric S. Lederer, Michael Carroll, Paul I.
Moskowitz and Keith Johnson [DE 32]; Defendant Creason & Associates, P.L.L.C.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Class Action Complaint [DE 33]; and Defendant
Creason & Associates, P.L.L.C.’s Motion for More Definite Statement [DE 34] (together,
“Motions”). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions and all related filings and is
otherwise fully advised in the premises.
This case is a proposed class action involving a public offering of securities
(the “Offering”) by Defendant Chanticleer Holdings, Inc. (“Chanticleer”). Chanticleer
owns and operates Hooters restaurants in international markets. Immediately prior to
the Offering, Chanticleer operated five Hooters franchises: four in South Africa (the
“South Africa Operations”) and one in Australia.
On June 19, 2012, Chanticleer filed an amended Registration Statement for the
Offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The Registration
Statement contained a preliminary Prospectus, and Chanticleer filed a final Prospectus
with the SEC on June 21, 2012.2 The Registration Statement was signed by
Defendants Michael D. Pruitt, Eric S. Lederer, Michael Carroll, Paul I. Moskowitz, and
Keith Johnson—all executive officers or directors of Chanticleer. The SEC declared the
Registration Statement effective on June 20, 2012.
For the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, (“FY 2011”) Chanticleer’s South
Africa Operations constituted 63 percent of the $1.43 million in revenue that the
company reported. In the first quarter ending March 31, 2012, (“Q1 2012”) the South
Africa Operations amounted to 100 percent of Chanticleer’s restaurant sales. As
The facts recited here are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Class Action
Complaint [DE 28] and the public filings attached to the parties’ motion papers.
See Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In a
motion to dismiss a securities action, a court may consider the contents of public
disclosure documents which are required to be filed with the SEC and are actually so
filed.” (citing Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (11th Cir.1999))).
The Court will refer to the preliminary and final Prospectuses together as the
pertinent here, the Registration Statement and Prospectus (together, the “Filings”)
included income-statement and balance-sheet line items for FY 2011 and Q1 2012.
The Filings represented that the financial statements for FY 2011 were “audited.”
Also, the Filings included an audit-opinion letter from Chanticleer’s auditor, Defendant
Creason & Associates, P.L.L.C. (“Creason”). Creason’s letter stated in relevant part:
We did not audit the financial statements of [Chanticleer’s
South Africa Operations], which statements reflect total
assets and revenues constituting 72 percent and 66 percent,
respectively, of the related consolidated totals. Those
statements were audited by other auditors whose reports
have been furnished to us, and our opinion, insofar as it
relates to the amounts included for the South Africa
Operations, is based solely on the reports of the other
In our opinion, based on our audit and the reports of the
other auditors, the consolidated financial statements referred
to above present fairly, in all material respects, the
consolidated financial position of Chanticleer Holdings, Inc.
and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2011 and 2010, and
the consolidated results of their operations and their cash
flows for the years ended December 31, 2011 and 2010, in
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in
the United States of America.
The Offering commenced on or about June 21, 2012, and included 2.44 million
Chanticleer Units that were sold at $4.50 apiece. Each Unit consisted of one share of
Chanticleer common stock and one warrant to purchase a share of common stock for
$5.00. The Offering generated proceeds of $10.12 million, and the securities issued
were listed on NASDAQ.
On September 10, 2012, Chanticleer filed a Current Report with the SEC. The
Current Report disclosed that Chanticleer’s financial statements for FY 2011 and
Q1 2012 could no longer be relied upon because the statements for the South Africa
Operations had not, in fact, been audited:
Item 4.02(a) Non-Reliance on Previously Issued
Financial Statements of a Related Audit Report or
Completed Interim Review
On September 7, 2012, the audit committee of Chanticleer
Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”), upon recommendation of
the Company’s management determined that the
Company’s consolidated Financial Statements for its fiscal
year ending December 31, 2011 and the interim unaudited
financial statements for its fiscal quarters ending March 31,
2012 and June 30, 2012 could no longer be relied on. The
Company determined that the audited financial statements
of [the South Africa Operations] which are the South African
management company and the four entities setup for the
stores we operate in South Africa, were not audited as the
Company was led to believe. [Defendant] Mark Hezlett, the
CFO and Director of our South Africa Operations, has
resigned effective immediately.
Due to this disclosure, NASDAQ halted trading in Chanticleer’s stock on September 11,
2012. Before trading was halted, the last trade for Chanticleer’s common stock was
$3.64 per share.
On December 4 and 17, 2012, Chanticleer filed restated financial results for
FY 2011 and Q1 2012, respectively (the “Restatement”). The Restatement included
audited and reviewed financial statements for the South Africa Operations. The revised
statements showed, among other discrepancies, that the earlier Filings had understated
Chanticleer’s operating losses for FY 2011 by 33.8 percent and its losses for Q1 2012
by 44.6 percent.
On January 16, 2013, trading in Chanticleer’s stock resumed on NASDAQ.
Over the next four trading days, the price of Chanticleer’s common stock fell from its
halted price of $3.64 per share to $2.44 per share on January 22, 2013. Thereafter,
Chanticleer’s stock price continued to drop. As of February 15, 2013, the stock was
trading at $1.66 per share.
In connection with the Offering, Plaintiff Francis Howard purchased 8,500
Chanticleer Units at a total price of $38,080. On October 12, 2012, Howard filed this
proposed class action against Chanticleer, several of its senior officers and directors,
two underwriters of the Offering, and Creason (collectively, “Defendants”). See DE 1.
The Court later appointed Howard to serve as lead plaintiff and approved his selection
of class counsel. See DE 27; 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i), (v). Thereafter, Howard
filed an Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws
[DE 28] (“Amended Complaint”). Based on the Filings’ misstatements about the
auditing of Chanticleer’s financial statements, Howard claims that Defendants violated
Sections 11 and 15(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Act”). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k,
77o(a).3 Howard contends that those misstatements caused him to purchase
Chanticleer Units at “artificially inflated prices.” DE 28 at 7, ¶ 34; see id. ¶ 29. In
addition to his own claims for damages, Howard seeks to represent the following class:
[A]ll persons other than defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Chanticleer units, common stock or
warrants pursuant or traceable to the Company’s public
offering, which commenced on or about June 21, 2012 . . . ,
including those who purchased or otherwise acquired
Chanticleer common stock, warrants, or Units between June
21, 2012 and September 10, 2012, inclusive[.]
Id. at 2, ¶ 1.
In response to the Amended Complaint, Defendants Chanticleer Holdings, Inc.,
Michael D. Pruitt, Eric S. Lederer, Michael Carroll, Paul I. Moskowitz, and Keith
The Amended Complaint also pleads claims against the two underwriters,
Dawson James Securities, Inc., and Merriman Capital, Inc. After filing the Amended
Complaint, however, Howard voluntarily dismissed those Defendants from this action.
See DE 47–48.
Johnson (together, the “Chanticleer Defendants”) filed their Motion to Dismiss [DE 32].4
Defendant Creason also filed a Motion to Dismiss [DE 33], as well as a Motion for More
Definite Statement [DE 34]. All of these Motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision.
Liability Under the Act
Section 11 of the Act “allows purchasers of a registered security to sue certain
enumerated parties in a registered offering when false or misleading information is
included in a registration statement.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
381 (1983); see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). In particular, the statute imposes liability when an
effective registration statement “contained an untrue statement of material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). As relevant here, a person
who acquires securities issued under a false or misleading registration statement may
bring an action against
every person who signed the registration statement;
every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part
of the registration statement with respect to which his liability is
every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration
statement as being or about to become a director, person
performing similar functions, or partner; [and]
every accountant . . . who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
Defendant Mark Hezlett has not responded to the Amended Complaint or
otherwise appeared in this case.
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is
used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to
the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation,
which purports to have been prepared or certified by him[.]
Id.; see Ehlert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A § 11 claim can be
brought against the issuer of the securities, the issuer’s directors or partners, . . . and
accountants who are named as having prepared or certified the registration
Section 11 “was designed to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of
the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a direct role
in a registered offering.” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-82 (footnotes omitted).
To prove a § 11 claim, “a plaintiff need only show a material misstatement and/or
omission in the registration statement” for the securities he acquired. APA Excelsior III
L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); see Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. If a plaintiff makes this showing, “[l]iability against the
issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements.” Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (footnote omitted); see Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm.
Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “[t]here is no state of mind
element to a § 11 claim”).
Defendants other than the issuer may avoid § 11 liability by proving a “due
diligence” defense, which is essentially a “negligence standard.” Herman & MacLean,
459 U.S. at 382; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 & n.26 (1976).
Generally, such a defendant must show that when the relevant part of the registration
statement became effective, “he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground
to believe and did believe . . . that the statements therein were true and that there was
no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A), (B)(i); see id.
§ 77k(b)(3)(C). For this defense, “the standard of reasonableness [is] that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property” Id. § 77k(c).
In addition to primary liability under § 11, § 15(a) of the Act “imposes joint and
several liability upon controlling persons for acts committed by those under their control
that violate” § 11. Ehlert, 245 F.3d at 1320; see 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a). To establish a
prima facie case of a § 15(a) violation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants
“(1) each had power or influence over the controlled person and (2) each induced or
participated in the alleged violation.” Ehlert, 245 F.3d at 1320 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A defense to § 15(a) liability exists when “the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.” 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a).
A plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires that the complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must contain factual allegations that are “enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Thus, a complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration, citations & internal quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, a complaint must be liberally construed, assuming the alleged facts
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.
See id. at 555-56. A complaint should not be dismissed simply because the court is
doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove the necessary facts. See id. Accordingly,
a well-pleaded complaint will survive a motion to dismiss even if it appears “that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Chanticleer Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Chanticleer Defendants argue that, in addition to meeting the pleading
standards discussed above, Howard must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) because his claims are based on allegations of fraud. Rule 9(b)
requires a party alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This particularity requirement “serves an important
purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with which
they are charged and protecting defendants against spurious charges of immoral and
fraudulent behavior.” Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the Court finds that Howard’s
claims are not based on fraud and therefore are not subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened
In Wagner v. First Horizon Pharmaceutical Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (11th
Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of when Rule 9(b) applies to
“nonfraud” claims under the Act—such as § 11 claims—which do not require proof of
fraud or scienter. The Eleventh Circuit held that “Rule 9(b) applies when the
misrepresentation justifying relief under the Securities Act is also alleged to support a
claim for fraud under the [Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934] and Rule 10(b)-5.”
Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1277. In other words, a § 11 claim “must be pled with particularity
when the facts underlying the misrepresentation at stake in the claim are said to be part
of a fraud claim, as alleged elsewhere in the complaint.” Id. at 1278. But if a plaintiff
brings a § 11 claim “without alleging the misrepresentation at issue in the claim was
fraudulent, they would avoid the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).” Id.
In this case, Howard has pleaded only two claims: a § 11 claim based on
misstatements in Chanticleer’s Filings and a related controlling-persons claim under
§ 15(a). Nowhere in the Amended Complaint does he assert a separate claim for
securities fraud. See Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1277. More, the Amended Complaint
expressly states that neither of Howard’s claims is based on fraud. See DE 28 at 11,
¶ 53; id. at 14, ¶ 71; see In re Unicapital Corp. Secs. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (emphasizing that § 11 claims “do not require any intent to defraud on
the part of the defendant, or even knowledge of the misrepresentation or omission”).
The Chanticleer Defendants correctly observe that Howard may not rely on
“a general disclaimer in an attempt to immunize the nonfraud claims from the Rule 9
requirements.” Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1277. Yet the Amended Complaint goes much
further than that: It not only lacks a separate fraud claim but also contains no
allegations of fraud in the claims that are pleaded. Defendants point to Howard’s
averment that “Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known of the material misstatements and omissions” in the Filings. DE 28 at 11-12,
¶ 57. Defendants also note (1) Creason’s statement in the Filings that audit reports for
the South Africa financial statements “ha[d] been furnished to” Creason,
(2) Chanticleer’s later statement in the Current Report that those financial statements
“were not audited as the Company was led to believe,” and (3) the further statement in
the Current Report that Defendant Mark Hezlett had “resigned effective immediately.”
Id. at 4, ¶ 14. But whether considered separately or together, these allegations—which
suggest fraud indirectly at best—fall far short of the independent fraud claim necessary
to invoke Rule 9(b). See Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1277-78.
Having determined that Howard’s claims do not rely on allegations of fraud, the
Court need not consider the Chanticleer Defendants’ arguments that the claims are not
pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). And the Chanticleer Defendants do
not contest that Howard has alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for relief
under § 11 and §15(a). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
The Chanticleer Defendants argue, however, that the Amended Complaint “establishes
a clear defense”—namely, that they cannot be held liable for Creason’s representations
about the audit of the South Africa financial statements because they had no reason to
believe that those representations were false or misleading. DE 32 at 11; see 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (providing that a person may not be held liable for “any part of the
registration statement purporting to be made on the authority of an expert (other than
himself) [if] he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe . . . that the
statements therein were untrue or” misleading). The Court disagrees.
A complaint is “subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its allegations—on
their face—show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim.” Marsh v.
Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The Chanticleer
Defendants contend that this standard is met here: “The allegations from the face of
the Amended Complaint make clear that the Individual Defendants had no reason to
believe that the expertised audit reports were false or misleading.” DE 32 at 14.
Though some of the Chanticleer Defendants may ultimately prove this defense, the
Amended Complaint does not establish it as a matter of law. Viewing the alleged facts
in the light most favorable to Howard, senior officers and directors of Chanticleer—
some of whom were on the firm’s Audit Committee—represented that the FY 2011
financial statements for the bulk of the company’s operations had been audited when,
in reality, they had not. Too, Chanticleer’s restated financial results showed that the
originally reported figures significantly understated the amount of operating losses. And
Howard contends that “[n]one of the defendants made a reasonable investigation or
possessed a reasonable belief that the statements contained in the [Filings] were true”
or not misleading. DE 28 at 12, ¶ 59; see id. at 15, ¶ 74 (“Had [Defendants] exercised
reasonable care, they could have known of the material misstatements and omissions
alleged herein.”). Nothing in the Amended Complaint contradicts these allegations,
which adequately plead the Chanticleer Defendants’ liability under § 11 and § 15(a).
Therefore, the Court will deny the Chanticleer Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Creason’s Motion to Dismiss
Creason asserts that it cannot be held liable for the misstatements in the Filings
because it did not prepare or certify the inaccurate financial statements for
Chanticleer’s South Africa Operations. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4). The Court finds this
argument meritless. Section 11 permits a claim against
every accountant . . . who has with his consent been named
as having prepared or certified any part of the [false or
misleading] registration statement, or as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in connection
with the registration statement, with respect to the statement
in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which
purports to have been prepared or certified by him[.]
Id. Here, Creason’s audit-opinion letter does state that Creason “did not audit the
financial statements of” the South Africa Operations. But Creason’s letter further
represents that “[t]hose statements were audited by other auditors whose reports have
been furnished to us, and our opinion, insofar as it relates to the amounts included for
the South Africa Operations, is based solely on the reports of the other auditors.” As
Chanticleer later revealed in the Current Report, the South Africa financial statements
had not been audited by anyone. So Creason could not have reviewed reports from
other auditors, much less expressed an opinion about the South Africa financial
statements based on such reports. Said differently, Creason certified the South Africa
financial statements based on its claimed review of audit reports that never existed.
These facts are more than sufficient to state a § 11 claim against Creason.
In addition, Creason maintains that while it audited Chanticleer’s financial
statements for FY 2011, it did not audit the financial statements for Q1 2012.
See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381 n.11 (“Accountants are liable under Section
11 only for those matters which purport to have been prepared or certified by them.”
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4)). The record confirms, and Howard does not dispute, that
the Q1 2012 financial statements contained in the Filings were unaudited. Accordingly,
the Court will dismiss Howard’s claim against Creason with respect to the Q1 2012
financial statements only.
Creason’s Motion for More Definite Statement
Creason also seeks to require Howard to provide a more definite statement of
his claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) allows a party to “move for a more
definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is
so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(e). Creason argues that it cannot reasonably respond to the Amended
Complaint because that pleading does not specify which of Creason’s statements about
the South Africa Operations were allegedly false. The Court rejects this argument.
As discussed above, Howard has plausibly alleged that Creason made at least the
following false statements: that the FY 2011 financial statements for the South Africa
Operations “were audited by other auditors,” that those auditors’ reports “ha[d] been
furnished to” Creason, and that Creason’s opinion of the South Africa financial
statements was “based solely on the reports of the other auditors.”
More, Creason claims that it cannot respond to Howard’s allegation that
“Chanticleer’s restatement was caused primarily by the oversight or misuse of facts.”
DE 28 at 6, ¶ 28. Again, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The challenged
allegation refers to the preceding paragraphs in the Amended Complaint, which assert
that the Filings’ incorrect financial statements did not comply with generally accepted
accounting principles. Especially in light of the allegations regarding Creason’s false
statements, Creason can reasonably interpret and respond to this allegation as well.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
The Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint on Behalf of
Defendants Chanticleer Holdings, Inc., Michael D. Pruitt, Eric S. Lederer,
Michael Carroll, Paul I. Moskowitz and Keith Johnson [DE 32] is DENIED;
Defendant Creason & Associates, P.L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Class Action Complaint [DE 33] is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
Creason is based on Chanticleer’s financial statements for the quarter ending
March 31, 2012, that claim is DISMISSED. But Plaintiff may proceed with his
claim against Creason with respect to Chanticleer’s financial statements for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2011;
Defendant Creason & Associates, P.L.L.C.’s Motion for More Definite Statement
[DE 34] is DENIED;
By October 8, 2013, Defendants shall file Answers to Plaintiff’s Amended Class
Action Complaint [DE 28]; and
Because this action is still in the pleadings stage, trial is reset for the two-week
period commencing May 12, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
case may be called. Calendar call is reset for May 8, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.
All other provisions of the Court’s original trial Order [DE 4] shall remain in effect.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,
Florida, this 17th day of September, 2013.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of record via CM/ECF
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