Corbin v. Town Of Palm Beach

Filing 102

OPINION AND ORDER granting 98 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Kenneth A. Marra on 3/4/2014. (ir)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 13-80106-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN
ROGER DALE CORBIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TOWN OF PALM BEACH,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER1
This cause is before the Court upon Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Disparate Impact Claim (DE 98). Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Non-Objection
(DE 101). The Court has carefully considered the Motion and is otherwise fully advised in the
premises.
I. Background
The Court incorporates the facts from its prior Order granting summary judgment to
Defendant on the disparate treatment claim and denying summary judgment to Plaintiff on the
disparate impact claim (DE 97). Additional facts, as culled from affidavits and answers to
interrogatories and reasonably inferred therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party, for the purpose of this motion, are as follows:
Plaintiff was the only diabetic employee to whom the Town and Fire Department rule of
calling in sick when not at home has impacted. (Danielle Olson Aff. ¶ 5.) The Town has not
denied any diabetics use of available sick time for violating the calling in rule when not at home
1

The Court presumes familiarity with its prior Orders.

and there is no statistical evidence demonstrating that this rule affects diabetics in any different
manner than any other employees. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff was not terminated for violating the
Town and Fire Department rule, but for insubordination and deceit. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The sick leave
rules were established many years ago to detect and curb sick leave abuse, which was prevalent
in the Fire Department. Abuse caused cost overruns and was the subject of union contract
negotiations. Abuse discourages other employees who are honestly obeying the rules and
encourages sick leave abuse in other departments. (Ans. to Interrog. 2, Ex. 1, DE 98-1.)
Defendant moves for summary judgment and argues that there is no statistical evidence to
demonstrate causation and the policies challenged by Plaintiff are consistent with business
necessity.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The stringent burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court
should not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved
against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. To discharge this
burden, the movant must point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the
2

nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325.
After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the burden of production shifts and
the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.” Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) and (B).
Essentially, so long as the non-moving party has had an ample opportunity to conduct
discovery, it must come forward with affirmative evidence to support its claim. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 257. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). If the evidence advanced by the nonmoving party “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, then summary judgment may
be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50.
III. Discussion
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the ADA. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)). These types of claims “involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Id. The ADA prohibits employers from
using policies which “screen out” disabled individuals unless the criteria “is shown to be job3

related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(6). Besides pointing to a specific employment practice that allegedly has a disparate
impact, a plaintiff must also demonstrate causation by offering statistical evidence to show that
the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited discrimination. Hallmark Developers v. Fulton
County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d
1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999). Once a prima facie case is established, the employer can respond
with evidence that the challenged practice is both related to the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314.
There is a Town-wide policy requiring employees to be home when calling in sick and a
Fire Rescue Department policy requiring employees to be home when calling in sick unless they
notify the department otherwise. Defendant has provided unrebutted evidence that these policies
do not have a disparate impact on employees and there is no statistical evidence showing
otherwise. (Persaud Aff. ¶ 7, DE 87; Olson Aff. ¶ ¶ 5-9.) Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a
question of fact on the issue of causation, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Nonetheless, for the purpose of a complete record, the Court will discuss business necessity. The
record evidence demonstrates that the challenged policies exist to address the problem of chronic
sick leave abuse and to reduce cost overruns, and thus are consistent with business necessity.
See Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO v. New York City Transit Auth., 341
F. Supp. 2d 432, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (violations of sick leave not only “drains[ ] public funds”
but has the potential to “disrupt[ ] vital services.”) Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact on this point.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
4

IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Disparate Impact Claim (DE 98) is GRANTED. The Court
will separately issue judgment for Defendant.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,
Florida, this 4th day of March, 2014.
______________________________________
KENNETH A. MARRA
United States District Judge

5