National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Tyco Integrated Security, LLC et al
Filing
66
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Amended Pleadings due by 3/14/2014. Signed by Judge Kenneth A. Marra on 3/3/2014. (ir)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 13-80371-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, by
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH,
PENNSYLVANIA, as subrogee,
Plaintiff,
v.
TYCO INTEGRATED SECURITY, LLC, F/K/A
ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC., A
SUBSIDIARY OF TYCO INTERNATIONAL
LTD., CO., AMAURY VILLA AND AMED
VILLA,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Tyco Integrated Security LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [DE 32]. The motion has been fully briefed
by the parties and is ripe for this Court’s consideration. The Court has reviewed all papers
submitted in connection with the pending motion, the entire file, and is otherwise duly advised in
the premises.
I. Legal Standard
With respect to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court observes first that Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
1
relief.” The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, “only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950. When considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true in determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
As a general rule, the Court must “limit[] its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits
attached thereto” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Grossman v. Nationsbank,
N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d) mandates that if matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court and not
excluded, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. There is an
exception to this rule for documents that are (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2)
undisputed. Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002). Undisputed means that the
2
authenticity of the document is not challenged. Id.
II. Background Facts
Since Plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion, the
background facts are gleaned from the Amended Complaint.
Tyco Integrated Security LLC (“TycoIS”)1 provides premises security and fire safety
equipment and monitoring services under separate contracts to Eli Lilly’s sales offices and
distribution warehouses throughout the United States, including its Enfield, Connecticut
Distribution Warehouse [DE 27 at ¶18]. On November 18, 2004, Eli Lilly and TycoIS entered
into two agreements and riders for services at the Enfield facility [DE 32-1, 32-2]2. In addition to
general Terms and Conditions, the Agreements set forth the “Scope of Work”.3 The Agreements
provided that an annual fee was to be paid in advance for a period of five years. Thereafter, the
Agreement would be automatically renewable yearly unless terminated by either party upon
written notice at least 30 days prior to the anniversary date [Id.]. Subsequently, various
additional agreements and riders were entered into in 2005 and 2009, all containing specific
descriptions of the scope of the work [DE 32-3].
1
Plaintiff sued Tyco Integrated Security, LLC., f/k/a ADT Security Services, Inc., a
subsidiary of Tyco International Ltd, Co. [DE 27]. Defendant states that ADT changed its name
to Tyco Integrated Security (“TycoIS”) on June 30, 2012 [DE 32 at 3 n.2]. Since Defendant is
not raising any legal issue relative thereto, rather, it just wants the proper party to be referenced,
the Court will use “TycoIS” to refer to the moving Defendant. For ease of reference, the Court
will also use “TycoIS” when referring to the original entity ADT.
2
Defendant appended the contract to its brief. Since the authenticity of these documents
have not been challenged by Plaintiff, the Court may rely upon them in deciding this motion to
dismiss as they are referred to in the Amended Complaint.
3
The full Agreements, which were filed under seal, have been reviewed by the Court;
however, the Court will not refer in this Opinion to the details redacted from the public copy.
3
As the contracts are scheduled to expire, TycoIS submits confidential bid proposals for
Eli Lilly to evaluate [DE 27 at ¶18]. During Fall 2009, TycoIS conducted a survey and security
needs assessment at Eli Lilly’s Enfield facility in anticipation of preparing a new bid proposal
[Id. at ¶¶28-32]. This culminated in the 2010 Confidential System Proposal (“2010 Proposal”),
which was first presented to Eli Lilly by TycoIS on December 17, 2009 [Id. at ¶33].
The 2010 Proposal contains specific details, identifying by “x” and “y” coordinates the
location of proposed equipment. It illustrates, explains and highlights specific faults and blind
spots in the video surveillance systems at the Enfield warehouse, including those areas of the
doors and bays not visible to the surveillance monitoring [Id. at ¶42]. It includes architectural
drawings of the layout of the interior of the Enfield warehouse, with graphic overlays noting
every motion detector, beam sensor, roof hatch, intercom, overhead door contact, fixed cameras
(including their directional views and descriptions of items not in the camera view), panic button,
card recorder, glass break sensor, contact, control panel and keypad [Id. at ¶43]. It highlights that
the roof of the Enfield warehouse is unmonitored [Id. at ¶45]. It highlights the absence of
internal monitoring equipment at specified locations in the warehouse [Id. at ¶46]. It highlights
the need for and placement of recommended, additional motion detectors in the Master Control
Center (MCC) in the Enfield facility [Id. at ¶47].
The Amended Complaint states that the revised 2010 Proposal, dated February 19, 2010,
represents on its face that it is confidential. It states that “All material, information, and supplied
system assessments furnished in this document are strictly confidential” “intended solely” for Eli
Lilly to evaluate ADT/TYCO services as a potential vendor. It also represents that “no portion of
the supplied material would be reproduced or distributed without the expressed written
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permission of ADT/TYCO Security Services, Inc.” [Id. at ¶41].
The 2010 Proposal expired 90 days from “the date listed on the front page of the
agreement.” The date listed on the front page of the agreement is February 19, 2010 [Id. at ¶48].
On or about December 22, 2009, Defendant Amaury Villa incorporated Trans-USA, Inc.,
a tractor trailer truck leasing company [Id. at ¶34]. On or about January 7 through January 9,
2010, Amaury Villa traveled between Miami, Florida and Enfield, Connecticut [Id. at ¶36].
On February 22, 2010, Amaury Villa and Amed Villa, through Trans-USA, Inc., obtained lease
agreements for two tractor trailer trucks [Id. at ¶49]. Between February 26, 2010 and March 5,
2010, Amaury Villa travelled between Miami, Florida and Enfield, Connecticut [Id. at ¶50].
51.
At 3:40 a.m. on March 14, 2010, less than a month after the date of delivery and
presentation of the February 19, 2010 revised Proposal, pharmaceuticals valued in excess of
$60,000,000 were stolen from the Enfield warehouse [Id. at ¶51]. Defendants Amaury Villa and
Amed Villa and one other individual parked a tractor-trailer in the only loading bay (out of
seven) identified in the 2010 Proposal to be outside the view of the existing surveillance cameras
[Id. at ¶ 52]. They crossed the entire length of the roof of the distribution warehouse to arrive at
a small area comprising less than 1% of the total surface area of the roof. This location was
identified in the 2010 Proposal as above an area unmonitored by the existing security equipment
and adjacent to the MCC room identified by “x” and “y” coordinates as requiring additional
intrusion detection devices and cameras. Amaury Villa and Amed Villa rapelled from the small
location on the roof to the unmonitored area of the warehouse; accessed the MCC room
undetected by monitoring equipment; and disabled the existing security systems master controls,
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telecommunications systems and cell batteries to the back-up communications systems [Id. at
¶53].
The equipment at the Enfield facility was operable prior to the event and did not fail;
rather, it was avoided by Defendants Amaury Villa and Amed Villa. They exploited details of
the layout of the warehouse and the vulnerabilities of the camera surveillance and intrusion
detection systems identified by TycoIS in the 2010 Proposal to enter undetected and disable the
relevant portions of the security system [Id. at ¶55].
The Amended Complaint contains a recitation of comparable crimes committed at other
facilities utilizing TycoIS security systems. It notes that in July 2008, a Quality One Wireless
warehouse in Orlando, Florida was illegally entered via a hole cut through the wall of an adjacent
warehouse. Individuals knew precisely where to cut a hole between the adjoining walls to gain
entry and remove cell phones and wireless equipment without triggering the security equipment.
The Orlando warehouse was secured by TycoIS with alarms, motion sensors and video
surveillance. No alarm wires were cut, and the TycoIS alarm system for the warehouse and inner
offices were working properly at the time of this invasion [Id. at ¶72].
The Amended Complaint also notes that in December, 2009, Amaury Villa was arrested
and pled guilty to breaking and entering the AM-C Warehouse in Grand Prairie, Texas. The
security equipment and services at the Grand Prairie Texas warehouse were provided by TycoIS
and included motion detectors, infrared beams and contact sensors. Prior to the theft, in or about
March 2009, TycoIS had conducted a security assessment of this facility and generated a
document/proposal that included a detailed map of the facility identifying the locations of the
existing security equipment and inventory within the warehouse. It documented that the offices
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within the warehouse were inadequately monitored by security equipment and that the halls and
corridors were monitored by intrusion detection equipment. It also documented that the inventory
of stored merchandise within the warehouse was cigarettes and mapped where the inventory was
located. [Id. at ¶¶ 77-81].
Despite the existence of an elaborate security system in place at the Grand Prairie, Texas
warehouse, Amaury Villa avoided the security system by rappelling from a small location on the
roof of the warehouse into the office spaces (outside the scope of detection devices). He
continued to avoid the monitored corridors and hallways by tunneling through the unmonitored
office walls. He did not remove any property within the office spaces; rather, he used the offices
to avoid the monitored corridors and gain access to the warehouse area that was identified by
TycoIS as storing cigarettes. The equipment and monitoring services at the Grand Prairie, Texas
warehouse did not fail, but were actively bypassed by Amaury Villa with detailed confidential
technical knowledge of the system and its flaws as documented and maintained by TycoIS. [Id. at
¶¶ 82-84].
Defendant Amed Villa was charged in connection with the January 2010 burglary of
3,500 cases of cigarettes, valued at more than $8 million, stored at the Federal Warehouse in East
Peoria, Illinois. At that time, TycoIS provided security services to the East Peoria, Illinois
warehouse. The equipment and monitoring services at the East Peoria, Illinois warehouse did not
fail, but were actively bypassed by Amaury Villa, with detailed confidential technical knowledge
of the system and its flaws as documented and maintained by TycoIS. [Id. at ¶¶ 88-90].
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III. Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains eight counts against TycoIS.4 Count I alleges
that TycoIS was negligent for failing to use care in protecting and safeguarding the confidential
information regarding Eli Lilly’s security infrastructure [DE 27 at 20-24]. It alleges that TycoIS
knew or reasonably should have known that multiple warehouse invasions had occurred utilizing
confidential information that TycoIS had acquired in connection with its security evaluations [Id.
at ¶98]. It also alleges that TycoIS had a duty to disclose that these multiple invasions had
occurred [Id. at ¶¶100-101].
Count II (Failure to Safeguard Confidential Information) alleges that TycoIS compiled a
single document creating a comprehensive guide to Eli Lilly’s security coverage and then failed
to safeguard it [Id. at ¶¶113-119]. Count III (Failure to Disclose/Warn) alleges that TycoIS failed
to warn Eli Lilly about previous incidents in which TycoIS’s clients or prospective clients
suffered theft losses [Id. at ¶¶120-126].
Count IV alleges fraudulent inducement, stating that TycoIS fraudulently induced Eli
Lilly to permit it to conduct a security assessment of its existing security equipment and store that
information at TycoIS’s Boca Raton, Florida office. It states that Eli Lilly relied upon false
representations that the documentation would remain confidential and used solely by TycoIS to
evaluate Eli Lilly’s security needs [Id. at ¶¶127-135]. Count V alleges constructive fraud against
TycoIS [Id. at ¶¶136-144]; Count VI alleges fraudulent misrepresentation [Id. at ¶¶145-154];
Count VII alleges negligent misrepresentation [Id. at ¶¶155-163], and Count VIII alleges a
4
Counts IX-XIV assert claims against the Co-Defendants, both of whom have defaulted
[DE 42, 43].
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violation of the Florida Deceptive Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) [Id. at ¶¶164-173].
IV. TycoIS’ Motion to Dismiss
A. TycoIS argues that Eli Lilly contractually waived National Union’s right of
subrogation.
In support of its argument that Eli Lilly contractually waived National Union’s right of
subrogation against TycoIS, Defendant points to the following language in the agreement
between Eli Lilly and TycoIS for security services :
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT [TycoIS] IS NOT AN INSURER,
THAT INSURANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE OBTAINED BY THE
CUSTOMER AND THAT THE AMOUNTS PAYABLE TO
[TycoIS] HEREUNDER ARE BASED UPON THE VALUE OF
THE SERVICES AND THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY AS HEREIN
SET FORTH AND ARE UNRELATED TO THE VALUE OF
CUSTOMER’S PROPERTY OR PROPERTY OF OTHERS
LOCATED IN THE CUSTOMER’S PREMISES. CUSTOMER
AGREES TO LOOK EXCLUSIVELY TO CUSTOMER’S
INSURER TO RECOVER FOR INJURIES OR DAMAGE IN
THE EVENT OF ANY LOSS OR INJURY AND RELEASES
AND WAIVES ALL RIGHT OF RECOVERY AGAINST
[TycoIS] ARISING BY WAY OF SUBROGATION.
[DE 32 at 7].
Among other arguments in response, Plaintiff states that this contractual language has no
effect upon conduct that is an independent tort [DE 46 at 19]. The Court agrees. The contracts
between Eli Lilly and TycoIS relate to the installation of various security equipment and
monitoring relative thereto. The allegations in the Amended Complaint relate to Defendant’s
alleged failure to protect confidential information it acquired in connection with the proposal it
prepared to do future work for Eli Lilly; Defendant’s alleged failure to warn Eli Lilly about the
other invasions; and Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations relative thereto. None of these
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relate to the contracts containing the anti-subrogation provision. The anti-subrogation clause in
the contract does not, therefore, preclude the instant action.
The Court finds the case United States Fire Insurance Company v. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc.,
2D12-1956, 2013 WL 5225374 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. September 18, 2013) to be persuasive authority
in this regard.5 The Court finds the case relied upon by Defendant, Rose v. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc.,
989 So.2d 144 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2008), to be inapposite.6
Since the Amended Complaint raises claims independent of the contractual relationship
between Eli Lilly and TycoIS, Defendant’s argument that the one-year limitation of action
provision in their contract bars Plaintiff’s claims similarly fails.
B. TycoIS argues that the Connecticut statute of limitations bars this action
TycoIS argues that the relevant choice of law principles favor the application of
Connecticut law to this case [DE 32 at 13-18]. It then states that the case is barred by
Connecticut’s statutes of limitation [Id. at 19-20]. Plaintiff responds that Florida law should be
applied to this case [DE 46 at 8-11].
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the conflict of laws rules of the forum state.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). In Florida, that is the “most
5
By relying upon this Florida case, the Court is not ruling that Florida law necessarily
applies in this case. As noted below, the Court cannot make that conflicts of law determination
at this early point in the litigation. Connecticut, like Florida, recognizes the concept of tort
claims that are independent of contract claims, see, e.g., Greenwich Interiors, LLC v. DCM
Systems, LLC, No. FSTCV085009200S, 2009 WL 765529 (Conn. Superior Ct., Jud. Dist.
Stamford-Norwalk, February 25, 2009); so, no choice of law is needed to resolve this particular
issue.
6
In light of this holding, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the respective positions
of the parties as to whether the contract was still in effect when the burglary occurred.
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significant relationship” test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See, e.g.,
Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir.
2007).
The parties’ briefs on this point make it clear that there exist factual questions that
preclude a decision at this time as to which state’s law will apply to this case. As Defendant
points out, the Amended Complaint does not allege how, when, or where the Villas obtained the
2010 Proposal [DE 32 at 5]. It argues that the “allegation that improper conduct occurred in
Florida is speculative and does not trump application of Connecticut law.” [Id. at 15]. It is,
however, equally speculative at this point to assume that improper conduct did not occur in
Florida, when it has been alleged that Defendant stored the confidential information in its office
in Boca Raton, Florida.
The full picture of what occurred here is currently unknown. That is not, however, a
reason to deny Plaintiff discovery. At this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot fairly evaluate
the significant relationship test and determine which state’s law applies. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint cannot, therefore, be dismissed based upon Connecticut’s statutes of limitation.
C. TycoIS argues that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead its claims.
1. TycoIS argues that the Amended Complaint does not satisfy federal
pleading standards.
TycoIS argues that the Amended Complaint contains speculative and conclusory
allegations that do not satisfy the minimal pleading requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) [DE 32 at 2225]. It bases this argument on the absence of any allegations as to how, when or where the
11
burglars obtained the 2010 Proposal [Id. at 23].
The Court rejects this argument. Essentially, Defendant’s position is because Plaintiff is
not in possession of every fact that would support its claims, it has failed to state a claim.
Clearly, that is not the law.
The very cases Defendant cites hold to the contrary. The Supreme Court has held that
“[w]hile a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (emphasis added, internal
citations omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”.Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(emphasis added, quotations and citations omitted).
The Amended Complaint is far from the kind of bare bones complaint that would warrant
dismissal at this stage of the proceedings. Accepting as true the allegations in the Amended
Complaint, it contains sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.
2. TycoIS argues that Plaintiff did not plead recoverable damages under
FDUTPA.
TycoIS relies upon Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So.2d 580 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) in arguing
that Plaintiff has failed to plead recoverable damages under FDUTPA. In Heller, the court found
that the subject of the consumer transaction was the installation of a burglar alarm system and the
services performed thereon, rather than the items stolen from the house. 454 So.2d at 584. As
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noted supra, the instant action is premised on allegations that are independent of the installation
and monitoring of the security system. The Heller case is, therefore, inapposite.
A claim under FDUTPA has three elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2)
causation and (3) actual damages. Mantz v. TRS Recovery Servs., Inc., 11-80580-CIV, 2011 WL
5515303 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2011). All three of these elements have been pled in the
Amended Complaint. Whether this claim ultimately is proven and what damages may be
recoverable will depend upon the evidence adduced during discovery and trial. There is no basis
to dismiss this claim at this time.
3. TycoIs argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claims and negligent
misrepresentation claim fail to state claims.
TycoIS relies upon Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1983) for
the proposition that to constitute actionable fraud, a false representation must relate to an existing
or pre-existing fact [DE 32 at 26]. It then goes on to argue that the two alleged fraudulent
statements, namely that the proposals would remain confidential and that no portion of the
supplied material could be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of
TycoIS, both relate to future acts [Id.].
Although TycoIS argues in its reply papers that Plaintiff abandoned its fraud and
negligent misrepresentation claims by failing to address this argument specifically [DE 49 at 78], Plaintiff did respond to the argument by stating that the Amended Complaint adequately pled
these claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) [DE 46 at 16-17]. Plaintiff points to additional facts
throughout its Amended Complaint to support its argument. [Id.]. Plaintiff also alludes to
“multiple occasions” when representations were made [Id. at 16].
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Ultimately, however, Plaintiff has failed to set forth its fraud claims with the particularity
required by Rule 9(b). See, e.g,. Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001).
Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint sets forth “(1) precisely what statements
were made in what documents or oral representations or what omissions were
made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement and the person
responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3)
the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff,
and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.”
Id. at 1202 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has requested leave to amend any claims that are dismissed by the Court [Id. at
23]. Since Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 provides that leave should be freely granted, the Court gives
Plaintiff leave to amend Counts IV-VII should Plaintiff still seek to proceed with these claims.
4. TycoIS argues that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because
Plaintiff has alleged that the contract between the parties was no longer in
effect.
TycoIS argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that the contracts between the parties were no
longer in effect means that Plaintiff “has essentially admitted that TycoIS’s disclosure of the
specifics of the unmonitored alarm system did not cause its alleged damages.” [DE 32 at 29].
TycoIS argues that the Court should, therefore, dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
[Id.].
First, it is well established that a party may plead alternative theories of its case. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(d)(2). As this Rule notes: “If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is
sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.” Second, as discussed above, the Court has held that
the allegations in the Amended Complaint fall outside the parameters of the contracts that these
parties entered into. Third, as further discussed herein, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled Counts I-III
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and VIII and thus avoids dismissal of these Counts. The Court finds no basis to ignore these
viable claims in their entirety based upon Plaintiff’s allegation that the contracts were not in
effect. Finally, parties on occasion continue to render services without the benefit of a contract
after a contract expires. The Court is not commenting on whether or not that occurred here,
rather, it is mentioned simply to explain why the Court does not view Defendant’s theory as
having merit.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.
Tyco Integrated Security LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint [DE 32] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
2.
Counts IV-VII of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND these
counts by filing a Second Amended Complaint on or before March 14, 2014.
3.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I-III and VIII is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,
Florida, this 3rd day of March, 2014.
______________________
KENNETH A. MARRA
United States District Judge
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