Jacobs v. City of West Palm Beach

Filing 177

ORDER denying 163 Motion to Lift Stay and granting 169 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 8/19/2016. (bkd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 9:14-CV-80964-ROSENBERG/BRANNON
DEIRDRE M. JACOBS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION TO LIFT STAY
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Lift Stay [DE 163] and
Defendant’s Motion to Compel [DE 169]. The Court has reviewed the documents in the case file
and is fully advised in the premises.
The central issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff’s attempt to revoke a settlement
agreement was valid. Plaintiff’s right to revoke is delineated in the agreement as follows:
Plaintiff also understands that s/he has the right to revoke this release for a period of
seven (7) days following its execution by sending written notice . . . .
DE 163-1 at 4. Plaintiff’s argument is that this revocation clause permitted her to revoke the
agreement within seven days of the date upon which the agreement was fully executed.
Defendant’s argument is that this clause applied to the time period running seven days from the
date Plaintiff executed the agreement.1 Defendant argues that the agreement makes it clear that
Plaintiff’s seven-day right to revoke ran from the date of her execution citing, inter alia, the
following provision:

1 Although the agreement was amended after Plaintiff’s execution, that amendment has no effect (due to the date upon
which the amendment occurred) on the Court’s analysis.

DE 163-1 at 5. If Plaintiff’s interpretation is correct, Plaintiff revoked the Settlement Agreement
in time. If Defendant’s interpretation is correct, Plaintiff’s revocation came too late. Upon review,
the Court agrees with Defendant.
The Court concludes that the terms of the revocation provision (and the phrase “its
execution”) are clear and unambiguous for two reasons. First, the two provisions quoted above,
when read together, make it clear that Defendant bargained for the right to present the Settlement
Agreement to its City Commission without worry over whether the Plaintiff would revoke the
Settlement Agreement after Defendant had gone to the considerable trouble to approve the
agreement (by counsel), present the agreement to the City Commission, hold a hearing pertaining
to the same, and ultimately enter a formal resolution on the matter.2 There was plenty of time for
Plaintiff to revoke the Settlement Agreement before it was considered by the City Commission.
Defendant’s fear, which was appropriately grounded in the procedural history of this case,
ultimately came true when Plaintiff attempted to revoke the Settlement Agreement long after the
City Commission formally voted and accepted the settlement.
The revocation clause is also clear and unambiguous because the general rule for
revocation clauses like the one before the Court is that a claimant releases his or her claims seven
2 The Court’s conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of paragraph 11. That paragraph, which contains Plaintiff’s
revocation right, focuses on Plaintiff’s representations and Plaintiff’s execution of the agreement.

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days after the claimant signs the agreement. See Nakamoto v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No.
09-05193, 2010 WL 2348634 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2010) (“[R]egulatory interpretation . . . indicates
that the seven-day revocation period commences upon the employee’s execution, not the
employer’s communication of assent.”). The mere fact that the language in the instant case states
that the period runs from “its execution,” when examined in the context of the plain language of
the agreement and governing law, does not render the phrase “its execution” ambiguous. Stated
another way, the contract language used here in this case does nothing to disturb the default rule
governing this type of provision. Plaintiff elected not to revoke her agreement until long after she
signed it and long after it had been approved by the Defendant City Commission. Plaintiff missed
her chance; Plaintiff waited too long.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s
Amended Motion to Lift Stay [163] is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion to Compel [169] is
GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED by this Court to COMPLY WITH THE TERMS
OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. Plaintiff will provide Defendant with the Settlement
Agreement for Defendant’s execution by August 26, 2016. All other requests for relief, including
Defendant’s request for sanctions and attorney’s fees, are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
and may be renewed after the Settlement Agreement has been complied with.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Pierce, Florida, this 19th day of August, 2016.

_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record

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