Walter v. Jet Aviation Flight Services, Inc. et al

Filing 113

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 64 Defendants' Motion for Final Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 7/31/2017. (nkl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 9:16-CV-81238-ROSENBERG/BRANNON
JOHN WALTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JET AVIATION FLIGHT SERVICES, INC.
and MATTHEW RAVER,
Defendants.
/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment
[DE 64]. The Court has carefully considered Defendants’ Motion, and the parties’ respective
filings in opposition thereto and in support thereof, and is otherwise fully advised in the
premises. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships.
Plaintiff John Walter (“Walter”), a pilot, asserts that Defendant Matthew Raver (“Raver”), his
former co-pilot, made defamatory statements about Walter’s flying to their employer, Defendant
Jet Aviation Flight Services, Inc. (“Jet Aviation”). Walter further asserts that Jet Aviation, in
turn, made defamatory statements about Walter’s flying to Bruce and Suzanne Kovner (“the
Kovners”), the owners of a private plane regularly flown by Walter. As a result of these
defamatory statements, Walter asserts, Jet Aviation terminated Walter’s employment and the
Kovners decided that Walter should cease flying their plane.

In the Motion presently before the Court, Raver and Jet Aviation seek summary judgment
as to all four claims asserted against them. With respect to Walter’s claims that Raver made
defamatory statements to Jet Aviation (Count I), and that Jet Aviation made defamatory
statements to the Kovners (Count III), summary judgment is denied because the Court cannot
determine as a matter of law whether either Raver or Jet Aviation was motivated primarily by
malice, and such a finding is necessary to overcome the qualified privilege to which both Raver’s
and Jet Aviation’s statements are entitled. With respect to Walter’s claims that Raver tortiously
interfered with the business relationship between Walter and Jet Aviation (Count II), and that Jet
Aviation tortiously interfered with the business relationship between Walter and the Kovners
(Count IV), summary judgment is granted because neither Raver nor Jet Aviation was motivated
solely by malice, and Walter has therefore failed to overcome the privilege to which both Raver’s
and Jet Aviation’s interferences are entitled.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The existence of a factual dispute is not by itself sufficient grounds to defeat a
motion for summary judgment; rather, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is
genuine if “a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.”
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). A fact is material if “it would affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

2

favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See
Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court does not weigh conflicting
evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, upon
discovering a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must deny summary judgment. See id.
III.

FACTS 1

Walter and Raver are both pilots who, while employed by aircraft management company
Gama Aviation, began flying the Kovners’ private plane on a regular basis. DE 63-1, Walter
Deposition at 50:25–51:2, 52:11–19. When the Kovners moved the management of their plane
from Gama Aviation to Jet Aviation, they asked Walter and Raver to follow and continue flying
their plane. Id. at 51:13–24, 53:4–15. Walter and Raver agreed and, in April of 2015, began their
employment with Jet Aviation, where they continued to fly the Kovners’ plane on a regular
basis. Id. at 60:12–61:11, 61:25–62:3, 64:18–21.
During his employment with Jet Aviation, Walter reported directly to Nicholas Guiffre
(“Guiffre”), Jet Aviation’s chief pilot. Id. at 61:12–23, 186:14–15. Walter’s employment with Jet
Aviation was at will; as such, it could be terminated with or without cause and with or without
notice at any time by either party. Id. at 68:16–69:11.
In November of 2015, Walter and several Jet Aviation employees—including Guiffre,
Raver, Jet Aviation’s director of operations, and Jet Aviation’s director of safety—participated in
a conference call to discuss concerns about Walter’s flying after Raver reported to Jet Aviation
that Walter had engaged in certain improper flying practices. Id. at 185:3–189:23; see also DE
63-3 (emails dated April 18, 2016 and April 28, 2016 in which Walter acknowledges that this
conversation took place, that they discussed Raver’s reported concerns about Walter’s flying,
and that Walter agreed to adhere to certain flying practices). In April of 2016, Raver again
1

The facts set forth in this section are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

3

reported in an email to Guiffre that Walter had engaged in certain improper flying practices,
including those previously reported in 2015, on numerous occasions. DE 82-5, Guiffre
Deposition at 28:10–32:1; DE 82-11 (Raver’s email to Guiffre).
These concerns were then conveyed to the Kovners. 2 During a telephone call with Jet
Aviation employees, Bruce Kovner and his employee, Karen Cross (“Cross”), were informed
that Walter was using “irregular procedures” while flying the Kovners’ plane, which “were not
within the acceptable parameters of best practices.” DE 82-3, Bruce Kovner Deposition at
13:20–15:7; see also DE 63-5 (excerpts from deposition of Jet Aviation employee Christine
Amos and copy of Amos’s handwritten notes taken during April 19, 2016 telephone call between
Jet Aviation management, Bruce Kovner, and Cross, showing that concerns about Walter’s
flying were discussed). Bruce Kovner felt that Jet Aviation was telling him that Walter was
flying the plane in an unsafe manner. DE 82-3, Bruce Kovner Deposition at 16:24–17:2. For that
reason, Bruce Kovner told Jet Aviation that he expected a thorough investigation. Id. at 24:1–8,
25:1–5.
Guiffre investigated Raver’s reported concerns by speaking to Jet Aviation employees—
including Raver, Walter, and Jet Aviation’s director of operations—and reviewing emails, the
Airman’s Information Manual, and approach charts for the airports into which Walter and Raver
had flown. DE 82-5, Guiffre Deposition at 10:24–11:2, 11:20–12:19. Jet Aviation subsequently
reported back to Cross, following which Bruce Kovner decided—and informed Jet Aviation—
that Walter should no longer fly the Kovners’ plane. DE 82-3, Bruce Kovner Deposition at 25:6–
26:22.
Jet Aviation terminated Walter’s employment on April 29, 2016. DE 63-1, Walter
2

Raver and Jet Aviation assert that Walter has presented no evidence that Jet Aviation conveyed these concerns to
the Kovners. With respect to this issue, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Walter and draws all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006).

4

Deposition at 99:16–18. While Guiffre did not make the final decision to terminate Walter’s
employment, Guiffre told Walter that his employment was being terminated for flying too low
and “for a continued pattern of noncompliance, or something like that.” Id. at 99:19–100:14; DE
97-1, Guiffre Deposition at 13:23–14:6.
Walter has since found other employment. His current employer heard nothing about
these concerns with Walter’s flying prior to hiring him; Walter’s hiring and compensation were
in no way affected by the circumstances surrounding his separation from Jet Aviation. DE 63-7,
Peter Cipriano Deposition at 16:2–24, 23:11–16. No prospective employer told Walter that he
would not be hired because of any concerns reported by Raver and Jet Aviation, and at least one
employer hired Walter despite hearing of such concerns. DE 63-1, Walter Deposition at 296:9–
297:1, 324:14–22. However, Walter testified that as a result of losing his employment with Jet
Aviation and his role as the Kovners’ regular pilot—precipitated by Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s
reported concerns—Walter has suffered a pay cut, the expense and inconvenience of commuting
to Connecticut, and emotional distress. Id. at 301:1–6, 305:25–306:12, 320:25–321:10.
The parties dispute the motivation behind Raver’s decision to report concerns about
Walter’s flying to Jet Aviation. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Walter and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds that Raver’s decision to do so was
motivated by a combination of malice and a genuine but misguided belief that Walter was
engaging in unsafe flying practices.
As evidence of Raver’s malice, Walter testified to specific instances of Raver’s
“predilections to malice, bullying and mischief,” including Raver’s “ominous” statements that
Walter “better be glad [Raver] doesn’t want [Walter’s] job,” that Raver had gotten two other
pilots fired, that Raver had an uncle who was part of the Mafia, and that Raver had an unstable

5

fraternity brother who fired shots at the cast and crew of a reality television show and threatened
people who interfered with Raver. Id. at 259:23–261:19. 3 Walter felt threatened by these
statements. Id. at 261:5–7. Walter further testified that Raver was “very angry” and “had many
issues with Jet Aviation.” Id. at 257:11–16, 262:2–4, 263:19–264:23, 266:20–267:19. In an email
to Jet Aviation addressing Raver’s reported concerns about Walter’s flying, Walter wrote that he
was “concerned that [Raver’s] anger may be clouding his perception of our flight operations.”
See DE 63-3 at 3; see also DE 63-1, Walter Deposition at 360:22–361:23.
As evidence of Raver’s genuine but misguided belief that Walter was engaging in unsafe
flying practices, Walter testified that Raver was ignorant of proper flying procedures and that
this ignorance contributed to Raver’s decision to report concerns about Walter’s flying to Jet
Aviation. For example, Walter testified that “Raver caused much of this with his ignorance,”
referring to when Raver reported concerns about Walter’s flying to Jet Aviation. Id. at 85:24–
86:8; see also id. at 87:15–89:3, 109:9–22, 337:3–11, 368:13–19, 369:19–370:7 (discussing
Raver’s ignorance); DE 63-3 at 5 (email from Walter to Cross in which Walter writes that he
hoped to “educate” Raver on proper flying procedures and that he believed Raver was
“confusing” certain issues and “emotionally reacting”); id. at 2–3 (email from Walter to Jet
Aviation management in which Walter writes of Raver’s reported concerns, “I’m not quite sure
how this is a problem other than [Raver’s] perception.”).
Despite Walter’s belief that Raver’s concerns were unfounded, Walter invited Raver to
raise his concerns with Jet Aviation management if Walter and Raver could not agree on proper
flying procedures. See id. at 5. When asked about having invited Raver to contact someone
higher up at Jet Aviation to discuss his concerns, Walter testified, “I wouldn’t stand in

3

Raver disputes having made any of these statements. See DE 92-3, Raver Deposition at 9:11–17, 69:1–6, 70:18–
71:17, 71:24–72:17.

6

someone’s way of voicing their opinion about a safety concern.” DE 63-1, Walter Deposition at
199:13–17. Walter further testified that pilots have a duty “to ensure the proper outcome of a
safe flight,” meaning a safe landing. Id. at 22:23–23:5. If one pilot feels that another pilot is
flying unsafely, he has an obligation to report that to the employer. Id. at 38:6–17.
The parties also dispute the motivation behind Jet Aviation’s decision to report concerns
about Walter’s flying to the Kovners. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Walter and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds that Jet Aviation’s decision to do
so was motivated by a combination of malice and a genuine but misguided belief that Walter was
engaging in unsafe flying practices.
As evidence of Jet Aviation’s malice, Walter testified—based on conversations with
other pilots 4 and his own knowledge of the industry—that Jet Aviation wanted to terminate his
employment in order to replace him with a pilot of its own choosing and was looking for an
excuse to do so. Id. at 106:14–108:16, 251:24–253:25. Walter further testified that a vice
president at Jet Aviation emailed Cross offering “to vet [the Kovners’] pilots while we’re
checking for a new maintenance person,” suggesting that Jet Aviation wanted to replace the
Kovners’ pilots, Walter and Raver, with pilots of its own choosing. Id. at 249:3–250:16.
As evidence of Jet Aviation’s genuine but misguided belief that Walter was engaging in
unsafe flying practices, Walter testified that Jet Aviation management did not understand proper
flying procedures, and that his own understanding of proper flying procedures was greater than
Jet Aviation’s. Id. at 362:25–363:8.

4

To the extent Walter’s testimony relies on the statements of other pilots, Jet Aviation challenges this testimony as
inadmissible hearsay evidence, which cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. See Macuba v.
Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999). However, even if the Court does not consider the statements of other
pilots, Walter has presented sufficient evidence for this Court to find that Jet Aviation wanted to replace Walter and
Raver with other pilots and was looking for an excuse to do so. Again, for purposes of this Motion, the Court views
the facts in the light most favorable to Walter and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor.

7

IV.

DISCUSSION

The Court first addresses Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s request for summary judgment as to
Walter’s defamation claims, then turns to their request for summary judgment as to Walter’s
claims for tortious interference with business relationships.
A. Defamation Claim Against Raver (Count I) and Defamation Claim Against Jet Aviation
(Count III)
Jet Aviation argues that Walter has failed to present any evidence that Jet Aviation made
any defamatory statements. In addition, both Raver and Jet Aviation argue that any defamatory
statements they made were privileged. Raver and Jet Aviation also argue that Walter has failed to
present any evidence of damages caused by their defamatory statements.
The Court concludes that Walter has in fact presented evidence that both Raver and Jet
Aviation made defamatory statements. No absolute privilege applies in this case, and any
qualified privilege to which Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s statements are entitled may be overcome
by evidence of express malice—that is, evidence that the primary motive for the statements was
an intention to injure Walter. The Court cannot determine what either Raver’s or Jet Aviation’s
primary motive was. The Court also finds that Walter has presented evidence of damages caused
by Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s defamatory statements. Summary judgment must therefore be
denied as to Walter’s defamation claims.
1. Applicable Legal Principles
As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Walter’s Complaint asserts claims for
defamation or claims for defamation per se. See DE 93 at 3. A claim for defamation per se may
proceed under a theory of slander per se where the statement at issue imputes “conduct,
characteristics, or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of [the plaintiff’s] lawful
business, trade, profession, or office.” See Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1240,
8

1247 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla.
1953)). While neither Count I nor Count III of Walter’s Complaint uses the phrase “defamation
per se,” each alleges that the statements at issue were “incompatible with Walter’s trade or
profession.” See DE 1, Complaint ¶¶ 51, 65. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Walter has
alleged defamation per se against both Raver and Jet Aviation. The Court therefore proceeds
under the legal framework applicable to claims for defamation per se.
“As a general rule, there is a presumption of malice where statements are defamatory per
se, but that presumption ceases to exist where the Defendant has a qualified privilege to make the
statements.” Shaw v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 818 F. Supp. 1539, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(citing Axelrod v. Califano, 357 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)). In other words, “[t]he
determination that a defendant’s statements are qualifiedly privileged eliminates the presumption
of malice attaching to defamatory statements by law. The privilege instead raises a presumption
of good faith and places upon the plaintiff the burden of proving express malice.” Nodar v.
Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984).
“[C]ommunication between a corporation and employees identified as witnesses or those
with an interest in the disciplinary practices of their employer and the safety and security of their
workplace are privileged.” See Colbert v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-243-J25-JBT,
2013 WL 12145017, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2013) (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So.
2d 830, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). While Colbert does not explicitly state as much, a
review of American Airlines and cases cited therein establishes that this is a qualified—not
absolute—privilege. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, 960 So. 2d at 834 (citing Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 809)
(referring to statements that are “conditionally privileged”); see also Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 810
(“Under the common law of Florida, a communication to an employer regarding his employee’s

9

performance is conditionally privileged, and the mode, manner, or purpose of the communication
would go to the question of abuse or forfeiture of the privilege.”). 5 Similarly, Florida law
recognizes a qualified privilege for “communication made in good faith on any subject matter by
one having an interest therein, or in reference to which he has a duty . . . if made to a person
having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which would otherwise
be actionable . . . .” Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 809. 6
A qualified privilege may be overcome by evidence of express malice. “Express malice
under the common law of Florida, necessary to overcome the common-law qualified privilege, is
present where the primary motive for the statement is shown to have been an intention to injure
the plaintiff.” Id. at 806 (emphasis added). “Express malice has been defined as ‘ill will,
hostility, evil intention to defame and injure,’ and is a very high standard for a plaintiff to meet.”
Shaw v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 818 F. Supp. 1539, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (quoting
Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 3 So. 211 (1887)).
Where a person speaks upon a privileged occasion, but the speaker is motivated
more by a desire to harm the person defamed than by a purpose to protect the
personal or social interest giving rise to the privilege, then it can be said that there
was express malice and the privilege is destroyed. Strong, angry, or intemperate
words do not alone show express malice; rather, there must be a showing that the
speaker used his privileged position to gratify his malevolence. If the occasion of
the communication is privileged because of a proper interest to be protected, and
the defamer is motivated by a desire to protect that interest, he does not forfeit the
privilege merely because he also in fact feels hostility or ill will toward the
5

Raver relies on Colbert to assert an absolute privilege for his statements to Jet Aviation. However, Colbert
establishes only that “[s]tatements related to and within the scope of the grievance process are protected by absolute
privilege.” Colbert, 2013 WL 12145017, at *3 (citing Hope v. Nat’l All. of Postal & Fed. Employees, Jacksonville
Local No. 320, 649 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)). Hope involved statements made during a formal
grievance procedure between a labor organization and an employer. That is not the case here.
6
Despite the assertions of Raver and Jet Aviation, the Court is not convinced that the statements of either party are
entitled to a separate qualified privilege for statements concerning aviation safety. The only two cases cited by
Raver and Jet Aviation do not establish any privilege that applies to this case. See Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v.
Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (involving the application of 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a)); Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., No. C 99-04003 SI, 2004 WL 603587, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2004) (involving the application of Cal. Civ.
Code § 47). As the Court concludes that both Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s statements are qualifiedly privileged on
other grounds, the Court need not reach any conclusion as to the existence or applicability of a qualified privilege
for statements concerning aviation safety.

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plaintiff. The incidental gratification of personal feelings of indignation is not
sufficient to defeat the privilege where the primary motivation is within the scope
of the privilege.
Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 811–12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
2. The Instant Case
The Court begins with Jet Aviation’s contention that Walter has presented no evidence
that Jet Aviation made any defamatory statements. Jet Aviation argues that the only allegation of
defamation by Jet Aviation in Walter’s Complaint is that Jet Aviation told Cross “some things”
about Walter. See DE 1, Complaint ¶ 47. Jet Aviation further argues that Walter conceded during
the December 5, 2016 hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [DE 17] that
this allegation was the sole basis for Walter’s defamation claim against Jet Aviation. Finally, Jet
Aviation argues that Walter failed to depose Cross during discovery and, therefore, cannot
present any evidence of what Jet Aviation said to her.
The Court notes that, in addition to alleging that Jet Aviation told Cross “some things”
about Walter, Walter’s Complaint alleges that Jet Aviation made “statements about Walter to
Kovner and his employees.” See DE 1, Complaint ¶ 64. In addition, having reviewed the
transcript of the December 5, 2016 hearing, the Court is not convinced that Walter did in fact
concede that that the sole basis for his defamation claim against Jet Aviation was the allegation
that Jet Aviation told Cross “some things” about Walter. See DE 63-2. Regardless, as discovery
had not yet been conducted, it is entirely possible that Walter was aware of no other basis for his
defamation claim against Jet Aviation at the time of that hearing. That does not preclude Walter
from advancing evidence of defamation by Jet Aviation about which Walter subsequently
learned during discovery.
The Court does not agree that Walter has failed to present evidence of any defamatory

11

statements made by Jet Aviation. As set forth above, Walter has presented the deposition
testimony of Bruce Kovner, which indicates that Jet Aviation raised concerns about Walter’s
flying to him and Cross. In addition, while Amos’s deposition testimony and handwritten notes
do not establish conclusively who said what during an April 19, 2016 telephone call, they do at
least support the reasonable inference that Jet Aviation raised concerns about Walter’s flying to
Bruce Kovner and Cross.
However, both Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s statements about their concerns with Walter’s
flying are entitled to a qualified privilege. As Walter’s co-pilot and fellow Jet Aviation
employee, Raver unquestionably had an interest in the safety and security of the workplace and
in Walter’s employment performance. His statements to Jet Aviation about these matters are
therefore qualifiedly privileged. See Colbert v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-243-J25-JBT,
2013 WL 12145017, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2013) (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So.
2d 830, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)); Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 810. Likewise, as the company
managing the Kovners’ private plane and employing the pilots who flew that plane, Jet Aviation
unquestionably had an interest in the safety of Walter’s flying, a matter in which the Kovners
had a corresponding interest. Its statements to the Kovners about Walter’s flying are therefore
qualifiedly privileged as well. See Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 809.
While Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s statements are entitled to a qualified privilege, neither
party is entitled to summary judgment if there is evidence of express malice—that is, evidence
that the primary motive for the statements was an intention to injure Walter. As set forth above,
the Court has determined for purposes of the Motion presently before it that both Raver and Jet
Aviation were motivated by a combination of malice and a genuine but misguided belief that
Walter was engaging in unsafe flying practices. The Court cannot determine, however, whether

12

either Raver’s or Jet Aviation’s primary motive in reporting concerns about Walter’s flying was
an intention to injure Walter. This is a question for the jury.
Finally, the Court rejects Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s contention that Walter has failed to
present any evidence of damages caused by their defamatory statements. As set forth above,
Walter has presented evidence that he suffered a pay cut, the expense and inconvenience of
commuting to Connecticut, and emotional distress as a direct result of Raver’s and Jet Aviation’s
statements. Accordingly, summary judgment must be denied as to Walter’s defamation claims.
B. Tortious Interference Claim Against Raver (Count II) and Tortious Interference Claim
Against Jet Aviation (Count IV)
Jet Aviation argues that Walter had no business relationship with the Kovners with which
to interfere. In addition, both Raver and Jet Aviation argue that, as parties to the business
relationships with which they interfered, they cannot be held liable for tortious interference. Both
parties also argue that Walter has failed to present any evidence of damages caused by their
interference.
The Court need not decide whether Walter did in fact have a business relationship with
the Kovners. Even assuming that he did, the Court concludes that Jet Aviation was privileged to
interfere with that relationship, just as Raver was privileged to interfere with the business
relationship between Walter and Jet Aviation. As malice was neither Raver’s nor Jet Aviation’s
sole motive, Walter cannot overcome this privilege, and summary judgment must be granted as
to Walter’s tortious interference claims. Having reached that conclusion, the Court need not
determine whether Walter has presented evidence of damages caused by their interference, and
therefore declines to do so.
1. Applicable Legal Principles
To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship under Florida
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law, Walter must establish: “(1) the existence of a business relationship that affords the plaintiff
existing or prospective legal rights; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the business relationship;
(3) the defendant’s intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship; and (4) damage
to the plaintiff.” Int’l Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Austral Insulated Prod., Inc., 262 F.3d 1152, 1154
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla.
1994)).
With respect to the third of these four elements, “an interference is unjustified where the
interfering defendant is a stranger to the business relationship.” Hamilton v. Suntrust Mortg. Inc.,
6 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus,
“a claim for tortious interference . . . cannot lie where the alleged interference is directed at a
business relationship to which the defendant is a party. In other words, the interfering defendant
must be a third party, a stranger to the business relationship.” Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
“An interfering defendant is not a stranger . . . if the defendant has any beneficial or
economic interest in, or control over, that relationship. This includes when a defendant has a
supervisory interest in how the relationship is conducted or a potential financial interest in how a
contract is performed.” Hamilton, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1320 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Similarly, an agent of a corporate party to the business relationship cannot be held
liable for tortious interference if he was acting within his capacity and scope as an agent of the
corporation.” SIG, Inc. v. AT & T Digital Life, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1199 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
(citing Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1367 (M.D.
Fla. 2007)). “[A]n employee or representative of a contracting party must be considered as a

14

party to the [contractual] relationship. Given that corporate entities . . . must act through
individuals, a tortious interference claim will generally not lie against employees and
representatives of contracting entities.” Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1099 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
There is, however, an exception to the general principles set forth above. Interference by
one who is not a stranger to a business relationship may nevertheless be unjustified where
“malice is the sole basis for the interference. In other words, the party must be interfering solely
out of spite, to do harm, or for some other bad motive.” Ernie Haire, 260 F.3d at 1294 n.9
(emphasis in original). “While non-strangers generally have a ‘privilege to interfere’ with the
business relationship to protect their own economic interests, they may still be liable for tortious
interference if they do so in bad faith.” Hamilton, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1320 (internal citation
omitted). In other words, “[t]his privilege is not absolute; it is destroyed where an employee acts
solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the
employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in
the employer’s best interest.” Dukenel v. Kindred Hosp. E., LLC, No. 09-61184-CIV, 2010 WL
1850238, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Reyes v. Foreclosure Asset Sales & Transfer P’ship, No. 13-22829CIV, 2014 WL 12623071, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2014); Palm Beach Cty. Health Care Dist. v.
Prof’l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d 1090, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2. The Instant Case
With respect to Walter’s tortious interference claim against Raver, the relevant business
relationship is that between Walter and Jet Aviation. As Walter’s co-pilot and fellow Jet
Aviation employee, Raver was not a stranger to that relationship. See Hamilton, 6 F. Supp. 3d at

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1320; SIG, Inc. v. AT & T Digital Life, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1199 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Cox v.
CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). And, as set forth above,
the Court has determined for purposes of the Motion presently before it that Raver was
motivated by a combination of malice and a genuine but misguided belief that Walter was
engaging in unsafe flying practices. In other words, malice was not Raver’s sole motive.
Accordingly, Walter cannot overcome Raver’s privilege to interfere, and summary judgment
must be granted as to Walter’s tortious interference claim against Raver.
With respect to Walter’s tortious interference claim against Jet Aviation, the relevant
business relationship is that between Walter and the Kovners. While Jet Aviation disputes that
any such relationship existed, the Court need not decide that issue. Assuming that such a
relationship did exist, Jet Aviation—as the company managing the Kovners’ plane and
employing Walter to fly it—was no stranger to that relationship. Without question, Jet Aviation
had an economic interest in and at least some control over any relationship between Walter and
the Kovners. See Hamilton, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1320. As set forth above, the Court has determined
for purposes of the Motion presently before it that Jet Aviation was motivated by a combination
of malice and a genuine but misguided belief that Walter was engaging in unsafe flying
practices. In other words, malice was not Jet Aviation’s sole motive. Accordingly, Walter cannot
overcome Jet Aviation’s privilege to interfere, and summary judgment must be granted as to
Walter’s tortious interference claim against Jet Aviation.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’
Motion for Final Summary Judgment [DE 64] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as follows: Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Raver as to Count II (Tortious

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Interference Claim Against Raver) and in favor of Jet Aviation as to Count IV (Tortious
Interference Claim Against Jet Aviation). As to Count I (Defamation Claim Against Raver) and
Count III (Defamation Claim Against Jet Aviation), summary judgment is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 31st day of July,
2017.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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