Jones, Sr. v. City of Palm Beach Gardens et al

Filing 75

ORDER, granting in part and denying in part 67 Motion for Leave to File ; denying as moot 68 Motion to Strike 67 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Unopposed as to Claims Against Current Defendants Raja and City of Palm Beach Gardens), 68 Plaintiff's MOTION to Strike 66 Notice of Supplemental Authority , or Render as Moot Amended Complaint due by 4/13/2022. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 4/6/2022. See attached document for full details. (mee)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Clinton Jones, Sr., individually as
the Parent of Corey Jones and as
the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Corey Jones, Plaintiff,
v.
City of Palm Beach Gardens and
Nouman Raja, Defendants.

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) Civil Action No. 16-81247-Civ-Scola
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Order

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
third amended complaint (ECF No. 67) and motion to strike or render moot (ECF
No. 68). The Defendant City of Palm Beach Gardens filed a partial opposition to
the motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 72), as well as an opposition to the
motion to strike (ECF No. 70). The Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the motion
for leave to amend. (ECF No. 73.) After careful consideration of the briefing, the
record, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court grants in part and denies in
part the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 67) and denies the
Plaintiff’s motion to strike or render moot (ECF No. 68).
1. Background
On July 6, 2016, Clinton Jones Sr. sued the Defendants, alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence, and battery in connection with the fatal shooting
of Corey Jones by Defendant Nouman Raja while he was an officer with the Palm
Beach Gardens Police Department. (ECF No. 1.) Two months later, Jones filed the
operative complaint—the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 39.) At all times,
Jones only brought claims against the City of Palm Beach Gardens and Nouman
Raja.
On September 26, 2016, the predecessor judge stayed this case pending
resolution of criminal proceedings brought against Raja. (ECF No. 44.) A jury
subsequently found Raja guilty of manslaughter and attempted first degree
murder on March 7, 2019. (ECF No. 47.) Yet the stay in this case continued, as
criminal appellate proceedings were underway. After nearly six years, the stay in
this case was lifted on March 10, 2022. (ECF No. 63.)

2. Analysis
Jones now seeks to file a third amended complaint, pleading new factual
allegations against the existing Defendants as well as adding three new
defendants—Andrew Spragg, Javier Garcia, and Randall Anderson—all officers in
the Palm Beach Gardens Police Department. (ECF No. 67-1.) Jones alleges in his
proposed third amended complaint that these defendants are liable under section
1983 under inadequate supervision and failure-to-train theories. (Id.)
The City only opposes Jones’s motion to the extent that it pleads new
claims against new defendants, which the City argues are barred as untimely.
(ECF No. 72); see Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1285
(11th Cir. 2000) (finding that leave to amend may be denied where the proposed
amendment is futile and barred by the relevant statute of limitations), abrogated
on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). Jones
counters that these claims are timely, as (1) the claims “relate back” to the
Second Amended Complaint, (2) the stay in this case tolled the statute of
limitations, and (3) the claims accrued only when Jones recently discovered
supporting facts. (ECF No. 73.) The Court holds that these new claims are
untimely.
First, the Court finds that these claims do not relate back to the operative
complaint. For claims against a new party to “relate back” to an earlier-filed
complaint, the plaintiff must satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(C). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also Lannen v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 10-61311CIV, 2012 WL 13001860, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2012) (Scola, J.). Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
requires that, in addition to satisfying Rule 15(c)(1)(B), the newly-added parties
must have received adequate notice of the action and “knew, or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the new party’s identity, the action
would have been brought against [them].” Id. Therefore, a plaintiff must show
that (i) the new claims arise “out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out” in the original timely pleading, (ii) the newly-added party received
appropriate notice of the action, and (iii) there was a mistake concerning the
newly-added party’s identity. See id.
Here, Jones does not explain how Officers Spragg, Garcia, and Anderson
should have known that this action would be brought against them but for a
mistake concerning their identity. Rather, Jones states that he first learned of the
proposed defendants’ alleged involvement in the underlying issues in “late 2021
to early 2022.” (ECF No. 73 at 2, 7.) However, “lack of knowledge is not an error, a
misnomer, or a misidentification that falls within the ‘mistake’ requirement.” See
Lannen, 2012 WL 13001860, at *3 (cleaned up). And “once a court determines
that no ‘mistake’ was made, it is irrelevant whether the to-be-joined party
received notice and would not be prejudiced.” Id. (quoting Lelieve v. Orosa,

No. 10-23677-CIV, 2011 WL 5103949, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2011)). Therefore,
as Jones has alleged no mistake in identifying Officers Spragg, Garcia, and
Anderson, the Court finds that the proposed claims brought against those officers
do not relate back to the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Second, the Court finds that the stay in this case did not equitably toll the
relevant statute of limitations. “Equitable tolling is a remedy that must be used
sparingly” and only in “extreme cases.” See Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311,
1318 (11th Cir. 2008). And while the doctrine of equitable tolling is appropriate
where the plaintiff was “misled or lulled into inaction” through no fault of her
own, it also requires that the plaintiff diligently pursue her rights in the
meantime. See Starling v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1215,
1233–34 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (finding that equitable tolling applied, in part as the
plaintiff “diligently pursued her claim to the extent she could while the Court
imposed stay was in effect”); Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th
Cir. 2008) (finding that equitable tolling was appropriate as the plaintiff “diligently
pursued his claim”); Wallace v. Warden of M.D.C., 14 Civ. 6522, 2016 WL
6901315, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016) (finding that a court-imposed stay did
not equitably toll the relevant statute of limitations, as the plaintiff did not
establish that he had “been pursuing his rights diligently” notwithstanding the
stay).
Here, Jones does not establish that he had diligently pursued his rights
while the case was stayed. Indeed, he could have moved to lift the stay for the
purpose of filing an amended complaint, but he did not. See generally Retractable
Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 2:08-CV-16-MHS-RSP, 2013 WL
12139159, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2013) (finding that a stay did not equitably
toll the statute of limitations as the plaintiff did not move to lift the stay to amend
the pleadings). While Jones consistently opposed the stay, he has not established
that he diligently pursued the case while the stay was in effect. Therefore,
equitable tolling is inappropriate.
Last, the Court finds that Jones’s proposed new claims are untimely, as
they accrued more than four years ago. Section 1983 claims brought in Florida
must be pled within four years of the alleged unlawful conduct. See City of
Hialeah, Fla. v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 (11th Cir. 2002). However, this
statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the facts which would support a
cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably
prudent regard for his rights.” See Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716
(11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Calhoun v. Ala. Alcoholic Beverage Control Brd., 705 F.2d
422, 425 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Here, Jones argues that he did not learn of the facts supporting claims
against Officers Spragg, Garcia, and Anderson until “late 2021 to early 2022”
when Jones’s counsel reviewed transcripts from Raja’s 2019 criminal trial. (ECF

No. 73 at 2.) However, Jones does not establish why a reasonably prudent person
could have only learned that Officers Spragg, Garcia, and Anderson were Raja’s
supervisors from the 2019 criminal trial, which took place three years after this
case was filed. Therefore, the Court finds that any claims against those
individuals began to accrue earlier, when a reasonably prudent person could have
discovered the proposed defendants’ relationship to Defendant Raja. For this
reason, the proposed claims are untimely.
3. Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the Court grants in part and denies in part
the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. (ECF No. 67.) The Court grants the
motion—to the extent that it is unopposed—and grants leave to the Plaintiff to
add new factual allegations against the existing Defendants. However, the Court
denies the motion to the extent that it seeks to state new claims against new
defendants. The Plaintiff must file his third amended complaint as a separate
docket entry by April 13, 2022. Defendants Raja and Palm Beach Gardens must
respond to the third amended complaint by April 27, 2022.
As the Court grants in part the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint, the Court denies as moot the City’s pending motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 41); see Taylor v. Alabama, 275 F. App’x 836, 838 (11th Cir.
2008) (noting that an amended complaint moots a motion to dismiss a prior
pleading). Last, the Court denies as moot the Plaintiff’s motion to strike or
render as moot the City’s notice of supplemental authority in support of its
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 68.) The City may address such authorities and legal
argument if it moves to dismiss the third amended complaint.
Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on April 6, 2022.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge