Peer v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston
Filing
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ORDER denying as moot 17 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robin L. Rosenberg on 2/5/2018. (ail)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 9:17-CV-80281-ROSENBERG/HOPKINS
THERESA PEER,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF BOSTON,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING, AS MOOT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Theresa Peer’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [DE 17], and Defendant Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston’s (“Liberty Life”)
Motion for Summary Judgment, [DE 29]. The Court has carefully reviewed the motions, the
responses and replies, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth
below, the Motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
I.
INTRODUCTION1
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (“ERISA”) seeking a disability-based waiver of premium of
a group life insurance policy pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Peer is a participant in an
employee welfare benefit plan (the “Plan”) established and maintained by her employer, Novo
Nordisk, Inc. Liberty Life insures life benefits under the Plan, pursuant to a Group Life Insurance
Policy (the “Policy”).
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Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth herein are taken from the parties’ statements of
undisputed material facts filed in support of their respective motions and responses [DE 18, 26].
The Policy contains a Waiver of Premium benefit, whereby Liberty Life continues a Plan
participant’s life insurance coverage at no cost to the participant upon a finding of disability and
satisfaction of certain terms and conditions (the “Waiver of Premium”). Plaintiff sought a Waiver
of Premium, which Liberty initially denied by letter dated July 14, 2016. Plaintiff requested
information from Liberty Life regarding the denial of her request for the Waiver of Premium and
filed an appeal on November 15, 2016. Liberty denied Plaintiff’s appeal by letter dated January
23, 2017.
Plaintiff filed this action on March 7, 2017 seeking an award of the Waiver of Premium
benefit, an order clarifying and enforcing her rights to future Waiver of Premium benefits under
the terms of the Plan, and an order requiring Liberty Life to provide a “reasonable claims
procedure” with regard to future claims for the Waiver of Premium benefit. See Compl. [DE 1] ¶
4. After Plaintiff filed her Complaint, Liberty Life administratively reversed its denial of
Plaintiff’s claim for Waiver of Premium benefit, approved the Waiver of Premium, and
reinstated her Policy benefits retroactive to their prior termination. See Decl. of L. Marcus, Ex. A
to Def.’s Resp. [DE 27-1]; Decl. of P. McGee, Ex. B to Def.’s Resp. [DE 27-2]; Aug. 4, 2017
Ltr. from Liberty Life to P. Sullivan [DE 27-5]. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment.
II.
A.
DISCUSSION
The Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The existence of a factual dispute is not by itself sufficient grounds to defeat a motion for
summary judgment; rather, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “a
reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 247-48). A fact is material if “it would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court does not weigh conflicting
evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, upon
discovering a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must deny summary judgment. See id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once the moving
party satisfies this burden, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’”
Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
327 F. App’x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Instead, “[t]he non-moving party must make a
sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.”
Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Accordingly, the non-moving
party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, to show that a reasonable jury could
find in favor of that party. See Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343.
B.
Plaintiff’s Claim for an Award of the Waiver of Premium Benefit is Moot
On July 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking an award of
the Waiver of Premium benefit. Mot. [DE 17] at 1, 20. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s denial of
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the Waiver of Premium was wrong because she was totally disabled for the six months
immediately following her last day of active employment on October 9, 2015, as required under
the Policy for entitlement to a Waiver of Premium. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant violated
ERISA regulations by its claims procedures, in particular by its responses to Plaintiff’s requests
for documents in connection with her appeal of the Waiver of Premium denial. As a result,
Plaintiff contends that she has “demonstrated her entitlement to the Waiver of Premium benefit.”
Mot. at 20.
Notably, Plaintiff’s Motion was filed before Liberty Life reversed its denial of her
Waiver of Premium and approved the benefit. Thus, in response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s claims are now moot. Defendant points out that Plaintiff’s motion does not
seek adjudication on the question of Plaintiff’s future right to benefits or her request for a claims
process in the future. See Def.’s Resp. [DE 27] at 2. Plaintiff does not refute this contention and
the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Motion, though not styled a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeks only judgment on her request for an award of the Waiver of Premium. Thus, the
only issues for the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment are whether Plaintiff is
entitled to a Waiver of Premium and whether that claim is moot.
Federal courts may only decide claims that present actual controversies. Engelhardt v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (citing U.S. Const. Art.
III, § 2; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). A claim becomes moot “when it no longer
presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief,” Ethredge
v. Hall, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993), or “when the parties have no ‘legally cognizable
interest’ in the outcome of the litigation,” Westmoreland v. Nat’l Trans. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d
1461, 1462-63 (11th Cir. 1987). “Whether the parties have a legally cognizable interest depends
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on what relief the court may grant: if intervening events have made it ‘impossible . . . .to grant
effectual relief,’ the claim is moot.” Engelhardt, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 (quoting Aquamar, S.A.
v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999)).
In her Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to award her a Waiver of Premium. It is
undisputed that, after Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit (and after she filed her Motion), Liberty
Life reversed its prior denial and approved Plaintiff’s claim for a Waiver of Premium, granting
her that Waiver and reinstating her coverage. Therefore, because Plaintiff has received the relief
she sought and there is no further relief that the Court can award Plaintiff on her claim for an
award of the Waiver of Premium benefit, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion must be denied
as moot. See Pakovich v. Verizon LTD Plan, 653 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff’s] benefit
claim became moot when the Plan paid it in full”); Engelhardt, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (denying
plaintiff’s claim for past benefits as moot because plaintiff was paid all past benefits owed and,
therefore, there was no further relief the court could award on that claim); Lamuth v. Hartford
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044 n.3 (W.D. Wa. 2014) (concluding that claim for
clarification of specific right to future benefits was not moot but dismissing claim for past
benefits as moot: “Given that [defendant] has awarded [plaintiff] benefits and rendered payment,
the Court concludes that her claims seeking the payment of benefits are properly dismissed as
moot. There is simply no relief for the court to award on such a claim.”).
C.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied
Defendant filed a cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29] on December 18, 2017.
In the Motion, Defendant raises no new arguments and presents no new evidence, merely
adopting its memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion. Although Defendant’s
Motion is not expressly limited to the claims in Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant’s Motion does
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nothing more than incorporate Defendant’s opposition, which repeatedly noted the limited scope
of Plaintiff’s motion and the claims for relief addressed therein. Thus, the Court denies as moot
Defendant’s motion with regard to Plaintiff’s claim for a Waiver of Premium. Moreover, there is
a lack of clarity as to what Defendant seeks due to Defendant’s choice to merely adopt its
opposition to Plaintiff’s limited motion as its own affirmative request for relief. To the extent
Defendant intended to request summary judgment on any other claims, the Court finds that
Defendant has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment on those
claims at this time.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 17] is DENIED AS MOOT and Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 29] is DENIED AS MOOT as to Plaintiff’s claim for a Waiver of
Premium and DENIED as to all other claims.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Pierce, Florida, this 5th day of February,
2018.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
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