Riess, Gary v. Palm Beach Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 5

ORDER Dismissing Case (Without Prejudice) Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 3/6/2025. See attached document for full details. (skz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 9:25-cv-80268-GAYLES
GARY R. RIESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PALM BEACH SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Gary R. Reiss’s Complaint under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 1]. Because Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee and
has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [ECF No. 3], the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) apply. Under that statute, the Court shall dismiss a complaint if it
determines the action is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). For the following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as a shotgun pleading.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Palm Beach County Jail. In his Complaint, he alleges

that on December 14, 2024, he was charged with fleeing and eluding by Deputy Zachary Hall.
[ECF No. 1 at 4]. According to Plaintiff, Deputy Hall stated in his police report that he attempted
to conduct a traffic stop on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff fled in his motorcycle. Id. at 4–5.

Plaintiff alleges that the next day, Deputy Hall surveilled his residence and located his
motorcycle—even though it was “fully covered” and on “private property”—and then peeked into
Plaintiff’s bedroom window, violating Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at
5. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Hall observed Plaintiff with a female companion in the bedroom
and then called for backup. Id. at 6. Thereafter, fifteen deputies arrived, including two K-9 units.
Id. Plaintiff alleges that the deputies were there to arrest him for only a misdemeanor charge of
driving on a suspended license and for the fleeing and eluding charge of the day before. Id.
Plaintiff claims that the deputies then shut off the electricity to his residence to disable his
security cameras. Id. Plaintiff claims that “nobody knocked or rang the doorbell” and that he
became scared because he saw “shadows running outside his bedroom window[.]” Id. Plaintiff
alleges he was initially unaware that police were outside his home and thought it might be a home
invasion. Id. Plaintiff then opened his bathroom window and saw the officers and the dog. Id.
Plaintiff told the officers he was coming out and asked them to remove the dog because he had
PTSD from previous dog bites. Id. A deputy said, “ok,” and Plaintiff prepared to exit the bathroom,
“saying please, please remove the dog I am coming out.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that before he exited the bathroom, the two K-9 deputies, Deputy Justin
Olbert and Deputy Garret M. Bechtel, kicked in the bathroom door and “sicced” the dog on
Plaintiff. Id. According to Plaintiff, he had complied with the deputies’ commands before he was
attacked. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that the dog attacked him for approximately four to six minutes,
and that during the attack, the deputies were laughing and playing a “tug of war” with the dog,
pulling on its leash as it mauled Plaintiff’s forearm. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that the dog bit him
so hard that its tooth broke off into Plaintiff’s forearm bone. Id. Plaintiff states that he “begged for
mercy for them to please get the dog” off him and was then “punched [and] kicked in the head,”
knocking Plaintiff’s tooth out and knocking him unconscious. Id. at 7–8.
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Plaintiff alleges that he “woke up in the driveway handcuffed so hard that he begged for .
. . Deputy Jerrie R. Obray to loosen the left handcuff,” which was the arm the dog mauled. Id. at
8 (cleaned up). Plaintiff claims that another deputy, Deputy Sean Malynn, laughed at him, saying,
“think next time you want to run[.]” Id.
Plaintiff states that he was then taken to the hospital, where he underwent emergency
surgery to his left forearm and wrist, which included the surgical removal of the dog’s tooth from
his forearm bone, eighteen to twenty-five stiches, twenty-five metal staples, and a skin graft. Id. at
8–9. Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of the deputies’ blows to his face and temple area, he
suffered “degeneration and permanent impairment of vision.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims he is
“permanently disabled,” his “predominant left hand does not properly function, two fingers do not
properly open, [and] there is permanent nerve damage.” Id. at 9 (cleaned up). Plaintiff avers that
he remained in the hospital for almost a month due to his injuries. Id. at 10. He states that following
his arrest, he was charged with failure to appear in connection with his suspended license for
nonpayment of child support, fleeing and eluding, and resisting arrest without violence. Id. at 9.
Plaintiff claims that while he was in the hospital, his public defender sent her investigator
to interview Plaintiff and take pictures of his injuries. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant White
refused to allow the investigator to interview Plaintiff or take pictures of his injuries. Id. Plaintiff
avers that this violated his due process rights and interfered with his access to the courts, as his
attorney could not obtain evidence of the deputies’ excessive use of force. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that after he was discharged from the hospital, around the first week of
January, he was returned to the custody of the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office “with specific
instructions for the medical department” at the jail. Id. According to Plaintiff, the jail’s medical
department failed to follow the orders of the surgeon in Plaintiff’s discharge paperwork. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Alexandra, the jail’s doctor, “failed to remove [the] staples and stiches in
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the time ordered by the surgeon, leaving them in an extra 3–4 weeks, causing [his] skin to grow
over [the] staples[.]” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff claims he advised his attorney about this issue and
wrote grievances, which the jail never addressed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the staples were finally
removed, “but in retaliation Plaintiff’s medication was stopped [and] he could not get it renewed.”
Id. Plaintiff states that he “had to beg wound care nurses to request a renewal of Tylenol/Advil.”
Id. He further claims that Dr. Alexandra has only seen him one time since he was discharged from
the hospital, and that she refuses to give him anything stronger than Advil or review his discharge
paperwork. Id.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) excessive force
claims based on the K-9 attack, the punches and kicks to his head, and the tight handcuffs; (2)
failure to intervene claims against the deputies who failed to stop the attacks or remove the
handcuffs; (3) a due process or access-to-the-courts claim 1 against Sergeant White for his refusal
to allow the public defender’s office to interview Plaintiff or take pictures of his injuries; and (4)
a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Dr. Alexandra for failing to remove
Plaintiff’s staples and stiches or provide pain medication. Plaintiff names eleven Defendants: (1)
Ric Bradshaw, the Palm Beach County Sheriff; (2) Deputy Hall; (3) Deputy Malynn; (4) Deputy
Bechtel; (5) Deputy Tolbert; (6) Andrew Starr, “Deputy Supervisor”; (7) Deputy Obray; (8)
Deputy Lamara; (9) Sergeant White; (10) Dr. Alexandra; and (11) Wellpath, the private entity that
provides medical services to Palm Beach County inmates. Id. at 2–4. For relief, Plaintiff requests
damages and injunctive relief requiring Wellpath to provide him with adequate medical treatment
for his injuries. Id. at 13–14.

It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s allegations assert a procedural or substantive due process claim or an
access-to-the-courts claim, but the Court need not resolve this issue at this time.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa
Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). A pleading fails to state a claim for relief when it
does not contain sufficient “factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The standards
governing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) apply to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). A complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, but it must provide as grounds for relief something more than
“labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Court holds pro se pleadings “to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys” and construes them liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the Court does not have “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,
or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.
of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest possible constitutional violations, but his Complaint must be

amended to remedy certain pleading deficiencies before the Court orders service on Defendants.
Specifically, the Complaint is an impermissible “shotgun” pleading. Shotgun pleadings are
complaints that violate either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), 10(b), or both. See Weiland
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a
complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
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to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b). “If doing so would promote clarity,” Rule 10(b) also mandates that “each claim
founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate count . . . .” Id.
“‘Shotgun’ pleadings are cumbersome, confusing complaints that do not comply with these
pleading requirements.” Yeyille v. Miami Dade Cnty. Pub. Sch., 643 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir.
2016).
The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun pleadings. See Weiland, 792 F.3d
at 1321–23. The first type is a “complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and
the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. The second type of shotgun
pleading is a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. The third type is a complaint that does
not separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief. Id. at 1322–23. The
fourth type is a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which of the
defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1323. “The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint falls primarily into the second, third, and fourth categories of
shotgun pleadings. Most notably, it is written as a continuous narrative and fails to state its claims
in numbered paragraphs or separate its claims against each Defendant into a different count. See
Yeyille, 643 F. App’x at 884–85 (stating that a complaint “written in narrative, diary-like form”
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was a “quintessential shotgun pleading of the second type identified in Weiland.”). Therefore, it is
“impossible for Defendants and the Court to determine with any certainty which factual allegations
give rise to which claims for relief.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir.
2018).
The Complaint also contains “vague[] and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
particular cause of action,” making it difficult for the Court to decipher which facts are relevant to
which claims. Id. at 1322. For instance, Plaintiff begins his Complaint by describing events
preceding his December 15, 2024 arrest, including a traffic stop by Deputy Hall the day before the
arrest, Plaintiff’s interaction with Deputy Hall at a gas station, the fact that deputies shut off
electricity to Plaintiff’s residence, and how Deputies Hall and Malynn had previously “illegally
interacted” with Plaintiff’s female companion. Id. at 5–6. It is unclear how these events are relevant
to Plaintiff’s claims, or which claims they are intended to support. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that
Deputy Hall’s act of surveilling his residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights; but it is
unclear whether Plaintiff is attempting to assert a separate claim for an illegal search, as his claims
are not separated into counts and the allegations supporting the putative illegal search claim are
vague.
Further, the Complaint generally “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which
of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. While Plaintiff alleges
some specific bad actions by Dr. Alexandra and certain law enforcement officers, he fails to do
the same for other defendants. Plaintiff asserts claims for excessive force, but at times the
Complaint fails to specify which Defendants committed the alleged acts of excessive force. For
example, Plaintiff alleges that he was “punched [and] kicked in the head,” but he does not indicate
which Defendants punched and kicked him. [ECF No. 1 at 7]. Plaintiff also asserts failure-to-7-

intervene claims but fails to identify which Defendants engaged in the acts or omissions underlying
those claims. To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must clearly specify which Defendant committed
each specific act that forms the basis of that claim. See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538
(11th Cir. 1993) (“section 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
actions taken by a particular person under color of state law and the constitutional deprivation”);
Brown v. Tallahasse Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint that “failed to name individual defendants and failed to articulate specific claims
against those defendants.”).
In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that fails to give
Defendants or this Court enough clarity to discern Plaintiff’s precise causes of action or the facts
underlying those claims. See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Shotgun
pleadings are flatly forbidden by the spirit, if not the letter, of these rules because they are
calculated to confuse the ‘enemy,’ and the court, so that theories for relief not provided by law and
which can prejudice an opponent’s case, especially before the jury, can be masked.”) (quotations
omitted)). Accordingly, the Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to
amend.
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
A pro se Plaintiff must be granted at least one opportunity to amend his Complaint if an

amended complaint might state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Silberman v. Miami
Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida.
See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a pleading which states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
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jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
While Rule 8 allows a plaintiff considerable leeway in framing a complaint, the Eleventh
Circuit has tightened the application of Rule 8 with respect to § 1983 cases in an effort to identify
meritless claims. See GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1367 (“Some factual detail in the pleadings is
necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims.”). Accordingly, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege with
specificity the facts which make out his claim. See Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d 1131, 1134 (11th
Cir.1998) (“[T]he contours of an asserted constitutional right ‘must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”). Factual detail in
the pleadings is particularly necessary in cases involving qualified immunity, where the Court must
determine whether a defendant’s actions violated a clearly established right. See GJR Invs., 132
F.3d at 1367.
In addition, Plaintiff must separate each cause of action against each Defendant into a
different count. The Amended Complaint must state its claims “in numbered paragraphs, each
limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). To promote
clarity, “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate
count[.]” Id. Plaintiff must clearly write the name of each Defendant who is a party to this action
and specify which Defendant is responsible for each act or omission that forms the basis of his
claims. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
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1. Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. On or before April 7, 2025, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint, labeled “Amended
Complaint,” that cures the deficiencies identified above. The Amended Complaint shall:
a. Contain a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims against each named
Defendant, a basis for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.
b. Be either typed in 12-point font or larger and double-spaced or handwritten
legibly.
c. Be written on the § 1983 complaint form attached to this order.
3. The Amended Complaint must show Case No. 25-cv-80268-GAYLES so that it will be
filed in this case.
4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a copy of the civil rights complaint
form, together with this Order, at the address listed below.
5. This case is CLOSED for administrative purposes only.
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 6th day of March, 2025.

DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Gary R. Riess, pro se
0531835
Palm Beach County Jail
Inmate Mail/Parcels
Post Office Box 24716
West Palm Beach, FL 33416

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