Bugge et al v. Roberts et al

Filing 69

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all Defendants except Defendant Roberts. As to Defendant Roberts, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 9/30/13 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
TROY P. CRUMBLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN KEVIN ROBERTS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:08-CV-65 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 58.) For
the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED-INPART AND DENIED-IN-PART.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
I. Introduction
The following summary of relevant facts contains the undisputed facts derived
from the Complaint (Doc. 1), Defendants’ Answer (Doc. 16), Defendants’ November 23,
2009 Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 20-1), former plaintiff Peter A. Bugge’s
January 26, 2010 Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts1 (Doc. 25-12),
Defendants’ instant Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 58-56), and Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 66), all of which were

Defendants’ November 23, 2009 Statement of Undisputed Facts and former plaintiff Peter A. Bugge’s
January 26, 2010 Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts were in relation to a motion for
summary judgment as to Bugge, executor of the estate of John C. Bradford, the father of John W.
Bradford, an inmate who died due to the alleged constitutional violations by Defendants in the abovecaptioned matter. Plaintiff Bugge’s pleadings are relevant to the instant dispute because Mr. Bradford
allegedly sustained injuries under facts similar to those alleged by Troy P. Crumbley. For these reasons,
some facts are extrapolated from pleadings that do not directly relate to Crumbley.

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submitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.2

Where relevant, the factual summary also

contains undisputed and disputed facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits submitted, all of which are construed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56; Celotex
Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
II. Relevant Facts
In July 2006, John W. Bradford (“Bradford”) and Troy P. Crumbley (“Plaintiff”)
were being housed at Calhoun State Prison (“CSP”), which is located within the Middle
District of Georgia. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1-2.) Bradford was assigned to cell 136 in Dorm J-2.
(Doc. 25-12 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was assigned to bunk 53B in Dorm D-4. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 2.)
However, Defendants did not consistently enforce bunk assignments. (Id.; Doc. 58-2 at
2 lns. 6-13.)

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Local Rule 56 states:
The movant for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
shall attach to the motion a separate and concise statement of the material facts to which
the movant contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. Each material fact shall be
numbered separately and shall be supported by specific citation to the record. Material
facts not supported by specific citation to the record and statements in the form of issues
or legal conclusions (rather than material facts) will not be considered by the court.
Affidavits and the introductory portions of briefs do not constitute a statement of
material facts.
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a
separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the
respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be made to
each of the movant’s numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the moving
party’s statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record
shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate. The response
that a party has insufficient knowledge to admit or deny is not an acceptable response
unless the party has complied with the provisions of Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
All documents and other record materials relied upon by a party moving for or opposing a
motion for summary judgment shall be clearly identified for the court. Where possible,
dates, specific page numbers, and line numbers shall be given.

M.D. GA. LOCAL R. 56.

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On July 5, 2006, following an altercation between Bradford and another inmate,
Bradford was beaten by several inmates in his assigned cell at CSP and died from his
injuries. (Doc. 25-12 at ¶¶ 22-23.) Inmate Carlos Fanning pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter for Bradford’s death. (Id. at ¶ 64.) Bradford did not ask to be placed in
protective custody prior to the fatal beating, but the parties disputed whether officers
were alerted that “there was about to be trouble” if Bradford and the other inmate were
not separated. (Id. at ¶ 15; see Doc. 25-2 at 2; see also Doc. 31 at 4 n.4.)
On July 6, 2006, the day after Bradford’s death, a shakedown was conducted at
CSP by the Department of Corrections’ statewide tactical squad. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 52.) The
shakedown resulted in the confiscation of 23 weapons. (Id. at ¶ 54; Doc. 58-34 at 3.)
CSP was on “lockdown” from July 6 through July 12, 2006. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 55.) During
that time, the Office of Investigations and Compliance conducted interviews at CSP. (Id.
at ¶ 61.) Warden Roberts did not conduct or oversee the investigations. (Id. at ¶ 62.)
On July 7, 2012, Plaintiff was questioned about Bradford’s murder and the
conditions of the prison after informing an investigating officer “you’ve got problems at
this compound.” (Doc. 58-3 at 17 lns. 10-25.) Plaintiff “asked [investigators John
Moore and Bruce Oliver] to be locked down” at this time.3 (Id. at 15 lns. 17-20; Doc. 584 at 4 lns. 15-17.) On July 12, 2006, around 4:00 p.m., while Plaintiff was at the medical
facility in the prison, an officer announced that investigators wanted to speak with him
for a second time. (Doc. 58-4 at 8 lns. 2-11.) Once Plaintiff met with the officer, the
officer told Plaintiff that he was wanted for questioning a second time and he therefore
“must be telling them something good.” (Id.) The purpose of the second interview was
Plaintiff maintains that he did not ask specifically to be placed in protective custody, but instead asked to
be “locked down” and alleges that the investigators know that the two requests are synonymous. (Doc.
58-4 at 4 lns. 14-20.)

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to investigate an alleged income tax fraud scheme that was being perpetrated by inmates
at CSP. (Doc. 58-1 at 28 lns. 14-20.) During the second interview, he again asked
investigators to remove him from his dormitory. (Doc. 58-4 at 9 lns. 10-15.)
During the evening of July 12, 2006, after the second interview, John Moore and
another investigator told all inmates to “get in the right bunks.” (Id. at 10 lns. 4-8.)
Plaintiff was concerned because inmates were required to return to their assigned bunks
to sleep that night, and his assigned bunk was in a dimly lit area in the back of the
dormitory. (Id. at 10 lns. 16-24.) Also, Plaintiff was concerned about remaining in his
dormitory because the announcement made by the officer escorting him to the second
interview caused “the whole dormitory [to know Plaintiff was going] to counseling” to
speak with investigators. (Doc. 58-3 at 19 lns. 8-25.)
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Plaintiff learned that an inmate had broken into his
locker. (Doc. 58-1 at 30 lns. 10-18.) Believing he now had a “legitimate reason” to speak
with prison officials in light of his concerns about being suspected of providing
information about other inmates’ criminal conduct, Plaintiff approached Defendant
Battle. (Doc. 58-4 at 11 lns. 2-13.) Plaintiff is “sure [he] told [Defendant Battle] she
needed to move [Plaintiff to a different dorm].” (Id. at 11 lns. 11-13.) However, he was
not transferred to another dorm. (See Doc. 58-27 at 2.) In addition, although Plaintiff
cannot remember the exact content of the information he relayed to prison officials, he
remembers complaining about his placement in the back of the dormitory to sleep, the
general dangerousness of the prison, and his exposure to other inmates. (Doc. 58-2 at 1
lns. 16-21, 2 lns. 19-23, 5 lns. 3-4.) After the shift change at 10:00 p.m., prison officials
conducted a “surprise” shakedown of Plaintiff’s dormitory. (Doc. 58-1 at 32 lns. 10-14.)

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The lights were turned off and Plaintiff was attacked by several inmates shortly before
midnight. (Id. at 12 lns. 7-9.)
Defendant Roberts, who was Warden of CSP from December 16, 2004 through
June 30, 2006, was not present at CSP on July 5, 2006. (Docs. 20-3 ¶ 7; 25-13 at ¶¶ 24,
25; 66 at ¶ 1.) Defendant Thompson became Warden of CSP on July 1, 2006, but was
not present at the prison until July 5, 2006. (Docs. 20-13 at ¶ 8; 25-13. at ¶¶ 27, 28; 66
at ¶ 5.) The following Defendants held the following positions at CSP at all times
relevant to this suit:

Defendant Christine Cross was Deputy Warden of Care and

Treatment (Docs. 25-12 at ¶ 30; 66 at ¶ 8), Defendant Jerry Jefferson was Deputy
Warden of Security (Docs. 20-3 at ¶ 32; 66 at ¶ 11), Defendants Eula Battle and Eddie
Smith were Sergeants (Docs. 20-3 at ¶ 40; 66 at ¶¶ 14, 23), and Defendants Anthony
Cox, DeWayne Booker, Derrick McDaniel, William McGinnis, and Horace Gilbert were
Correctional Officers II. (Docs. 20-3 at ¶¶ 37, 44, 50, 54, 57; 66 at ¶¶ 18, 27, 30, 34, 37.)
Plaintiff does not recall seeing Defendants Cross or Jefferson on July 12, 2006,
and did not tell either of them that he believed he was in danger on that day. (Doc. 66 at
¶¶ 9, 12.) Defendant Battle worked from 1:45 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on July 12, 2006.
(Id. at ¶ 15.) Defendant Cox worked from 1:45 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on July 12, 2006 in
CSP’s medical unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20.) Plaintiff has no recollection of seeing Defendant
Cox on July 12, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Defendant Smith worked 9:45 p.m. on July 12, 2006
until 6:00 a.m. on July 13, 2006, and was assigned to central control # 2 as an assistant
supervisor. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 40, 41.) Plaintiff has no recollection of seeing Defendant
Smith on those dates. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Defendants Booker and McDaniel were not present
at CSP on July 12, 2006. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 32.) Defendants McGinnis and Gilbert worked
from 9:45 p.m. on July 12, 2006 until 6:00 a.m. on July 13, 2006. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 38.)
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Inmate McMillian, a white male, arrived at CSP on November 9, 2005, and was
initially assigned to Dorm J-2. (Doc. 25-1 at ¶¶ 1, 10.) McMillian described Dorm J as
the intake dormitory; Dorm D as an “open dormitory,” containing D-1 for “mobile
construction,” D-2, D-3 for “older inmates,” and D-4, which was “known as the roughest
dormitory”; Dorm E as containing “two man cells”; and Dorm F, which contained Dorm
F-2, a “faith based dormitory and safest housing unit on the compound.” (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 6,
11, 12.) When McMillian first arrived at CSP, a black inmate offered him a shank and
explained that white inmates needed weapons for protection. (Id. at ¶ 10.) McMillian
was housed in Dorm J-2 for two and one-half months, and left on January 22, 2006.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 6.) He heard that armed robberies and locker break-ins occurred, but
never witnessed them. (Id. at ¶ 2, 3, 11.)
Inmate Mobley, a white male, was housed in Dorm J-2 at CSP beginning in
November 2005. (Doc. 25-5 at ¶¶ 1, 2.) Items were stolen from Mobley’s locker in
December 2005 and January 2006. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) Mobley heard of other white
inmates experiencing locker break-ins, and older white inmates being victims of “snatch
robberies” while walking from the store to their cells. (Id. at ¶ 6.) He regularly observed
his cellmate with cocaine and marijuana. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Mobley feared for his life during
his tenure in Dorm J-2. (Id.) Mobley claims that he wrote Defendants Roberts and
Cross, among others, but he was ignored. (Id.)
Inmate Moss, a white male, was housed at CSP for approximately two years,
beginning in 2004. (Doc. 25-6 at ¶ 3.) While at CSP, Moss was housed in Dorm H-1 for
about six months and Dorm D-3 for about 18 months. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Moss observed gang
problems in Building D and believed that the “guards had no control over the inmates.”
(Id. at ¶ 5.) He explained that the “Gangsta Disciples” was a gang that operated “in
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every dormitory but mostly D-4 … and they controlled the drug trade, were extremely
violent running in large packs stealing, robbing and committing acts of violence against
the whites and receiving little punishment when caught.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) Moss accused
Officers Booker and McDaniel as being “tied into the gangs” and explained his belief
that Officer Booker was involved in enabling an inmate to be “ganged out by the
[Gangsta Disciples.]” (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Moss read a letter that Plaintiff drafted to send
to the commissioner regarding the conditions of the prison, and wrote a similar letter to
Defendant Roberts. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Moss observed Plaintiff as one of the few inmates in
Dorm J-2 to be “called out … to be interviewed,” had knowledge that Plaintiff was afraid
that the Gangsta Disciples believed that he “ratted them out,” and attempted to deliver a
weapon to Plaintiff for protection shortly before Plaintiff’s attack. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-23.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Peter A. Bugge (“Bugge”), executor of the estate of John C. Bradford, Bradford’s
father, and Plaintiff, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to the dangers of CSP in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 10.) Specifically, Plaintiff
and Bugge alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the violent gangs that
were openly operating at CSP, took inadequate security measures, scheduled security
guards in a manner that caused understaffing, and otherwise allowed the operation of a
dangerous prison in a way that culminated in Bradford’s death and Plaintiff’s injuries.
(Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) The Complaint named former Warden Kevin Roberts, current Warden
Dannie Thompson, Deputy Wardens Christine Cross and Jerry Jefferson, Sergeants
Anthony Cox and Eddie Smith, Lieutenant Eula Battle, and Officers William McGinnis,
Derrick McDaniel, and Horace Gilbert. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
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On March 30, 2009, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to
Plaintiff for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc 15 at 3.) The Court denied
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Bugge. (Id. at 10.) On September 24, 2010, the
Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Bugge, finding that
“none of the Defendants had sufficient knowledge of [a substantial risk of serious harm
to Bradford and therefore Bugge] failed to establish a necessary causal link between any
of the Defendants and the attack on Bradford.” (Doc. 31 at 23.)
The Eleventh Circuit reversed this Court’s Order on May 18, 2011. See Bugge v.
Roberts, 430 F. App’x 753 (11th Cir. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit found that Plaintiff had
exhausted administrative remedies because officials at CSP improperly denied his
formal grievance. Id. at 756. Also, the Eleventh Circuit held that Bugge’s evidence was
sufficient to survive summary judgment based on the claim that Defendants were
“deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm posed to Bradford due to
dangerous prison conditions at CSP, and that defendants’ deliberate indifference to
those conditions caused the attack that resulted in Bradford’s death.” Id. at 759. Among
the evidence that the Eleventh Circuit found persuasive was evidence suggesting:
numerous racially charged robberies occurred at CSP,
particularly of store-bought goods; there were “hundreds” of
weapons in the prison, and almost every inmate in
Bradford's dormitory owned or had access to a shank; prison
officials refused to discipline inmates for possessing
weapons; and gangs, which operated in every dormitory,
were extremely violent, stealing, robbing, and committing
acts of violence against white inmates in particular. There is
also evidence that officials encouraged inmates to obtain
weapons for protection, due to the dangerous conditions at
CSP… Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
Bugge, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether a
substantial risk of serious harm existed at CSP.
Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 759.

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However, the Eleventh Circuit held that all Defendants were entitled to summary
judgment except for Warden Roberts because there was evidence that he was aware of
the dangerous conditions at CSP, and evidence suggested that he was the only
Defendant with “the power to take reasonable steps to address them.” Id. at 760. The
Court noted that “Warden Roberts left his post at CSP on July 2, 2006, and that Warden
Thompson took over on July 5, 2006, the day of Bradford’s murder.

Thompson,

therefore, had no opportunity to learn about or address the conditions that existed when
Roberts left immediately before the murder.” Id. at 761 n.9.
On remand, Bugge and Defendants reached a settlement agreement and this
Court dismissed Bugge’s claim with prejudice. (Docs. 46, 47.) On October 4, 2012,
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 58.)

Plaintiff

responded on November 19, 2012. (Docs. 65, 66.) Defendants filed their reply on
December 20, 2012. (Doc. 68.) Having the benefit of full briefing on the instant matter,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58) is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir.
1990). A fact is “material” if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable
substantive law and it might affect the outcome of the nonmoving party’s case. Allen v.
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Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A judgment is appropriate “as a matter of law” when the
nonmoving party has failed to meet its burden of persuading the Court on an essential
element of the claim. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804
(1999); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
The movant bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by
presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing or
pointing out to the court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in
support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id.
at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required “to go
beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must do more
than summarily deny the allegations or “show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must provide “enough of a showing that the
[trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251).

“[M]ere conclusions and

unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all the evidence and all
factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322- 23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. “Inferences from the nonmoving
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party’s ‘specific facts’ as to other material facts, however, may be drawn only if they are
reasonable in view of other undisputed background or contextual facts and only if such
inferences are permissible under the governing substantive law.” Mize v. Jefferson City
Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court must grant summary
judgment if it finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
II. Court’s Analysis
Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment for three reasons. First,
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Thompson and Cross are
barred by res judicata because Plaintiff brought identical claims against those
defendants in Georgia Superior Court and those claims were dismissed with prejudice.
(Doc. 58-55 at 3.) Second, Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment on his deliberate indifference claim as to both harms alleged; the
harm stemming from “inadequate security measures” at CSP, and the harm stemming
from the questioning that occurred on July 7 and 12, 2006. (Id. at 7.) Third, and in the
alternative, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 17.)
In view of the following findings and rulings, the Court does not and need not address
the res judicata defense. The Court addresses the other two arguments in turn.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & Deliberate Indifference
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen … to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, “a plaintiff must establish that an act or omission

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committed by a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege,
or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Chatham v.
Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 287 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Further, a plaintiff
must demonstrate “proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts
or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F.
App’x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th
Cir. 1986)). “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). “A prison
official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment.”

Id. Thus, “deliberate indifference” is actionable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that
Defendants were “aware of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists—and [Defendants] must [have] also draw[n] that
inference.” Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). “To survive
summary judgment on such a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must ‘produce sufficient evidence
of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to
that risk; and (3) causation.” Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App’x 753, 757 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)); Staley v. Owens,
367 F. App’x 102, 107 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350)). Plaintiff argues
that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to two substantial risks of serious harm:
(1) the general risk of harm faced by the allegedly inadequate security measures taken at
CSP, and (2) the individualized risk of harm faced after the Department of Corrections
investigators questioned him on July 7 and 11, 2006. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12, 19.)
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i.

Substantial Risk of Harm

As to the first element, which is the objective component of the claim, “an
excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Purcell v. Toombs Cnty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). Although
“occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment … [a] prisoner has a right … to be reasonably protected from
constant threat of violence … from his fellow inmates.” Id. at 1320-21 (citing Woodhous
v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)). The objective standard “embodies
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency’ but
must be balanced against competing penological goals.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d
1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not face any substantial risk of serious harm.
(Doc. 58-55 at 7.)

Defendants assert that the general prison conditions did not pose

such a risk because substantial changes took place at CSP following Bradford’s murder
on July 5, 2006. (Id. at 8.) Defendants also claim that the interviews that took place on
July 7 and 12, 2006 did not pose such a risk of harm to Plaintiff because none of the
Defendants had any involvement in calling Plaintiff to meet with the investigators,
Plaintiff did not ask to be placed in protective custody, and the white inmate that was
implicated in the tax fraud scheme that was being investigated on July 12 was not
involved in the beating that occurred later that night. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff argues that the
general condition of CSP posed a substantial risk of harm to him because of the
widespread violence at the prison and presence of weapons. (Doc. 65 at 8-9.) Plaintiff
also argues that the interviews posed a substantial risk of harm because inmates had

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witnessed circumstances that would permit them to infer he had been cooperating with
investigators regarding criminal activity at CSP. (Id. at 9.)
The Court finds that both substantial risks of harm identified by Plaintiff existed
before he was attacked on July 12, 2006. Based on the evidence before the Court,
construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record supports a finding that,
although efforts were being made by the Department of Corrections to remediate the
dangerous nature of CSP, a reasonable jury could find that the condition of CSP posed a
substantial risk to Plaintiff. The only evidence Defendants have presented that suggests
a reduction in the dangerousness of CSP is that 23 weapons were confiscated during the
shakedown on July 6, 2006. (Docs. 58-34 at 3; 66 at ¶ 54.) This fact alone does not
negate the Eleventh Circuit’s findings regarding the dangerousness of CSP.
The Eleventh Circuit found that, prior to Bradford’s murder, gang activity was
rampant throughout the prison, weapons were widely available, and guards suggested to
inmates that they should obtain weapons to protect themselves. Bugge, 430 F. App’x at
759. The evidence did not confine these conditions to Bradford’s dormitory. Id. In fact,
the evidence supported a finding that Plaintiff’s dormitory, Dorm D-4, was more
dangerous than Bradford’s dormitory, Dorm J-2. (Doc. 25-6 ¶ 9.) A reasonable jury
could find, based on the evidence before the Court, that the actions taken by the
Department of Corrections in the days intervening Bradford’s death on July 5 and
Plaintiff’s beating on July 12 did not operate in such a way to extinguish the substantial
risk of harm posed by the dangerous condition of CSP.
Furthermore, the Court finds a substantial risk of harm was posed to Plaintiff by
his participation in the investigations that took place on July 7 and 12, 2006. At that
time, Plaintiff was removed from his dormitory twice in the presence of all other
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inmates for the purpose of speaking with investigators. (Doc. 58-4 at 8 lns. 2-11.)
Plaintiff was one of the few inmates removed from his dormitory for this purpose. (Doc.
25-6 ¶¶ 20-23.) Clearly, the inmates were aware that the investigations were taking
place in light of a recent murder that occurred at CSP. They were likely to infer that
investigators were seeking suspects who were involved in Bradford’s murder. In light of
the gang activity and violence at CSP, the Court finds that Plaintiff faced a substantial
risk of harm by being placed back in the normal population in his dormitory following
his interviews with investigators.
ii.

Deliberate Indifference

The second element is a subjective standard with three components: “(1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct
that is more than mere negligence.” Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 757 (citing McElligott v.
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999)). In other words, Defendants must have
“know[n] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or safety.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. It is not necessary that Plaintiff demonstrate knowledge that it
was “likely [he was] to be assaulted by a specific prisoner who eventually committed the
assault.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007).
Defendants may escape liability if they show that “they did not know of the underlying
facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger[,] or that they knew the underlying
facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
The requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference is something more than
negligence or carelessness. See Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004). As
such, “simple negligence is not actionable under § 1983, and a plaintiff must allege a
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‘conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner’s rights.’ ” Smith v. Reg’l Dir. of Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 368 F. App’x 9, 14 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.
App’x 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982)).

“The known risk of injury must be a strong

likelihood, rather than a mere possibility[,] before a guard’s failure to act can constitute
deliberate indifference.” Staley, 367 F. App’x at 107 (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894
F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)) (alteration in original).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantial
risk of harm posed by (1) the general dangerousness of CSP, and (2) the individualized
risk of harm posed by his participation in the investigations that took place on July 7
and 12, 2006. As to the first risk of harm, the evidence demonstrates that the only
defendants who had the power to change the dangerous condition of CSP were the
former and current Wardens, Defendants Roberts and Thompson. See Bugge, 430 F.
App’x at 760-61. Accordingly, all other Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as
to the first risk of harm. See id.
As to Defendant Thompson, Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony illustrates that
Defendant Thompson was taking steps to make the prison safer. A shakedown was
conducted on July 6, 2006; the prison was locked down from July 6 until July 12, 2006;
criminal activity at the prison was being investigated; known gang members were being
placed in segregation. Unlike Defendant Roberts, there is no evidence that suggests any
inmate notified Defendant Thompson of the dangerous condition of the prison. (See
generally Docs. 25-1, 25-4, 25-5, 25-6, 25-7.) Because there is no evidence in the record
to support a finding that Defendant Thompson was deliberately indifferent to the
condition of CSP, he is entitled to summary judgment as to the first risk of harm.

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As to Defendant Roberts, he would only be entitled to summary judgment on this
element if circumstances took place between Bradford’s murder and Plaintiff’s beating
in such a way that changed the basis of the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that he was
deliberately indifferent to the harm posed by the dangerous condition of CSP. As the
Court pointed out on appeal, Defendant Roberts was the only defendant who was
alleged to have had the power to take reasonable steps to address the dangerous
condition of CSP. Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 760. Because the evidence suggested that
“several inmates wrote to Roberts to inform him of the dangerous prison condition[,]
Roberts failed to discipline inmates for possessing weapons or engaging in gang
violence[, and] the pervasive and widespread nature of the conditions that the evidence
shows existed suggest[ed] that Roberts ‘had been exposed to information concerning the
risk and thus must have known about it,’ ” a jury question existed as to whether
Defendant Roberts was deliberately indifferent. Id. at 760-61 (citation omitted). There
is no evidence in the record to suggest that circumstances changed such that Defendant
Roberts was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed to Bradford, but not
deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed to Plaintiff. The evidence presents a
jury question as to whether Defendant Roberts was deliberately indifferent to the harm
posed by the dangerous condition of CSP. As such, Defendant Roberts is not entitled to
summary judgment as to this element.
As to the second alleged risk of harm, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any
particular Defendant had subjective knowledge of the risk posed by his participation in
the investigations. Plaintiff was unsure as to whether he informed any Defendants that
he believed he was in danger. (See Doc. 58-4 at 11 lns. 11-13.) The only persons Plaintiff
is certain he told that he believed he was in danger were investigators John Moore and
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Bruce Oliver. (Doc. 58-3 at 15 lns. 17-20; Doc. 58-4 at 4 lns. 15-17.) Those individuals
are not named in this suit. As such, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants
“actually possessed the requisite knowledge to be held liable.” See Bugge, 430 F. App’x
at 758-59. Therefore, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the second
risk of harm.
iii.

Causation

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must raise a factual question as to
whether Defendant Roberts’ alleged deliberate indifference caused the harm actually
suffered by Plaintiff. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582. In other words, Plaintiff must have
produced sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to whether Defendant Roberts
was deliberately indifference to the dangerous condition of CSP and, as a result, Plaintiff
was beaten by other inmates. See id. As noted above, evidence exists in the record that
suggests Defendant Roberts’ had knowledge of the dangerous condition of CSP. The
record also supports a finding that, without Defendant Roberts’ deliberate indifference
to the dangerous condition of CSP, those responsible for Plaintiff’s beating would not
have had the opportunity to carry out the same. Thus, a jury could find that Defendant
Roberts’ deliberate indifferent to the risk posed by the general condition of CSP caused
the harm suffered by Plaintiff. As such, Defendant Roberts is not entitled to summary
judgment because “genuine issues of material fact exist as to the remaining element of
[Plaintiff’s] claims against Roberts—deliberate indifference and causation.” See Bugge,
430 F. App’x at 761.
B. Qualified Immunity
To defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that Defendant (1) violated a
constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
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Floyd v. Corder, 426 F. App’x 790, 791-92 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Holloman ex rel.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)). “A government officer
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless, at the time of the incident,
‘preexisting law dictates, that is, truly compel[s],’ the conclusion for all reasonable,
similarly situated public officials that what Defendant was doing violated [Plaintiff’s]
federal rights in the circumstances.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 103031 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lassiter v. Ala. A&M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.
1994)). A government officer is not entitled to qualified immunity where previous cases
with “materially similar” facts establish that those specific circumstances violate federal
law. Id. at 1032. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the condition of CSP, if
proved, would have violated Bradford’s constitutional rights based on the precedent set
by Marsh, 268 F.3d 1014, Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995), and
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
In Marsh v. Butler County, the Eleventh Circuit held that similar prison
conditions as those allegedly present at CSP violated a clearly established constitutional
right. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1033 (citations omitted). In Marsh, the plaintiff alleged that
violent inmates were not segregated from the rest of the inmate population, the prison
was routinely understaffed, homemade weapons were readily available, and prisoners
were not adequately disciplined.

Id. at 1029.

Williams and Hale also involved

dangerous prison conditions. See Hale, 50 F.3d at 1581 (overcrowding and frequent
inmate fighting); Williams, 547 F.2d at 1211 (270 stabbings with 20 resulting deaths in
three years, numerous forcible rapes, overcrowding, understaffing of prison guards, and
sanitation violations). The Eleventh Circuit implicitly found that Marsh, Williams, and
Hale are “materially similar” to the circumstances in this case, and “ ‘dictate[d]’ … the
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conclusion for all reasonable, similarly situated public officials that what Defendant was
doing violated [Plaintiff’s] federal rights in the circumstances.” See Marsh, 268 F.3d at
1030-31.
The law of the case doctrine holds that “a decision of an appellate court on a legal
issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” Jeffries v.
Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). For the doctrine to apply,
the appellate court must have actually decided the issue. United States v. Saintil, No.
13-11549, 2013 WL 4838821, *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (citing United States v.
Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this doctrine, “[a]n
appellate decision binds all subsequent proceedings in the same case not only as to
explicit rulings, but also as to issues decided necessarily by implication on the prior
appeal.” United States v. Krocka, No. 12-14435, 2013 WL 2631426, *3 (11th Cir. June
13, 2013) (citing United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Although the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly hold that qualified immunity
does not apply to Defendant Roberts, it noted that “based on Marsh, Hale, and
Williams, the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the
defendants’ alleged misconduct.” Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 760 n.8. The Court vacated
summary judgment in favor of Defendant Roberts. Id. at 761. This holding necessarily
implies that the Eleventh Circuit found that Defendant Roberts is not entitled to
qualified immunity since a contrary finding would have entitled Defendant Roberts to
summary judgment. Because the same dangerous conditions that were prevalent at the
prison in relation to Bradford’s death could be deemed to have contributed to Plaintiff’s
beating, the Eleventh Circuit’s implicit holding that Defendant Roberts is not entitled to
qualified immunity is the law of the case.
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED as to all Defendants except Defendant Roberts. As to Defendant Roberts,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of September, 2013.
/s/ W. Louis Sands __________________
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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