Joseph v. Astrue

Filing 22

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 19 Report and Recommendations; Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. Social Security Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 3/30/12 (jbk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
PATRICIA JOSEPH,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of :
Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
____________________________________:

CASE NO.: 1:10-CV-114 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation from United States Magistrate Judge
Thomas Q. Langstaff, filed February 2, 2012. (Doc. 19). It is recommended that the Social
Security Commissioner’s final decision be affirmed.

(Id. at 8).

Plaintiff timely filed an

Objection, which challenges the Recommendation for its rejection of multiple doctors’ opinions,
allegedly without good cause. (Doc. 20 at 1). On these grounds, Plaintiff requests that the Court
reverse and award benefits. (Id. at 8).
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review for Social Security Appeals
“[T]he federal courts’ ‘review of the [ALJ’s] decision is limited to an inquiry into

whether there is substantial evidence to support [its] findings . . . and whether the correct legal
standards were applied.’” Powell v. Astrue, 250 Fed. App’x 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002)). This is a “highly deferential
standard of review.” Id. at 963. The Court is forbidden from reweighing the evidence or
substituting its judgment for that of the ALJ. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.

1

1990). “Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [the court]
must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
“[T]he ALJ’s failure [to specifically address evidence] only constitutes reversible error if
it created an evidentiary gap that caused unfairness or clear prejudice.” Caldwell v. Barnhart,
261 Fed. App’x 188, 190 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir.
1995)); see also Dyer, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d
1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)) “[T]he ALJ’s decision [simply] . . . [can]not [be] a broad
rejection[,] which is ‘not enough to enable this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered [the
claimant’s] medical conditions as a whole.’”). Having established the applicable standard of
review of Plaintiff’s social security appeal, the Court turns to its discussion of Plaintiff’s
objections on which she bases her request for the Court’s reversal of the Commissioner’s
decision and award of benefits.
II.

Plaintiff’s Objections
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff informs the Court that his Objection is limited in scope

to the ALJ’s ‘errors’ that were addressed by the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, and points the Court to his initial brief and his reply brief for a full discussion
of the ALJ’s alleged errors. (Doc. 20 at 2). However, in choosing not to raise these alleged
errors in his Objection, Plaintiff has waived his right to raise those errors on appeal. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b) advisory committee notes.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to the extent that
it recommends adopting the ALJ’s finding rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating

2

psychiatrist, Dr. Vandewalle, and psychologists, Drs. Wager and Willers.

(Docs. 19, 20).

Plaintiff argues that in finding that the doctors’ opinions were not supported by the objective
evidence and treatment notes, the ALJ “asserted psychiatric or psychological expertise superior
to that of the true experts, the doctors,” which is not allegedly permissible as part of an ALJ’s
analysis.

(Id. at 7).

Plaintiff also argues that the treatment notes supported the doctors’

conclusion that Plaintiff met the criteria for listings 12.04 and 12.05, and that the opinions alone
may be entitled to substantial weight. (Id. at 8).
The Social Security regulations provide guidelines for the ALJ to use when evaluating
medical opinion evidence. (See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). The ALJ considers many factors when
weighing such evidence, including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship,
whether an opinion is well-supported, whether an opinion is consistent with the record, and the
area of a doctor's specialization. (Id. at § 404.1527(d)). In light of the applicable law, the ALJ
was entitled to consider and weigh the doctors’ opinions to determine whether they were
consistent with the record. (Id.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ provided good cause to
disregard the doctors’ opinions. The Eleventh Circuit has held that:
[t]he ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician substantial or considerable
weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary. The ALJ must clearly
articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician,
and the failure to do so is reversible error. Where the ALJ articulated specific
reasons for failing to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight,
and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible
error.
Goff v. Comm’r, 253 F. App’x 918, 921 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

3

The ALJ provided specific reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs. Wager, Willers,
and Vandewalle regarding Plaintiff’s alleged disability. (See Doc. 13-2 at 20-22). For example,
the ALJ found that the treatment notes did not support the doctors’ findings of a “severe degree
of limitations”; instead, the ALJ found no evidence of functional limitations existed on the
record aside from the doctors’ own assessments. (Id.) The ALJ also found that the doctors’
opinions simply concluded that Plaintiff was “at Listing level depression” without providing any
reason for that depression to exist.

(Id.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Willers’ low GAF rating of

Plaintiff contradicted his own assessment of Plaintiff’s IQ as well as treatment records that
demonstrated improvements in Plaintiff’s GAF rating in response to anti-depressant medication.
(Id.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s actual work history refuted Dr. Willers’ assessment
(echoed by Dr. Vanderwalle) that Plaintiff’s “ability to get out into the world into the workforce
has always been marginal and basically unsuccessful.” (Id.) Based on these findings, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had failed to present specific medical findings that demonstrated how her
impairments met or equaled one or more of those set out in the List of Impairments.
Plaintiff’s Objection indicates that she seems to be operating under three misconceptions.
First, Plaintiff fails to appreciate that it is her burden, as well as her physicians, to establish that a
disability exists. In the five step process, a claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying
disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 4. Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004).

While the ALJ is required to review all of

the medical findings and other evidence that supports a medical source’s statement that a
claimant is disabled, it is Plaintiff’s ultimate burden to prove she is disabled, and consequently,
Plaintiff is responsible for producing evidence in support of her claim. Plaintiff’s doctors can
assist in this process through providing medical opinions. And while it is true that the opinion of

4

a treating physician is entitled to substantial weight, it may be discounted when it is not
accompanied by objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816
F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987).
Second, Plaintiff fails to appreciate the difference between a disability as found by a
doctor and a disability as determined by the Social Security Regulations. The doctor’s finding of
a disability is determined by his medical opinion. The law defines disability as the inability to do
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To make this
determination, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation process.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920. While the doctor’s findings are considered in the five step process, they do
not conclusively determine the final finding. As the Regulations state, the Commissioner will
“consider opinions from treating and examining sources on issues such as…your residual
functioning capacity…[although] the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to
the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). Most importantly, “[a] statement by a medical
source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean we will determine you are
disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). While Plaintiff cites to the Marbury case in an effort to
disparage the ALJ’s findings, Marbury was an exceptional case with an entirely different factual
basis than the instant case. In Marbury, the ALJ specifically disregarded the diagnoses of two
treating physicians in favor of his own diagnosis that Marbury’s claimed seizure disorder was
“questionable.” The ALJ has done nothing of the sort in the instant case; on the contrary, the
ALJ’s findings are based on the record.

5

Finally, Plaintiff fails in her argument to appreciate the duty of the Magistrate Judge and
this Court. In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, the Court’s role is
limited. It is legally bound not to decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). A
review of the Plaintiff’s argument indicates she wishes the Magistrate Judge and this Court to
reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ because she is able to point to evidence that arguably
supports her claim. Our role is only to ensure that the ALJ’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence and that the appropriate legal standards were applied.
The ALJ’s decision was based on Plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and in the context of the
current analysis. When considered in this manner, the ALJ’s determination that the opinions of
Drs. Vandewall, Wager and Willers did not overcome what the ALJ found to be contradictory
evidence in the record. (Id.) It is well established that the fact finder may have “good cause” to
afford less weight to a treating physician's opinion where the opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the physician's own medical records or where the evidence supported a
contrary finding. Anderson v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 2011 WL 4435569, 1 at *1
(11th Cir. September 26, 2011). Here, the ALJ has articulated specific reasons for failing to give
the opinion of the doctors’ controlling weight, and those reasons are supported by substantial
evidence; thus, the Court will not disturb the ALJ’s decision. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d
1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments as
stated in her Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation should be, and are
OVERRULED. 1 (Docs. 18 and 19).

1

Because the Court does not find reversible error, it will not address Plaintiff’s request for awards.

6

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the objections set forth in Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 20) are
OVERRULED and United States Magistrate Judge Langstaff’s February 2, 2012 Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 19) is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED and made the Order of this Court for
reason of the findings made and reasons stated therein together with the reasons stated and
conclusions reached herein. Accordingly, the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of March 2012.

/s/ W. Louis Sands
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7