BIRD v. Sumter County Board of Education et al

Filing 82

ORDER dismissing this case without prejudice. The preliminary in junction ordered by the Court on 6/21/2012 is lifted. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W. Louis Sands on 10/28/2013. (bcl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
WILLIAM BIRD,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUMTER COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 1:12-CV-76 (WLS)

ORDER
Based on a review of the parties’ arguments regarding the posture of this case
following Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), the Court finds
that this matter is moot and the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the
above-captioned

case.

Accordingly,

the

case

is

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, and the preliminary injunction granted by the Court on June 21, 2012
(Doc. 50) is LIFTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff William Bird is a registered voter in Board of Education District 7 of
Sumter County, Georgia. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 11.) Intervenor-Plaintiffs are Mathis K. Wright,
Michael D. Coley, Sybil Paterson, Eugene Edge, Jr., Cynthia Johnson, Valarie Grimes,
Robin Plair Wiley, and the Sumter County Branch of the NAACP. (See Doc. 60.)
Defendants are the nine members of the Sumter County Board of Education, the Sumter
County School District, and the Sumter County Board of Elections and Voter
Registration and the Director thereof. (See Docs. 1, 62.)

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Plaintiff brought suit claiming that the nine Board of Education districts of
Sumter County violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See Doc. 1.) The grievance
grew out of the report of the 2010 Decennial Census (“2010 Census”), which calculated
the population shifts in the preceding decade within the Board of Education districts.
(Id. at ¶ 12.) The population data indicated that the ideal split among the districts would
result in 3,646 individuals residing in each district. (Id. at ¶ 18.) The distribution at the
time Plaintiff brought suit, however, resulted in diluted voter strength in District 7, and
disproportionately large voter strength in Districts 1 and 8. (See id.)
During the regular and special sessions of the 2011 Georgia General Assembly,
Senate Bill 154 and Senate Bill 4EX (“the 2011 Plan”) were submitted in an effort to
resolve the malapportionment made evident by the 2010 Census. (Id. at ¶ 20.) That
plan was based on the 2010 Census data and implemented a plan with five districts and
two at large seats. (Doc. 76 at 2.) Both bills passed through the General Assembly and
were signed into law by Governor Nathan Deal. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 20.) On November 1, 2011,
the 2011 Plan was submitted to the United States Department of Justice for
preclearance, as required by Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
However, the submission was withdrawn on January 31, 2012. (Id.) As such, the voting
districts remained as they were prior to the passage of Senate Bills 154 and 4EX. (Id.)
Plaintiff brought this suit claiming that the districts were disproportionate in population
to such an extent as to violate the “one person, one vote” principle. (Id. at ¶ 1.)
On May 31, 2012, the Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff’s requests for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 50 at 4.) Following that
hearing, the Court issued an order holding that Plaintiff had standing to bring this suit,
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his request for a temporary restraining order to restrain qualifications was moot, and
Plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction. (Id. at 7-13.)
Following a scheduling conference held by the Court on August 16, 2012, the
Court found it “prudent and appropriate [for the Court] to craft its own remedial map of
the Board of Education districts of Sumter County.” (Doc. 70 at 1, 4.) In its March 28,
2013 Order appointing the Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Office of the
General Assembly of the State of Georgia and its necessary staff, the Court noted that it
would not consider Senate Bills 154 and 4EX because they remained subject to
preclearance by the Department of Justice. (Id. at 4.)
On June 26, 2013, Counsel for Plaintiff advised the Court that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013),
could have an effect on the above-captioned matter. (Doc. 73.) Accordingly, the Court
ordered the parties to respond to the following questions:
1. Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,
striking down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 impact the Court’s
jurisdiction or any party’s claim or defense? If so, how? Can or should the
case proceed?
2. Is the remedy currently under consideration by the Court moot? Why or
why not?
3. Would a further hearing be necessary or beneficial to the Court or to any
party? Why or why not?
(Doc. 75.)
On July 12, 2013, Plaintiff, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, and Defendants responded to
the questions posited by the Court. (Docs. 76-81.)
DISCUSSION
Federal courts have a duty to dismiss a case where it becomes apparent that the
court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. See Taylor v. Phillips,
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442 F. App’x 441, 443 n.3 (11th Cir. 2011). Where a case is rendered moot, subject
matter jurisdiction is lost. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty., Fla.,
382 F.3d 1276, 1281 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004). Federal courts only have jurisdiction over
cases that present live “Cases” and “Controversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 559 (1992). The personal interest that must exist at the beginning of a suit
must continue throughout the duration of that suit. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). “Where no legally cognizable interest is at stake between the
parties, a case becomes moot ‘and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for
purposes of Article III.’ ” RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v. Blake Const. & Dev., LLC, 718
F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013). “[P]ut another way, a case is moot when it no longer
presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.”
S. Miami Holdings, LLC v. FDIC, No. 12-15992, 2013 WL 4046717, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug.
12, 2013) (citing Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1282).
The Court finds that this matter was rendered moot by Shelby County, Alabama
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that the current
population distribution in the voting districts in Sumter County was unconstitutionally
disproportionate.

(See Doc. 1.)

The Georgia General Assembly took measures to

ameliorate the disproportionality during the 2011 General and Special Sessions and
passed Senate Bills 154 and 4EX. (See Doc. 77.) Those bills were passed by both houses
and signed by the Governor. The bill noted that it that it would become effective when
signed by the Governor, and did not precondition its effectiveness on preclearance by
the Department of Justice.

All laws in conflict with the 2011 Plan were

contemporaneously repealed.

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The Court finds that the 2011 Plan should be treated as effective as of September
21, 2011, when signed into law by Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal. Nothing in the
Shelby County decision precludes the retroactive effect typically afforded judicial
decisions. See generally Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1984). At least one other case has held Shelby
County applies retroactively. See Hall v. Louisiana, No. 12-00657-BAJ-RLB, 2013 WL
5405656, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept, 27, 2013). “When [the United States Supreme Court]
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling
interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate [the] announcement of the rule.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 97 (1993). There is no reason Shelby County should be treated as an exception to
this general rule.

Therefore, because the 2011 Plan was passed by the Georgia

Legislature and signed by the Governor, and the Court must treat Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act as inapplicable to the 2011 Plan when passed, the 2011 Plan should be given
retroactive effect. The issue of preclearance is no longer extant.
None of the parties contend that the 2011 Plan violates the “one-person one-vote”
principle that the previous plan was alleged to violate. (Docs. 76 at 3, 78 at 1-2, 79 at 23; see generally Doc. 81.) The parties agree that Shelby County operated to make the
2011 Plan “the plan currently in effect for all future elections.” (Doc. 76 at 3; see also
Docs. 78 at 2, 79 at 3, 81 at 7.) However, the parties disagree as to how the Court should
proceed in this matter. Plaintiff contends that the matter is now moot and “the only
issue left … will be Plaintiff’s upcoming motion for attorney[’]s fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.” (Doc. 76 at 4.) Plaintiff-Intervenors agree that the matter is now moot,
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but argue that, “since the Court enjoined elections for the School District in its June 21,
2012 Order (Doc. 50), the Court should establish a schedule of elections under the [2011
Plan].” (Doc. 78 at 2.) Defendant Sumter County School Board of Elections and Voter
Registration, et al. agrees with Plaintiff, contends the matter is moot, and argues that
the Court should take no further action. (Doc. 79 at 3.) Defendant Sumter County
School District, et al. contends that this matter is not moot because the 2011 Plan
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.1 (Doc. 81 at 4-5.) The Defendant School
District also contends that the 2011 Plan is unworkable as that plan contemplates initial
elections in 2012, which did not take place due to the Court’s injunction. (Id.)
The Court disagrees with Plaintiff-Intervenors and Defendant Sumter County
School District, et al. Once the Court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it
must dismiss. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(h)(3); Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
713 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2013).

The Court does not have jurisdiction to

implement the 2011 Plan. Furthermore, the 2011 Plan, which has been alleged by
Defendant Sumter County School District, et al. to be unworkable and violative of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, is not properly before this Court. The Complaint
alleged only that the districts as drawn before the 2011 Plan went into effect violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and the
Georgia Constitution. (See Doc. 1.) The Complaint was not amended to add grounds for
relief, and no counterclaims or crossclaims were filed. (See generally Docket.) All
arguments before the Court have been based on the “one-person one-vote” principle,

A violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act “is established by a showing that members of a protected
class ‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.’ ” Brown v. Sec’y of State of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271, 1281 n.9 (11th
Cir. 2012). Shelby County did not disturb Section 2. See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2619 (2013).
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not grounds regarding racial discrimination in violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. If Defendant Sumter County School District, et al. seeks to challenge the
2011 Plan, it should follow the appropriate procedural avenue to do so.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that this matter is moot and that the
Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the above-captioned case.
Accordingly, the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Also, because the
Court dismisses this matter, the preliminary injunction ordered by the Court on June 21,
2012 (Doc. 50) is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of October, 2013.
/s/ W. Louis Sands
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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