FUQUA et al v. Pridgen et al

Filing 82

ORDER denying 48 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; denying 52 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting in part and denying in part 72 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 7/30/13 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
BEVERLY FUQUA et al,

:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
JOHN PRIDGEN et al,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________ _:

Case No.: 1:12-cv-93 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Donnie Haralson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48);
Defendant Judges John Pridgen, Robert Chasteen, Jr., and T. Christopher Hughes’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 52); and Defendants James R. Butts, James C. Clark, John K.
Fletcher, Dewey R. Hannon, Wilbert King, and Donald C. Paulk’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 72). For the reasons that follow, the judges’ and sheriff’s motions (Docs. 48, 52)
are DENIED, and the third motion (Doc. 72) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL and FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights case against judges, bailiffs, and a sheriff in Ben Hill County
and Crisp County, Georgia. Plaintiffs are members of the public who allege the
defendants barred them from attending criminal proceedings at the County Law
Enforcement courtrooms, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section I, of the Georgia Constitution. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) They seek
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future courtroom closures, nominal damages
against the bailiffs, and litigation expenses. (Id. ¶ 1.)

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The Court described the factual allegations in a previous order. (Doc. 42.) Here it
is sufficient to summarize. Ben Hill County and Crisp County, both of the Cordele
Judicial Circuit, have Law Enforcement Centers (LECs). The LECs house pretrial
detainees and contain a small courtroom where Superior Court judges hold various
criminal hearings, such as arraignments, bond hearings, guilty pleas, and sentencings.
Bailiffs or deputy sheriffs guard the LEC courtroom doors and stop every person seeking
entrance. To gain entrance, the visitor must identify herself and the criminal defendant
whose hearing she wants to observe. The posted officer then tells the visitor to wait in
the lobby until that person’s case is called. She is then allowed entrance only if she
belongs to the criminal defendant’s family and that defendant enters a plea of guilty.
This practice allegedly occurs regardless of available seating.
Plaintiffs filed the complaint containing these allegations on June 21, 2012. They
also moved for a preliminary injunction and provided about a dozen affidavits
substantiating the allegations. (Doc. 4.) In opposition to a preliminary injunction,
Defendants Chief Judge John Pridgen and Judges Robert Chasteen, Jr. and T.
Christopher Hughes (“Defendant Judges”) provided affidavits stating they have open
proceedings but sometimes ask court officers to limit entry to interested parties because
of space limitations. (Doc. 10.) In January and February 2013, Plaintiffs provided five
more affidavits from individuals who were excluded from some of the described
proceedings. (Doc. 38, 41.)
On February 20, 2013, the Court resolved three pending motions, including
Defendant Judges’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 42.) In the process, the Court rejected
Defendant Judges’ arguments that the complaint failed to state a First Amendment

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violation and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a declaratory judgment. The Court then
scheduled a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Fourteen days after the Order’s entry, on March 6, 2013, Defendant Judges
executed a standing order titled, “STANDING ORDER 2013-01: COURTROOM ACCESS
FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS” (hereinafter “Standing Order”). (Doc. 52-2.) The
Standing Order provides that “this Circuit has been and will continue to be dedicated to
the Constitutional Rights of the Public to have access to the Courts.” Further, it explains,
“it is and always has been the policy of the Superior Court Judges of the Cordele Judicial
Circuit that all proceedings in all courtrooms of the Circuit be open to the general public,
except when closure is specifically found by the Court to be necessary in certain specific
cases provided by law.” The Standing Order then provides that the bailiffs and deputy
sheriffs “shall allow access for persons who wish to observe court proceedings to the
extent possible to remain in compliance with occupancy and safety requirements.” The
Standing Order states that all criminal court proceedings will be held in the Ben Hill and
Crisp County courthouses, unless ordered otherwise in particular cases.
Shortly after filing the Standing Order, Defendant Judges moved to dismiss this
case for mootness. They argue the case no longer presents a live controversy because the
Standing Order requires the bailiffs and sheriffs to keep courtrooms open and the
county courtrooms allow more seating.
In its February 20, 2013 Order, the Court also denied Defendant Crisp County
Sheriff Donnie Haralson’s motion to dismiss. Haralson filed an interlocutory appeal and
renewed his motion to dismiss for qualified immunity and sovereign immunity. After
Haralson voluntarily dismissed his appeal, he also moved to dismiss for mootness and
lack of standing. He argues Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a declaratory judgment

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because he cannot provide the relief requested. Only the judges can decide where and
how to conduct the criminal proceedings. He rests his mootness argument on Defendant
Judges’ Standing Order.
Finally, the newest parties to this action—Ben Hill County bailiffs James R. Butts,
James C. Clark, John K. Fletcher, Dewey R. Hannon, Wilbert King, and Donald C.
Paulk—moved on May 10, 2013 to dismiss claims for lack of standing and absolute
quasi-judicial immunity. Like Sheriff Haralson, they, too, argue they cannot provide the
requested relief because only the judges control the courtrooms. Additionally, they claim
they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they merely serve as
conduits for a valid judicial order. The bailiffs also move to dismiss any existing Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) for
lack of standing and mootness. After concluding the case remains justiciable, the Court
rejects Defendant Bailiffs’ assertion of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. To the extent
Plaintiffs raised Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in their complaint, the Court
dismisses them. Finally, the Court denies Defendant Haralson’s renewed grounds for
dismissal.
I. Justiciability
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal judicial power to
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. "In our system of government,
courts have 'no business' deciding legal issues or expounding on law in the absence of
such a case or controversy.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013)
(quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). This limit—called

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justiciability—preserves separation of powers and ensures that the courts of the United
States focus only on cases presenting an actual adversarial dispute. Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001).
The requirement of justiciability includes the doctrines of standing and
mootness. Id. Both standing and mootness ask, in essence, whether interested parties
present a case with an actual, live controversy to which a court can provide meaningful
relief. E.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Defendant
Bailiffs and Defendant Haralson claim Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive or
declaratory relief because these defendants allegedly have no control over the courtroom
proceedings. Defendant Judges and Defendant Haralson argue this case is moot because
they have ceased the challenged practice. After a consideration of both arguments, 1 the
Court concludes that this case is justiciable as to all parties and claims.
a. Standing
Standing is a core component of Article III’s case-and-controversy limitation.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omitted). “The
Supreme Court has explained that the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing
under Article III consists of three elements: an actual or imminent injury, causation,
and redressability.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d
1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
Defendant Haralson and Defendant Bailiffs challenge the third element.
Redressability requires the plaintiff to show it is “’likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S.

The Court may consider the entire record on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing or mootness, Elend
v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir. 2006), and the Court has considered the entire record.

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at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). In
other words, “[r]edressability is established when a favorable decision would amount to
a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly
redresses the injury suffered.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd., 641 F.3d at 1266. The
remedy need not mend every injury, so long as it provides some measure of relief. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).
Non-judicial defendants claim redressability is lacking because they have no
authority to grant the requested relief. Specifically, only the judges, they assert, can
control who enters the courtrooms and where the proceedings are located. Thus, they
argue injunctive and declaratory relief cannot remedy Plaintiff’s alleged injury. This
argument is unpersuasive.
First, assuming Defendants’ version of the events—that they are merely passive
enforcers of the judge’s instructions—their arguments lack legal merit. It is bedrock
federal law that a defendant who enforces an unconstitutional policy can be enjoined
from future enforcement, regardless of the policy’s authorship. See Odebrecht Constr.,
Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2013). Defendants’
argument to the contrary is like saying the attorney general in Ex Parte Young could be
not enjoined because he was enforcing a legislative act only the legislature could amend.
Cf. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). The act may be unconstitutional in
the abstract but it does not generally cause injury until there is a possibility of
enforcement. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979). Enjoining an executive officer from carrying out an unconstitutional command
prevents that command from causing injury.

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Notably, neither the bailiffs nor Sheriff Haralson offer any law to directly support
this result. Their reliance on Abdullah v. Alabama Sentencing Commission, 386 F.
App’x 947 (11th Cir. 2010), is misplaced. Defendant Bailiffs description of Abdullah is
accurate: “In that case, the plaintiff sought to have a state statute concerning sex
offender reporting abrogated and to have state records of sex offenders purged . . . . The
defendant, however, was only empowered to make recommendations concerning
criminal legislation and was not empowered to enact, modify, appeal or enforce
legislation.” (Doc. 72-1 at 4 (citing Abdullah, 386 F. App’x at 949) (emphasis added).)
Unlike Abdullah, Defendants not only enforce the challenged practice, but also, based
on the preponderance of the record evidence, enforce it with wide discretion.
Second, beyond its lack of legal support, Defendants’ arguments face a more
practical problem. The record does not support their role as passive enforcers.
Defendants point to the judges’ affidavits and Standing Order to establish they
obediently minister the judges’ instructions. This is odd, because, in those very
documents, Defendant Judges imply, perhaps accidentally or unintentionally, that any
violation is on the part of the bailiffs and deputy sheriffs. “It . . . has always been” the
judge’s policy to keep the courtrooms open absent a case-by-case finding. (Doc. 52-2.)
Further, the judges claim they have always directed the bailiffs and deputy sheriffs to
allow the public in the proceedings as space permits. (E.g., Doc. 10-1 ¶¶ 18–22.) But
someone, according to the allegations of about a dozen affiants, has denied the public
full access to the proceedings at the LECs despite abundant seating. In every case, the
person in the first instance to deny entry is a bailiff or deputy sheriff.
In summary, the record and law amply support the Court’s finding that Plaintiffs
have standing to seek an injunction against the bailiffs and sheriff. Regardless of the

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source of the alleged policy of closure, an injunction will prevent them enforcing the
challenged practice. Because the Court concludes Plaintiffs have standing to seek
injunctive relief, the Court likewise finds they may also seek a declaratory judgment. See
Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A
party has standing to bring an action under the declaratory judgment act if an ‘actual
controversy’ exists, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), which is the same as an Article III case or
controversy.”). Their motions to dismiss on this ground are DENIED.
b. Mootness
Defendant Judges and Defendant Haralson claim this case is now moot because
the Standing Order ends the challenged practice. “[A] federal court has no authority ‘to
give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159
U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). When a case becomes moot—meaning it no longer presents a
“live” controversy to which a court can provide meaningful relief—a court must dismiss
it for lack of justiciability. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty., Fla.,
382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Ordinarily, a defendant cannot moot a case in the midst of litigation simply by
ending its unlawful conduct. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). “Otherwise, a defendant could engage in unlawful
conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off,
repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013). For that reason, the defendant who seeks to moot a case
through voluntary cessation of the challenged practice faces a “stringent” burden.

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Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. He must show that “subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.” Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S.
199, 203 (1968)).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “when the defendant is not a private
citizen but a government actor, there is a rebuttable presumption that the objectionable
behavior will not recur.” Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1283 (emphasis in original). If there is
reasonable basis to believe the terminated conduct will recur, however, the government
defendant is not entitled to rely on its presumption to moot the case. Id. at 1283–85;
Harrell v. The Florida Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). Courts in the Eleventh
Circuit consider a number of factors to weigh the possibility of recurrence for
government officials: (1) whether the termination of the offending conduct was
unambiguous, (2) whether the policy change appears to be the result of substantial
deliberation or simply an attempt to manipulate the Court’s jurisdiction; and (3)
whether the government has “consistently applied” the new policy. Rich v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 531–32 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
The timing and content of the decision are relevant both to whether the
termination was unambiguous and whether the policy change appears to be an attempt
to manipulate the Court’s jurisdiction. Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1266–67. “As for timing, a
defendant’s cessation before receiving notice of a legal challenge weighs in favor of
mootness . . . while cessation that occurs ‘late in the game’ will make a court ‘more
skeptical of voluntary changes that have been made.’” Id. at 1266 (citations omitted).
Thus, for example, the Eleventh Circuit has found cases justiciable when the state
changed course after being sued by a plaintiff and the Department of Justice, Rich, 716

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F.3d at 532; when the defendant brought a mootness argument during a hearing for
preliminary injunction, Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); and when a city moved to dismiss the
case for mootness one day after amending its challenged ordinance and six weeks after
the filing of the lawsuit, Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 943 F.2d 283, 284–
86 (11th Cir. 1991).
As for the content of the decision, the Eleventh Circuit has considered a number
of factors to determine whether the defendant “unambiguously terminated” the
unlawful conduct. See Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1267. “[A]ct[ing] in secrecy, meeting behind
closed doors and . . . failing to disclose the basis for [the] decision” cut against a finding
that the case is moot. Id. (noting that, as a result of the secrecy, the court has “no idea
whether the [defendant’s] decision was ‘well-reasoned’ and therefore likely to endure”).
Likewise, courts view with skepticism defendants who, while claiming the case is moot,
continue to push the challenged practice’s constitutionality. See id.; ACLU v. The
Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, “[i]n determining whether an offending policy is likely to be
reinstated, the [the Eleventh Circuit] is more likely to find that the challenged behavior
is not reasonably likely to recur where it constituted an isolated incident, was
unintentional, or was at least engaged in reluctantly. . . . Conversely, [the court is] more
likely to find a reasonable expectation of recurrence when the challenged behavior
constituted a continuing practice or was otherwise deliberate.’” Atheists of Fla., Inc. v.
City of Lakeland, Fla., 713 F.3d 577, 594 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citation and
quotations omitted).

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Applying these factors, the Court concludes Defendants have not unambiguously
terminated the challenged practice. Defendants’ Standing Order, filed nine months after
the initiation of this lawsuit, came “late in the game.” Rich, 716 F.3d at 532 (citation
omitted). The extraordinary delay in executing the one-page order causes the Court
pause, particularly given the haste—two weeks—with which Defendants executed it
following the denial of their motion to dismiss. That the Standing Order arrived just
before a hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction also suggests Defendants have
not unambiguously terminated the challenged practice. Defendants have offered no
explanation for the delay.
The content of the Standing Order fares no better in the Court’s analysis. The
Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Standing Order merely reiterates the position
Defendants took in their motion to dismiss and response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Order begins by explaining the Defendant Judges are
dedicated to the public’s constitutional right to attend court proceedings. Further, the
Standing Order explains “it is and always has been the policy of the Superior Court
Judges . . . that all Court proceedings in all courtrooms of the Circuit be open to the
general public, except when closure is specifically found by the Court to be necessary in
certain specific cases as provided by law.” (Doc. 52-2 (emphasis added).) The Order
therefore requires “the bailiffs and/or deputy sheriffs . . . [to] allow access for persons
who wish to observe court proceedings to the extent possible to remain in compliance
with occupancy and safety requirements.” (Id. (emphasis added).) But Defendant
Judges have long argued their proceedings are open to the public “to the extent possible
to remain in compliance with occupancy and safety requirements.” (See Doc. 10 at 10
(noting the judges instruct courtroom staff to “first ensure that any members of the

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public with an interest in the proceedings . . . are permitted to enter the courtroom for
those proceedings and then, if space is available, permit the public to enter and leave at
their discretion”); Doc. 10-1 ¶ 22 (“My instructions to the bailiffs are, and always have
been, that when space is available members of the public should be permitted to enter
and leave at their discretion provided that they do not disrupt proceedings.”); Doc. 10-2
(same); Doc. 10-3 (same); Doc. 9-1.) At bottom, the Standing Order harkens back to the
same hyper-technical argument the Defendants made in their motion to dismiss—
namely, that because they never entered a written or oral order formally closing the
courtroom, there was and is no constitutional violation, merely space limitations. But
this explanation fails to explain why so many members of the public allege they are
excluded from proceedings, despite available seating. Additionally, by maintaining it
“always has been” the judges’ policy to keep the proceedings open, Defendants have
essentially continued to press the challenged practice’s constitutionality.
Because the Standing Order echoes familiar statements, it raises questions about
the reasons for its sudden issuance. In explanation, Defendants point to affidavits they
executed about a year ago, which reflect “their intention . . . to do what is necessary to
ensure that all superior court proceedings are open to the public to the extent consistent
with capacity and safety concerns. . . . Moving all superior court criminal proceedings to
the larger county courthouses which can accommodate more members of the public and
ordering all bailiffs and deputy sheriffs to follow their directives in this regard
accomplishes this objective.” (Doc. 77 at 8.) But the Court fails to see why this reasoning
did not persuade Defendants sometime in the nine months between the complaint and
Standing Order. Because the Standing Order’s reasoning and purpose are buried

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beneath such questions, the Court is unable to assess whether its reasoning is sound
today and whether the decision is likely to endure. See Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1267.
The evidence also preponderates toward a finding that the challenged practice is
more than a one-time occurrence. About eighteen people have testified via affidavit that
they have been excluded, often on different days, from some part of the LEC
proceedings. In their affidavits, Defendants disavow any knowledge, beyond a single
episode, of complaints from members of the public being excluded from criminal
proceedings at the LECs. But this statement is undermined by the fact that Defendants
were sued for the same conduct in 2003. But regardless of that case, this lawsuit and the
affidavits in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction surely put Defendants on notice of
complaints about the proceedings in the LECs. Despite that, Plaintiffs furnished
affidavits as late as February 2013 of people who cannot gain access to all of the
proceedings. Because the challenged practice is not a fleeting, one-time incident, the
Court is less likely to find the case is moot. Finally, the Court notes there is no evidence
that Defendants have consistently applied the new policy. There is also no evidence in
the record identifying any case-specific decision by order based on space limitations.
For those reasons, the Court finds the case is not moot because Defendants have
not unambiguously terminated the challenged practice. The same facts also make it
appear as though Defendants’ Standing Order is an attempt to manipulate the Court’s
jurisdiction. In other words, at this stage, the Court cannot say it is absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur at the LECs or
the county courthouses.
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss must be, and are, DENIED.

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II. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Defendant Bailiffs claim they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
because they are being sued for executing a judge’s facially valid order. The doctrine of
absolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute judicial immunity. Roland v.
Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). “The policy justifying an extension of absolute
judicial immunity . . . is to prevent court personnel and other officials from becoming a
‘lightning rod for harassing litigation’ aimed at the court.” Richman v. Sheahan, 270
F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir.
1980)). “Therefore, law enforcement personnel, acting in furtherance of their official
duties and relying on a facially valid court order, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity from suit in a section 1983 action.” Roland, 19 F.3d at 556 (citing Henry v.
Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986)). A “facially valid order”
does not mean a lawful order. Id. “An erroneous order can be valid.” Id. (quoting Turney
v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990)). But “[w]hile non-judicial officers are
entitled to absolute immunity when their official duties have an integral relationship
with the judicial process . . . that immunity only attaches when the officials are acting
within the scope of their authority.” Blanchard v. Overton, 449 F. App’x 862, 864 (11th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The party invoking the
immunity bears of the burden of establishing it applies. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993).
The Court finds that Defendant Bailiffs have not met their burden. Absolute
quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984); Shuler v. Swatek, 465 F. App’x 900, 903
(11th Cir. 2012) (noting, in suit against sheriffs acting in quasi-judicial capacity, that

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“judicial immunity does not bar claims brought under § 1983 seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief.”).
As to Plaintiffs’ request for nominal damages, Defendant Bailiffs have failed to
show they followed a valid judicial order and, thus, acted with absolute immunity.
According to the Complaint, the bailiffs are “directly responsible for setting policy and
determining who enters and leaves the courtroom, and when.” (Doc. 43 ¶¶ 19–24
(emphasis added).) The Complaint states that the bailiffs do not allow members of the
public into the courtrooms unless (1) the person seeking entry is related to a criminal
defendant and (2) the criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty. (Id. ¶ 27.) The
Complaint provides numerous examples of the bailiffs applying this policy. (Id. ¶¶ 31(a),
31(b), 31(d), 31(e).) The judges allegedly have “authorized, condoned, ratified, approved,
and/or knowingly acquiesced” in this policy, (Id. ¶¶ 15–17) but nothing in the Complaint
implies they ordered the bailiffs to restrict access in this manner.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, and limiting review to the
four corners of the complaint, Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted), 2 the Court must conclude that Defendant Bailiffs are not
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity at this immature stage of litigation.
This ground is also DENIED.
III.

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Defendant Bailiffs move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims.

To the extent Plaintiffs bring those claims, they are DISMISSED for the

reasons stated in the Court’s previous Order. (Doc. 42.)
Because the Court has not considered materials outside of the Complaint to address this ground of
Defendant Bailiffs’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not convert the motion to a motion for summary
judgment.

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IV.

Defendant Haralson’s claims for qualified immunity and sovereign
immunity

Defendant Haralson renewed his claims for qualified immunity and sovereign
immunity in his motion to dismiss to preserve those issues for appeal. The Court now
denies those claims for the same reasons stated in its previous Order. (Doc. 42.)
CONCLUSION
For those reasons, Defendant Judges’ and Defendant Haralson’s motions (Doc.
48, 52) are DENIED. Defendant Bailiffs’ (Doc. 72) motion is DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part, as follows: all of Defendant Bailiffs’ claims regarding standing and
absolute quasi-judicial immunity are denied, and his claims regarding any existing Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims are granted.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of July 2013.
/s/ W. Louis Sands
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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