LEE v. Williams et al

Filing 14

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 7 Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff's Objection 11 isoverruled. Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Sharon Lewis are dismissed. Plaintiff may proceed with claims against Defendants Nurse Williams and Dr. Ayers. Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 10/12/2012. (bcl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
MORGAN KENNETH LEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Nurse WILLIAMS,
Dr. AYERS, and
Dr. SHARON LEWIS,
Defendants.

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Case No.:

1:12-CV-108 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court is a Recommendation (Doc. 7) from United States Magistrate
Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff, filed August 28, 2012. The Recommendation concerns a
complaint filed by Plaintiff Morgan Kenneth Lee, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
claims for relief against Defendants Nurse Williams, Dr. Ayers and Dr. Sharon Lewis.
(Docs. 1, 6). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the aforementioned defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical conditions. (See generally id.)
On August 6, 2012, Judge Langstaff ordered that Plaintiff be permitted to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7). However, Judge Langstaff found that Plaintiff’s
initial complaint was missing the page upon which Plaintiff should have set forth his
claims and allegations against the three named Defendants. (Id. at 1). Thus, Judge
Langstaff requested that Plaintiff supplement his complaint to include allegations
related to his claims of deliberate indifference on the part of the three named
defendants.

(Id. at 1-2).

On August 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his

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complaint. (Doc. 6).
On August 28, 2012, Judge Langstaff recommended that Plaintiff’s request that
Defendants be prosecuted and that he “be returned to parole ASAP” be dismissed from
this action. (Doc. 7 at 4). Judge Langstaff concluded that the Court has no authority to
provide any of the aforementioned relief. (Id.) Judge Langstaff also recommended that
Dr. Sharon Lewis, Medical Director for the Georgia Department of Corrections, be
dismissed from Plaintiff’s suit. (Id. at 5). Judge Langstaff noted that Plaintiff merely
alleged that Dr. Lewis “confirmed all denials,” an allegation that, without more, is
insufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983. (Id.) Judge Langstaff
nevertheless recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Williams and
Ayers be permitted to proceed. (Id. at 6).
Judge Langstaff informed Plaintiff that the period within which to file a written
objection to the Recommendation would expire on September 11, 2012. (Id. at 4-6).
However, Plaintiff did not file a written objection until September 12, 2012, one day
after the deadline. (See Doc. 11). Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s Objection is
untimely. However, the Court will nonetheless address Plaintiff’s Objection. In his
Objection, Plaintiff objects to Judge Langstaff’s recommendation that Dr. Lewis be
dismissed from the suit. (Id.) Per Plaintiff, records show that Dr. Lewis performed a
physical on Plaintiff in 2010 when Plaintiff was incarcerated at Johnson State Prison
(“JSP”), and as such, she was aware of various medical ailments. (Id. at 1). However,
the events giving rise to the allegations in this complaint took place beginning January
2012 at Calhoun State Prison (“CSP”). (Doc. 6 at 5). Specifically, Dr. Lewis did not deny
Plaintiff’s grievance until May 2012, according to Plaintiff. (Id. at 4). Nonetheless,
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Lewis should not be dismissed since Dr. Lewis reinstated

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Plaintiff’s pain medication, physical therapy, and diet, and stated that Plaintiff would
never walk again without the assistance of a walker or a cane, when she treated him at
JSP. (Id. at 1-2). After reviewing Plaintiff’s objection, this Court ACCEPTS Judge
Langstaff’s Recommendation.
To start, “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not
liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th
Cir. 1999). To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must either
allege 1) that the supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violation or 2) that a causal connection existed between the actions of the supervising
officials and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. (describing the instances when a
supervisor can be held liable under § 1983). With regard to the second prong, a causal
connection can be established when either one of the following is present: 1) “a history
of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the
alleged deprivation and he fails to do so” or 2) “the supervisor’s improper custom or
policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.”

Id. (additional

citations and quotations omitted). To be actionable, “[t]he deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant,
rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Id. (citations
omitted).
A review of Plaintiff’s initial complaint, supplement to his complaint, and written
objection indicate that Plaintiff has alleged none of the above in the instant case.
Plaintiff has merely alleged that Dr. Lewis denied his grievance and has bolstered this
claim with facts relating to Dr. Lewis’s alleged knowledge of his medical conditions

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gleaned from her treatment of Plaintiff during his stay at a different prison two years
before his arrival at CSP. (Doc. 11 at 1). However, the additional allegations made by
Plaintiff relating to Dr. Lewis’s specific knowledge of his medical conditions do not
establish any allegations of a “history of widespread abuse” that put Dr. Lewis “on notice
of the need to correct the alleged deprivation.”
Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Lewis personally participated in the alleged
efforts to preclude him from receiving medical care, which Dr. Lewis interfered with his
treatment in any way, or that as Medical Director, Dr. Lewis had a policy or practice that
encouraged the alleged deprivation of proper medical attention to Plaintiff. See Nichols
v. Burnside, No. 5:11-cv-116, 2011 WL 2036709, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2011)
(dismissing claim of supervisory liability for denial of a grievance as against prison
warden since “[p]laintiff ma[de] no allegation that [warden] attempted to prevent
plaintiff from receiving proper medical care, that [warden] interfered with treatment in
any way, or that a policy or practice of [warden’s] was a moving force behind the alleged
deprivation of proper medical attention to plaintiff”), adopted by No. 5:11-cv-116, 2011
WL 2020662 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2011). Stated in other words, filing the grievance with
Dr. Lewis alleging a denial of medical care is “simply insufficient to establish direct
participation.” Weems v. St. Lawrence, No. 4;09-cv-65, 2009 WL 2422795, at *4 n.7
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2009). At best, Plaintiff has alleged an isolated incident (denial of a
grievance) against Dr. Lewis, which is insufficient for avoiding dismissal. See Owens v.
Leavins, No. 5:05-cv-228, 2006 WL 2640275, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006) (“Isolated
incidents are generally insufficient to establish a supervisor’s liability, and filing a
grievance with a supervisory person does not alone make the supervisor liable for the
allegedly violative conduct brought to light by the grievance, even if the grievance is

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denied.”)
Additionally, though Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lewis conducted one of his
physicals and reinstated his medical restrictions and treatment plans, Plaintiff has still
failed to allege that Dr. Lewis should be held liable under § 1983. The Court again notes
that this physical took place at another prison, two years before the incident giving rise
to this suit. Plaintiff cannot bootstrap any observations made during this physical to
show that Dr. Lewis’s denial of a grievance two years later demonstrates that she should
be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Dr. Lewis
knew about the alleged denial of any medical care, or anything to this effect. Thus,
although Dr. Lewis may have conducted a physical of Plaintiff in the past, her denial of
Plaintiff’s grievance, when later acting in a supervisory capacity, does not by itself
implicate deliberate indifference to a constitutional right. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed
to proffer any facts, via his pleadings, to allege a claim for supervisory liability against
Dr. Lewis. Accordingly, this Court agrees that Dr. Lewis should be dismissed.
This Court has fully reviewed and considered the record. Having found that
Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate’s findings with regard to the dismissal of Dr.
Lewis are meritless, and Petitioner having not objected to the remaining findings in the
Magistrate’s August 28, 2012 Recommendation (Doc. 7), this Court finds that said
Recommendation should be, and hereby is, ACCEPTED, ADOPTED and made the
Order of this Court, to the extent the same is consistent with this Order, for reason of
the findings made and conclusions stated therein together with the findings made,
reasons stated and conclusions reached herein. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection (Doc.
11) is OVERRULED; Plaintiff’s request that Defendants be prosecuted and that he be
returned to parole is dismissed from this action; and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

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Dr. Sharon Lewis are hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiff may only proceed with his § 1983
claims against Defendants Nurse Williams and Dr. Ayers.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of October, 2012.
/s/ W. Louis Sands___________________
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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