ADAMS v. FRAZIER

Filing 16

ORDER adopting 11 Report and Recommendations. Accordingly, Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus is Dismissed. The Court denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 5/16/14 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
QUINTON ADAMS,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID FRAZIER, Warden,
Respondent.

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CASE NO.: 1:12-CV-160 (WLS)

ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is a Recommendation from United States
Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff filed May 16, 2013. (Doc. 11.) Therein, Judge
Langstaff recommends denying Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.

(Id. at 9.)

Judge Langstaff’s Recommendation provided Petitioner with fourteen days to file an
objection. (Id. at 9.) With permission from the Court, Petitioner filed an objection on
June 3, 2013 and June 14, 2013. (Docs. 12-15.) Because Petitioner sought and obtained
leave from the Court to file the objections, they are timely and will therefore be
considered by the Court.
On October 23, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus.
(Doc. 1.) Therein, he asserted two grounds for habeas relief: (1) ineffective assistance of
trial counsel because (a) trial counsel failed to strike jurors who knew the victim’s
family, (b) failed to impeach witnesses with prior convictions, and (c) failed to object to
the prosecutor’s improper statements regarding the veracity of witnesses and facts that
were not in evidence; and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because
appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal an issue regarding a jury charge. (Id. at 5, 7.)
The first ground was raised on direct appeal and the Georgia Supreme Court held that
trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Likewise, the second ground was raised during state habeas proceedings
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and the state habeas court found that Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s performance was
not ineffective under the Strickland standard.

Judge Langstaff recommends dismissing

the Petition because both of Petitioner’s asserted grounds for relief were addressed in
state proceedings and neither of those proceedings “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (Doc. 11 at 7, 9.) See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In his first objection, Petitioner “conten[d]s that he met both prongs of the
Strickland v. Washington standard.” (Doc. 13 at 6.) Petitioner does not address whether
the state courts’ resolution of his claims involved an unreasonable application of federal
law. Whether he met the Strickland v. Washington standard is not necessarily
determinative of whether he is entitled to habeas relief. As noted by Judge Langstaff,
whether Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief depends on whether the state courts’
adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because Petitioner’s first
objection does not controvert any finding in Judge Langstaff’s Recommendation, that
objection (Doc. 13) is OVERRULED.
In his second objection, Petitioner argues that the jury charge was erroneous
under a line of Georgia cases and the failure of appellate counsel to raise that issue on
appeal entitles him to relief. Again, Petitioner fails to address whether the opinion of
the state habeas court meets the standard set out in § 2254(d)(1). The state habeas court
identified the ineffectiveness standard in Strickland v. Washington as the pertinent
standard and found that trial counsel withdrew his objection to the jury charge.
Without a valid objection to the jury charge, appellate counsel did not err by failing to
raise the jury charge as a trial error. The Court agrees with Judge Langstaff’s finding
that “[i]t does not appear, nor has Petitioner shown, that the state habeas court’s
decision in this matter was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.”

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(Doc. 11 at 8.)

For that reason, Petitioner’s second objection (Doc. 15) to Judge

Langstaff’s Recommendation is OVERRULED.
Upon full review and consideration of the record, the Court finds that Judge
Langstaff’s Recommendation (Doc. 11) should be, and hereby is, ACCEPTED,
ADOPTED and made the Order of this Court for reason of the findings made and
reasons stated therein, together with the reasons stated and conclusions reached herein.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED.
Under Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases, “[t]he
district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.” And “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a
COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court finds
that no reasonable jurist would find it debatable that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The Court therefore DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
SO ORDERED, this 16th day of May 2014.

/s/ W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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