BUTLER v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATION et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion to Dismiss; granting 9 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. Judgment shall be entered in favor of defendants. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W. Louis Sands on 11/19/13 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
BENNIE BUTLER,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BELLSOUTH
:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC, and :
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
:
OF AMERICA LOCAL 3201,
:
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:

CASE NO.: 1:12-CV-189 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court are Bellsouth Telecommunications’ and Communication
Workers of America Local 3201’s motions to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the
motions are GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL and RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Bennie Butler is a former machine operator for Defendant Bellsouth
Communications, LLC (Bellsouth). Following his termination from Bellsouth in January
2009, Butler brought suit against Bellsouth and his union, the Communication Workers
of America Local 3201, for race discrimination, breach of contract, and conspiracy.
The instant case, filed December 11, 2012, is not Butler’s first lawsuit arising from
his employment with Bellsouth. Prior to this lawsuit, Butler filed suit September 27,
2011, alleging claims of race and age discrimination under Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act against Bellsouth and against the Union for breach
of duty of fair representation. The Court granted Bellsouth’s motion to dismiss for

1

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and judgment was entered in favor of the
defendants. Specifically, on September 27, 2012, the order “dismissed without
prejudice” Butler’s claims against Bellsouth, finding the Butler had failed to show he
filed a timely charge of discrimination to the EEOC.
Butler refiled suit December 11, 2012, this time raising claims of race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, breach of contract under Georgia law, and
conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Two motions to dismiss followed.
Bellsouth moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that Butler’s claims are
barred by res judicata because he could have brought his current claims in the previous
lawsuit. Butler counters that the Court’s previous rulings were not adjudications on the
merits. Bellsouth also argues that Butler fails to state a § 1985 claim and that his statelaw claims are preempted by federal law.
The Union also moved to dismiss, arguing that service was untimely, the §§ 1981
and 1985 claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and the Labor Management
Relations Act preempts the breach of contract claim. Butler has not responded to the
Union’s motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert by motion the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Motion to
Dismiss a Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless the
Plaintiff fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible, and not
merely just conceivable, on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegations are not ‘enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d
1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308,
1309 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Stated differently, the factual allegations in the complaint must
2

‘possess enough heft’ to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Edwards, 602 F.3d
at 1291 (quoting Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.
2007)).
While the Court must conduct its analysis “accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,” Hill
v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003), in evaluating the sufficiency of a Plaintiff’s
pleadings the Court must “make reasonable inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor, ‘but [is] not
required to draw Plaintiff’s inference.’” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242,
1248 (11th Cir. 2005)), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S.
Ct. 1702 (2012). The Supreme Court instructs that while on a Motion to Dismiss “a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,” this principle
“is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
for the proposition that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation” in a complaint.

II.

Analysis
a. Statute of Limitations under §§ 1981, 1985

In Georgia, a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under
sections 1981 and 1985. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 625–26 (11th Cir. 1986).
As the Union points out, Butler’s complaint identifies the latest operative event (his
termination) as January 3, 2009. Butler first filed suit more than two years later, on
September 27, 2011, and filed the instant suit December 11, 2012. Thus, even if the
section 1981 and 1985 claims related back to the first complaint, they would still be
untimely.

3

Butler has not responded to the Union’s motion to dismiss, so the Court is
unaware of any hatch through which he can escape the applicable statute of limitations.
Having not responded, Butler has not met the burden of establishing equitable tolling.
See Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Although a court may
equitably toll a limitations period, the plaintiffs must establish that tolling is
warranted.”). Likewise, a § 1981 claim is not tolled by exhausting administrative
remedies under Title VII or the ADEA. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 465–66 (1975) (holding that pursuit of administrative remedies under Title VII did
not toll statute of limitations for § 1981 claim).
Thus, Butler’s section 1981 and 1985 claims are untimely and must be dismissed.

B. Preemption.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts state law claims
that depend “upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Eleventh
Circuit has held that the LMRA preempts Georgia breach of contract claims like the one
here. See Bartholomew v. AGL Resources, Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2004); see
also Davis v. Texprint (GA), Inc., 774 F. Supp. 638 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Because Butler’s state law claim depends on the content of the collective
bargaining agreement, that claim must be dismissed. Butler did not respond to this
issue in either of the motions, so he has not offered any rationale to hold otherwise.

CONCLUSION
Bellsouth’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Because the
Court finds the §§1981, 1985 claims untimely, it need not address the assertion of res
judicata, so that ground is denied without prejudice. The Union’s motion is GRANTED.

4

For those reasons, Butler’s Complaint is DISMISSED. Judgment shall be entered in
favor of defendants.
SO ORDERED, this

19th day of November, 2013.

/s/ W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5