CAULEY v. COLVIN

Filing 16

ORDER adopting 11 Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff's Objection 14 is overruled. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 8/13/2014. (bcl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JAMES A. CAULEY,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
:
Commissioner of Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :

CASE NO.: 1:13-cv-00052 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court is a March 7, 2014 Report and Recommendation from United States
Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff on this Social Security appeal. (Doc. 11.) Judge Langstaff
first considered whether Plaintiff’s new evidence, a July 2012 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) disability determination, merits a remand under Section Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
magistrate judge also considered whether the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination of
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) was supported by substantial evidence. Finally, Judge
Langstaff considered Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ erred in determining that other jobs exist in
the national economy that Plaintiff is capable of performing. Judge Langstaff disagreed with Plaintiff
on each of these issues and recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
The Report and Recommendation provided the Parties with fourteen (14) days to file
written objections to the recommendations therein. (Doc. 11 at 8.) In a March 13, 2014 Order, the
magistrate judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Written Objections to the
Recommendation. Plaintiff timely filed his objections on April 21, 2014. (Doc. 14.)
In an objection to the Recommendation (Doc. 14), Plaintiff argues the Commissioner’s
decision must be reversed and remanded for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s new evidence, a July 2012

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U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) disability determination, merits a remand under Sentence
Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); (2) the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) RFC assessment was not
supported by substantial evidence.
First, the Court agrees with Judge Langstaff that Plaintiff’s new evidence does not merit a
remand. Plaintiff contends that the July 2012 VA decision gives rise to a reasonable possibility of
changing the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 14 at 2.) Plaintiff contends that the VA’s finding that Plaintiff’s
depressive disorder and brain injury produce a variety of residual limitations creates “a reasonable
probability that the jobs cited in Step 5 of the Commissioner’s decision would not be available to
such an individual.” (Id. at 4.) The VA determination, however, “does not contain any additional,
relevant medical information” that was not available to the Commissioner and is, at its heart, a nonbinding determination by another agency. (Doc. 11 at 4.) The Court agrees with Judge Langstaff that
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the new evidence could reasonably be expected to change the
ALJ’s decision.
The Court further agrees with Judge Langstaff that the ALJ’s RFC determination is
supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner’s factual findings are deemed conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence, and a court may not reweigh the evidence in determining whether
an ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff’s Objections repeat
verbatim his Brief in Support of Reversal and Remand, contending that the ALJ erred in assessing
his RFC by not accounting for all of Plaintiff’s impairments, specifically Plaintiff’s depressive
disorder, headaches, cognitive limitation, and traumatic brain injury. (Doc. 6 at 11; Doc. 14 at 5.)
However, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that the ALJ ignored these impairments in making
the RFC determination.

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In his Objections, Plaintiff also refers to authority regarding consideration of medical
opinions of record but does not raise a specific argument as to whether the ALJ erred in considering
the various medical opinions. (Doc. 14 at 5.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ relied on
Plaintiff’s medical records, medical opinions from two doctors, opinions provided by state agency
consultants, and evidence of Plaintiff’s activities. The Court agrees with Judge Langstaff that the ALJ
properly reconciled conflicting medical evidence by looking to Plaintiff’s activities and state agency
evaluations. (Doc. 11 at 6.) The Court agrees with Judge Langstaff that the ALJ’s determination of
Plaintiff’s RFC was supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, for all of the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 14) is OVERRULED,
and U.S. Magistrate Judge Langstaff’s March 7, 2014 Recommendation (Doc. 11) is ACCEPTED,
ADOPTED and made the Order of this Court for reason of the findings made and reasons stated
therein, together with the reasons stated and conclusions made herein. The Commissioner’s decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of August 2014.

/s/ W. LOUIS SANDS
THE HONORABLE W. LOUIS SANDS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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