Harris v. Sheriff Kevin Sproul, et. al.

Filing 43

ORDER adopting 39 Report and Recommendations.; granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants.Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 11/10/14 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
PHILLIP BRYAN HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN SPROUL et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 1:13-cv-71 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court is a Recommendation from United States Magistrate Judge Stephen
Hyles in this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 civil rights action. (Doc. 39.) In the Recommendation,
Judge Hyles recommends that the Court grant Defendants Sproul, Lewis, Montgerard, and
Shepard’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) and deny Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel
and for Sanctions (Docs. 26, 27).
Judge Hyles’ Recommendation provided the Parties with fourteen days1 from the
date of its service to file written objections to the recommendations. (Doc. 39 at 10.) On
November 4, 2014 Plaintiff Harris filed thirty-four handwritten pages of Objections to Judge
Hyles’ Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 41.) The next day, Defendants filed a Response
to Harris’ Objections. (Doc. 42.)
Harris objects to Judge Hyles’ recommendation that his retaliation claims be dismissed for failure to exhaust. The Court notes that Harris’ objections largely reiterate and
elaborate on his claims regarding retaliation by Defendants Griffin, Lewis, and Sproul. (Id. at
2-3, 5-8.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, “a [district court] judge . . . shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Here, upon the review of the Recommendation, the Court finds no reason to disturb the recommended findings. Judge Hyles
The Parties were given an additional three days because service was made by mail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d)
(adding three days to specified period within which a party may act if service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C) by
mailing process to a party’s last known address).
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established clear legal reasoning for the recommended dismissal of the retaliation claims
against Defendants Lewis, Griffin, and Sproul for failure to exhaust with citations to and application of proper binding and persuasive authority. The Court therefore OVERRULES
Harris’ Objections as to Judge Hyles’ Recommendation that Harris’ retaliation claims be
dismissed for failure to exhaust and adopts Judge Hyles’ findings that Harris did not exhaust
these claims.
To the extent that Harris asserts in his Objections new claims of denial of access to a
law library (Id. at 5-8) and restriction of his right to practice his religion (Id. at 4, 17), the
Court notes that new claims may not properly be asserted in Objections to a Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
Harris does not address in his Objections Judge Hyles’ Recommendation regarding
his failure to intervene claim. The Court notes that Judge Hyles analyzes Harris’ failure to
intervene claim against Defendants Sproul and Lewis under an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. However, Harris is a pretrial detainee. (Doc. 23-1 at 1 (stating
“Plaintiff has been incarcerated in the Dougherty County Jail since August 20, 2011, and he
has been indicted on felony charges of rape, incest, aggravated child molestation, and child
molestation).) For accuracy’s sake, the Court notes that the Eighth Amendment does not
protect pretrial detainees but that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of
arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985). Though the
precise point in the pretrial phase at which Fourth Amendment protections end and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections begin has not been identified by the Eleventh
Circuit, the Court finds that this case, in which Harris has appeared before a judicial officer
and been in pretrial detention for an extended period of time, lies clearly within the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s protections. Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d
1246, 1253-54 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, due process protections of pretrial detainees are at least as extensive as Eighth Amendment protections. Id. at 1573-74. The Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard, therefore, is applicable in this case. Id.

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Judge Hyles articulates the deliberate indifference standard as applying when officers
are subjectively aware that a “substantial risk of serious harm exists.” (Doc. 39 (citing Carter
v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).) This standard applies to constitutional
violations, such as denial of adequate food, shelter, and medical care and failure to protect
prisoners from violence, that are “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991). The Court concurs with Judge Hyles’ conclusion that Harris has failed to allege a
substantial risk of serious harm to which Sproul and Lewis were deliberately indifferent.
(Doc. 39 at 8.) The Court finds that Harris’ allegations regarding Shepard’s retaliatory conduct simply do not rise to the level of sufficiently serious.
The Court also finds it necessary to consider whether Harris’ claim against Sheriff
Sproul and Major Lewis survives summary judgment under a theory of supervisory liability
since he has alleged that Sproul and Lewis were Shepard’s supervisors. (Doc. 1 at 5; see also
Doc. 23-2 at 11.) A supervisor can be liable for his subordinates’ constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
A causal connection may be established when: 1) a “history of widespread
abuse” puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; 2) a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support
an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or
knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.
Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360).
Here, there are no facts in the record supporting a finding that Sproul or Lewis personally participated in Shepard’s retaliatory actions. Further, there are no facts supporting a
finding of a causal connection. The record contains no facts indicating that Sproul or Lewis
were on notice of the need to correct a history of widespread retaliation. There are no facts
supporting a finding that Sproul or Lewis instituted a custom or policy in deliberate indifference to Harris’ right to be free from retaliation, beyond Harris’ conclusory statements that
Defendants condone Shepard’s actions (E.g. Doc. 31 at 12.). Finally, there are no facts sup3

porting an inference that Sproul or Lewis directed Shepard to retaliate against Harris. Defendants Sproul or Lewis, thus, cannot be held liable on a theory of supervisory liability and
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Upon full review and consideration of the record, the Court finds that Judge Hyles’
Recommendation should be, and hereby is, ACCEPTED, ADOPTED and made the Order of this Court for reason of the findings made and reasons stated therein together with
the findings made and reasons stated herein. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 23) is GRANTED, and judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of November, 2014.

/s/ W. Louis Sands______________________
W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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