WRIGHT v. ARAMARK CORPORATION et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 26 Motion to Strike ; granting 14 Motion to Dismiss; granting 15 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 2/5/2014. (bcl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
TRACEY M. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO.: 1:13-CV-144 (WLS)
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court are Defendants Albany State University and
Everette Freeman’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in Lieu of
Answer (“the ASU Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 14), Defendants Aramark
Campus, LLC, Henry Ward, Aaron Kelly, and Bevelia Allen’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“the Aramark Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”)
(Doc. 15), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the
Motions to Dismiss (Docs 14 & 15) are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc.
26) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint pro se against
Defendants and a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 1 & 2.) On
September 4, 2013, she filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 4.) Following an order to
supplement and Plaintiff’s supplement in compliance thereto, Defendants filed Motions
to Dismiss. (Docs. 5-7, 9-10.) On October 11, 2013, Plaintiff’s request for IFP status was
granted. (Doc. 7.) After Plaintiff was ordered to respond to the Motions to Dismiss, she
filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 12 & 13.)
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In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, she claims that she was formerly
employed by Aramark Corporation and worked at the Albany State University campus.
(Doc. 13 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that she applied and was interviewed for a position as
Office Manager, but “after she was hired[,] for no reasons given[,] her position was
changed to ‘office work’ with less pay despite [the fact that] she was doing the work of
office manager until she was terminated.” (Id. at 5-6.) She claims that, while employed
with Aramark, she was “subjected to harassment, discrimination, inappropriate
remarks” such as when dog bones were allegedly placed on her office chair “implying
that [she] is a ‘dog.’ ” (Id. at 5.) She asserts that she is entitled to relief because Aramark
failed to place her as Office Manager, failed to promote her, underutilized her, engaged
in occupational segregation, considered various protected characteristics when making
employment decisions, failed to compensate her fairly, knowingly hired and promoted
people with “propensities to discriminate” against Plaintiff, denied her the use of
electronic devices, denied her religious accommodations, and penalized her for
complaining about “unlawful discriminations.” (Id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff claims that “Aaron Kelly . . . and Bevelia Allen initiated the
discriminatory practices.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that, on January 9, 2012, Henry
Ward “ordered her to go home and never to return” after she volunteered to clean the
office after it was left in an unsanitary condition following Christmas break. (Id. at 5,
14.) Plaintiff claims that her termination was an act of discrimination on the basis of her
gender, age, religion, and disability. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff also claims that “Defendants violated [her] rights under the [Family
Medical Leave Act by] reprimanding her for tak[ing] the leave and for interfering with
her medical leave [that] she needed due to her and [her] family.” (Id. at 16.) Further,
she claims that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act because she
“was denied accommodation for her medical disability through her employment” since
another employee’s “offensive perfume odor that trigger[ed]” her “respiratory and
breath[ing] problem” was not addressed by management. (Id. at 17-18.) Plaintiff also
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asserts that Defendants are liable for wrongful termination and a violation of the Equal
Pay Act. (Id. at 19; Doc. 13-2 at 3.)
On November 25, 2013, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint. (Docs. 14 & 15.) In the ASU Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ASU
and Everette Freeman claim that they are entitled to dismissal because ASU is not
capable of being sued and Ms. Freeman is not subject to individual liability under any
of the statutes cited by Plaintiff. (See Doc. 14-1 at 5, 8.) Also, the ASU Defendants assert
that they should be dismissed because they are not Plaintiff’s “employer” as defined by
the statutes at issue. (Id. at 6.) Similarly, Defendants Ward, Kelly, and Allen argue that
they are not subject to individual liability under any of the statutes cited by Plaintiff,
and they are not Plaintiff’s “employer” as defined by the statutes cited by Plaintiff. (See
Doc. 15.) Aramark claims that it is entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff’s charge of
discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
only includes sex discrimination, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII
or any other statute. (See id.) On November 5, 2013, Aramark submitted a copy of the
Charge of Discrimination Plaintiff filed with the EEOC. (Doc. 10-1.)
On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff was ordered to respond to the Motions to
Dismiss.
(Doc. 17.)
At that time, the Court reminded Plaintiff that the Second
Amended Complaint rendered her previous complaints and the corresponding motions
to dismiss legal nullities. (See id.) On December 9 and 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed responses
to the Motions to Dismiss.
(See Docs. 18 & 19.)
Plaintiff also included various
documents related to the EEOC proceedings. (See Doc. 18-1.) In her response to the
ASU Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff claims that ASU is capable of being sued
under Title VII and was her employer under that statute because “[t]he stationary
use[d] by [Aramark] . . . says Albany State University is a ‘component’ of [Aramark] or
[Aramark] is a ‘component’ of Albany State University.” (Doc. 18 at 9.) In her response
to the Aramark Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff claims that, under Title VII,
supervisors may be held vicariously liable. (Doc. 19 at 10.) As such, Plaintiff asserts
that her claims against all Defendants are proper. (Id.)
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On December 23, 2013, Defendants filed replies to Plaintiff’s responses. (See
Docs. 21 & 22.) The ASU Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s argument regarding the
definition of “employer” under Title VII is erroneous but, even under her definition,
neither ASU nor Everette Freeman qualify as her employer. (Doc. 21 at 4.) Those
Defendants also argue that the cases cited by Plaintiff “possibly as authority supporting
individual liability” under Title VII “do not stand for the proposition that Title VII
allows for individual liability.” (Id. at 6.) The Aramark Defendants argue that “it is
undisputed that [Plaintiff’s] charge of discrimination only names Aramark and only
alleges sex-based discrimination.”
(Id. at 3.)
Those Defendants also assert that
Plaintiff’s conclusory statements and scant factual allegations are insufficient to state a
claim under Title VII or FMLA. (Id. at 4.)
On January 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendant ASU’s Reply.
(Doc. 26.) Therein, she argues that the “[r]eply filed by Albany State University on
12/23/2013 was untimely and should be stricken on the ground that the only motion
filed by ASU was declared moot and has been denied and there was no other motion
filed by Defendants (ASU) that warrants reply.” (Id. at 2.) On January 27, 2014, the
ASU Defendants filed a response. (Doc. 27.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert by motion the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to
dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless the
plaintiff fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible, and not
merely just conceivable, on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegations are not ‘enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d
1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308,
1309 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Stated differently, the factual allegations in the complaint must
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‘possess enough heft’ to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’ ” Edwards, 602 F.3d
at 1291 (citation omitted).
While the Court must conduct its analysis “accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,” Hill
v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003), in evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s
pleadings, the Court must “make reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, ‘but we are
not required to draw [P]laintiff’s inference.’ ” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252,
1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d
1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court instructs that while on a motion to
dismiss “a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,” this
principle “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, for the proposition that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation” in a complaint).
In the post-Twombly era,
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679.
II.
Analysis
A.
Claims against Albany State University & Individual Defendants
Individual employees are not subject to liability under Title VII, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), or the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). Fodor v.
D’Isernia, 506 F. App’x 965, 966 (11th Cir. 2013) (no individual liability under Title VII or
ADA); Shuler v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 480 F. App’x 540, 543 (11th Cir. 2012) (no
individual liability under ADEA); Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1172
n.17 (11th Cir. 2003) (no individual liability under EPA); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683,
685 (11th Cir. 1999) (no individual liability under FMLA). Thus, to the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against Defendants Foss, Sutherland, Ward, Kelly, Allen,
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McKee, Reynolds, Neubauer, and Freeman in their individual capacities, those claims
are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
The claims Plaintiff seeks to assert under the statutes cited in her Second
Amended Complaint may only be asserted against her employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (Under Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer” to
make employment decisions based on certain protected characteristics.); 42 U.S.C. §§
12111, 12112 (Under the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability”; “The term ‘covered entity’ means an
employer.”); 29 U.S.C. § 630 (Under the ADEA, an “employer” is defined as “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year.”)1; 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (FMLA definition of employer mirrors ADEA
definition); 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Under the EPA, an “employer” is defined as “any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”).
Because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that any Defendant was her
employer as defined by those statutes, save Defendant Aramark, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim against any Defendant except Defendant Aramark. (See Doc. 13 at 3.)
Thus, Defendants Foss, Sutherland, Ward, Kelly, Allen, McKee, Reynolds, Neubauer,
and Freeman2 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.3 To the extent that Plaintiff
seeks to assert claims against any of those Defendants in their official capacities, such
The language in the ADA that defines an “employer” to include “any agent of such person” has been
limited to only “ensure respondeat superior liability of the employer for acts of its agents.” See Mason v.
Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996).
2 Those Defendants are also likely entitled to dismissal on the ground that only Aramark was named in
Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination, and Plaintiff was only given the right to sue Aramark. (See Doc. 18-1
at 56, 58.) See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Ass., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
3 From a review of the record, it appears as though only Aramark, Albany State University, and Everette
Freeman waived service. (See Doc. 8; see generally Docket.) Arguably, Henry Ward, Aaron Kelly, and
Bevelia Allen lost their ability to object to Plaintiff’s failure to serve them with process. (See Docs. 10 &
15.) See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). Nonetheless, the Court finds that all Defendants except Aramark are subject
to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under that section, the Court is required to “dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” Id. Because Plaintiff failed to allege that any Defendant other than Aramark was her employer,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against those Defendants under any of the discrimination statutes cited
in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
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claims are not cognizable because Aramark is a private entity.4 See Owens v. Connections
Cmty. Support Programs, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 791, 796 (D. Del. 2012) (“Generally, a suit
against a[] public officer in his or her official capacity is used to compel that officer to
take some official action [and that] concept . . . is inapplicable to suits against private
parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit.”).
B.
Claims Against Aramark
Aramark argues that Plaintiff can only bring a claim for sex discrimination
because that is the only basis of discrimination alleged in her charge to the EEOC. (Doc.
15 at 8.) Aramark asserts that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for FMLA interference or
retaliation. (Id. at 9.) Aramark also claims that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title
VII for sex discrimination or hostile work environment. (Id. at 11-12.)
i.
Administrative Exhaustion
On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.
(See Doc. 15 at 17.) Therein, she stated that she was “subjected to a hostile work
environment by Aaron Kelly, Manager, Henry Ward, Manager and Bevelia Allen,
Supervisor.” (Id.) She also stated that she “believe[d] that [she] was discriminated
against because of my sex (female).” (Id.) On the Notice of Charge of Discrimination
prepared by the EEOC, only “Sex” is indicated as a basis for discrimination under Title
VII. (Doc. 18-1 at 22.) However, other bases of discrimination were noted by Plaintiff in
a letter to the EEOC dated June 25, 2012. (See id. at 15-20.) In its February 18, 2013, predetermination letter, the EEOC addressed the other bases of discrimination that Plaintiff
raised in her June 25, 2012, letter. (See id. at 12.) The EEOC also noted, however, that
“the only basis that was timely was the basis of sex (female).” (Id.)
Defendant argues that the only basis of discrimination that should be considered
is sex because it was the only basis included in the charge of discrimination. Plaintiff
argues that, because she advised the EEOC of the other bases of discrimination before
Even if official capacity suits against individuals who work for private companies are cognizable, the
suit would, in effect, be one against the company for whom that individual works. See Thomas v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 364 F. App’x 600, 601 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)). Thus,
the Court’s analysis relating to the claims against Aramark would apply with equal force to the official
capacity suits.
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she filed the charge of discrimination, and the EEOC thus had the opportunity to
investigate those additional bases, the additional bases of discrimination should be
considered. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that sex is the only basis of
discrimination that should be considered.
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA require that, prior to filing a claim, a plaintiff
must exhaust the available administrative remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination
with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating that Plaintiff must file Title VII
Charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice); 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (stating that Plaintiff must file disability charge under same strictures as Title
VII charge); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A) (stating that Plaintiff must file age discrimination
charge within 180 days after the alleged discrimination). The FMLA and EPA do not
require administrative exhaustion. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.3d
1518, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1992).
“A judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation ‘which
can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” Penaloza v.
Target Corp., No. 13-10446, 2013 WL 5828008, *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2013) (citing Mulhall
v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994)). “The purpose of exhaustion is
to [give] the [EEOC] the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory or
retaliatory practices.” Basel v. Sec’y of Def., 507 F. App’x 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Wu v.
Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989). Generally, courts may only consider the
Plaintiff’s complaint while analyzing a motion to dismiss. Rueda-Rojas v. United States,
477 F. App’x 636, 637 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76
(11th Cir. 2005)). However, “a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to
determine whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies.”
Id. (citing
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-77 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff has not submitted any documentation to suggest that the additional
bases of discrimination were included in a “charge.” The allegations submitted to the
EEOC on June 25, 2012, did not contain any language to suggest that those allegations
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were verified. (See Doc. 10-1 at 15-20.) Because a valid charge of discrimination must be
verified, Plaintiff’s June 25, 2012, letter was not a valid charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b) (“Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation.”); Pijnenburg v. W. Ga.
Health Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001). Further, as noted by the EEOC,
“the only basis that was timely was the basis of sex (female).” (Doc. 18-1 at 12.)
Because the additional bases were not filed in a valid charge to the EEOC in a timely
manner, the Court will not consider those bases. Pijnenburg, 255 F.3d at 1307-08.
ii.
Title VII Sex Discrimination
To properly state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must
allege that her employer took an adverse employment action against her on the basis of
her gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502 (1993) (noting that there is no liability under Title VII unless unlawful
discrimination motivated an adverse employment action). Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint fits within the definition of a “shotgun pleading,” and, therefore, coherent
factual allegations are difficult to discern.
Plaintiff broadly claims that she “was
harassed” and “discriminated against,” but provides a scant factual basis. She states
that she was not given the wages of Office Manager even though she completed the job
duties associated with that position, dog bones were placed on her desk to suggest that
she is a dog, and she was not given the same privileges that other employees were
given. However, Plaintiff does not assert that any of those incidents were motivated by
her gender.
Although Plaintiff states that she “believe[s] that Aramark has
discriminated against her . . . due to her sex” (Doc. 13 at 14-15), her belief that she was
discriminated against, standing alone, is not sufficient to state a claim for Title VII
discrimination.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for sex
discrimination under Title VII. As stated above, the Court must accept all factual
allegations as true in determining whether the complaint provides the plaintiff with a
plausible entitlement to relief.
However, the Court need not accept as true legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for
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failure to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege a sufficient factual basis for the Court to
conclude that Plaintiff could be entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff has failed to
articulate facts that indicate that an adverse employment action was taken against her
on the basis of her gender, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
Title VII sex discrimination.
iii.
Title VII Hostile Work Environment
To state a claim of hostile work environment under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege
that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Anduze v. Fla. Atl. Univ., 151 F. App’x
875, 878 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To
make such an allegation, Plaintiff must claim that “(1) she belongs to a protected group;
(2) she has been subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic of the employee; (4) the harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of the employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment;’ and (5) the employer is responsible for
such environment under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability.” Id. at 878-79
(citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).
As to her retaliation claim, Plaintiff asserts that she was told to leave and never
come back, her efforts to reorganize the storage room were undermined when another
employee restored the room’s contents to how they were before Plaintiff’s efforts to
reorganize the room, she was not allowed to eat breakfast at her desk, she was
reprimanded for leaving work early even though such activity had previously been
allowed, she was not allowed to use electronic devices, she was forced to work in a
dirty environment, and she was subjected to demeaning language that made her feel
like a child. (See Doc. 13-1.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII because, among other reasons, she did not sufficiently allege that she
was harassed based on a protected characteristic. Plaintiff does not offer any factual
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allegation to suggest that any of the actions were taken because she was female beyond
her own belief. Further, the above-mentioned incidents are not “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of the employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment.” At best, the incidents described by
Plaintiff involve rude co-workers, not individuals engaging in discriminatorily abusive
conduct. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for hostile
work environment.
iv.
Family Medical Leave Act
Plaintiff seems to seek to assert a retaliation claim and interference claim under
the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). See Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of
City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he FMLA creates two types
of claims: interference claims . . . and retaliation claims.”). To state a retaliation claim,
Plaintiff must allege that an adverse employment action was taken against her because
she exercised a right protected by the FMLA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
To state an
interference claim, Plaintiff must allege that Aramark interfered with, restrained, or
denied her the ability to exercise a right protected under the FMLA. See id.
Plaintiff argues that she properly asserted a claim under the FMLA because “she
suffered [a] pattern of reprisal” and that Aramark “[r]eprimand[ed] [her] for using
Family medical leave or interfering with her Family medical leave, sick leave, vacation
time and raises.” (Doc. 12 at 8, 16.) Those factual allegations do not suggest that
Aramark took an adverse employment action against her, forced her to take FMLA
leave, or prevented her from taking FMLA leave. Because those are the only facts
alleged by Plaintiff that implicate her rights protected by the FMLA, she has failed to
state a claim for retaliation or interference under the FMLA.
v.
Equal Pay Act
“To state a claim under the [Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)], a party must [allege] that
the employer paid employees of one gender lower wages for equal work which
required ‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which was performed under similar
working conditions.’ ” Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., No. 13-10726, 2013 WL
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6244735, *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2013) (citing Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1078
(11th Cir. 2003)). As to her EPA claim, Plaintiff stated that she “was discriminated
against when the employer demoted me from Officer Manager to Office Worker” and
that she “was never paid Officer Manager wages before the demotion in title.” (Doc. 132 at 3.) Because Plaintiff has not alleged that a male employee was paid higher wages
for equal work, Plaintiff has failed to assert a valid claim under the EPA.
III.
Motion to Strike
On January 10, 2014, Plaintiff moved to strike the ASU Defendants’ reply (Doc.
22) as untimely. (Doc. 26.) The ASU Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint on November 25, 2013.
(Doc. 14.)
Plaintiff filed a
response on December 17, 2013. (Doc. 19.) The ASU Defendants had fourteen days to
file a reply. See M.D. GA. L.R. 7.3. They filed their reply on December 23, 2013, which
was within the deadline ascribed by Local Rule 7.3. (Doc. 22.) Thus, their reply was
timely. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 26) is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the ASU Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) and
the Aramark Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) are GRANTED. Because no
claims remain in this case, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Also, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 26) is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February 2014.
/s/ W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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