Cotton v. Ben Hill County et al
Filing
38
ORDER granting 25 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE LESLIE J ABRAMS on 03/31/2016. (mdm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
EDDIE LEE CONTON,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BEN HILL COUNTY, GEORGIA, and :
SHERIFF BOBBY MCLEMORE,
:
in his individual capacity,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
CASE NO.: 1:13-CV-149 (LJA)
ORDER
Defendants Ben Hill County’s (“Ben Hill”) and Sheriff Bobby McLemore (“Sheriff
McLemore”) have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff Eddie Lee Cotton’s Section
1983 and state law claims arising out of his arrest in 2012. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ Motions (Docs. 25, 27) are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This action concerns the arrest of Plaintiff and the seizure of his cattle for alleged
animal cruelty.1 On March 24, 2012, Deputy Billy Leonard (“Deputy Leonard”), a deputy
sheriff of the Ben Hill County Sheriff’s Department, observed that Plaintiff’s cattle were tied
with ropes to trees and other objects, preventing them from accessing food or water. Deputy
Leonard subsequently informed Sheriff McLemore of the condition of the cattle, who, in
turn, contacted Joe A. Thomas, a livestock supervisor at the Georgia Department of
The relevant facts are derived from the Amended Complaint (Doc. 7), Defendants’ Answer to the Amended
Complaint (Doc. 13), Sheriff McLemore’s Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 25-1); Ben Hill’s Statement of
Material Facts (Doc. 27-1), Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendants’ Statements of Material Facts (Docs. 34-1, 361), and the record in this case. Where relevant, the factual summary also contains undisputed and disputed
facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, all of which
are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
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Agriculture. Sheriff McLemore requested that Mr. Thomas send an inspector to meet with
Deputy Leonard to assess the condition of the cattle.
On March 29, 2012, Deputy Leonard met Van Sapp, a livestock inspector with the
Georgia Department of Agriculture, at the Plaintiff’s property to evaluate the condition of
the cattle. Mr. Sapp concluded that Plaintiff’s cattle were starving and, based upon the
manner in which they were restrained, the cattle were unable to access food, water, or shade.
As a result, Deputy Leonard believed he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and impound
his cattle for animal cruelty in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(b). Consequently, Deputy
Leonard arrested Plaintiff and coordinated with South Central Livestock to move the cattle
to its facilities for treatment and care. Deputy Leonard was later advised that he would need
to have separate warrants for each animal at issue, which resulted in Plaintiff being arrested
again on April 10, 2015. Plaintiff was bonded out on both occasions and did not spend the
night in jail. Plaintiff’s cattle were returned to him after he successfully repaired his fence to
allow the cattle to roam freely.
On September 10, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action, asserting
federal constitutional tort claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for arrest without probable
cause and deprivation of property without due process of law. (Doc. 1.) On December 9,
2013, Plaintiff amended his complaint, again asserting federal constitutional claims, but also
adding claims pursuant to the Georgia Constitution. (Doc. 7.) Because Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint was filed outside the 21-day “matter of course” window and because Plaintiff
failed to seek leave from the Court or the consent of the Defendants, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to show cause as to why the amended complaint should not be dismissed. (See Doc.
9.) In response, Plaintiff referenced his pro se status as the reason for his filing and asked the
Court to allow him to file his amended complaint to “clarify the issues.” (Doc. 10 at 2.)
On February 10, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file the amended
complaint, but dismissed several of the claims, including Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ben
Hill and his claims against Sheriff McLemore in his official capacity. (See Doc. 12.) Thus, the
only claims the Court allowed to proceed were the federal and state constitutional claims
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against Sheriff McLemore, in his individual capacity, and Plaintiff’s state law claims against
Ben Hill.
On May 28, 2015, Sheriff McLemore and Ben Hill each moved for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (Docs. 25, 27.) On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff
submitted a 36-page response to Sheriff McLemore’s Motion (Doc. 34), and, on July 6, 2015,
Plaintiff filed his response to Ben Hill’s Motion. (Doc. 36.) On July 10, 2015, Sheriff
McLemore filed his reply, requesting that the Court strike pages 21-36 for violations of Local
Rule 7.4. (See Doc. 37.)
Local Rule 7.4 provides that, absent leave from the Court, “all briefs in support of a
motion or in response to a motion are limited in length to twenty (20) pages.” M.D. Ga. L.R.
7.4. Plaintiff did not seek leave to exceed the page limit set forth in Local Rule 7.4. Plaintiff
also failed to file his respective responses within the twenty-one-day deadline provided under
Local Rule 7.2. Plaintiff offers no explanation for exceeding the page limit or untimely filing
his responses. Although pro se plaintiffs are held to less stringent standards than lawyers,
Plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Local Rules of this Court. See Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir.
2002) (“Despite construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required
them to conform to procedural rules.”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)
(a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure”). Moreover, the leniency to which pro se litigants are entitled “does not
give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla.,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).
This is not Plaintiff’s first case before this Court. In fact, Plaintiff has appeared pro se
in at least three other cases prior to commencing this action. See Cotton v. Bank of America,
1:08-CV-77 (M.D. Ga.); Cotton v. G.S. Development, 1:05-CV-116 (M.D. Ga.); Cotton v. Shoney’s
Inn, 1:98-CV-49 (M.D. Ga.). Plaintiff should therefore know and adhere to the applicable
procedural rules. However, given that Plaintiff’s non-compliant filings will not affect the
ultimate resolution of this matter, the Court will not strike them.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary judgment at
any time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir.
2013). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Grimes v.
Miami Dade Cnty., 552 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of the
claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “It is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965
F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there
is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (1986); Barreto v. Davie
Marketplace, LLC, 331 F. App’x 672, 673 (11th Cir. 2009). The movant can meet this burden
by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact, or by
demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some
element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required “to go
beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than
summarily deny the allegations or show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Instead,
the nonmovant must point to evidence in the record that would be admissible at trial. See
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that hearsay may be
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considered on a motion for summary judgment only if it “could be reduced to admissible
evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form”) (quotation omitted). Such evidence may
include affidavits or declarations that are based on personal knowledge of the affiant or
declarant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict in its favor. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. The Court, however, must grant summary
judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Local Rule 56 requires that the movant attach to its motion for summary judgment a
separate and concise statement of material facts to which the movant contends there is no
genuine issue to be tried. M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. The non-movant must then respond “to each of
the movant’s numbered material facts.” Id. “All material facts contained in the movant’s
statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of
materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise
inappropriate.” Id. Moreover, the “respondent to a motion for summary judgment may not
assert insufficient knowledge to admit or deny a material fact asserted by the movant unless
the respondent has complied with the provisions of Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Id.
Plaintiff’s respective responses to Defendants’ Statements of Material Facts largely
consist of unsupported and conclusory assertions without any citation to the record. Thus,
Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56. The Court, however, “cannot grant a
motion for summary judgment based on default or as a sanction for failure to properly
respond.” United States v. Delbridge, No. 1:06-CV-110 (WLS), 2008 WL 1869867, at *3 (M.D.
Ga. Feb. 22, 2008) (citing Trustees of Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Engineers &
Participating Employers v. Wolf Crane Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2004)). Instead,
the Court must undertake an independent review of “the evidentiary materials submitted in
support of the motion” to ensure that the Defendants have met their burden of
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demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. United States v. One Piece of Real
Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004); see also
Delbridge, 2008 WL 1869867, at *3 (finding that the “Court must make an independent
review of the record,” even if the non-movant fails to respond to the statement of material
facts). Having established the applicable standards, the Court will now proceed with
reviewing the merits of Defendants’ Motions.
DISCUSSION
I.
Federal Claims
As noted above, the only federal claims that remain in this action are Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims against Sheriff McLemore, in his individual capacity, for arrest without
probable cause and deprivation of property without due process. The Court allowed these
claims to proceed based on Plaintiff’s allegation that Sheriff McLemore “seized the cattle
and impounded said cattle without due notice to the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 12 at 9.) Sheriff
McLemore contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to
point to any evidence showing that he participated in the decision to arrest Plaintiff and
impound the cattle. According to Sheriff McLemore, Deputy Leonard solely made that
decision based on the report he received from Mr. Sapp. In response, Plaintiff asserts that
Sheriff McLemore participated in the arrest by conversing with Deputy Leonard on March
24, 2011, and requesting that Mr. Thomas send an inspector to assess the condition of the
cattle, such that he should be liable under the theory of supervisory liability.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that “a Claim of Respondeat Superior Liability can
arise out of a suit at 42 U.S.C 1983,” (Doc. 34-2 at 24),“[i]t is well established in this Circuit
that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their
subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269). Rather, “supervisory liability
under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a
supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. The necessary causal
connection can be established by showing that: (1) a history of widespread abuse puts the
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responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails
to do so; (2) a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights; or (3) the facts support an inference that the supervisor directed
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to
stop them from doing so. Id. “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient
to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued
duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)).
It is undisputed that Sheriff McLemore was not present at the time Deputy Leonard
arrested Plaintiff and impounded the cattle. There is also no evidence that Sheriff McLemore
instructed or directed Deputy Leonard to arrest Plaintiff. Rather, the record reflects that the
probable cause determination was made exclusively by Deputy Leonard based on the report
he received from Mr. Sapp. That Sheriff McLemore requested an inspector to meet Deputy
Leonard at the property is not sufficient to establish that Sheriff McLemore personally
participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. It is also insufficient to support an
inference that Sheriff McLemore directed Deputy Leonard to act unlawfully or knew that
Deputy Leonard would act unlawfully prior to Plaintiff’s arrest, but failed to stop him from
doing so.
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that Sheriff McLemore had a
policy or custom that allegedly caused his arrest and the impoundment of the cattle, or that
Sheriff McLemore was deliberately indifferent. As the Supreme Court has stated, “‘deliberate
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan
Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Plaintiff has made no such showing here, and
his conclusory allegations to the contrary are insufficient to meet the “extremely rigorous”
standard necessary to impose supervisory liability. Cotton, 749 F.3d at 1360; see generally Evers
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This court has consistently held that
conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”).
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Furthermore, even if Plaintiff could establish that Sheriff McLemore personally
participated in the arrest and the impoundment of the cattle, his Section 1983 claims would
still fail. It is well-settled that “a supervisor may not be held liable under section 1983 unless
the supervised official committed an underlying violation of a constitutional right.” Myers v.
Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights
were violated because Deputy Leonard lacked probable cause to arrest him and unlawfully
seized his cattle in violation of Georgia law.
“[A]n arrest without probable cause violates the right to be free from an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th
Cir. 2004). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the collective
knowledge of the law enforcement officials, of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has
been or is being committed.” United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This probable cause standard is practical
and non-technical, applied in a specific factual context and evaluated using the totality of the
circumstances.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). “Probable
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity, and even seemingly innocent activity can provide the basis for
probable cause.” Myers, 713 F.3d at 1326 (citation and quotations omitted). “Whether an
arresting officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause naturally depends on
the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137
(internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff was arrested for misdemeanor animal cruelty in violation of O.C.G.A. § 1612-4(b). O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(b) provides that:
(b) A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals when he or she:
(1) Causes physical pain, suffering, or death to an animal by any
unjustifiable act or omission; or
(2) Having intentionally exercised custody, control, possession, or
ownership of an animal, fails to provide to such animal adequate food,
water, sanitary conditions, or ventilation that is consistent with what a
reasonable person of ordinary knowledge would believe is the normal
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requirement and feeding habit for such animal's size, species, breed,
age, and physical condition.
At the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, Deputy Leonard observed Plaintiff’s cattle with their feet
and necks restrained by rope, and unable to access food, water, or shade. Mr. Sapp, a
livestock inspector, agreed that the cattle were being mistreated and recommended that they
be impounded and given medical treatment. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer
could believe that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-124(b)(2). See Cotton v. State, 589 S.E.2d 610, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding conviction
under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(b) where evidence showed that “the cows were confined in a very
small pen, that there was no water in their pen on the day the deputy and agriculture
inspector released them from the pen, that they were thin and desperate for water, and that
they suffered from a lack of water”). Accordingly, Plaintiff suffered no constitutional
deprivation at the time he was arrested.
Plaintiff also asserts that that Deputy Leonard violated his constitutional rights by
unlawfully impounding his cattle. In support, Plaintiff cites to O.C.G.A. § 4-11-9.2(d), which
requires that, before impounding an animal, “a licensed accredited veterinarian approved by
the Commissioner or a veterinarian employed by a state or federal government and
approved by the Commissioner . . . examine and determine the condition or treatment of the
animal.” Plaintiff contends that because Mr. Sapp was not a qualified veterinarian, Deputy
Leonard violated O.C.G.A. § 4-11-9.2(d) and is, thus, liable under Section 1983. Contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertions, “Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong committed
under the color of state law, but only for those that deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.”
Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 69899 (1976)). “While the violation of state law may (or may not) give rise to a state tort claim, it
is not enough by itself to support a claim under section 1983.” Id. (citations omitted); see also
Lovins v. Lee, 53 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he defendants’ violation of that state
statute did not give rise to a viable substantive due process claim.”).
Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that a violation of Georgia law
governing the impoundment of animals contravenes federal law or violates a federal right.
Thus, even if Deputy Leonard failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 4-11-9.2(d) by not having a
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qualified veterinarian examine the cattle before impounding them, Plaintiff has not shown
that such failure “deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.” Hayes
v. Sec’y, Florida Dep't of Children & Families, 563 F. App’x 701, 702-03 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing
Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claim for the impoundment of his cattle fails as a matter of law.
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the impoundment of the cattle violated
Plaintiff’s federal rights, Plaintiff’s claim would still be subject to dismissal. The Supreme
Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee
does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). “For intentional, as for negligent
deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and
unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.” Id. Thus, “[e]ven
assuming the continued retention of [Plaintiff’s cattle] is wrongful, no procedural due
process violation has occurred if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009). “The state of Georgia has
created a civil cause of action for the wrongful conversion of personal property,” Lindsey v.
Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1), and the Eleventh
Circuit has recognized that “[t]his statutory provision covers the unauthorized seizure of
personal property by police officers. Therefore, the state has provided an adequate
postdeprivation remedy when a plaintiff claims that the state has retained his property
without due process of law,” id. (quoting Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n. 1 (11th Cir.
1987)). Accordingly, “[b]ecause [Plaintiff] has had access to an adequate postdeprivation
remedy, no procedural due process violation has occurred.” Id.; see also Burlison v. Rogers, 311
F. App’x 207, 208 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that “as long as some adequate postdeprivation
remedy is available, no due process violation has occurred.”).
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish any violation of a federal right, Sheriff
McLemore is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.
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II.
State Claims
Once a plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed, “there remains no independent
original federal jurisdiction to support the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
the state claims against Defendant.” Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342,
1352 (11th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over claims after it has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state
claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004). “Where § 1367(c) applies, considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity may influence the court’s discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.” Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1353 (citing Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph
Cty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir.1994). The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district
courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been
dismissed prior to trial.” Raney, 70 F.3d at 1089.
The Court finds that any state law claims asserted by Plaintiff should be dismissed to
allow him to pursue those claims in a more appropriate forum. The state court is best
equipped to research and rule on matters of state law, and comity would suggest that it
should be allowed to do so. In addition, Section 1367(d) gives “the plaintiff at least 30 days
to re-file in state court after a federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,”
thereby removing “the principal reason for retaining a case in federal court when the federal
claim belatedly disappears.” Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Scientific–Atlantic, Inc., 493 F.
App’x 78, 82 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012); see also. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing that state law
claims asserted in federal court along with “related” federal claims “shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed”). Although it may be more
convenient for Plaintiff to continue litigating his case in this Court, neither judicial economy
nor fairness to other litigants support retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims while
delaying justice in other cases where the Court retains original jurisdiction. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
In light on the forgoing, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 25, 27)
are (Docs. 25, 27) GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Sheriff McLemore are
DISMISSED with prejudice and Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of March, 2016.
/s/ Leslie J. Abrams
LESLIE J. ABRAMS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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