JONES v. EDMOND et al

Filing 32

ORDER dismissing as moot 7 Motion to Dismiss; granting 19 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing as moot 20 Motion to Stay; granting 22 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. All of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Vincent Edmond remain pending, and the stay on discovery is hereby lifted. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 11/7/14 (wks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
TRABIAN JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
VINCENT EDMOND, individually,
ERIC BRINSON, individually, and
WILEY GRIFFIN, JR., individually,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-31 (WLS)

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Eric Brinson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19), and Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 20)
and Defendant Wiley Griffin, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22). For the following reasons,
Defendant Brinson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 20)
are DENIED as moot and Defendant Brinson’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint (Doc. 19) and Defendant Griffin’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) are
GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Trabian Jones filed his original complaint on February 20, 2014. (Doc. 1.)
Defendant Brinson filed his first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), and the Court thereafter
granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. (Doc. 14.) In the meantime, the Court
granted Defendant Brinson’s Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss. (Doc. 13.) On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint. (Doc. 15.)
Subsequently, Defendants Brinson and Griffin filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s amended
complaint. (Docs. 19, 22.) Defendant Brinson also moved to stay discovery pending
resolution of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Doc. 20.)

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff Jones alleges that on February 25, 2012 the
vehicle in which he was a passenger was stopped at a roadblock/checkpoint in Grady
County, Georgia. At least three officers were at the roadblock—Defendants Edmond, a
Grady County Sheriff’s Deputy; Brinson, a Georgia State Patrolman; and Griffin, a Grady
County Sheriff’s Deputy. Jones alleges that Brinson was the officer in charge at the
roadblock. After the vehicle was stopped, Brinson ordered Jones out of the car and patted
him down, finding no drugs or weapons on him. Brinson told Jones the officers smelled
marijuana in the vehicle, and Jones responded, saying that was not possible. Another
passenger in the vehicle, Chad Smith, was patted down and arrested for driving on a
suspended license, though he was not the driver of the vehicle. Brinson placed Mr. Smith in
the back of the patrol car. While Griffin watched Jones, another officer gave the driver of
the vehicle, Shockasha Adair, a roadside sobriety test, which she passed. Another officer also
searched the inside of the vehicle for drugs and weapons and found no contraband or
weapons. Then, Edmond conducted another pat down search of Jones and searched the
trunk of the vehicle. Again, no contraband or weapons were found on Jones or in the trunk
of the vehicle.
In the presence of Griffin and Brinson, Edmond ordered Jones to the front
passenger side of Brinson’s vehicle and directed Jones to lift his shirt and pull down his
pants and underwear. Jones protested but ultimately complied, exposing his genitals to
public view. Jones characterizes this incident as a strip search but does not allege that
Edmond or any other officer placed his hands on Jones while his body was exposed. When
Jones asked Edmond if he was being detained during the strip search, Edmond responded
affirmatively. The strip search revealed no contraband or weapons.
After the strip search, either Brinson or Griffin or both told the driver of Jones’
vehicle as well as the driver of the vehicle with which they were caravanning to continue on
and gave them Jones’ cell phone. After Jones’ companions drove away, Jones was informed
that he was free to go without a citation. The officers allowed Jones to use Mr. Smith’s

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phone to call his friends. Jones alleges that he was detained at the roadblock for an hour to
an hour and a half.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Brinson’s first Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 7) as moot because an amended complaint and subsequent motion to dismiss,
which the Court now considers, were filed. The Court also DISMISSES Defendant
Brinson’s Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 20) as moot because discovery has remained
stayed since entry of the Court’s April 22, 2014 Order staying discovery and because the
Court now resolves Brinson’s second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19).
Jones sues the Defendants in their individual capacities only. Jones does not
specifically challenge the legality of the roadblock or the pat down searches to which he was
subjected. (Docs. 15 at 10; 24 at 5.) Jones does allege that Edmond subjected him to an
unlawful search and that the strip search constituted excessive force. Jones alleges that
Brinson and Griffin violated his Fourth Amendment rights by failing to intervene in
Edmond’s unlawful search and use of excessive force and by subjecting him to an unlawful
arrest without probable cause. Brinson and Griffin both raise qualified immunity as a
defense to Jones’ Fourth Amendment claims against them.
I.

Motion to Dismiss Standard
Defendants Brinson and Griffin each move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them

based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert by
motion the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to
dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless the plaintiff
fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible, and not merely
conceivable, on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Dismissal
for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegations are not ‘enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Rivell v. Private Health Care System, Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)).
“Stated differently, the factual allegations in the complaint must ‘possess enough heft’ to set

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forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Financial Securities
Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007)).
While the Court must conduct its analysis “accepting the allegations in the complaint
as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff,” Hill v. White, 321
F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003), in evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings the
Court must “make reasonable inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor, ‘but [is] not required to draw
[p]laintiff’s inference.’” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)),
(abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012)). The
Supreme Court instructs that in considering a motion to dismiss “a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint;” this principle, however, “is inapplicable to
legal conclusions,” which “must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, for the proposition that courts “are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” in a complaint).
II.

Qualified Immunity Standard
Both Defendants Brinson and Griffin argue that Jones’ claims against them should be

dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials from suit in their individual capacities when their conduct does not
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense, and when it appears on the face of a complaint that a plaintiff has not
claimed a violation of clearly established law, it is proper to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
To properly claim qualified immunity, a government official “must first prove that he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred.” Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted).
Then, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.”
Id. In order to satisfy this burden, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the defendant committed a
constitutional violation and that (2) the constitutional right the defendant violated was clearly

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established at the time he did it.” Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th
Cir.2004) (quotations omitted). A right “is clearly established [when] it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). “If the law did not put the office on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful . . . qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. at 195.
The Court finds as an initial matter that, taking the facts alleged by Jones as true, both
Brinson and Griffin were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority throughout
the course of events alleged in Jones’ amended complaint. Both Brinson and Griffin were
on-duty law enforcement officers working a roadblock. The Court finds that the stop of
Jones’ vehicle and the subsequent searches were conducted pursuant to the typical job duties
of law enforcement officers, which include traffic stops and searches. See Holloman ex rel.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004). Having found that Brinson and
Griffin were both acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the Court will now
consider whether Jones’ amended complaint alleges that Brinson and Griffin committed
constitutional violations and whether the constitutional rights allegedly violated were clearly
established at the time of the incident.
III.

Jones’ Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claim
Jones alleges that Defendants Brinson and Griffin violated his Fourth Amendment

rights by subjecting him to an unlawful seizure when the stop extended beyond the initial pat
down search and also contends that this seizure transformed into an unlawful arrest without
probable cause. (Doc. 15 at 10, 15.) The Eleventh Circuit explained in U.S. v. Perkins:
The Supreme Court has identified at least three separate categories of policecitizen encounters in determining which level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny
to apply: (1) brief, consensual, and non-coercive interactions that do not
require Fourth Amendment scrutiny, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); (2)
legitimate and restrained investigative stops short of arrests to which limited
Fourth Amendment scrutiny is applied, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3)
technical arrests, full-blown searches, or custodial detentions that lead to a
stricter form of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975).
348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations modified).

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When a vehicle is stopped by a law enforcement officer in a traffic stop, both the
driver and the passengers are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin
v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). Courts have consistently upheld roadblocks and
checkpoints as lawful stops akin to investigatory stops in the second category described by
the Eleventh Circuit. E.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); U.S. v.
McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
During the course of a traffic stop, officers “may order the driver to get out of the
vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment” because the government has a “legitimate
and weighty” interest in officer safety and requiring a driver to exit his vehicle during a
lawful stop constitutes a de minimis intrusion. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11
(1977). Furthermore, following the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio, once a vehicle is stopped, a
driver may be patted down for weapons. Id. at 112. Jones does not contest and the foregoing
supports that the initial vehicle stop and pat down search were lawful under the Fourth
Amendment.
However, “a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment
if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.”
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124
(1984)). In determining the reasonableness of a stop, a court should consider “(i) the public
interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective
facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and expertise.”
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized
certain facts, such as “an officer's not taking the detained individual to a station or office, not
conducting a full search of the person, or not touching the individual,” that indicate that a
stop was investigatory rather than an arrest requiring probable cause. Courson v. McMillian,
939 F.2d 1479, 1492 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). On the other hand, a seizure may
require probable cause where certain other factors are present, such as: “the blocking of an
individual's path or the impeding of his progress; the display of weapons; the number of
officers present and their demeanor; the length of the detention; and the extent to which the

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officers physically restrained the individual.” United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556
(11th Cir. 1989).
The Court therefore considers the factors that Jones alleges transformed his
detention into an arrest that should have been supported by probable cause. These factors
include: the stop’s duration of between an hour and an hour and a half; the officers’ allowing
Jones’ vehicle and companions to leave; the officers’ giving Jones’ cell phone to one of his
companions, who then left; and the roadside strip search. (Doc. 15 at 15.)
The Court first considers whether the duration of the stop transformed the stop into
an arrest under clearly established law. “The temporary seizure of driver and passengers
ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the
stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver
and passengers they are free to leave.”

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 325 (2009).

However, such a stop may become unreasonable where officers’ inquiries measurably extend
the duration of the detention. Id.; see also United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir.1999).
In U.S. v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court emphasized the impossibility of devising a bright line
rule for when the duration of a stop transforms it from a Terry stop to a stop requiring
probable cause. 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). In Pruitt, the Eleventh Circuit held that a detention
was unconstitutional where an officer delayed writing a speeding ticket for nearly an hour
and a half while a he waited for the arrival of a drug dog. Id. In contrast, in U.S. v. Hardy, the
court held that a Terry stop lasting fifty minutes was not unconstitutional where the stop was
extended while officers waited for and utilized a drug dog. 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Court finds that there is, in fact, no bright line rule, and that stops lasting as long as
Jones’ alleged stop lasted have been found to be both lawful and unlawful under various
circumstances. Furthermore, Jones himself alleges the articulable suspicion by which the
officers justified the continued detention of Jones –the officers’ smelling marijuana. (Doc. 15
at 5.) The facts as alleged indicate that the officers were acting on more than an
“unsupported hunch.” Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1221. The Court finds, therefore, that the duration
of the stop alone did not violate clearly established law such as to strip Brinson and Griffin
of their qualified immunity.

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The Court next considers whether the officers’ releasing Jones’ driver and
companions, along with his cell phone, transformed the stop into an arrest under clearly
established law. The Court finds that these actions did not transform the stop into an arrest.
While the officers’ releasing Jones’ companions along with the vehicle he was travelling in
could be considered “impeding his progress,” the Court finds that Jones has not alleged that
he was subjected by Brinson and Griffin to “restraints comparable to those associated with a
formal arrest,” such as handcuffs nor that the officers at any time drew their weapons. United
State v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1149 (11th Cir. 2004). Factors such as relatively short duration
and the public location of the stop support the idea that a traffic stop is not an arrest
requiring probable cause because these factors diminish officers’ inherent intimidating
power. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1149-50 (11th Cir. 2004). According to Jones’
amended complaint, these factors were present in this case. Jones was allowed to call his
companions to pick him up as soon as he was told he was free to go. The Court finds that
these actions alone could not have transformed the stop into an arrest requiring probable
cause and that Jones has not alleged a constitutional violation with regard to these actions
don’t by Brinson and Griffin.
Finally, the Court considers the strip search conducted by Edmond. The Court finds
that even if the strip search violated Jones’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Brinson and Griffin cannot be liable for this violation
because Jones does not allege that Brinson or Griffin ordered or participated in the strip
search.
Taking as true the fact alleged by Jones that Brinson was the officer in charge at the
roadblock, supervisory officials are not automatically liable under Section 1983 for
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of supervisory liability. Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Supervisory liability is only imposed where the
supervisor participates in the unconstitutional conduct or where there is a causal connection
between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation. Id. Jones has not
alleged that Brinson personally participated in the strip search. Nor does Jones allege a causal
connection, such as a custom or policy, notice of a history of abuse by Edmonds sufficient

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to put Brinson on notice, or an order to Edmond to conduct the search. To the contrary,
Jones alleges that after the search Brinson told Edmond that he should not have performed
the strip search. Brinson, therefore, cannot be held liable on a theory of supervisory liability.
Jones’ supervisory liability theory does not allege a constitutional violation by Brinson.
Jones also alleges that Brinson and Griffin are liable for failing to intervene in the
strip search. The Court finds that both are entitled to qualified immunity regarding this
claim. In the excessive force context, an officer who merely stands by while another officer
commits a constitutional violation is liable if he is “in a position to intervene.” Byrd v. Clark,
783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.1986). However, even if Brinson and Griffin were in a
position to intervene, the law at the time of this incident was not clearly established as to
whether they had a duty to intervene under these circumstances involving a strip search that
allegedly constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment rather than an
excessive force claim. See Tarantino v. Citrus County Government, 2014 WL 4385550 at *11-14
(M.D. Fla. 2014) (outlining cases addressing failure to intervene both strip search and
excessive force contexts and concluding that the law at the time of an incident that occurred
on July 17, 2011 was unclear as to whether officers had a duty to intervene in an unlawful
strip search).
The Court agrees with the Tarantino court’s conclusion that failure to intervene
liability may be a viable theory of liability in Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure
claim but that the law at the time of this incident, which occurred less than a year after the
Tarantino incident, was not clearly established. Id. See also Lives v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 360
(8th Cir. 2012) (noting that “other circuits recognized a duty to intervene outside of the
excessive force context” but that in Jones v. Cannon “the Eleventh Circuit refused to find a
clearly established duty to intervene to stop other constitutional violations”) (citing 174 F.3d.
1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)). Defendants Brinson and Griffin, therefore, are entitled to
qualified immunity regarding Jones’ claim that their failure to intervene in the strip search
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
because the law was not clearly that they had a duty to intervene.

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IV.

Jones’ Excessive Force Claim
Jones alleges that the strip search conducted by Edmond constituted excessive force

in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Brinson and Griffin are liable for failing to
intervene. (Doc. 15 at 12.) To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a
plaintiff must allege that a seizure occurred and that “the force used to effect the seizure was
unreasonable.” Bryan v. Spillman, 217 Fed. App’x 882, 885 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). As discussed above, the Court finds that the Defendants did, in fact, “seize” Jones
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court finds that it was clearly established law in the Eleventh Circuit at the time
of the incident that officers could be liable under the Fourth Amendment for failing to
intervene to stop another officer’s excessive force. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 133031 (11th Cir. 2008). However, the Court finds here that it was not clearly established law at
the time of the incident that a strip search executed without any physical contact constitutes
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Jones pleads no facts indicating that any
physical force was used during the strip search. Jones cites Sims v. Glover, a Middle District of
Alabama decision holding that a forced public strip search could constitute excessive force
under the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 24 at 12 (citing 84 F.Supp.2d 1273 (M.D. Ala. 1999)).)
But Sims is not controlling in this District and is insufficient to establish clearly that such a
search constitutes excessive force such that Brinson and Griffin were on notice that they had
a duty to intervene. Neither Jones nor the Court can point to any controlling cases holding
that a public strip search constitutes excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has held repeatedly that more than de minimis force is
required to support an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Bryan v.
Spillman, 217 Fed. App’x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2007); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257-58
(11th Cir. 2000). Since it was not clearly established law that the strip search constituted an
excessive use of force, it follows that Brinson and Griffin cannot be liable for failure to
intervene to prevent the search. See Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
2009) (holding that where officer’s use of force was not excessive, another officer could not

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be liable for failure to intervene). The Court finds, therefore, that Brinson and Griffin are
entitled to qualified immunity on Jones’ excessive force claim.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court finds that Defendant’s Brinson and Griffin are entitled to qualified
immunity from Jones’ Fourth Amendment claims, Defendant Brinson’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 7) and Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 20) are DISMISSED as moot and Defendant
Brinson’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19) and Defendant Griffin’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) are GRANTED as to each of Plaintiff’s claims against them.
All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vincent Edmond remain pending, and the stay on
discovery is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of November, 2014.
/s/ W. Louis Sands______________________
W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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