JONES v. CASSEUS et al

Filing 9

ORDER dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ordered by U.S. District Judge W LOUIS SANDS on 11/18/2014. (bcl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION

LAREGINALD JONES,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
NO. 1:14-CV-116 (WLS)
VS.
:
:
Officer CASSEUS, et al.,
:
:
Defendants
:
_____________________________________

ORDER
Plaintiff LAREGINALD JONES, an inmate at the Dougherty County Jail
(“DCJ”), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit (Doc. 1).
By Order dated September 22, 2014 (Doc. 7), the Court granted Plaintiff’s request
to proceed in forma pauperis and waived the initial partial filing fee.

Plaintiff is

nevertheless obligated to pay the Court’s $350.00 filing fee, using the installment payment
plan described in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The account custodian at the DCJ shall cause to be
remitted to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s
income credited to Plaintiff’s account (to the extent the account balance exceeds $10) until
the $350 filing fee has been paid in full. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of
this Order to the account custodian at the DCJ.
In its September 22nd Order, the Court also directed Plaintiff to supplement his
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complaint, which he has done (Doc. 8). The allegations in Plaintiff’s original complaint
and supplement are addressed below.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial
screening of a prisoner complaint “which seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court
to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”
A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual
allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.”
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).

A complaint fails to state a claim

when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint
“must contain something more . . . than  a statement of facts that merely creates a
suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
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In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must
be viewed as true.

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”

Tannenbaum v. United States,

148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579,
1581 (11th Cir. 1995).

If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide

factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to
dismissal.

See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming

the district court’s dismissal of a section 1983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual
allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). See also 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the
standard in section 1915A “shall” be dismissed on preliminary review).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was paroled from state prison on February 28, 2011. On March 3, 2011,
Plaintiff was pulled over while driving a car he had borrowed from a friend. Plaintiff was
not wearing a seat belt and did not have a valid driver’s license. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Officers Casseus, Jenkins, and George Camp conducted a warrantless search of
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the car Plaintiff was driving and found several bags of marijuana. Plaintiff was taken to
the Dougherty County Jail, where Defendant Officers Jerry Fulmer & John Doe
interviewed him. Following the interview, Plaintiff was placed under arrest and charged
with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and violation of his parole.
Plaintiff was arraigned on March 4, 2011. Also on that day, Plaintiff’s friend
confessed that the marijuana found in her car belonged solely to her, not to Plaintiff.
Defendant Parole Officer Chris Walker recommended revocation of Plaintiff’s parole,
notwithstanding that Walker heard Plaintiff’s friend’s confession. Plaintiff’s parole was
revoked, apparently in March 2011, and he was returned to prison until March 2012.
On April 18, 2014, the marijuana charge against Plaintiff was dropped.
Plaintiff filed this action against the above named Defendants on August 7, 2014,
seeking damages for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and denial of
substantive due process.
III. DISCUSSION
A. False Arrest and Imprisonment
The length of the statute of limitations for filing a section 1983 claim is controlled
by state law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). In Georgia, the limitations period
for a section 1983 claim is the two-year statute for personal injury claims codified at
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986).
Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations period for claims under
section 1983, federal law determines the date the claim accrues, which is when the
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statutory period begins to run. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996).
A claim seeking damages for false arrest and imprisonment accrues when the victim
becomes held pursuant to legal process or, if earlier, when the victim is released. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-91 (2007); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)
(false arrest claims “‘cover the time of detention up until the issuance of process or
arraignment, but not more’”).

Any claim arising out of confinement beyond institution

of legal process is a claim for malicious prosecution, Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392, which
accrues when the prosecution terminates in the criminal defendant’s favor.

Burgest v.

McAfee, 2008 WL 344485 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2008); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581,
585-86 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claim is barred by the two-year statute of
limitations.1

Plaintiff received legal process on March 4, 2011, when he appeared at his

arraignment.

His complaint is dated August 15, 2014, more than two years thereafter.

B.

Malicious Prosecution

To state a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must allege the
elements of a common law malicious prosecution claim and “a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Grider v. City of Auburn,

Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010).

The elements of a malicious prosecution

claim by a Georgia plaintiff are as follows:

“(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or

1 Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the warrantless search of the car he was driving. Any such
claim would likewise be barred by the statute of limitations.

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continued by the [Section 1983] defendant, (2) with malice and without probable cause,
(3) that terminated in the [Section 1983] plaintiff’s favor, (4) that caused damage to the
[Section 1983] plaintiff, and (5) that resulted in unreasonable seizure of the [Section
1983] plaintiff.”

Smith v. Mercer, __ F. App’x __, 2014 WL 4977332 (Sept. 30, 2011)

(citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881-82 (11th Cir. 2003)).

“[T]he existence of

probable cause defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256.
Even if Plaintiff’s arrest on the marijuana charge were without probable cause,
which does not appear to be the case, Plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of that
charge.

Plaintiff was sent back to prison based upon the other charge arising out of his

March 2011 arrest -- that he violated his parole.

See Sevostiyanova v. Cobb County of

Georgia, 569 F. App’x 666 (11th Cir. June 13, 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s valid arrest
and conviction on one charge precluded her suffering damages as a result of another
charge arising from the same arrest). Because Plaintiff has not successfully challenged his
parole revocation, he cannot attack such revocation in a section 1983 action.

See Heck,

512 U.S. at 486-87 (“To recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177
(3d Cir. 2006) (applying Heck to parole revocations).
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Plaintiff thus has not alleged a

colorable malicious prosecution claim.
C.

Substantive Due Process

Plaintiff summarily alleges a claim for violation of his substantive due process
rights.

There is, however, “no substantive due process right to be free from malicious

prosecution without probable cause.”

Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 853 (11th Cir.

2010) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994)).
IV.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the instant lawsuit is hereby DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
SO ORDERED, this

18th

day of November, 2014.

/s/
W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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