CALHOUN v. LOCKETTE et al

Filing 15

ORDER granting 5 JOINT MOTION to Stay Discovery; granting 10 JOINT MOTION Stay Issuance of the Issuance of the Scheduling Order; denying [1-3] Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Certification of Class Action; denying [1-4] Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE LESLIE J ABRAMS on 11/28/2017. (mdm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
APRIL D CALHOUN,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIE E LOCKETTE, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 1:17-CV-153 (LJA)

ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff April Calhoun’s Motion for Preliminary Certification of
Class Action, Doc. 1-3, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 1-4, Defendants’
Motion to Stay Discovery, Doc. 5, and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Issuance of the Scheduling
Order, Doc. 10.
For the reasons stated below: Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Certification of Class
Action, Doc. 1-3, is DENIED; Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 1-4, is
DENIED; and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery and Motion to Stay Issuance of the
Scheduling Order, Docs. 5 & 10 are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This action was originally filed in the Superior Court of Dougherty County and was
removed to this Court by Defendants. Doc. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that she was incarcerated
as a pretrial detainee in the custody of Defendant Sheriff Sproul, the Sheriff of Dougherty
County, on April 22, 2017. Doc. 1-2 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that her Fourth and Sixth
Amendment and due process rights under the federal Constitution and her rights under the
Georgia Constitution were violated because: (1) from the date of her arrest through the date
of filing this action, Plaintiff had no bond set nor was she afforded a bond hearing; (2) “other
than a first appearance . . . [Plaintiff] has had no court appearance [ ] since the date of her
arrest, including any court of inquiry (also referred to as a ‘preliminary hearing’ or a ‘probably

cause hearing’) pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-20, et seq.;” (3) Plaintiff applied for appointed
counsel but “has not had any visits from or communications from any attorney;” (4) Plaintiff
requested “a bond hearing or other court hearing since her arrest by asking employees of
Defendant Sproul, but was informed . . . that they [cannot] do so, but that any request for a
bond hearing or other hearing must come from an attorney;” (5) the magistrates of Dougherty
County follow the policy of Defendant State Court Judge Darrisaw “in regards to setting
bonds and setting hearings for a court of inquiry (committal hearings);” (6) Defendant
Darrisaw has a policy “of refusing to set bonds for pretrial detainees on warrants which charge
certain felonies, as in this case, even though they are authorized by law, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1, to
do so;” (7) Defendant Darrisaw has a policy “of refusing to set dates for courts of inquiry, also
known as committal hearings or probable cause hearings, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-20, et
seq., unless requested to do so by an attorney at law,” resulting in the “jailing for weeks and
sometimes months of persons who are wholly innocent of the offense, or against him there is
no evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to detain them . . . pending a grand jury
presentment;” (8) “there is no procedure . . . to obtain a hearing for either setting a bond,
reducing a bond, or setting a court of inquiry” without an attorney request; (9) “[w]hen
committal hearings are afforded, they have frequently been conducted in derogation of Due
Process of Law and in derogation of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-28, by [ ] Defendant Darrisaw;” and
(10) Defendant Darrisaw has “refused” to allow criminal defendants “to subpoena witnesses
and evidence, . . . present live testimony, . . . and ha[s] bound over [criminal] defendants based
on the hearsay testimony of persons . . . whom the court refused to allow the accused to call
to the witness stand.” Doc. 1-2 at 3-7.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Superior Court Judge Lockette and Sproul are “not
alleged to have committed any transgressions in regard to [Plaintiff],” but were named to
“allow the class to obtain full relief.” Doc. 1-2 at 7-8. Plaintiff seeks a “writ of prohibition,” a
“writ of mandamus,” an “order supervising inferior court,” both “preliminary and permanent”
injunctive relief, and the release of Plaintiff and the proposed class members from jail. Doc.
1-2 at 9-10.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Motion for Preliminary Class Certification
The Court first notes that Plaintiff relies on her Motion for Class Certification that she

filed in state Superior Court—referencing only Georgia law. This Court, however, will apply
federal law. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions.” Mills v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008). To represent a class, Plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “These four requirements are commonly referred to as numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Once the Rule 23(a) requirements are
met, parties seeking to represent a class must establish at least one of the[ ] three requirements
[of] Rule 23(b),” Mills, 511 F.3d at 1307-08, specifically:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members
would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that,
as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Rule 23 requirements
have been met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).

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Here, Plaintiff seeks a class “composed of all present and future pretrial detainees in
custody of Defendant Sproul in the Dougherty County, Georgia, jail facility.” Doc. 1-3. As to
the Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiff makes no argument, but appears to stand on her
Complaint, reciting that the requirements for class certification, albeit stated in terms of
Georgia law, have been met. See Doc. 1-3. Assuming for argument’s sake that this is proper,
Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a). Plaintiff satisfies the impracticability
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1); however, her allegations do not satisfy the other three
requirements. Specifically, Plaintiff does not show that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class because the Complaint makes clear that: not all pretrial detainees are
deprived of the hearings Plaintiff seeks; not all pretrial detainees have the same felony charges
that precipitated the denial of bond; and not all pretrial detainees lack appointed counsel. Thus,
Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 23(a)(2). The Complaint further makes clear that Plaintiff’s
claims are not typical of those in the class. Some members of the proposed class were given
committal hearings while Plaintiff was not. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s individual claims are not
applicable to those proposed class members that were purportedly deprived of rights under
Georgia law at said committal hearings. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 23(a)(3). Plaintiff
also has not demonstrated that her situation was or is sufficiently similar to those of the
members of the class she seeks to represent such that she can fairly and adequately protect the
class’ interests. The broad class of all pretrial detainees in the Dougherty County Jail
encompasses a wide variety of individualized circumstances, and Plaintiff has made no attempt
to explain how or why she is uniquely situated to represent all of those individualized
circumstances. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 23(a)(4). Accordingly, preliminary class
certification is not appropriate.
II.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff presents no argument in her Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 1-4.

From the face of the Complaint, however, Plaintiff has not met the required elements for a
preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish:
“(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs

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whatever damage the proposed injunction might cause the non-moving party; and (4) if issued,
the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Lebron v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of
Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff
does not present claims against two of three named Defendants. Further, much of the relief
sought is not within this Court’s power. For example, Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus
against Defendant Judge Darrisaw. However, “[a] federal court lacks the general power to
issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of
their duties.” Johnson v. Georgia, 661 F. App’x 578, 581 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Finally, it is not apparent that irreparable injury will be suffered unless an injunction
is issued. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate.
III.

Motions to Stay

Given that the Court declines to certify Plaintiff’s proposed class and given the
deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint noted above, a stay of both discovery and the issuance of
the Court’s scheduling order is appropriate. A district court has broad discretion in regulating
discovery. See Moore v. Potter, 141 F. App’x 803, 808 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that “district
court did not abuse its broad discretion” when entering stay of discovery to resolve motion to
dismiss). The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “[f]acial challenges to the legal sufficiency
of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief,
should . . . be resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d
1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.” U.S. v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (11th Cir. 1991).
“To determine whether a stay is appropriate a district court ‘must balance the harm
produced by the delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted and
entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.’” Arriaga-Zacarias v. Lewis Taylor Farms, Inc., 2008
WL 4544470, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2008) (quoting Fedlman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652
(M.D. Fla. 1997)). “In making this determination it may be helpful for the court to take a
‘preliminary peek’ at the merits of the dispositive motion to assess the likelihood that such
motion will be granted.” Id.

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Here, Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings “challenging Plaintiff’s
standing, raising sovereign immunity with respect to some claims, and challenging the
sufficiency of the Complaint.” Doc. 5 at 2; Docs. 3 & 4. Based on the Court’s preliminary
review of the Complaint and the briefing submitted in connection with the Motions for
judgment on the pleadings, a stay is appropriate as there may be valid defenses that would
limit the scope of the Complaint. By staying discovery until the Motions for judgment on the
pleadings are ruled upon, the parties will benefit by avoiding unnecessary discovery. The
resulting harm is minimal when compared to that benefit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Certification of Class Action, Doc. 13, is DENIED; Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 1-4, is DENIED; and
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery and Motion to Stay Issuance of the Scheduling Order,
Docs. 5 & 10 are GRANTED. Discovery and the issuance of the scheduling order in the
instant action are STAYED pending the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motions for Judgment
on the Pleadings, Docs. 3 & 4.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of November, 2017.

/s/ Leslie J. Abrams
LESLIE J. ABRAMS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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