Sadler v. Franklin County School District
Filing
27
ORDER granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 08/03/2011 (ajp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
KENNETH R. SADLER,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
FRANKLIN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
*
CASE NO.
3:10-CV-26 (CDL)
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
former
Kenneth
employer,
(“FCSD”),
of
29 U.S.C. § 621
Motion
for
Sadler
Defendant
terminated
violation
R.
his
the
seq.
Summary
Franklin
County
employment
Age
et
(“Sadler”)
because
Discrimination
(“ADEA”).
Judgment
(ECF
In
No.
in
its
11),
claims
that
his
School
District
of
age,
his
Employment
presently
FCSD
in
Act,
pending
argues
that
Sadler is collaterally estopped from pursuing this claim because
the
issue
was
previously
decided
arising from Sadler‟s termination.
in
the
state
court
action
For the following reasons,
the Court grants FCSD‟s motion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P.
56(a).
Fed. R.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party=s favor.
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is material if it is relevant or
necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in light most favorable to Sadler, the facts are as
follows.
I.
Overview of Sadler’s Employment with FCSD
Sadler has worked as a teacher, assistant principal, and
principal during his career in education.
19:25, 24:4-16, ECF No. 18-1.
Sadler Dep. 18:14-
He retired from his job as a high
school principal in 1997, but after spending several years in
retirement,
Sadler
accepted
a
job
with FCSD as an assistant
principal at Franklin County Middle School (“FCMS” or “middle
school”) in 2001.
As an assistant principal at FCMS, Sadler
primarily handled discipline, with additional responsibility for
bus
and
building
maintenance.
academic
performance
teachers
in
stayed
on
their
task
and
and
teacher
classrooms
that
Sadler
the
and
instruction
making
teachers
2
also
sure
were
assisted
with
by
observing
that
students
prepared
to
give
instruction.
Id. at 55:15-56:9.
Sadler‟s yearly evaluations
reveal that he was not responsible for curriculum, and in some
years he was not assigned to the areas of student performance,
organizational setting, comprehensive improvement plan, or staff
performance.
See
Sadler
Dep.
Ex.
5,
Georgia
Leadership
Evaluation Instrument: Annual Evaluation Report, ECF No. 18-9.
Sadler helped with the SACS plan—an accreditation program for
school
systems—the
year
the
middle
school
was
under
review.
Floyd Dep. 16:25-17:4, ECF No. 23. He also attended meetings on
school improvement, and although Sadler was not a formal member
of the team that created the school improvement plan, he did
make
verbal
contributions
improve the school plan.
and
suggestions
regarding
Sadler Dep. 71:12-72:9.
review student test results.
how
to
Sadler helped
Floyd Dep. 17:13-18:4.
During his
employment with FCSD, Sadler also attended conferences aimed at
professional
learning
development.
Sadler
Dep.
43:20-44:5;
Sadler Dep. Ex. 4, Franklin County Schools SDU Credit Forms, ECF
No. 18-8.
II.
Sadler’s Transfer to ISS
For the 2006-2007 school year,
FCMS
failed
to meet the
adequate yearly progress requirements (“AYP”) of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq., for the
second year in a row.
As a result, the school was in jeopardy
of being reconstituted by removing the principal and faculty.
3
Def.‟s Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 5, O‟Dell Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 115.
FCSD‟s Superintendent at the time, Frederic Ayer (“Ayer”),
determined that changes needed to be made at FCMS in order to
improve performance.
Def.‟s Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 3, Ayer
Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 11-3.
After discussing the matter with the
principal
of
school,
concluded
that
the
middle
administrators
Lucy
at
Floyd
the
(“Floyd”),
school
knowledgeable about curriculum and instruction.
felt
that
Sadler‟s
strength
was
student
needed
to
Id. ¶ 5.
discipline,
Ayer
be
Floyd
but
he
lacked the “skill set” necessary to help the school improve in
providing instruction to students.
Floyd Dep. 35:3-11.
Given Sadler‟s focus on discipline throughout his career,
Ayer thought that Sadler did not have sufficient knowledge of
curriculum
and
meeting AYP.
this
belief,
instruction
to
Ayer Aff. ¶ 5.
he
proposed
assist
the
management
team
in
Ayer asserts that on the basis of
to
the
Franklin
County
Board
of
Education (“Local Board”) that Sadler be transferred to the In
School
Suspension
(“ISS”)
position
School (“FCHS” or “high school”).
at
Id.
Franklin
County
High
Ayer suggested to the
Local Board that Sadler receive the same compensation that he
did
as
an
assistant
principal,
although
responsibilities would not be administrative.
Id.
his
primary
Ayer planned
for Sadler to help the two assistant principals at FCHS with
administrative duties when they could not cover them because of
4
their coaching responsibilities.
Id.
The Local Board indicated
at the meeting that it would agree to the transfer but did not
vote on the issue at that time.
Sadler
claims,
Id.
however,
that
when
Ayer
met
with
him
regarding the transfer proposal, Ayer did not mention his lack
of
administrative
instruction
Sadler,
as
Ayer
experience
the
told
him
that
the
areas
for
reason
in
of
the
transfer.
he
was
being
curriculum
According
transferred
and
to
“since
you‟re old, the [middle] school is large, and your pay will
remain the same until you retire in three-and-a-half years.”
Sadler Dep. 91:6-8; see also id. 92:19-23.
At the time of the
proposed transfer, Sadler was 70 years old.
Sadler told Ayer
that he accepted the transfer as long as FCSD paid him the same
amount and allowed him to keep the position until he retired.
Id.
at
96:20-97:5.
“mentioned,
as
he
Ayer
had
claims
before,
that
that
at
the
meeting
Sadler
the
new
middle
school
building was large and he was having some difficulty getting
around it.”
Ayer Aff. ¶ 6.
He denies saying anything about
Sadler being old or anything about his age.
Id.
After his meeting with Sadler, Ayer told Floyd that she
could
begin
looking
principal at FCMS.
for
Sadler‟s
Id. ¶ 7.
replacement
as
assistant
In March 2007, Ayer presented his
recommendations to the Local Board for teacher and administrator
contract
renewals,
and
the
Local
5
Board
approved
the
recommendations.
Ayer
Aff.
Minutes ¶ I, Mar. 8, 2007.
Ex.
A,
Franklin
County
The list of renewals from FCMS
included Sadler‟s name as an assistant principal.
0340.
in
Schools
Id. at DEF
Shortly after that, Ayer left his job to take a position
Alabama.
After
Ayer
left
but
before
FCSD‟s
new
Superintendent, Ruth O‟Dell (“O‟Dell”) began, Floyd recommended
Jason Macomson (“Macomson”) as Sadler‟s replacement.
Floyd Dep.
Ex. 7, Franklin County Schools Recommendation to Superintendent,
Apr. 11, 2007.
Macomson was 34 years old.
the hiring of Macomson to replace Sadler.
The Board approved
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 17,
Franklin County Schools Minutes ¶ I, May 16, 2007, ECF No. 22 at
117.
III. FCSD’s Budget Problems and Elimination of the ISS Teaching
Position
Shortly
after
O‟Dell
assumed
her
new
position
as
Superintendent at FCSD, she discovered that the district faced a
severe budget crisis.
The Board instructed O‟Dell to review
different options for cutting the budget.
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 17,
Franklin County Schools Minutes ¶ G, May 16, 2007, ECF No. 22 at
116.
Sadler
signed
and
position on June 5, 2007.1
returned
his
contract
for
the
ISS
On June 7, 2007, O‟Dell presented
1
Sadler previously signed a contract on May 22, 2007 accepting a
position as assistant principal at FCHS.
Sadler Dep. 142:7-14.
Sadler subsequently signed the contract assigning him to the ISS
position and reflecting the arrangement initially proposed by Ayer.
Sadler Dep. 143:23-144:11, 147:16-19; Sadler Dep. Ex. 10, Contract of
Employment, June 5, 2007, ECF No. 18-15.
6
several options for reducing the deficit, including a reductionin-force
(“RIF”)
plan.
As
part
of
the
RIF
package,
O‟Dell
proposed eliminating the requirement that the ISS position be
filled by a certificated teacher because the State Board of
Education
rules
did
not
require
ISS
to
certificated employee. O‟Dell Aff. ¶ 16.
be
staffed
with
a
Sadler‟s salary in the
ISS position would have been $73,614, with an additional $24,278
in retirement and health insurance benefits, totaling $97,892.
Id.
¶
17.
In
contrast,
filling
the
ISS
position
with
a
paraprofessional who did not have a teaching certificate would
cost FCSD $25,129.
Id.
O‟Dell asserts that she considered moving Sadler to another
position once she decided to recommend the RIF package including
elimination of the ISS certificated position.
O‟Dell
could
have
moved
Sadler
to
an
O‟Dell Aff. ¶ 19.
assistant
principal
position at either the high school or the middle school.
Dep. 50:10-21.
O‟Dell
FCHS had an opening for an assistant principal,
but O‟Dell concluded that Sadler should not be transferred to
that
position
because
administrative skills.
of
his
lack
O‟Dell Aff. ¶ 19.
of
instructional
The Human Resource
Director informed O‟Dell that Sadler was not eligible to be
certificated
leadership
for
a
position
certificate.
other
Id.
than
Ultimately,
one
O‟Dell
requiring
a
decided
to
offer Sadler the ISS position at the paraprofessional pay rate.
7
On June 8, 2007, O‟Dell met with Sadler to inform him of
her recommendation to eliminate the certification requirement
for the ISS position and the resulting reduction in his salary.
O‟Dell Dep. 57:12-58:20.
Sadler does not recall whether O‟Dell
discussed any effort that she made to reassign him to another
position or any of the budget issues leading to the decision.
Sadler Dep. 150:25-153:24.
All he remembers from the meeting
was that O‟Dell told him that his salary would be approximately
$19,000.
Id. at 151:6-24.
Sadler declined the paraprofessional
ISS position.
The
Local
Board
held
a
meeting
considered O‟Dell‟s budget proposals.
on
June
14,
2007
and
In addition to the RIF—
which implicated several FCSD employees—her proposed reductions
included the elimination of new school buses, elimination of
dental insurance for employees, and cancelling optional field
trips.
June
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 11, Franklin County Schools Minutes ¶ H,
14,
2007,
ECF
No.
22
at
97-99.
She
presented
five
different options consisting of various combinations of expense
reductions
and
millage
increases.
Id.;
O‟Dell
Dep.
Ex.
3,
Budget Development PowerPoint Presentation, June 14, 2007, ECF
No. 22 at 7-8.
a
RIF
The Local Board approved a package that included
eliminating
several
positions,
including
certification requirement for the ISS position.
the
teaching
O‟Dell Dep. Ex.
11, Franklin County Schools Minutes ¶ H, June 14, 2007, ECF No.
8
22 at 97-98.
The Local Board also approved the transfer of
another administrator—whose position was eliminated in the RIF—
to and “associate principal” position at FCHS, and it approved
several new hires.
Id. ¶ I, ECF No. 22 at 100.
Sadler‟s counsel sent a letter to O‟Dell asserting Sadler
had
been
discriminated
against
requesting an investigation.
Daniel
to
R.
O‟Dell,
June
on
the
basis
of
age
and
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 18, Letter from M.
22,
2007,
ECF
No.
22
at
118-19.
O‟Dell did not conduct an investigation because, according to
O‟Dell,
position
she
and
made
the
would
recommendation
have
been
to
eliminate
investigating
her
own
the
ISS
conduct.
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 9, In re Sadler: Hr’g Before Franklin Cnty. Bd.
of Educ. 89:18-25, Aug. 27, 2007 [hereinafter Fair Dismissal Act
Hr‟g Tr.], ECF No. 22 at 39.
O‟Dell
stating
his
that
as
a
result
of
sent Sadler a letter
refusal
to
accept
the
paraprofessional ISS position, she would seek termination of his
employment
under
the
Fair
(“Fair Dismissal Act”).
Dismissal
Act,
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940
O‟Dell Dep. Ex. 20, Letter from R.
O‟Dell to K. Sadler, July 2, 2007, ECF No. 22 at 121.
The
letter identified the specific grounds under which O‟Dell was
seeking
Sadler‟s
termination,
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(6),
which
see
provides
id.,
for
including
termination
in
order to “reduce staff due to loss of students or cancellation
of
programs,”
and
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(8),
9
allowing
termination
for
“[a]ny
other
good
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(6) & (8).
informing
Sadler
proceedings,
special
she
of
her
offered
education
and
cause,”
After O‟Dell sent the letter
initiation
Sadler
students.
sufficient
a
of
the
co-teaching
O‟Dell
Dep.
termination
position
71:3-72:3.
with
Sadler
rejected O‟Dell‟s offer.
IV.
Sadler’s Fair Dismissal Act Hearing and Subsequent Appeals
to the State Board of Education and Franklin County
Superior Court
Pursuant
conducted
a
to
the
hearing
Fair
Dismissal
regarding
Act,
Sadler‟s
generally Fair Dismissal Act Hr‟g Tr.
the
Local
Board
termination.
See
At the hearing, Sadler
argued that the proposed termination of his contract was the
result of age discrimination.
The Local Board found cause to
terminate
contract,
Sadler‟s
employment
termination was lawful.
concluding
that
the
Fair Dismissal Act Hearing 199:6-16,
ECF No. 22 at 66.
Sadler appealed the Local Board‟s decision to the State
Board of Education (“State Board”).
Sadler argued that he was
terminated because of his age and that O‟Dell failed to follow
FCSD‟s RIF policy.
Def.‟s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Decision,
Sadler v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 1-2, Case No. 2008-20,
Feb. 15, 2008, ECF No. 11-7.
The State Board noted that Sadler
made the same claims at the Fair Dismissal Act Hearing.
The State Board sustained the Local Board‟s decision.
10
Id.
Id. at 3.
In
its
written
decision
affirming
Sadler‟s
termination,
the
State Board specifically found that the record did not support
his age discrimination claim.
Sadler
further
appealed
County Superior Court.
Id. at 2.
his
termination
to
the
Franklin
The superior court reviewed the Local
Board‟s decision under the “any evidence” rule, which requires
the court to affirm the decision of the Local Board if there is
any evidence in the record to support the decision.
Def.‟s Mot.
for Summ. J. Ex. B, Order Affirming Decision of the Bd. of
Educ., Sadler v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civil Action 08FV-0228, ECF No. 11-8 [hereinafter Superior Court Order].
Sadler argued in his appeal to the superior court that he
was
terminated
specifically
because
considered
of
his
The
comment
Ayer‟s
age.
that
superior
he
transferred
Sadler because he was old and the building was large.
& n.1.
court
Id. at 2
The court assumed without deciding that Ayer‟s decision
to transfer Sadler to the ISS position was discriminatory.
Id.
at 6.
Despite this assumption, however, the court found that
“there
was
evidence
before
the
Board
that
could
support
a
decision that Dr. O‟Dell did not act with any discriminatory
animus when she made the budget recommendations which included
change to the ISS position.”
Id.
Further, “[t]here was no
evidence of discriminatory comments by Dr. O‟Dell, [and] the
selection of the younger individual[,] [Dr. Macomson,] occurred
11
before
the
events
related
to
budget
reductions.”
Id.
The
superior court noted that Sadler argued in the Fair Dismissal
Act Hearing “that the sequence of events revealed the „real‟
reason
for
the
discrimination.”
change
Id.
in
the
ISS
position
was
age
According to the superior court, the
Local Board “could have, but did not, accept the allegation of
age discrimination.”
Id.
The superior court concluded that it
could not substitute its judgment for that of the Local Board.
Id.
The superior court acknowledged Sadler‟s argument to the
Local Board that “the decision to transfer was „inextricably
intertwined‟ with the decision to terminate him.”
Id. at 6 n.3.
Again, the superior court observed that “the Board could have,
but apparently did not, draw [sic] such a connection.”
Id.
The
court found that “[t]here was no evidence of a concerted plan by
the former superintendent and Dr. O‟Dell to place Mr. Sadler in
a position that was slated for elimination.”
court
determined
that
“there
was
evidence
Id.
in
The superior
the
record
to
support the decision of the Board of Education [and] that the
Board was not compelled to find the Superintendent‟s decision
was infected by age discrimination.”
Franklin
County
Superior
Court
Id. at 9.
affirmed
the
Thus, the
decision
of
the
State Board of Education upholding the Local Board‟s termination
of Sadler‟s contract.
Id. at 10.
12
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 19, 2007.
Pl.‟s Resp. to Def.‟s Mot. for Summ J. [hereinafter Pl.‟s Resp.]
Ex. B, Charge of Discrimination, ECF No. 20-2.
Sadler
a
right-to-sue
letter
received January 22, 2010.
to Sue, ECF No. 20-4.
2010.
on
January
The EEOC issued
20,
2010
that
was
Pl.‟s Resp. Ex. D, Notice of Right
Sadler filed this action on April 22,
Compl., ECF No. 1.
DISCUSSION
FCSD
argues
that
the
judgment
rendered
by
the
Franklin
County Superior Court affirming Sadler‟s termination for cause
precludes Sadler‟s claim that FCSD terminated him because of his
age.
Sadler
asserts
federal
courts
give
that
full
28 U.S.C. § 1738—requiring
faith
and
credit
judgments—should not apply to ADEA cases.
to
state
that
court
Sadler also argues
that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present his
age discrimination claim in the state proceedings.
The Court
rejects both of Sadler‟s contentions and will address each of
them in more detail in turn.
I.
Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to ADEA Cases
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, State “judicial proceedings . . .
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
13
Possession
from
which
they
are
taken.”
28
U.S.C. § 1738.
Accordingly, federal courts must “afford the same full faith and
credit to state court judgments that would apply in the State‟s
own courts.”
(1982).
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 463
“[A]n exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless
a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal.”
Id. at 468 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980)).
“It
is,
of
course,
a
cardinal
principle
of
statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored.”
Id.
(internal
has
quotation
marks
omitted).
The
Supreme
Court
determined that Congress did not intend to create an exception
to
§ 1738‟s
long-standing
directive
to
federal
courts
when
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Kremer,
456 U.S. at 466-79 (concluding that in Title VII cases, § 1738
requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court
judgments when courts from that state would do so); Allen v.
McCurry,
applies
449
in
§
U.S.
90,
95-105
1983
actions
(1980)
and
bar
federal
§ 1738
courts
courts).
Similarly, there is “no affirmative showing of a clear
legislative
purpose
by
litigated
Congress
exception to section 1738 for ADEA cases.”
to
in
from
constitutional
manifest
previously
that
deciding
and
claims
may
(deciding
state
create
an
Nichols v. City of
St. Louis, 837 F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation
14
marks omitted); accord Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d
455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[n]othing in the ADEA
evinces a Congressional intent that the rule set forth in § 1738
should not apply in age discrimination cases,” but concluding
that under state law claim was not precluded).
Sadler
points
the
Court
to
no
published
court
decision
holding that an exception to § 1738 exists for ADEA claims.
Instead, Sadler relies upon a strained interpretation of the
Supreme Court‟s decision in Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
A careful reading of Solimino
actually yields a conclusion contrary to Sadler‟s argument.
Solimino,
the
Supreme
administrative decisions
ADEA
discrimination
Court
considered
whether
In
state
rejecting ADEA claims could preclude
claims
in
federal
court.
The
Court
concluded that the ADEA “carries an implication that the federal
courts should recognize no preclusion by state administrative
findings with respect to age-discrimination claims.”
(emphasis
added).
specifically
However,
distinguished
the
the
Supreme
more
Court
limited
Id. at 110
in
Solimino
presumption
for
applying common-law rules of preclusion to state administrative
findings compared to the statutory mandate created by § 1738
requiring
that
federal
courts
respect
state
court
judgments.
See id. (noting the “presumption here is thus properly accorded
sway only upon legislative default, applying where Congress has
15
failed expressly or impliedly to evince any intention on the
issue.”).
judgment
The Court noted that “[w]e do not have before us the
of
a
state
court,
which
would
by
law
otherwise
be
accorded „the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States . . . as [it has] by law or usage in the
courts of such State.‟”
Id. at 109 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738)
(alterations in original).
face
of
§
1738,
we
have
The Court reasoned that “[i]n the
found
state-court
judgments
in
the
closely parallel context of Title VII . . . to enjoy preclusive
effect in the federal courts.”
“inapplicable
to
the
judicially
administrative bodies.”
Solimino,
Id.
Id.
Section 1738, however, was
unreviewed
findings
of
state
Unlike the facts presented in
there is before this
Court
a state court judgment
which, as the Supreme Court recognized, is entitled to the full
faith and credit of all federal courts, including this one.
As
can be readily seen, the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Solimino
supports, rather than contradicts, the Court‟s conclusion that
§ 1738 is applicable to the judgment of the Franklin County
Superior Court at issue here.
Sadler
next
resorts
to
a
policy
argument
that
applying
§ 1738 to ADEA cases will deter plaintiffs from following the
procedures outlined in the Fair Dismissal Act.
Court
found
it
appropriate
to
base
its
Even if the
decision
on
policy
considerations as opposed to traditional principles of statutory
16
interpretation,
which
it
does
not,
Sadler‟s
suggestion
that
those policy considerations support his position is dubious.
recognized
judgments
quality
by
of
of
the
Supreme
finality
would
adjudication
by
Court,
be
“stripping
far
more
lessening
the
state
destructive
incentive
As
court
to
for
the
full
participation by the parties and for searching review by state
officials” than any deterrent effect that might result from the
application of § 1738.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478; see also Burney
v.
728
Polk
(finding
Cmty.
Coll.,
“[t]he
judgments
of
F.2d
destructive
finality
is
1374,
effect
equally
of
1379
(11th
stripping
applicable
to
Cir.
1984)
state
court
state
court
judgments affirming that a claim of employment discrimination is
unproven made by a state administrative agency other than that
expressly
claims.”).2
authorized
to
determine employment discrimination
Accordingly, the Court must give preclusive effect
to the Franklin County Superior Court‟s judgment if a Georgia
court would do so.
2
Sadler contends that applying § 1738 in this case punishes him for
waiting for the EEOC to conduct an investigation of his age
discrimination claim.
It is Sadler‟s decision to appeal his
termination to the superior court, and not his decision to wait for
the EEOC to conduct an investigation, that triggers the application of
§ 1738 to his ADEA claim.
Accordingly, this argument is without
merit.
17
II.
Collateral Estoppel Under Georgia Law
The Court must next evaluate whether Georgia‟s collateral
estoppel rules preclude Sadler‟s claim.
Georgia law provides
that:
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall
be conclusive between the same parties and their
privies as to all matters put in issue or which under
the rules of law might have been put in issue in the
cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the
judgment is reversed or set aside.
O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40.
“When collateral estoppel applies, the
issue may not be relitigated even as part of a different cause
of action.” Langton v. Dep’t of Corr., 220 Ga. App. 445, 446,
469 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1996).
“A judicial decision based upon
administrative benefit hearings that determines the reasons for
an
employee‟s
causality
issue
termination
in
precludes
subsequent
relitigation
proceedings.”
of
Shields
the
v.
BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 273 Ga. 774, 778, 545 S.E.2d
898, 901 (2001); accord Langton, 220 Ga. App. at 446, 469 S.E.2d
at 510 (denying plaintiff‟s claims based on collateral estoppel
because “the superior court‟s determination that [plaintiff] was
terminated
for
cause
precludes
her
from
relitigating
the
issue.”).
“In the arena of wrongful termination, the Georgia
Court of Appeals has determined that collateral estoppel would
bar relitigation of the reasons behind an employee‟s dismissal.”
Shields, 273 Ga. at 777, 545 S.E.2d at 901.
18
The
estoppel
Court
concludes
that
under
rules,
Sadler‟s
claim
that
Georgia‟s
FCSD
collateral
terminated
his
employment because of his age is barred by the superior court‟s
judgment
affirming
Sadler‟s
termination
for
cause.
At
each
stage of the proceedings, Sadler argued that his termination was
the result of age discrimination and was not part of a lawful
RIF.
The Board determined that cause existed to terminate his
employment despite Sadler‟s allegations, and the State Board and
the Franklin County Superior Court reviewed and affirmed that
conclusion.
Therefore, this Court cannot revisit the reasons
behind Sadler‟s termination because a Georgia court would not do
so.
Further, “[i]t is well established that judicial affirmance
of
an
effect
administrative
. . . [and]
determination
[t]here
is
is
no
entitled
requirement
to
preclusive
that
judicial
review must proceed de novo if it is to be preclusive.”
Gorin
v. Osborne, 756 F.2d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Kremer,
456
U.S.
at
480
n.21)
(first
alteration
in
original).
Accordingly, the superior court‟s review of the Local Board‟s
decision under the “any evidence” standard does not deprive the
judgment
of
its
preclusive
effect.
The
Court
finds
that
Sadler‟s claim that FCSD terminated his employment because of
his age is barred by collateral estoppel under Georgia law.
19
III. Sadler’s Full and Fair
Discrimination Claim
Opportunity
to
Litigate
His
Age
Finally, the Court must evaluate whether Sadler had a full
and
fair
opportunity
discrimination.
See
to
litigate
Kremer,
his
456
at
U.S.
claim
480
of
age
(“[C]ollateral
estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier
decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate
the
omitted).
claim
or
issue.”)
(internal
quotation
marks
Where a federal court is “bound by the statutory
directive of § 1738, state proceedings need do no more than
satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment‟s Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full
faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.”
Sadler
utilized
the
procedures
set
Dismissal Act to contest his termination.
Act
of
Georgia
“provide[s]
constitutionally required.”
1112
(11th
Cir.
1986);
all
of
the
Id. at 481.
out
in
the
Fair
The Fair Dismissal
due
process
that
is
Sharpley v. Davis, 786 F.2d 1109,
see
also
O.C.G.A.
§
20-2-940
to
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-947 (effective until Jan. 1, 2013) (outlining
procedures that must be followed before a teacher, principal, or
other employee that has a contract for a definite term can be
terminated).
Further, at the Fair Dismissal Act Hearing, Sadler
was represented by counsel, had the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses,
and
presented
evidence
20
in
support
of
his
age
discrimination
claim.
Sadler
obtained
review
of
the
Local
Board‟s decision by following the appeal procedures provided by
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160.
Sadler asserts that he was denied a full opportunity to
pursue his age discrimination claim in the Fair Dismissal Act
Hearing.
Sadler contends that the Hearing Officer at the Fair
Dismissal Act Hearing made several erroneous evidentiary rulings
and
did
not
allow
cross-examination,
a
so
particular
he
was
line
of
questioning
“consistently
presenting his age discrimination claim.
blocked”
on
from
The record reveals
that the Hearing Officer weighed Sadler‟s arguments regarding
the
relevancy
of
cross-examination
Sadler.
The
the
but
evidence
made
Hearing
rulings
Officer
and
the
that
questioning
were
determined
unfavorable
that
the
on
to
evidence
offered by Sadler and the questions on cross-examination did not
actually demonstrate discrimination, but the Hearing Officer did
not stop Sadler from presenting evidence he found relevant to
Sadler‟s
discrimination
claim
or
from
cross-examination relevant to discriminatory animus.
Dismissal
Act
Throughout
the
evidence
Hr‟g
Fair
related
to
Tr.
91:12-92:17,
age
See Fair
93:4-9,
131:9-13.
Hearing
Sadler
introduced
discrimination
Dismissal
his
performing
claim.
Further,
Act
under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(e)(4), Sadler had the opportunity to
appeal the Hearing Officer‟s evidentiary rulings to the full
21
local
board
or
hearing
tribunal.
O.C.G.A.
20-2—940(e)(4).3
§
Although Sadler argues that he should have been able to pursue
his claim in accordance with FCSD‟s policy for investigating
discrimination,
Sadler
regarding
termination
his
Finally,
the
decision
superior
under
the
received
that
court‟s
“any
a
Fair
Dismissal
complied
review
evidence”
Act
Hearing
with
process.
the
of
due
Local
Board‟s
standard
did
not
deprive
Sadler of a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim.
See Gorin, 756 F.2d at 838 (finding no due process violation
deriving from the “any evidence” standard of review applied by
the state court).
The Court concludes that the “panoply of
procedures” afforded to Sadler under the Fair Dismissal Act,
“complemented by administrative as well as judicial review, is
sufficient under the Due Process Clause.”
Kremer, 456 U.S. at
484.
In summary, § 1738 requires that this Court give preclusive
effect
to
the
Franklin
County
affirming Sadler‟s termination.
3
Superior
Court‟s
judgment
Sadler had a full and fair
Sadler also argues that the Hearing Officer erroneously admitted an
offer to compromise into evidence by admitting O‟Dell‟s offer to
Sadler to co-teach special education after she initiated the
termination proceedings.
Although Sadler argues this evidence was
inadmissible, he offers no explanation as to why the admission of this
evidence violated his right to due process.
Sadler argued that the
evidence was inadmissible in the superior court and the court did “not
find that admission of the evidence of the offer was an abuse of
discretion.”
Superior Court Order 9.
Again, the Court is precluded
from revisiting this issue.
22
opportunity
resulted
to
from
proceedings
present
age
and
in
his
argument
discrimination
the
in
superior
that
his
the
state
court.
He
termination
administrative
lost.
Under
collateral estoppel principles, he does not get a second chance
to fight that battle.
This Court must give that state court
judgment the full faith and credit that it deserves and that the
statute
requires.
Accordingly,
FCSD
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, FCSD‟s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 11) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of August, 2011.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23
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