Washington v. CT Corp Systems, et al
Filing
56
ORDER granting 47 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 40 Motion for Summary Judgment, 44 Motion, 48 Motion, and 49 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 05/06/2012.(aaf) ***
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
ELIJAH R. WASHINGTON,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
CASE NO. 3:11-CV-29 (CDL)
VERIZON
COMMUNICATIONS,
INC. *
and VERIZON PENSION PLAN FOR
MID-ATLANTIC ASSOCIATES,
*
Defendants.
*
O R D E R
This action arises from the termination of Plaintiff Elijah
Washington (“Washington”) from his employment with Bell Atlantic
Corporation (“Bell Atlantic”), predecessor to Defendant Verizon
Communications,
Inc.
(“Verizon”),
on
February
27,
1989
and
Verizon’s subsequent refusal to grant Washington’s request for a
disability
pension,
Verizon’s
placement
of
Washington
in
a
deferred vested pension plan, and issues involving Washington’s
company
stock.
Washington,
proceeding
pro
se,
brought
this
action against Defendants asserting violations of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq., and the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
Presently pending before the
Court are cross-motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 40, 47,
49).
For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 47), rendering all other pending
motions (ECF Nos. 40, 44, 48-49) moot.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P.
56(a).
Fed. R.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party=s favor.
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is material if it is relevant or
necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The record reveals the following facts.
Unless otherwise
noted, the facts are undisputed for the purposes of the pending
motions.
Washington was employed by Bell Atlantic, the predecessor
of Verizon, from October 23, 1967 through February 27, 1989. 1
1
Bell Atlantic merged with GTE Corporation on June 30, 2000 and
changed its name to Verizon Communications Inc. in September 2000.
Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts Ex. 2, Bannigan Decl. Ex. 2-B,
Defs.’ Answers & Objections to Pl.’s 2nd Set of Interrogs. ¶ 1.A, ECF
No. 46-8 at 13.
2
Compl. Attach. 1, Letter from R. Smith (Aug. 30, 1994), ECF No.
7-1 at 1.
Washington missed work for an extended period of time
due to a back injury, which prevented him from performing the
duties of his job as a motor messenger when he returned to work
in 1988.
See Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts [hereinafter
Defs.’ SMF] Ex. 3, Jukins Decl. Ex. 3-A, Letter from S. Jukins
to E. Washington (June 13, 2007) [hereinafter Jukins Letter]
Attach. 1, Feb, 27, 1989 Meeting Notes, ECF No. 46-12 at 6.
Washington
could
no
longer
perform
the
motor
messenger
job
because of medical restrictions due to a back injury, so Bell
Atlantic temporarily assigned Washington to the job of a rider
with other messenger drivers and then permitted him to attempt
to qualify for other positions, but he failed to qualify and was
thereafter terminated.
Id. at 6-7; see also Defs.’ SMF Ex. 1,
Storms
(Part
Decl.
Ex.
1-H
2),
Letter
from
D.
Fish
to
E.
Washington (Mar. 28, 2008), ECF No. 46-6 at 170 [hereinafter
Fish Letter] (“To clarify, our records indicate that the last
position you held with the company was a Motor Messenger.
then
tested
position.
for
clerical
positions
and
a
traffic
You
operator
Your employment was terminated when you failed to
qualify for these positions.”); Jukins Letter, ECF No. 46-12 at
4 (discussing position testing and failure to qualify).
Washington
claims
that
he
was
“‘Terminated’
unlawfully, Handicap Discriminatory Cause.”
3
for
an
Compl. ¶ Compl. I,
ECF No. 7.
Verizon responds that Washington was terminated for
performance reasons when he failed to qualify for an alternative
position.
See Fish Letter, ECF No. 46-6 at 170 (“[y]ou ask for
the exact reason for your termination . . . you were terminated
for performance reasons. . . Your employment was terminated when
you
failed
to
qualify
for
these
[alternative]
positions.”);
Jukins Letter, ECF No. 46-12 at 4 (stating that Washington was
terminated when he failed to qualify for alternative positions).
Washington does not assert any claims in this action based on
the reason for his termination.
Because of his employment with Bell Atlantic, Washington is
a
participant
in
the
Verizon
Pension
Plan
for
Mid-Atlantic
Associates, formerly known as the Bell Atlantic Pension Plan,
(“the Pension Plan”).
No. 46-1 at 3.
Defs.’ SMF Ex. 1, Storms Decl. ¶ 4, ECF
When he was terminated on February 27, 1989,
Washington was forty-six years old with twenty-one years and
four months of credited service under the Pension Plan.
Decl.
Ex.
1-H
(Part
2),
Certificate
of
Right
to
a
Storms
Deferred
Vested Pension, ECF No. 46-6 at 154 [hereinafter Certificate of
Right].
Based
on
his
term
of
employment,
Washington
was
eligible to receive monthly pension payments in the amount of
$414.85
under a Deferred Vested Pension once he reached age
sixty-five.
Id.; Storms Decl. Ex. 1-A, Bell Atlantic Pension
Plan § 4 ¶ 1(b)(i), ECF No. 46-1 at 30-31 [hereinafter Pension
4
Plan].
Washington
also
owns
fifty-eight
shares
of
Verizon
common stock, the last shares of which he acquired in 1990.
Defs.’ SMF Ex. 4, Gereb Decl. Ex. 4-A, 12/13/2011 Certificate
Summary, ECF No. 46-13 at 5.
In
1990,
Bell
Atlantic
authorized
Washington under the Pension Plan.
a
vested
pension
for
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part
2), Letter from R. Fowler to E. Washington (Mar. 6, 1990), ECF
No. 46-6 at 152.
were
to
begin
Under this authorization, pension payments
when
Washington
reached
age
Certificate of Right, ECF No. 46-6 at 154.
sixty-five.
Alternatively, he
could elect to receive a reduced pension payment at age fiftyfive.
Pension Plan § 4 ¶ 1.(b)(iii), ECF No. 46-1 at 31-32.
Washington acknowledged receipt of the Certificate of Right to a
Deferred
Vested
Pension.
Storms
Decl.
Ex.
1-H
(Part
2),
Acknowledgement of Receipt, ECF No. 46-6 at 156.
In
stating
1996,
that
Washington
he
disagreed
wrote
with
a
letter
Bell
to
Bell
Atlantic’s
Atlantic,
decision
and
quoting Bell Atlantic’s statements regarding a reduced service
pension for retirement before age fifty-five.
Storms Decl. Ex.
1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington to B. Wright (Feb. 8,
1996) 1, ECF No. 46-6 at 132.
He further stated: “I want a
disability pension or service pension or deferred vested pension
whichever I did/do qualify for which is to my needs/benefit(s)
and at earliest qualification.”
Id. at 2, ECF No. 46-6 at 132.
5
On
August
23,
1997,
Washington
requested
a
deferred
vested
pension, stating that he would be “55 years of age this Dec. 12,
1997.”
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington
to B. Wright (Aug. 23, 1997), ECF No. at 147.
however,
contends
that
“when
[he]
turned
55
Washington,
years
of
age
December 12, 1997 and against the provisions of the Pension Plan
and without [his] knowledge and understanding was placed in a
‘Deferred Vested Pension’” by Verizon.2
Subsequently,
Washington
began
Compl. ¶ Compl. II.
writing
letters
to
Bell
Atlantic and later to Verizon requesting a disability pension
and/or a service pension as well as other insurance benefits.
E.g. Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington to
President, Bell Atlantic (July 5, 1999), ECF No. 46-6 at 104-05;
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington to V.
Bartley (April 27, 2000), ECF No. 46-6 at 30.
Bell Atlantic and
Verizon denied these requests, informing Washington he was not
qualified for the pension plans he requested.
E.g. Storms Decl.
Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from V. Bartley to E. Washington (Mar.
15, 2000), ECF No. 46-6 at 106; Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2),
Letter from B. Block to E. Washington (Feb. 19, 2008), ECF No.
46-6 at 12-14.
2
Despite this apparently disputed issue of fact, Washington’s
Complaint is dismissed for other reasons as discussed below.
6
In September 2007, Washington filed a lawsuit in the United
States
District
Court
for
the
Northern
District
of
Georgia,
complaining that he was discriminatorily terminated on the basis
of his race, sex, and “handicap of being injured on the job” in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Serv.
Co.
Verizon
Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 6, Washington v. Corp.
Wireless,
No.
1:07-CV-02262-RLV
(N.D.
Ga.
Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 1.
Washington specifically alleged
that
work,
after
being
injured
at
he
could
not
physically
perform his job, and was therefore “terminated 2/27/89 instead
of being placed on disability retirement.”
Id. ¶ 8.
He further
alleged: “At approx. age 60 I fought for and was given ‘an
associate reg pension pln’ of $130.00 monthly without health and
life insurance, I am not being told how much of my pension is
going into Verizon stocks.
Shanon Jukins, Sr. staff consultant
– benefits has stopped her co-operations.”
dismissed Washington’s Complaint.
Id.
That court
Order, Washington, No. 1:07-
CV-02262-RLV (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2007), ECF No. 16.
After this dismissal, Washington continued writing letters
to Verizon requesting a change from his current pension to a
disability
retirement
insurance,
life
pension,
insurance,
under a disability pension.
and
and
any
he
other
also
sought
benefits
health
available
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2),
Letter from E. Washington to S. Jukins (Dec. 29, 2007), ECF No.
7
46-6 at 178.
Washington’s
Verizon denied this request based on the Plan and
election
to
receive
the
pension benefit at age fifty-five.
reduced
deferred
vested
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part
2), Letter from B. Block to E. Washington (Feb. 19, 2008) 2, ECF
No. 46-6 at 13.
Washington appealed this denial and submitted
medical records and a letter from his treating physician stating
that he was disabled because of a back injury that occurred on
March 17, 1976.
See Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 1), Letter from
E. Washington to D. Fish (Apr. 2, 2008), ECF No. 46-5 at 52-53
(“Yes I intend to have my issues reviewed by the Verizon claims
review committee.”); Letter from R. Carter (July 17, 1995), ECF
No.
46-5
at
56.
The
review
committee
denied
Washington’s
appeal, referencing Washington’s lack of qualification under the
Pension
Plan
for
a
service
or
disability
pension
and
his
election to receive early payments in a reduced amount from his
deferred vested pension.
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-B, Letter from S.
Wallace to E. Washington (July 2, 2008) 1 & 4-5, ECF No. 46-2 at
2 & 5-6.
Washington again submitted a claim for additional pension
benefits under the Pension Plan in 2010, claiming entitlement to
an unreduced service pension.
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 1),
Claim Initiation Form, ECF No. 46-5 at 214-15.
Based on the
same reasons for denying Washington’s prior requests for changed
benefits, Verizon denied this claim.
8
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part
1), Letter from B. Block to E. Washington (Oct. 21, 2010), ECF
No. 46-5 at 207-10.
DISCUSSION
I.
Washington’s ERISA Claims
Washington claims that he was denied a disability pension
and/or a service pension and then placed into a deferred vested
pension plan in violation of ERISA.
Pretermitting whether these
claims have substantive merit, the Court finds that they are
time barred.
In an ERISA action, the Court must apply the statute of
limitations of the state where the action is brought.
Schwerman,
155
F.
App’x
416,
418-19
(11th
Cir.
Warren v.
2005)
(per
curiam) (citing Harrison v. Digital Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235,
1238 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Thus, the Court must look to Georgia
law for the appropriate limitations period.
Where an ERISA
claim for benefits is brought in Georgia, the Georgia six-year
contract
statute
Id. at 419.
of
limitations,
O.C.G.A.
§
9-3-24,
applies.
An ERISA cause of action “accrues when [Washington]
knew or should have known of the injury.”
Id. (citing Bowling
v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985)).
The record shows that, at the latest, Washington knew of
the alleged injuries April 27, 2000.
Washington wrote a letter
in February 2000 to Bell Atlantic, stating that, among other
things, he was “not allowed a regular or disability retirement.”
9
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington to D.
Sacco (Feb. 15, 2000), ECF No. 46-6 at 108.
After receiving
Washington’s many letters requesting different pension benefits,
on March 15, 2000, Verizon again clearly denied Washington’s
requests to be placed in a disability, service, or other pension
plan and for other benefits, and Verizon informed Washington
that he was not qualified for the pension plans he requested.
Storms Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from V. Bartley to E.
Washington (Mar. 15, 2000), ECF No. 46-6 at 106.
Confirming his
knowledge of what he alleges to be his injuries in this action,
Washington wrote a letter to Verizon on April 27, 2000 stating,
“When I did not pass [the clerical position tests], I requested
a disability retirement which I was denied.
The union processed
my grievance to arbitration and then terminated it.”
Storms
Decl. Ex. 1-H (Part 2), Letter from E. Washington to V. Bartley
(April 27, 2000) ¶¶ 4-5, ECF No. 46-6 at 31.
wrote
this
letter,
Washington
knew
he
had
When Washington
not
received
the
pension benefits that he seeks to recover through this action.
Washington, however, did not file this action until March 2011,
nearly eleven years after the 2000 letter in which he affirmed
his awareness that Verizon did not place him into the pension
plans in which he believed ERISA entitled him to participate.
Thus, Washington’s ERISA claims are untimely because he failed
10
to
file
this
Complaint
within
the
six-year
statute
of
limitations.
II.
Washington’s Securities Act of 1933 Claims
In addition to his ERISA claims, Washington purports to
assert claims under the 1933 Securities Act.
Verizon contends
that Washington’s allegations fail to state a claim under the
1933 Act and that Washington has failed to point to any conduct
that would amount to a violation of the 1933 Act.
First, Washington asserts that Verizon violated the 1933
Act by failing to provide him with a copy of his original stock
certificate.
He seeks the original stock certificate and a
return of the money he paid when he previously sought to obtain
his original stock certificate.
Washington
unknown
claims
amounts
a
of
Compl. ¶ Mot. III.
violation
shares
to
of
the
companies
1933
Act
IDEARC
Second,
for
and
issuing
FairPoint
Communications, Inc., which have now filed for bankruptcy.
¶ Compl. III(2).
Id.
Third, Washington alleges that “With IDEARC,
Plaintiff’s wife was deceptively lured to Dallas, TX only to be
told in Court by the Honorable Presiding Judge that IDEARC was
no longer an affiliate of CT Corp. Systems and Verizon Wireless
so the Honorable Judge could not rule in Plaintiff’z (sic) favor
and IDEARC had no monies.”
Compl. ¶ Compl. III(3).
Washington
seeks return of the funds expended by his wife in going to
Dallas to represent him.
Compl. ¶ Mot. III.
11
Fourth, Washington
“has asked in writing that CT Corp. Systems not issue any more
shares
of
III(4).
stocks
to
Finally,
any
other
Washington
companies.”
alleges
that
Compl.
the
1933
¶
Compl.
Act
was
violated because “On October 21, 2010 and January 24, 2011,
fictitious addresses were given to Plaintiff in the quest for
the copy of his original stock certificate.”
Compl. ¶ Compl.
III(5).
The Court finds that neither Washington’s allegations nor
anything
he
has
pointed
to
in
the
record
demonstrates
that
Verizon or any of its predecessors violated any provision of the
1933 Act.
Therefore, summary judgment is granted to Defendants
as to Washington’s 1933 Act claims.
CONCLUSION
The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 47), rendering all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 40,
44, 48-49) moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of June, 2012.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12
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