Rufus v. Chapman et al
Filing
56
ORDER adopting 41 Report and Recommendations and denying 30 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 37 Motion for Clarification; denying 39 Motion to Amend/Correct; finding as moot 46 Motion to Dismiss Party. Ordered by Judge C. Ashley Royal on 12/23/2011 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
MICHAEL ALONZA RUFUS
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
:
NO. 3:11‐cv‐74 (CAR)
Sheriff JONATHON CHAPMAN, et al., :
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the United States’ Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation [Doc. 41] to deny pro se Plaintiff Michael Rufus’ Motions to Amend
[Docs. 30, 39] and his “Motion for Clarification” [Doc. 37]. Plaintiff filed a timely
Objection to the Recommendation. [Doc. 44]. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Dismiss Defendants Chapman and Clerk of Court of Walton County [Doc. 46] for an
access to court claim that he raised in his Motion to Amend, Doc. 39. After careful
consideration, this Court agrees with the United States Magistrate Judge and finds that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend [Doc. 39], Motion to Amend [Doc. 30], and Motion for
Clarification [Doc. 37], should be denied. The Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge is therefore ADOPTED and MADE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.
As a result, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss an access to courts claim raised against
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Defendants in a motion to amend is DENIED AS MOOT. [Doc. 41].
Plaintiff filed suit on May 31, 2011, alleging several access to courts claims and a
First Amendment mail claim. In an Order dated August 17, 2011, this Court adopted
the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim
against Walton County Detention Center and Judge Samuel D. Ozburn. Doc. 27. In
response, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Amend/Correct
his Complaint, the latter of which the Court construed as a second motion for
reconsideration. See Doc. 31. On September 22, 2011, this Court denied these motions
and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. See Doc. 31.
Plaintiff has since filed two motions to amend his access to courts claim and one
“motion for clarification.” In the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation, the findings of
which are before the Court today, the Magistrate Judge construed Plaintiff’s motion
for clarification as a third motion to amend. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge
denied Plaintiff’s motions because they failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. In addition to at least four other separate pending motions filed as of the
date of this Order, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendants Chapman and
Clerk of Court of Walton County, Doc. 46, for an access to courts claim that he raised
in his Motion to Amend, Doc. 39.
Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation
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Plaintiff’s strongly worded and somewhat convoluted Objection appears to
discuss several varying, and, at times, repetitive topics. The Court was able to identify
two themes raised in his Objection that specifically address the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation. First, Plaintiff attempts to salvage his access to courts claim by
alleging that he suffered actual injury due to several defects in the state pre‐trial
habeas procedure. However, defects in state habeas corpus procedures “do not
constitute grounds for relief in federal court.” Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 180
(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Spradley v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that habeas corpus relief is not available to correct alleged errors in state habeas
proceedings)); see Collins v. Frank Murphy Hall of Justice, No. 2:09‐12315 2, 2009 WL
1799121, at *1 (E.D. Mich., June 22, 2009) (defects in state post‐conviction proceedings
could not constitute grounds for an access to courts claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to allege an access to courts claim for which relief may be granted.
However, even assuming Plaintiff’s access to courts claim did not challenge
state habeas procedures, Plaintiff’s claim still nevertheless would be denied for failure
to allege actual injury. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that a plaintiff raising
an access to courts claim “must show actual injury before seeking relief.” Wilson v.
Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998). Actual injury requires a showing of
“ultimate prejudice or disadvantage.” Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1063 (11th Cir.
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1991). Such a showing must be in regards to “prospective or existing litigation,” such
as “missing filing deadlines or being prevented from presenting claims.” Wilson, 163
F.3d at 1290 n.10.
In his Objection, Plaintiff alleges that his initial appearance in Georgia Superior
Court, held within eight days of filing his habeas petition, did not qualify as a habeas
hearing per Section 9‐14‐5 of the Official Code of Georgia. However, whether an
initial appearance qualifies as a habeas hearing is an issue that has yet to be decided
by the Georgia courts. See Smith v. Nichols, 270 Ga. 550, 553 (Ga. 1999) (“We need not
decide today whether an incarcerated defendant’s appearance in a courtroom satisfied
the statutory mandate that the defendant be produced for the purpose of an
examination into the cause of the habeas petition’s detention.” (quotation omitted)).
Moreover, even if his initial appearance does not qualify as a habeas hearing, Plaintiff
still fails to allege what, if any, actual injury occurred as a result of not having the
hearing. This is especially so because in his Objection, Plaintiff admits that he was
able to explain his habeas concerns to a habeas court, and therefore had a habeas
hearing: “Had Undersigned’s claims been frivolous in the state habeas court that court
could have easily said so.” Doc. 44 p.6.
Plaintiff also attempts to allege actual injury by stating that he is being
deprived of his right to petition the government for mandamus. However, as stated
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by the Magistrate Judge in his Recommendation, Plaintiff does not allege that the
delay “has foreclosed his ability to seek the requested relief.” Doc. 41, p2.
Plaintiff’s second theme in his Objection is a series of reasons of why his is
innocent in his state court criminal case. To the extent that Plaintiff objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s decision to refrain from interfering with an ongoing state criminal
proceeding, this Court must decline to do so as well. A federal court must abstain
from deciding issues implicated in an ongoing criminal proceeding in state court.
Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). This includes issuing an injunction to stop state court
criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (holding federal courts may not
enjoin state court criminal prosecutions absent exceptional circumstances). Such
abstention by this Court does not, as Plaintiff asserts, “prove issues of concerted
criminal acts” between “this Court’s officials and [the] involved state official.” Doc. 6,
p.44. Abstention is not a new concept to Plaintiff as the Court and Magistrate Judge
have both previously informed Plaintiff of this legal proposition. See Docs. 31, 21.
In addition to discussing Plaintiff’s thematic arguments, the Court would also
like to address a separate issue. Repetitive arguments, filings, and requests, on
matters previously decided by the Court, similar to Plaintiff’s second thematic
argument above, is undoubtedly considered a frivolous argument. Rule 11(b) of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty upon attorneys and pro se parties to
“refrain from filing or pursuing frivolous claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Rueter v. Merrill
Lynch, 440 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2006). Although reluctant to do so, a
district court is certainly within its discretion to impose sanctions on a pro se litigant
who violates Rule 11. United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 2008)
(imposing sanctions on plaintiff because his arguments were frivolous and he had
been warned by the Court not to raise them); Dean v. ARA Envtl. Serv., 124 F.R.D. 224,
227 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (“pro se litigants are not immune from Rule 11 sanctions”).
Here, the Court refrains from exercising its discretion to sanction Plaintiff.
However, the Court warns Plaintiff that filing motions and raising arguments that
have already been decided by the Court is frivolous and in violation of Rule 11. Such
action goes beyond zealous lawyering. See Mirabilis Ventures, Inc. v. Palazar Grp.,
LLC, No. 6:07‐cv‐1788‐ORL‐28GJK, 2010 WL 5582878, *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2010)
(“Rule 11 should not have a chilling effect on zealous or novel arguments).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 46, somewhat cryptically requests that the
Court dismiss Defendants Chapman and Clerk of Court of Walton County for an
access to court claim previously raised in his Motion to Amend, Doc. 39. However, as
explained above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, Doc. 39, is denied on the merits.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants [Doc. 46] is DENIED AS
MOOT.
In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Objections are without merit and
therefore agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation that Plaintiff’s motions
to amend, Doc. 30, 39, and his motion for clarification, Doc. 41, should be denied.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation [Doc. 41] to deny Plaintiff’s
Motions to Amend [Docs. 30, 39] and his Motion for Clarification [Doc. 41] is hereby
ADOPTED and MADE THE ORDER OF THE COURT. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. 46] is DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of December, 2011.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LMH
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